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Abstract
The principle of equality in the workplace, enshrined in the Sex Discrimination Act
1975, applies to a wide category of workers. However, there are certain exceptions to
the legislation. Ministers of religion are not protected by the Act where employment is
limited to one sex. Historically "employment" as a Church of England priest was limited
to one sex. Then in 1993, following the momentous General Synod vote, legislation was
passed which allowed women to be ordained as priests. A significant change had taken
place regarding the theology of the Church. This shift in theology also brought the legal
position of priests, in relation to sex discrimination, into question. An initial question
was, should such priests be protected by secular employment legislation? if so, what are
the legal difficulties of inclusion under the Sex Discrimination Act, and what are the
practical difficulties of accommodation under the Act? These questions form the
foundation stones of this thesis.
A four stage process was used to answer these questions. First, a philosophical analysis
of the theory behind sex discrimination law was undertaken, focusing on the concepts of
equality and difference. Secondly, the position of the Church of England in relation to
sex discrimination law was assessed with special reference to the employment status of
ministers of religion. Thirdly, drawing on the theoretical work of stages one and two, an
empirical investigation into the treatment of Church of England priests was conducted.
The fourth stage built upon the empirical findings and the theoretical framework. British
and European Community sex discrimination law was critically analysed, as was the
relevant ecclesiastical law, and recommendations for law reform were made.
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1Introduction
This thesis examines current sex discrimination legislation in Britain. This involves an
examination of national law, principally the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, and European
Community (EC) law, principally the Equal Treatment Directive. 1
 At the inception of
the research in September 1994, a major organisation was sought for the purpose of
assessing the theoretical and practical aspects of the legislation. From a legal perspective
it was preferable to concentrate on one of the exemptions from the legislation, allowing
recommendations for legal reform to be made. A recent development made one
particular exempted organisation stand out from the rest. The Sex Discrimination Act
does not apply to ministers of religion where employment is limited to one sex. 2 Such
priests are also exempted from the protections of the Equal Treatment Directive. Until
recently both exemptions clearly covered Church of England priests. However, in 1993
legislation was passed to allow the ordination of women priests for the first time in the
Church of England's two thousand year history. 3 Immediately the legal position of
10,000 priests in regard to sex discrimination was brought into question. Prior to this
thesis no assessment of the position of Church of England priests in relation to sex
discrimination legislation had been made. Additionally, the uncertain employment status
of ministers of religion, which is troubling the courts, is ripe for critique. Employment
status dictates a person's employment rights with regard to sex discrimination, equal pay
and unfair dismissal. Lack of requisite employment status results in the individual being
denied employment rights. An empirical study of the treatment of male and female
priests in the Church of England is a principal feature of this thesis. To summarise, the
aim of this research is to assess whether or not, in light of theory and the results of the
empirical study, it is justifiable to exclude Church of England priests from sex
discrimination legislation.
Is sex discrimination a problem in the Church of England? It was decided that proof of
sex discrimination in particular cases was not to be an aim of the research. Instead, the
Sex Discrimination Act 1975; Halsbury's Statutes of England and Wales, Fourth Edition, 1992 Reissue,
vol.6. EC Council Directive 76/207 (Equal Treatment)
2 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 19
Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993; Halsbury's Statutes of England and Wales, Fourth
Edition, vol.14 continuation. Unless otherwise indicated references to the 1993 Measure in this thesis
refer to the Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993.
2aim is to identify the problems which the Church of England face in relation to sex
discrimination and recommend law reform. To do this a four stage process is employed.
First, what is the theory behind sex discrimination law? This is detailed in Chapters One
and Two. Secondly, what is the relevant law under discussion? What is the relationship
between Church of England priests and sex discrimination law? This is briefly set out in
the Introduction before being discussed in Chapters Three, Four and Seven. Thirdly,
what is the position in practice of male and female priests? The methodological
approach to this is discussed in Chapter Five, whilst the results of the investigation are
presented in Chapter Six. The theoretical and empirical investigation into sex
discrimination in employment within the Church of England will serve two purposes. It
will explain the current position of male and female priests. Additionally, critical
analysis of this investigation within the robust theoretical framework will result in a
powerful thesis for the future direction of the law. Therefore, the fourth stage is the
presentation of legal and policy reforms which ought to be made as a response to the
theoretical and empirical investigation. Suggestions for reform are presented in Chapter
Seven and in the Conclusion.
At the root of discrimination law is the formal principle that we should all be treated
equally. In Chapter One the relevant literature on equality is reviewed and evaluated by
undertaking a philosophical analysis. Ideas of equality as a moral concept, equality and
justice and equality and rights are investigated. It is submitted that there is just one
formal idea of equality, that likes should be treated alike, but that there are many
different substantive theories of equality. There are at least five employment law
policies which use a substantive theory of equality; equality of opportunity, equality of
condition, equal treatment, equality of result and equality of respect. These are discussed
in detail.
Flowing directly from the philosophical discussion of equality is the question; are men
and women equal or are they different? In Chapter Two the philosophical foundations of
difference are examined. If equality is taken to mean equal treatment of men and women
before the law (as it often is in this debate) one must ask how equal treatment is defined.
The usual criticism is that equal treatment is defined in male terms. Such equality
threatens to destroy sexual difference. If female difference is taken as the dominant
3concept, this can itself lead to the subordination of women to the domestic sphere and
into economic dependence. The seemingly irreconcilable equality/difference debate has
forced writers to look for other means to produce genuine equality. Gradually writers
have moved away from the idea of women's inequality; that women do not receive the
same treatment as men, to ideas of disadvantage, oppression and subordination.
In Chapter Three the anatomy of the Church of England is detailed. It is necessary to
explain the structure of Church government and the relevant offices which can be held
in the Church. An analysis of Church legislation regarding the appointment and
dismissal of priests is given. This enables one to identify where sex discrimination could
occur and from whom it might emanate.
Chapter Four examines the employment status of ministers of religion, drawing on case
law concerning Church of England priests and ministers of other denominations and
religions. Unfair dismissal cases form the backbone of the discussion. To bring such a
claim it is necessary to prove the existence of a contract of employment. In this regard,
Church of England priests have usually been held to be office holders with public law
rights. At present case law denies that they can hold a contract of employment and hence
claim private law protection. In relation to sex discrimination no cases have been
brought. Section 19 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 provides that sex discrimination
against a minister of religion will not be unlawful where employment is limited to one
sex. Section 6 of the Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 provides that sex
discrimination in ordination or appointment against a female Church of England priest
will not be unlawful. As will be discussed, both section 19 and section 6 might be
inapplicable to the case in hand. In this situation a priest would still need to prove that
he or she was employed, as defined by the wider definition of employment contained in
the Sex Discrimination Act. As well as including a contract of employment, this
definition encompasses a contract personally to execute any work or labour. Case law on
unfair dismissal is used to demonstrate that a priest could be in employment for the
purposes of sex discrimination. It is argued that religious duties are not incompatible
with a contract of employment. Therefore, priests ought to be able to bring unfair
dismissal cases and sex discrimination cases (subject to section 19 and section 6).
4A questionnaire was administered to a sample group of priests. In Chapter Five the
construction of the questionnaire and the sample group is explained. Theoretical ideas
are used as a springboard for constructing relevant questions. Abstract concepts such as
equality of opportunity are broken down into a series of questions in order to measure
the treatment of priests. The idea of equality of condition runs throughout the
questionnaire. This has two aims; one to help compare like with like and secondly to
examine how conditions like age, education, pastoral experience and churchmanship
influence equality of opportunity, both independently and in conjunction with a person's
sex. The choice of data analysis method is explained with reference to quantitative and
qualitative research methods.
The questionnaire findings are presented in Chapter Six. How are women priests treated
now that they are eligible to be ordained to the priesthood? How is the Church
legislation working in practice? The treatment of women priests is examined by making
a comparative assessment with the treatment of male priests. Specific questions focus on
how male and female priests are treated when they are searching for a post and how they
are treated once in a post. In order to produce relevant answers the questions are
constructed using the terminology of the Sex Discrimination Act. However, inevitably
the answers will reflect a respondent's perception of sex discrimination which might not
constitute sex discrimination as defined by the law. Whether the perception of
discrimination does represent actual sex discrimination is not crucial as the purpose of
the questionnaire is to highlight problem areas rather than to prove or disprove sex
discrimination in particular cases. Perceptions of sex discrimination will help identify
where the discrimination exists, what form it takes and who is the perpetrator.
A detailed analysis of domestic and EC sex discrimination legislation in relation to the
Church of England is given in Chapter Seven. Whether priests can be included under the
legislation is asked before turning to specific problems which priests might encounter if
included under the legislation. Does the present law need reforming? If so, what changes
should be made? Drawing upon the theoretical and empirical investigation, Chapter
Seven and the Conclusion suggest possible solutions. These include reform of the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975, the Equal Treatment Directive and the Priests (Ordination of
Women) Measure 1993. Behind these specific suggestions lies the major theme of the
5uncertain employment status of Church of England priests.
The theoretical work was carried out using primary and secondary legal materials. The
primary sources comprise case law, statute law (including Church of England
legislation), EC case law and EC legislation. The secondary sources comprise books arid
articles on the philosophy of sex discrimination law, the law itself and, as far as was
necessary, the theological background. The bulk of the empirical work was carried out
by administering a questionnaire to a sample group of male and female clergy.
Additional strategies included contacting groups which are concerned with the
employment status of the clergy and discriminatory practices regarding the appointment
and treatment of the clergy. These included the Manufacturing, Science and Finance
Union and the Private Patrons' Consultative Group. Groups which have been set up
either to promote the position of women within the Church or to oppose the ordination
of women were also contacted. The former category included "Watch" a group which
monitors the treatment of women within the Church, the latter category included
"Forward in Faith". Church policy decisions which were relevant to sex discrimination
were also assessed.
Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993
Until the ordination of women to the priesthood was approved by the General Synod
and by Parliament in 1992, women were prohibited from exercising full priestly
functions within the Anglican Church. Since 1987 women have been able to act as
Anglican deacons, which is one type of Holy Order.4
 Their prohibition from the other
two Orders, the priesthood and the episcopate, was felt by many to be unjust, by others
it was deemed theologically necessary. The priest differs from the deacon in important
respects. The priest's ministry is one, "of oversight and leadership of the people of God
and a ministry which, in a particular way (though not exclusively) is focused in the
presidency of the Eucharist."5
' Deacons (Ordination of Women) Measure 1986. The first ordinations took place in 1987.
General Synod (1988) The Ordination of Women to the Priesthood. A Second Report by the 1-louse of
Bishops (GS 829) plO (London, General Synod). This will be referred to as the Bishops' Second Report.
6Since 1973 there had been sustained pressure to allow the ordination of women to the
priesthood. It was not until 1992 that this was achieved. In 1990 draft legislation
enabling the ordination of women priests was sent to the diocesan synods for approval.
Article 8 of the constitution of the General Synod required a majority approval by the 44
diocesan synods before the draft legislation could be given final approval by the General
Synod. 6 38/44 dioceses expressed assent by majority votes in their diocesan Houses of
Clergy and Laity. 7 Following the diocesan vote the Priests (Ordination of Women)
Measure was debated and approved by the General Synod by the required two-thirds
majority in all three of its Houses. Concurrently, the Synod approved the Ordination of
Women (Financial Provisions) Measure. This provides financial support for Church
workers who feel unable to remain within the Church of England, because of the
approval of women priests. This Measure, allowing a graceful departure for dissenters,
was passed with large majorities. In 1993 both pieces of legislation received
parliamentary approval and the royal assent. The first ordinations took place in March
1994.
The content of the legislation will be examined. The purpose is to briefly explain the
legal rights of male and female priests, diocesan bishops and parochial church councils
(PCCs). From henceforth references to the bishop refer to the diocesan bishop. Where
an assistant, suffragan or area bishop is involved this is specifically stated. 8 The
parochial church council will be referred to as the PCC. An in-depth analysis of the
legislation is given in Chapter Seven.
Section 1 (1) of the Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 allows women to be
ordained to the priesthood. Women are prohibited from being consecrated as bishops.9
In America, Canada and New Zealand women have been consecrated as Anglican
bishops. It remains to be seen whether the Church of England follows its more
progressive partners in allowing the consecration of women bishops. The present
disunity of the Church of England regarding women priests suggests this may be off the
6 Synodical Government Measure 1969 Sch 2 Article 8
General Synod (1993) The Ordination of Women to the Priesthood. The S\nod Debate p89 (London,
Church House Publishing). This will be referred to as the Synod Debate.
8 Definitions of these terms are given at 3.2.1.
Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 s 1(2)
7agenda for some time.
A bishop who is in office when the Canon enabling the ordination of women comes into
effect may make any one, or more than one, of the following three declarations:
"(a) that a woman is not to be ordained within the diocese to the office of a priest; or
(b) that a woman is not to be instituted or licensed to the office of incumbent or priest-
in-charge of a benefice, or of team vicar for a benefice, within the diocese; or
(c) that a woman is not to be given a licence or permission to officiate as a priest within
the diocese."°
A declaration made by a bishop will remain operative, unless officially withdrawn,
during the bishop's office and during the first six months of his successor's office." The
result of a bishop making all three declarations would be to exclude all women priests.
from that particular diocese. However, the power is somewhat limited by the fact that
the bishop must be in office at the time of the promulgation of the Canon. In February
1994 the General Synod met to promulgate Canon C4B and Amending Canon No. 13
pursuant to the 1993 Measure. Only the present episcopate have had the opportunity
actively to block women priests. This, coupled with the provisions of section 2 (5)
which limits the duration of the declaration to six months after the dissenting bishop has
left, seeks to prevent the permanent exclusion of women priests in certain dioceses. 12 In
the event, no bishop has made a declaration under section 2 (1) of the Measure, even
bishops who remain staunchly opposed to women priests.'3
The power of bishops formally to prevent the ordination and appointment of women
priests will be unavailable to the future episcopate. At the Synod debate it was suggested
that requiring the future episcopate to support or at least tolerate the ordination of
women, was another step towards marginalising opponents of women priests. Bishops
do not suddenly materialise - they are the priests, the rural deans and the archdeacons
who are working in the dioceses. What position will an ambitious, but dissenting priest
have in the Church of England? To climb further they must either reconcile their
'° Ibid. s 2 (1)
"Ibid. s 2 (5)
12 Ibid. general note which accompanies s 2
13 Personal Communication, Professor David McClean, 24/2/96
8position with the accepted Church position, or publicly deny their feelings whilst
secretly holding them, or depart from the Anglican communion altogether. It is
submitted that dissenters will still have a place in the Church of England. Women
priests will not necessarily benefit under future bishops. The present episcopate have
failed to take advantage of their formal powers contained in section 2 (1), preferring
instead (in dioceses such as Chichester) to rely on informal but accepted practices to
exclude women priests. There is no way of preventing future bishops, of whom there are
already a number appointed since the Canon was promulgated in 1994, from employing
the same informal methods of exclusion.
The power of the parish as regards the appointment of women priests is governed by
section 3 of the Measure. The PCC of a parish has the power to pass either or both
Resolutions contained in Schedule 1 of the Measure.'4
Resolution A states, "That this parochial church council would not accept a
woman as the minister who presides at or celebrates the Holy Communion or
pronounces the Absolution in the parish."
Resolution B states, "That this parochial church council would not accept a
woman as the incumbent or priest-in-charge of the benefice or as a team vicar for
the benefice."
Resolution A is designed for parishes who do not accept the ordination of women as
priests. Resolution A cannot be considered by a PCC if a woman priest is already
present in the benefice, whether as an incumbent, a priest-in-charge, a team vicar or a
curate. This includes both stipendiary and non-stipendiary ministers. t5 Resolution B is
not covered by the provisions of section 3 (3). It can be considered by the PCC of a
multi-parish benefice even if one of the team vicars is a woman priest.' 6
 Resolution B is
designed specifically for Evangelical parishes which have no objection to the ordination
14 Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 s 3 (1). PCC membership and election is discussed at
3.2.2.
' Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 s 3 (3)
16 Hanson, B.J.T. (1994) "Recent Legislative Developments" in Ecclesiastical Law Journal vol.3 no.15
p247
9of women to the priesthood but have difficulty with women being in positions of
authority in the Church. Such positions are deemed to cover incumbents, priests-in-
charge and team vicars. 17 A Resolution shall not be passed unless the secretary of the
PCC has given all PCC members four weeks notice of the meeting at which the motion
proposing the Resolution is to be considered. The meeting must be attended by at least
one half of PCC members entitled to attend. 18 Therefore the parish, through the PCC,
has considerable power to prevent the appointment of a woman priest. A PCC may
consider the Resolutions as frequently as they like. If a Resolution is in place, the PCC
can rescind it. 19 Once this has been done, there is nothing to stop the Resolution being
re-instated at a later date. There is no requirement that the PCC review a Resolution
after a number of years. 2° PCCs containing Christians with traditional conservative
values might block opportunities for women priests for sonic time.
Section 6 of the Measure clarifies that section 19 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 is
still lawful. If a woman is refused ordination or appointment as a priest she will be
unable to claim unlawful sex discrimination. Section 6 reads;
"Without prejudice to section 19 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, nothing in
Part H of that Act shall render unlawful sex discrimination against a woman in
respect of-
(a) her ordination to the office of priest in the Church of England;
(b) the giving to her of a licence or permission to serve or officiate as such as a
priest;
(c) her appointment as dean, incumbent, priest-in-charge or team vicar or, in the
case of a woman ordained to the office of priest, an assistant curate."
Section 19(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 states that;
"Nothing in this Part applies to employment for purposes of an organised religion
where the employment is limited to one sex so as to comply with the doctrines of
17 Ibid. p248
' Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 s 3 (4)
Ibid. s 3 (2)
20 Hanson, B.J.T. (1994) Op. cit., p247
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the religion or avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of a significant
number of its followers."2'
Section 6 of the 1993 Measure denies a woman priest the opportunity to claim sex
discrimination in regard to ordination and appointment. It does not cover working
conditions and dismissal. Section 19 (1) prevents a minister of religion claiming sex
discrimination in relation to all aspects of employment. Women are given the
opportunity to become ordained as priests, but they are given no corresponding legal
rights covering ordination and appointment. Whether they have any rights which cover
working conditions and dismissal is discussed in Chapter Seven. The focus of this thesis
is employment in the Church of England. Selection to train for the priesthood will not be
discussed. 22 Likewise, subsequent ordination as a priest is not the primary focus of the
research. It is discussed in relation to sex discrimination at 7.6.3. Instead this thesis
focuses on the appointment, working conditions and dismissal of a priest. It examines
parochial ministry; that is the ministry of a priest working in his or her parish. It does
not examine sector ministry, for example the work of chaplains in hospitals and prisons.
It does not examine the working structure of the cathedral and its dean and chapter.
However, it may be that cathedral officers, primarily the bishop, are influential in
parochial ministry.
The Church of England is now engaged in what it terms a reception process. This is
whereby the Church decides, through working with women priests, whether their
ordination is indeed God's will. 23 However, it seems highly unlikely that the Synod vote
would ever be reversed. To aid the reception process the General Synod has issued the
Episcopal Ministry Act of Synod. 24 This states that the two integrities; those supporting
women's ordination as priests and those opposing it, should be given equal respect. The
Act of Synod does not have legally binding force. Rather, it acts as a moral code with
the intention of preventing schism in a Church which is still divided over the issue of
21 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 19 (2) provides an exemption from sex discrimination in regard to
training as a minister of religion. The reader is referred to 7.6.3. for more information on this. Section 19
(1) will be referred to unless the text generally refers to the whole of section 19.
22 For more information on this the reader is referred to; Advisory Board of Ministry (1994) "Theological
Training in the Church of England"
23 Bishops' Second Report (1988) op. cit., pplOô-109
24 General Synod (1993) "Episcopal Ministry Act of Synod" (OS 1085) (London, Church House
Publishing)
11
women priests. However, it remains a fact that the Church, through the diocesan synods
and the General Synod, voted to support one integrity, the ordination of women priests.
It remains to be seen whether the two integrities can be successfully respected.
The law as described in the thesis is that existing on 30th April 1997. The only
exception to this is the discussion of the Court of Appeal decision in Diocese of
Southwark and Others v Coker, The Times, 17th July 1997, in Chapter Four.
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Chapter One
Equality: A Philosophical Analysis
The concept of equality shapes and defines the theoretical and methodological approach
of the research from inception to conclusion. The philosophical analysis of equality not
only acts as an introduction to the study of sex discrimination law, it serves as an
inspiration for the empirical study of Church of England priests. The integration of
equality theory, largely in the form of employment law policies, with the empirical
investigation is detailed in Chapter Five. Finally, the analysis of the meaning of equality
helps shape the conclusion of the research. The conclusion of this thesis is that the Sex
Discrimination Act and the Equal Treatment Directive should be amended to allow
Church of England priests access to protection from sex discrimination. Before one can
recommend the inclusion of priests under the legislation, one must understand the
philosophy which underpins the legislation. The starting point, therefore, is a critical
analysis of the meaning of equality.
To make any sense, the concept of equality must involve a unit of measurement. Science
uses measurements such as length, width and height. A comparison of two physical
objects will result in equality or difference depending upon the unit of measurement.
"Between any two things, however dissimilar, we can always find some point of
resemblance: and between any two things, however similar, we can always find some
point of difference." The idea of equality as a philosophical concept suffers from the
same difficulty. One cannot pronounce that two people are equal or different without
specifying the unit of measurement. An examination of the different ways of measuring
equality is crucial. It explains the chameleon-like nature of equality; forever in a
different guise. Hence, one may value equality, but only value it in certain areas. For
example, one might support equality of opportunity but not equality of income and
wealth. The respects in which equality is valued will not commit one to absolute
equality. It may be that trade-offs are needed against other values, such as freedom.2
'Lucas, J.R. (1967) The Principles of Politics p244 (Oxford, Clarendon Press)
2 Flew, Antony (1981) The Politics of Procrustes pp28-29 (London, Temple Smith)
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1.1 Equality as Fact
The natural differences between humans renders it impossible for them to be factually
equal in all respects. However, a weak version of factual equality can be used to suggest
that humans are equal because of their common humanity. "That all men are human is,
if a tautology, a useful one, serving as a reminder that those who belong anatomically to
the species homo sapiens...are also alike in certain other respects more likely to be
forgotten."3
 For example, humans are alike in their capacity to feel pain and affection.
Lucas argues that this reasoning has more to do with humanity than with equality. It is
an argument of universal humanity that we should treat all human beings, as humans,
humanely. The logical reasoning is respect for humanity not equality. Lucas describes
the egalitarian attempt to hijack the argument;
All men are men.
Therefore all men are equally men.
Therefore all men are equal.
He ridicules this sequence by applying it to numbers;
All numbers are numbers.
Therefore all numbers are equally numbers.
Therefore all numbers are equal.
The mistake of the egalitarian, claims Lucas, is to assume that the uniformity of humans
as humans, will make them equal in all other respects. 4
 Williams does employ a
humanitarian argument. However, he avoids deriving from the argument the premise
that humans are equal in all respects; this being the strong version of factual equality.
His weak version of factual equality recognises that humans are not equal in every
respect. Williams realises that the common humanity argument is useful but not
sufficient. One needs to move from equality as fact to equality as a moral concept.
Williams, Bernard (1962) "The Idea of Equality" in P. Laslett & W. Runciman (Eds.), Philosophy,
Politics and Society (Second Series) p1 10, 112 (Oxford, Basil Blackwell)
Lucas, J.R. (1967) op. cit., pp25O-25l
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1.2 Equality as a Moral Concept
The historical roots of the concept of equality lie in Greek philosophy. Aristotle made
pronouncements on equality which affect our modern understanding of the concept.
(1) "Equality in morals means this: things that are alike should be treated alike,
while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their
unalikeness."
(2) "Equality and justice are synonymous; to be just is to be equal, to be unjust is
to be unequal."5
A rule of distribution will be egalitarian and just if it distributes equal shares to equals.
Conversely, a policy will be inegalitarian if equals receive unequal shares or if unequals
receive equal shares.6
If two persons are alike, why should they be treated alike? How can one move from an
"is" proposition to an "ought" position? Initially, the definition of alike must be
uncovered. Westen suggests three possible definitions. The first definition, that persons
are alike in every respect, he discounts as impossible. No two people can be alike in
every respect. Secondly, does it refer to persons being alike in some respects? This
leaves one with an unworkable definition. All people are in some respect alike. This
would lead to the strange situation where we should treat all people alike. Rather, he
asserts that persons are morally alike. This definition avoids the problems of deriving an
"ought" from an "is". "It starts with a normative determination that two people are alike
in a morally significant respect and moves to a normative conclusion that the two should
be treated alike." 7 Rather than deriving an ought from an is, an ought flows from an
ought. People are morally alike, therefore they can expect a moral standard of treatment
Westen, Peter (1982) "The Empty Idea of Equality" in Harvard Law Review vol.95 p537, 543
paraphrasing Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, W. Ross trans. (1925) Book V 1131a-1131b (Oxford,
Clarendon Press)
6 Oppenheim, Felix (1981) Political Concepts p1 19 (Oxford, Basil Blackwell)
Westen, Peter (1982) Op. cit., pp544-545
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which treats them alike. For persons to be equal they must share the characteristic of the
unit of measurement; whether it be income, intelligence or height. This leads to people
being equal in a host of situations. The standard of measurement defines what is
equality, therefore the measurement will always be egalitarian. Inegalitarian rules of
distribution become a logical impossibility.8
Westen reveals the circularity of his construction of equality. "Just as no categories of
'like' people exist in nature, neither do categories of 'like' treatment exist; treatments
can be alike only in reference to some moral rule." 9
 Equality as a moral concept
instructs us to treat like people alike. How do we discover who these like people are?
They are people who ought to be treated alike. Has equality any substantive content of
its own? Westen believes it to be an empty vessel, a tautological device.'0
1.2.1 Proportional Equality
Aristotle developed his theory of equality with the idea of proportional equality." This
requires that there be equality of ratios between the characteristic of one person and his
or her goods and the characteristic of another and his or her allotment. The problem
again is that the chosen characteristic will define a class of equals and thus render the
principle egalitarian. For example, Feinberg applies the characteristic of common
humanity to economic wealth. Distributive justice is achieved when the following ratio
is accomplished.
A's share of P - A's possession of Q
B's share ofP - B's possession ofQ
Where P stands for economic goods and Q for common humanity. As all possess Q
equally all should receive P equally. 12 Feinberg dislikes the consequences of
proportional equality. He considers it to be a sufficient claim for human rights but not
S Oppenheim, Felix (1981) Op. cit., p1 19
Westen, Peter (1982) Op. cit., pp546-547
10 Ibid. p.547
Aristotle, Ethica Nico,nachea, Op cit., 1131a; Aristotle's Politics, B. Jowett trans. (1921) Book V
130 lb (Oxford, Clarendon Press)
12 Feinberg, Joel (1973) Social Philosophy p109 (Englewood Cliffs NJ, Prentice Hall)
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for the distribution of the economic pie. It is submitted that it is necessary to provide a
justification for the characteristics which define allotment. To strengthen the account of
equality as a moral concept, a philosophical analysis of which characteristics are morally
relevant is needed.
1.2.2 Equality and Liberal Theory
The Enlightenment period provides guidance on the morally relevant characteristics
which are used by contemporary writers on equality.
When animals are compared with humans it is often said that humans are rational,
animals are not. Others believe that humans have a soul and that animals do not. Yet a
potent argument in favour of the protection of animals is that like humans they feel pain.
Can we take from any of these characteristics one which will define human equality?
1.2.3 Equal Passions
Classical utilitarian thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill believed in equal
passions; that is people have a similar capacity for pleasure and pain. This school of
thought locates humans closer to the animal kingdom. "By nature we are all designed to
satisfy our passions. We naturally call good only that which is a means to our own
satisfaction." 3 No preordained hierarchy of passions exists. Rather, Gutmann describes
how reason is harnessed to "scout and spy" at how best to fulfil our desires. On this
account, reason (or rationality) does not have a separate moral content of its own. An
objection might be made that people are incapable of acting in their own interests. Mill
believed that what was needed was knowledge of one's interests. Knowledge would
serve self-interest not transcend it. It would balance pleasures and pains and decide upon
the most suitable cause of action.14
13 Gutmann, Amy (1980) Liberal Equality p20 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)
' Ibid. p25
17
1.2.4 Equal Rationality
The rationalist school of Locke and Kant viewed humans as equally rational individuals,
capable of constructing reasonable life plans and following the moral law. Locke
believed that all humans rationally desire the protection of life, liberty and property. If
this is so, why do some rational beings fail to recognise these self-evident rights as their
main political interest? 15
 The reason is that humans are not completely equal in their
rationality. Humans share varying degrees of rationality and they have different
capacities for rationality. Perhaps, Feinberg says, rationality involves a minimal
potential for rationality which is above anything lower animals can attain.16
Kantian metaphysics helps to explain why a person who possesses a rational faculty
does not always use it. The Kantian self is both rational (as a noumenal self) and sensual
(as a phenomenal self). Sometimes the sensual self will override reason. Kantian theory
maintains that, "Every person has the potential for human dignity based upon
reason... .As an end in oneself, one must be treated by others as a person guided by
reason and one must act not only according to but from the moral law." 7
 It is this moral
personality which is capable of giving rights to humans. Reason is seen as independent
of the passions. To achieve civil independence and equal subjection it is necessary that
people make the law as rational beings, not passionate beings with arbitrary wills.
However, Feinberg considers metaphysics to be an inadequate explanation of human
worth. The description of humans as persons and not things and the premise that
humans are ends in themselves does not explain human worth. Feinberg is sympathetic
to, although unconvinced by, metaphysical statements. He states, "It may well be that
universal 'respect' for human beings is, in a sense, 'groundless' - a kind of ultimate
attitude not itself justifiable in more ultimate terms."18
Gutmann describes how equal passions and equal rationality converge. Utilitarianism
must find a place for reason in its method and the rationalist must succumb to the effect
of human passions in the construction of principles of distributive justice. Are passions
Ibid. p28
16 Feinberg, Joel (1973) op. cit., p91
17 Gutmann, Amy (1980) Op. cit., p33
18 Feinberg, Joel (1973) Op cit., p93
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and rationality morally relevant characteristics? First, a reply can be made that persons
do not share these qualities equally, neither do they have an equal capacity to exercise
these qualities. This may be so, but Gutmann argues that there is no evidence to show
that such a capacity differs according to sex, race, religion or class.' 9 Therefore,
principles of justice favouring (say) males over females cannot be justified using the
unequal capacity argument. Secondly, there is the recurrent is-ought problem which
claims that one cannot derive normative conclusions regarding distributive justice from
empirical claims. Equal passions and equal rationality are not simply factual assertions.
Rather a process has taken place which gives greater political significance to people's
similarities than to their differences. Like Westen, Gutmann derives an ought from an
ought. "The argument from human equality to principles of egalitarian justice is
therefore circular, but the reasoning is not tautological. Our idea that human beings are
equal gains plausibility from our firm belief that certain distributive inequalities are
unjust. Our normative intuitions therefore support our descriptive belief in human
equality."20
1.2.5 Contemporary Liberal Thinkers
(a) Bernard Williams
Williams constructs a conception of equality which is based on equality of respect. As a
springboard he uses and criticises the theory of Kant. Williams dislikes Kant's
transcendental idealism. In order to remove moral worth from any contingency Kant
locates it as a transcendental characteristic. The capacity to will as a rational agent and
to receive equal respect as such an agent, has no connection with the empirical world
but is confined to metaphysics. Williams believes that for moral capacity to be useful in
the quest for equality it must have an empirical element. The absence of empirical
grounding would render equality as an empty concept - the very premise which Westen
propounds.2'
' Gutmann, Amy (1980) op. cit., p45
Ibid. p46
21 Williams, Bernard (1962) op. cit., ppl 15-116
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Williams suggests that we should regard each other from the "human point of view".
We should see the world through other peoples' eyes, including the label of their work
title and their achievement. It does not mean that each person is identical but it does
mean that each person is owed the effort of understanding. 22
 Feinberg suggests that this
represents a causal, not a logical, connection between the human point of view and the
idea of human worth. 23
 It is arguable that we have simply returned to the common
humanity argument - we should equally respect every person because each is a human
being. The idea of the human point of view, although appealing, appears groundless.
Williams does not escape the metaphysical trap after all.
(b) John Rawls
Rawls uses a liberal theory of justice based on the idea of the social contract to produce
principles of distributive justice. He states that the capacity for moral personality is a
sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice. He asserts that the majority of
persons possess moral personality and that they possess this property equally. 24 Moral
personality comprises: a sense of justice and the ability to make moral appeals with
some hope that the appeal will be followed. Aware of the pitfalls of Kant, Rawls avoids
metaphysics by empirically grounding moral personality. He derives equality from
natural characteristics. However, in doing so it is arguable that he contaminates his
theory with real world problems. For example, when does a person have a sufficient
moral personality? If people have different degrees of moral personality why should
there not be different grades of moral status, with greater duties assigned the greater the
moral capacity?25
 Rawis recognises such problems and states that, "provided the
minimum for moral personality is satisfied, a person is owed all the guarantees of
justice."26
22 Ibid. ppll6-l18
23 Feinberg, Joet (1973) Op . cit., p94
24 Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice pp505-507 (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
25 Singer, Peter (1979) Practical Ethics pp 16-17 (London, Cambridge University Press)
26 Rawls, John (1971) Op. cit., p507
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(c) Peter Singer
Singer makes the point, referred to by Gutmann, that it is arguable that despite
individual differences, there are no morally significant differences between the sexes
and the races. if one pursues this argument, that differences cut across society, and then
apply an intelligence test to assign hierarchical places in that society, one arrives at an
inegalitarian position. The hierarchical society could be justified by an appeal to the real
differences between people. It is an argument that is unpalatable to most people.27
Singer claims, "We can reject this 'hierarchy of intelligence'...if we are clear that the
claim to equality does not rest on intelligence, moral personality, rationality or similar
matters of fact." 28 However, it is submitted that moral personality and rationality
(arguably also a component of moral personality) are not wholly factual claims but have
a moral relevance. They are ought as opposed to is statements. Singer asserts that
equality is an ethical principle, not a factual one. Whilst, this may be true, Singer's
position is part of a wider problem on the relationship between facts and morals.29
Turner argues that the idea of equality as a moraJ concept, is not a relevant modern
concept. He believes that human nature is now recognised as a cultural product. "Within
this relativistic perspective it is difficult to isolate any specific form of human attribute
which could be shared universally amongst the whole human race." 30 Yet without the
highest level of abstraction, can one objectively verify political concepts and social
policies? What basis do ideas such as equality of opportunity and equality of result have
if one removes the formal, abstract idea of equality?
Westen believes that equality provides form but no substance. Turner believes that
equality is substance rather than form. It is submitted that the formal idea of equality can
act as the mainspring for substantive theories of equality. One needs the form to provide
the foundations, yet form is left floundering without content.
27 Singer, Peter (1979) op. cit., ppl7-18
28 Ibid. p18
29 For further information on the fact-value distinction the reader is referred to; Honderich, Ted (Ed.),
(1995) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy p267 (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
30 Turner, Bryan (1986) Equality p35 (London, Ellis Horwood)
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1.3 Equality and Justice
Browne describes justice as, "giving every person his due". 3 ' Is there a connection
between justice and equality? Egalitarians maintain that either there is a logical
connection or that there is a substantive or morally necessary connection. 32 Anti-
egalitarians eschew such a connection. Justice, on this reading, is connected to true
deserts and is not reliant on equality at all. In fact justice and equality are rival concepts.
Initially different types of justice will be defined. Noncomparative justice is when one
can determine a person's claims without making a comparison with anyone else.
Importantly, noncomparative principles do not involve any morally relevant
relationships between people. Instead the person is compared to an objective standard
and a judgment is delivered. The standards of noncomparative justice can be diverse and
unrelated. Comparative principles of justice require a comparative analysis of morally
relevant characteristics between people. 33 Comparative principles follow the
Aristotelian formula that like cases are to be treated alike and different cases are to be
treated differently.34 The idea of the like treatment principle is an idea of formal justice
for it does not itself specify what the relevant moral characteristics are to be.
Egalitarians state that the principle of formal justice is equivalent to formal equality.
Anti-egalitarians deny this. Formal justice is transformed into substantive justice by the
addition of relevant moral characteristics. It is the moral characteristics, not formal
justice, upon which commentators disagree.
Aristotle used formal logic to make a connection between equality and justice.35
Westen, agreeing with this approach, illustrates the equivalence relationship between
equality and justice. First, justice can be reduced to equality. One gives persons their
due by treating them in accordance with moral rules. Whether a person is governed by a
moral rule depends upon their moral characteristics. If they are morally alike in
significant respects they will be treated alike, if they are morally unalike in significant
31 Browne, Derek (1978) "Nonegalitarian Justice" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol.56, no.1 p48,
49
32 Ibid. p48
Ibid. p49
Feinberg, Joel (1974) "Noncomparative Justice" in Philosophical Review vol.83 p297, 310
Aristotle n.5 supra
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respects they will be treated unalike - and so we return to the concept of equality.
Secondly, equality is reducible to justice. Saying that persons who are alike should be
treated alike is to assume principles of justice which define that it is right to treat these
persons alike and wrong to treat them unalike. Here we return to giving people their
due.36 Westen believes that justice, like equality, is a formal concept. Justice asks us to
give people their due but it does not define what is their due. To ascertain what is one's
due, one must examine substantive moral or legal standards. Westen believes that the
substantive moral content is a source other than equality or justice.
1.3.1 Normative Egalitarianism
Many writers argue that equality and justice do have a substantive content, but there is
widespread disagreement as to that specific content. Some try to connect equality and
justice by substantive egalitarian principles. How the move is made from form to
substance is as important as the substantive principles themselves.
Feinberg explains how morally relevant characteristics are chosen. Intuitively many
would not choose sex or race as a morally relevant characteristic, whereas merit, need or
respect might be used. What supplies the relevance? Relevance can be given by the
object of the law.37 If the object of the law is equal income then people's incomes are
the relevant characteristic. How are the objectives of the law decided? How can one
decide whether the legislators have passed an unjust law? Feinberg answers that,
"Differences in a given respect are relevant for the aims of distributive justice.. .only if
they are differences for which their possessors can be held responsible; properties can be
the grounds of just discrimination between persons only if those persons had a fair
opportunity to acquire or avoid them." 38 He assesses five characteristics to see whether
they pass the fair opportunity test. First, he dismisses the idea of "perfect equality" (the
common humanity argument) as too imprecise on its own. Secondly, human need, a
principle derived from perfect equality, does match fair opportunity; "mere possession
of basic human needs qualifies a person for the opportunity to satisfy them." 39 His third
36 Westen, Peter (1982) op. cit., p557
Hart, H.L.A. (1961) The Concept of Law p159 (Oxford, Clarendon Press)
38 Feinberg, Joel (1973) Op. cit., p108
Ibid. p110
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characteristic, combined as merit and achievement, he dismisses. The skills one uses,
whether native or acquired, are not deserved but are randomly distributed as part of a
person's genetic inheritance. A fair opportunity to achieve is thwarted by genetic and
inherited factors. Fourthly, the contribution a person makes to the economy is an
appealing ground to decide upon distributive justice. Difficulties surround this too. For
example, how do you measure contribution? Factors other than individual contribution
will have helped the person, such as luck, social factors, uncreated natural resources and
the efforts of dead people. Finally, he dismisses the notion of effort, which is likewise
hampered from dispensing fair opportunity because of genetic or acquired handicaps.4°
The basis of this analysis is the idea of responsibility for one's attributes. It is submitted
that behind this is the idea of possession. Rawls discusses the idea that one cannot
possess one's attributes because one does not deserve those attributes. 4 ' What we need
to do is pare the self down to its core. Feinberg believes that in a stable economy basic
needs will have priority. When economic growth occurs nonegalitarian considerations
such as contribution and effort will be used.42
1.3.2 The Denial of the Equality-Justice Connection
Browne denies that there is a conceptually relevant connection between equality and
justice. He maintains that principles of equality cannot solve distributive problems,
whereas nonegalitarian principles will supply the solution. Browne argues that the
analytical egalitarianism of Aristotle is not as logical as it appears. The Aristotelian
principle assumes a background of noncomparative justice. Aristotle believed that
people were owed certain dues. But if justice depends upon claims and the possession of
goods appropriate to those claims, justice is noncomparative and nonegalitarian. Browne
argues that for justice to be egalitarian, "the normative claim must be made that the
relational property itself has some additional moral significance over and above that of
the attributes it relates. Moral importance must attach, not (or not only) to the fact that
each individual has a certain attribute, but (also) to the fact that those individuals are
° Ibid. pplo9-117
4° 
Rawls, John (1971) op. cit., pp3 10-315
42 
Feinberg, Joel (1973) Op. cit., p1 17
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equal (in some respect)." 43
 That equality is crucial to justice must be shown before the
Aristotelian principle is applied; the principle itself cannot prove this connection.
Browne believes that comparative principles, although promoting equality, do not
necessarily promote justice. Comparative principles have no relation to the amount a
person should receive. If all are treated badly then there is equality but not justice.
Normative egalitarians, like Feinberg, argue that there is a morally relevant connection
between equality and justice. Browne ignores the moral content that Feinberg attempts
to find in his discussion of need. Admittedly Feinberg does not specify what is needed
to live a minimally decent life, but he does say that this is a matter of justice, whereas it
is less evident that anything above the line is required by justice to be equally
dispensed.'
Flew likewise challenges the idea that equality and justice are synonymous. He believes
that equality of result, a forward looking notion, should not be equated with justice - the
backward looking notion of giving people their due. The fault of Flew's argument is that
equality of result, along with equality of opportunity and equality of respect, is a
substantive equality policy. It is misleading to equate equality of result with formal
equality. Similarly, it is questionable whether justice should always be defined as
receiving one's due or legitimate entitlements and having nothing to do with
redistribution.
Instead of denying the logic of Aristotle, Flew develops his logic by pursuing his study
of equality. When discussing distributive justice Aristotle stated, "it is possible for one
man to have a share either unequal or equal to that of another." 45
 He does not say that
we should redistribute goods of every kind. He even suggested that a relevant
characteristic of entitlement might be wealth. 46 The combination of private holdings and
contribution to economic wealth might determine distributive justice. Flew asserts that
Aristotle's distributive justice does not require that everyone receive an equal share of
all goods but rather that all systems of justice treat all relevantly like cases alike. It is
Browne, Derek (1978) op. cii, p52
Feinberg, Joel (1973) Op. cit., p1 10
Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, Op. cit., Book V 1 130b
46 Ibid. Book V 1131a-ll3lb
25
submitted that Flew misses the point. He uses the substantive content of Aristotle to
justify unequal results. A more useful course would have been to attack the formal logic
of Aristotle which holds equality and justice to be synonymous. For all Flew has done is
to return to the formula without criticising its form.
1.4 Equality and Rights
Equal rights, human rights, noncomparative rights, a right to equality of opportunity -
these are all phrases that abound in equality and discrimination literature. What is the
relationship between equality and rights?
Many writers see equality as being different to rights. 47
 The emphasis on difference has
led to disagreement regarding the priority of the concepts. Some argue that rights are the
source of equality.48
 Others argue that equality is the source of all rights. 49
 Nielsen,
perhaps unconsciously, covers all three positions in his description of equality and
rights.50 First, he contrasts the idea of equality as a goal - a desirable goal that humans
are treated as being equal in certain respects, with equality as a set of rights, if we
introduce negative rights equally (rights not to be interfered with) this will lead to
unequal wealth and well-being. if positive rights are introduced, depending upon what
they are, equal rights may be synonymous with equality as a goal. This suggests that
rights can be the source of equality. Secondly, he suggests that equality and rights are
related but independent concepts, "a certain condition of equality is a goal that we
should strive toward and that, quite independently of its attainment, there are certain
rights that we all have, the covering formula for which is the claim that we are all to be
treated as moral equals." 5 ' Thirdly, he asserts that there is a link between equality as a
goal and equality as a right. He believes that what starts off as a goal turns into a right
Feinberg, Joel (1973) op. cit., pp98-I 19, who believes that rights are noncomparative in nature, whilst
equality is comparative. For a similar analysis the reader is referred to; Flew, Antony (1981) Op. cit., p29
48 Westen, Peter (1982) Op. cit., p539 refers the reader to Beck, (1980) "Liberty and Equality" in 10
Idealistic Studies p36; Machan, (1977) "Equality's Dependence on Liberty" in 0. Dorsey (Ed.), 2
Equality and Freedom pp664-665
Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously pp273-274 (London, Duckworth)
° Nielsen, Kai (1985) Equality and Liberty (Totowa, New Jersey, Rowman & Allanheld)
Ibid. p9
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when the goal can be realistically achieved. This specifies equality as the source of
rights.52
Westen believes that contrasting equality and rights is the wrong approach. He considers
that equality statements involve, and collapse into, simple statements of rights. Rights
mean "all claims that can justly be made by or on behalf of an individual or group of
individuals to some condition or power - except claims that 'people who are alike be
treated alike"53
 Like people are treated alike because a moral rule states that they ought
to be treated alike. If both persons satisfy the rule they will be treated alike. "After such
a rule is established, equality between them is a 'logical consequence' of the established
rule. They are then 'equal' in respect of the rule because that is what equal
means....They are also then entitled to equal treatment under the rule because that is
what possessing a rule means." 54
 Equality thus derives from rights.
One of the reasons used to differentiate equality from rights is the comparative nature of
the former. Equality makes comparisons between the treatment of people, whereas
rights look to the individual complainant. A contrast is made between comparative
rights - rights which do make comparisons regarding the treatment of people, and
noncomparative rights - rights that are used without a comparative element. Therefore, a
contrast can be made between noncomparative rights on the one hand and comparative
rights and equality taken as identical concepts on the other.
To further cloud the situation Westen believes that a comparative right may exist in
isolation from equality. For example, an assessment of the right of preferential treatment
can only proceed by analysing the initial relationship of a person with others, it is not
concerned with equality. Additionally, equality claims can be noncomparative rights.
The right of persons qua persons not to be tortured can be assessed by looking at
individual treatment and not by making comparisons. 55
 It is submitted that the latter
example might not even be an equality right unless Westen is basing it on the common
humanity argument.
52 Ibid. pp7-lO
Westen, Peter (1982) op. cit., p540
Ibid. p548
" Ibid. p552
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There are two types of comparison at work here. Comparison for the purposes of
equality is conducted by taking each individual and deciding how they should be treated
by the moral standard. Then the treatment of persons under the standard is assessed to
determine whether they are being treated equally or not. When assessing a comparative
right one initially compares persons to see if they are alike or different. Only then does
one decide how they are to be treated under the moral rule of treatment. 56 Westen
illustrates this difference in his analysis of affirmative action programmes. In some
American states blacks have been given preferential treatment in graduate school
admissions. This can be regarded as a comparative right as one has to examine the
candidates' relationship with others. One cannot tell whether the right to preferential
treatment has been broken unless one initially compares the candidates. "[T]he
quantitative comparison logically precedes the determination of their rights." 57 The right
to preferential treatment has an equality dimension too. If one wants to decide who are
like and who are unalike one must take each person and determine their treatment under
the moral rule - in this case the rights under the preferential treatment scheme. Only then
can one assess whether people are being treated equally. "[TJhe comparison of 'like' to
'like' in respect to admission logically follows the determination of everyone's
admission rights."58
1.5 Legal Equality and Rights
To understand whether people are being treated differently a moral standard must be
used to gauge whether people are alike or not. This is not provided by the statement that
likes should be treated alike, states Westen, rather it comes in the form of an underlying
right. Once the particular right is found, whether it be, say, freedom of speech or
freedom of religion, "our substantive work is complete, and the additional and self-
evident step of stating our conclusion in terms of 'equals' or 'unequals' is entirely
superfluous."59
56 Ibid. p553
Ibid. p554
58 Ibid. pSSS
Ibid. p560
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Many writers agree with Westen but they do not extend the analysis to "suspect
classification cases". These are sex and race discrimination cases. Some writers
maintain that these cases are "true equality cases" which cannot be collapsed into rights
discourse.6° Westen believes that alongside rights of speech and religion stand rights of
sex and race. These rights can stand alone without reference to equality. Yet these rights
also provide the substantive standard for assessing like and unalike.
In Sweatt v Painter a state law which prohibited blacks from entering the state's law
school was challenged.6 ' Should race be allowed to make a difference here? The idea of
equality, that likes should be treated alike, does not help here. It cannot discern what are
relevant differences from what are irrelevant ones. One needs to show that the exclusion
on the ground of race caused Mr Sweatt an injury that would not have occurred in a case
where exclusion by race was unacceptable. A prohibition against race discrimination
must stem from a substantive right to be free from such injury. Only then can one say
that the state treated Mr Sweatt unequally by treating him differently in comparison to
like persons.62
1.6 Types of Equality
1.6.1 Overview
This thesis proceeds on the view that there is just one formal idea of equality - that likes
should be treated alike - but that there are many different substantive theories of
equality.63
The main types of substantive equality are discussed below. First, the beneficiaries of
equality policies and the breadth of these policies is examined. Some policies place the
individual as the subject of equality. An individual belonging to a relevant class will be
treated as equal with the other members of that class. Rosenfeld cites the example of
60 Ibid. p565 refers the reader to Fullinwider, Robert (1980) The Reverse Discrimination Controversy
pp222-223, 236-237 (Totowa, New Jersey, Rowman & Littlefield)
Sweatt v Painter 339 U.S. 629 (1950)
62 Westen, Peter (1982) Op. cit., pp566-567
63 Rae, Douglas & Yates, Douglas (1981) Equalities p133 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard
University Press) count at least 108 kinds of equality.
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one-person-one-vote. The relevant class in this situation is that of citizens. Each
individual citizen in the class is given the right to vote. Some policies place the group as
the subject of equality. In this situation a certain class must be treated equally. Equality
is not necessary between individuals but between subclasses. Provided that the
distribution between relevant subclasses is equal, the policy is satisfied. It does not
matter if the distribution within the subclasses is unequal.64
The breadth of equality policies is influenced by political ideologies. Although this
thesis is specifically concerned with equality policies in regard to employment, it is
•	 ,,65
useful to situate equality in a wider context by examining the domain of equality
The issue is; what classes of things are to be distributed equally? A libertarian such as
Robert Nozick would pursue a narrow domain of equality, focusing on the distribution
of formal property rights. 66 A Marxist would argue for a radical redistribution of wealth.
The broader the domain, the more likely that policies of positive action and positive
(reverse) discrimination would be approved. These policies would be inconceivable to
libertarians.
1.6.2 Equality Policies
Five equality policies that are used in employment law will be outlined. Initial
definitions will be given before a comparative assessment is made.
1.6.3 Equality of Opportunity
In democratic societies with mixed economies, like Britain and America, there is a
prevailing economic, social and political principle - equality of opportunity. The direct
discrimination provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations
Act 1976 are based on the concept of equal opportunity. 67 The idea is that each person
should be free to pursue their life plans and be able to compete for scarce goods in
society on an equal basis. How are goods allocated? Williams suggests that equal
Rosenfeld, Michael (1991) Affirmative Action and Justice p15 (New Haven, Yale University Press)
66 Ibid. p16
f,6 Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford, Basil Blackwell)
° Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 1(1) (a); Race Relations Act 1976 s 1(1) (a)
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opportunity to obtain goods is fulfilled if there is no exclusion from the competition on
grounds other than appropriate and rational ones. To prevent arbitrary principles such as
wealth being classed as appropriate and rational the "grounds considered appropriate for
the good should themselves be such that people from all sections of society have an
equal chance of satisfying them." 68
 Initially, one can say that people are rewarded
according to their merit. "In a meritocracy positions in the occupational structure of a
society would be filled on the basis of personal merit, in terms of universal criteria of
achievement, not on ascribed standards of age, sex or wealth." 69
 This is the weak
version of equality of opportunity. The strong version argues that because of genetic and
social factors people cannot compete equally, and it is unfair to rely on notions of merit.
People do not deserve their skills, neither is achievement untainted by factors beyond
the individual's control. It is argued that for equality of opportunity to function as a
social policy it is necessary to strengthen it to include the idea of equality of condition.
It is necessary to separate equality of opportunity from equality of result, but often the
distinction collapses. Flew believes this centres around the definition of opportunity.
"Someone has an opportunity to do something (or to have something) if, and only if,
they can do (or have) that something, if they choose." 7° A literal meaning of equality of
opportunity would be the offering of two people either the same or equivalent
opportunities. On this reading the objective has become equality of result; that all should
receive the same. The ordinary reading of equality of opportunity is that there is an open
competition for scarce resources. The only opportunity available is the opportunity to
compete. Flew believes that the latter definition is the correct one. Likewise, Levin
maintains that equality of opportunity does not entail equality of result. He equates
opportunity with probability. "I take an opportunity for a job to be the probability that
one will be offered that job." 71
 An individual's overall employment probability can be
displayed in graphic form by plotting their probability of getting a job against all
existing jobs. This is the individual's competition curve. Equality of opportunity is
measured by a comparative analysis of competition curves. This analysis is interesting
as it calls into question what variables should be included to define the curve and also
68 Williams, Bernard (1962) Op. cii, pp125-126
69 Turner, Bryan (1986) Op. cit., p35
70 Flew, Antony (1981) Op. cit., p46
71 Levin, Michael (1981) "Equality of Opportunity" in Philosophical Quarterly vol.31 p1 10
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whether the curve can be shifted upwards or downwards by the government. 72
 The last
words are reserved for Lucas who maintains that equality of opportunity and equality of
result are separate concepts. Additionally, he doubts the efficiency of the former. Unlike
Levin and Flew, Lucas does not think that opportunity can be measured. Does one fail
because one has missed an opportunity or because one has been deprived of that
opportunity? In a passage fit for inclusion in the Scriptures he writes, "We blame
external circumstances rather than our own inadequacies, and find in the failures of life
fuel for fires of resentment rather than lessons in the grace of humility. Equality of
Opportunity has bred envy rather than endeavour."73
1.6.4 Equality of Condition
The strong version of equality of opportunity requires equality of condition. To make
the competition for scarce resources fair the initial starting points must be equalised.
This is done by assessing the conditions which affect individuals. Williams suggests that
where a condition is curable it is to be regarded as part of what is done to the individual
rather than a part of the individual's core self. 74
 The tricky idea of tampering with the
self's core (whatever that is) is circumvented and some notion of equality between
persons is preserved. A social policy advocating equality of condition aims to equalise
the basic resources available to those entering the competition. Basic goods such as
money and education are needed so one can develop the capabilities to compete for
positions open to all. Compensation can be issued for handicaps and penalisation for
those who are unfairly advantaged. British anti-discrimination law fails to provide the
necessary equality of condition believe Fredman & Szyszczak. "[E}qual opportunity is
predicated on equalizing the starting point of different groups. Yet the legislation makes
no commitment to supplying sufficient resources to ensure such equality."75
72 The reader is referred to 1.7.3.
' Lucas, JR. (1967) op . cit., p247
Williams, Bernard (1962) Op. cit., ppl27-l28
Fredman, Sandra & Szyszczak, Erika (1992) "The Interaction of Race and Gender" in B. Hepple & E.
Szyszczak (Eds.), Discrimination: The Limits of Law p214, 216 (London, Mansell)
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1.6.5 Equality of Result
Equality of result (or equality of outcome) aims to transform an unequal starting
position into an equal finish. Factors which disadvantage the competitors starting point,
such as sex, race, disability, age, social status and natural ability, will be swept aside.
Other means such as positive action programmes and reverse discrimination are used to
produce equality of result. The achievement of equality of result, and likewise its lesser
partner equality of condition, would involve enormous state intervention. Although
some equality of result policies are being pursued the absolute success of the policy
would, Turner believes, lead to "political despotism which would subordinate individual
talent and achievement."76
Rosenfeld makes a distinction which somewhat answers this criticism. He divides
equality of result into lot- and subject-regarding equality of result. 77 Lot-regarding
equality of result is when every person is given equal lots. This ignores the difference
and creativity of persons and is susceptible to Turner's criticism. Subject-regarding
equality of result allocates goods that are necessary to the development of people's
talents. It is legitimate to allocate unequal bundles of goods as people's needs vary.
Apart from the problem of subjectivity of needs, this is a Utopian vision, clouded by the
presence of scarce resources. A policy combining lot-regarding and subject-regarding
equality of result could be the solution with the former providing necessary goods to all,
whilst the latter could concentrate on people's talents and recognise their differences.
Who chooses which characteristics are to be equalised? Who will equalise the
equalisers? 78 Why stop at equal wealth when we have eugenics at our disposal? What
reasons are given for equality in one direction but stops at the vision of Huxley's Brave
New World? We return to the idea that one may value equality in some respects but not
all. Just because those on the left of the spectrum have pushed the idea of equality
further than those on the right, does not prevent them being entitled to stop short of
annihilation.
76 Turner, Bryan (1986) Op. cit., p37
Rosenfeld, Michael (1991) O p. cit., p1 17
78 Flew, Antony (1981) Op. cit., p64
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1.6.6 Equal Treatment and Treatment as an Equal
Equal treatment and treatment as an equal are two related but different ideas. The latter
idea is also referred to as equal consideration of interests and equality of respect. 79
 For
ease it will be referred to as equality of respect.
The concept of equal treatment involves an equal distribution of some opportunity or
resource. For example, every citizen has a right to an equal vote in a democracy.
Equality of respect does not go this far, but it stipulates that each person is to be treated
with the same respect as everyone else. Equality of respect is prior to equal treatment.
As will be explained, the former may in some cases lead to the latter, but on occasion it
will result in differential treatment. The essence of equality of respect is that in our
moral deliberations we give equal weight to the interests of others. "True scales favour
the side where the interest is stronger or where several interests combine to outweigh a
smaller number of similar interests; but they take no account of whose interests they are
weighing."8° Picking out an arbitrary factor such as sex rather than weighing interests is
prohibited. The only important characteristic is that of having an interest. This begs the
question how is an interest created? To preserve equality of respect you cannot
neutralise the reasons that form the interest. Therefore, it could be argued that the
interest needs to be viewed against a background of social and genetic factors. The
reasons that form the interest might then include a person's experiences of being a male
or a female.
Equality of respect is only a minimal principle of equality, it does not necessarily lead to
equal treatment, or for that matter equality of result. Singer uses the example of two
people in pain to illustrate this. One person is in agony, whilst the other only has minor
pain. Two shots of morphine are available. By weighing the interests of the two the
result will be two shots for the first person and none for the second. Equality of respect
does not lead to equal treatment, yet says Singer the object is egalitarian. However, he
For example, Dworkin refers to it as treatment as an equal, Singer as equal consideration of interests
and Williams and Flew as equality of respect.
° Singer, Peter (1979) op. cit., p19
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uses grounds of utility to argue for this. An argument could be pursued which states that
utility considerations will not lead to equal treatment and nor will they preserve equality
of respect.8'
1.6.7 Reverse Discrimination
Reverse discrimination is influenced by equality of respect and equal treatment. In order
to preserve equality of respect it may be necessary to apply differential treatment to
disadvantaged groups in society. Equal treatment would only serve to marginalise these
groups. 82 Does reverse discrimination merely replace one injustice with another? Does it
treat another group with less respect? Can reverse discrimination be justified? Two
American cases take up this point. De Funis v Odegard presented the argument that race
could not be used as a criterion of admission into a law school. 83 The admission
procedure required that the majority group were screened against an average grade. The
minority group, which consisted of various ethnic minorities, received special
consideration by a committee and many were admitted despite being below the average
grade. The law school conceded that De Funis would have been admitted with his score
if he had been a member of the ethnic minority group. It was argued that distinctions of
race are unjust because they treat the opposing race with less than equal respect.
Unfortunately, as the law school then chose to admit De Funis, the court did not decide
the issue. Dworkin believes that this case presents a distinction between equality as a
policy and equality as a right. De Funis does not have a right to equal treatment in the
allocation of law school places, because not everyone has an equal right to legal
education. He does have a right to treatment as an equal when the university is deciding
its admission standards. "That is, he has a right that his interests be treated as fully and
sympathetically as the interests of any others when the law school decides whether to
count race as a pertinent criterion for admission."84
81 The reader is referred to 1.6.7. where Dworkin denies that equality of respect can be justified on
utilitarian grounds.
82 Montgomery, Jonathan (1992) "Legislating for a Multi-Faith Society: Some Problems of Special
Treatment" in B. 1-lepple & E. Szyszczak (Eds.), Discrimination: The Limits of Law pp193-2l3 (London,
Mansell); Poulter, Sebastian (1992) "The Limits of Legal, Cultural and Religious Pluralism" in B. Hepple
& E. Szyszczak (Eds.), Discrimination: The Limits of Law p172, 186 (London, Mansell)
83 De Funis v Odegard 416 U.S. 312 (1974)
Dworkin, Ronald (1977) op. cit., p227
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In Regents of the University of Galfornia v Allan Bakke the court held that race could
be used as one of a number of criteria of admission. 85
 A medical school reserved 16% of
its places for minority students. The quota did not vary according to the ability of the
minority applicants. Bakke, a white applicant, was denied a place. Could Bakke claim
that the use of the criterion of race in admissions denied him equality of respect?
If it is unjust to use racial distinctions there must be a flaw in making the distinctions as
such and not just because the distinction works against a group that is currently in
favour. 86
 Singer argues that a university has the discretion to decide its own criteria for
admission provided that they are applied impartially. The use of intelligence as a
criterion of admission is not generally contested. Yet if a university uses intelligence as
a criterion it is not because it is in the students' greater interest, nor is it because higher
intelligence carries with it an intrinsic right to be admitted, it is because the university
favours goals which will be promoted by the admission procedure. 87
 The reason why
reverse discrimination seems unusual is that it is the new policy, whereas an intelligence
criterion was the old policy. Since no-one has a right to be admitted, equality of respect
is not violated provided that the chosen criteria are applied impartially and the criteria
support reasonable goals. One might argue that the use of race cannot support
reasonable goals. Dworkin argues that it can be justified on ideal grounds of desiring a
more equal society, but not on mere utilitarian arguments. Programmes which
discriminate against blacks are based on utilitarian arguments. Hence, equality of
respect cannot be achieved. Programmes which discriminate in favour of blacks are
based on ideal as well as utilitarian considerations. Ideal arguments state that "a more
equal society is a better society even if its citizens prefer inequality. That argument does
not deny anyone's right to be treated as an equal himself."88
Bakke won his case on the facts because the court prohibited the use of quotas. They
held that a university could decide how to choose their students and that they were
entitled to use race as one factor among others in deciding this. Singer is confident of
the moral justifiability of reverse discrimination and he would extend it to the use of
85 Regents of the University of California v Allan Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
86 Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Op. cit., p229
87 Singer, Peter (1979) Op. cit., pp42-44; Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Op. cit., p225
88 Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Op. cit., p239
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quotas. However, the concern is that reverse discrimination will serve only to reinforce
stereotypes which state that certain groups will only prosper with special attention.
1.6.8 Formal Equality and Material Equality
Formal equality refers to formal, legal equality before the law. 89 Generally it is formal
equality of opportunity which is being discussed. Fullinwider defines it as a situation
where, "X and Y have equal opportunity in regard to A so long as neither faces a legal
or quasi-legal barrier to achieving A the other does not face." 9° A law shall not prohibit
an individual from exercising their talents and their present and future means. Material
equality is referred to in various ways; as fair, genuine, real and substantial equality.
This type of equality is concerned with equal access to means to achieve one's life
plans. Socially created differences in prospects must be eliminated, whereas naturally
received abilities will not be equalised.
Criticism has been made that formal equality does not accommodate the differences
between people. Does material equality solve this problem? Once one has decided that
there are differences between individuals one must decide whether to use formal, equal
treatment or different, material treatment. Those erring on the differential treatment side
see a further problem. The two concepts are commonly fused to provide an instrumental
view of equality - equality as a goal. 9 ' The idea is that equality before the law will
naturally lead to material equality. Within this goal of equality the male norm is
paramount, with emphasis on employment, not on other areas of social life such as the
family.92 For women, who are descriptively different to men, this creates a problem. "It
leaves women no other possibility than to try to participate in a world shaped by men,
without changing it."93
89 Occasionally it is referred to as procedural equality; Meehan, Elizabeth & Sevenhuijsen, Selma (1991)
"Problems in Principles and Policies" in E. Meehan & S. Sevenhuijsen (Eds.), Equality, Politics and
Gender p1, 2 (London, Sage)
9° Rosenfeld, Michael (1991) Op. cit., p28 quoting Fullinwider, Robert (1980) Op. cit., p101
' Bussemaker, Jet (1991) "Equality, Autonomy and Feminist Politics" in E. Meehan & S. Sevenhuijsen
(Eds.), Equality, Politics and Gender p52, 57-58 (London, Sage)
92 Parvikko, Tuija (1991) "Conceptions of Gender Equality: Similarity and Difference" in E. Meehan & S.
Sevenhuijsen (Eds.), Equality, Politics and Gender p36, 48 (London, Sage)
Bussemaker, Jet (1991) Op. cit., p58
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1.7 A Comparative Analysis of Substantive Equality Ideals
1.7.1 Birds Eye Walls v Roberts and Ja,nes v Eastleigh BC
When assessing legislation or judicial decisions it is necessary to know what precise
meaning of equality is involved. Applying different legal standards will result in
different legal consequences.94 In Birds Eye Walls Ltd v Roberts a company paid a
larger bridging pension to male employees than to female employees. 95 It was argued
that differential treatment was necessary in order to combat the discriminatory state
pension structure. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that there was no unlawful
sex discrimination contrary to Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. It is arguable that the
purpose of the employer influenced the ECJ decision. 96 In James v Eastleigh BC free
admission to a swimming pool was only allowed to those who had reached state pension
age.97 Men and women were treated differently because of the discriminatory state
pension age. The House of Lords held that this was unlawful sex discrimination, despite
the employer's lack of discriminatory intent. Similar facts result in differing case
decisions. In Roberts there is no sex discrimination, whereas in James there is. Fredman
believes that the decisions can be understood if one assesses them in terms of equality
policies. In Roberts there was unequal treatment of men and women. However, if
assessment is made on equality of result - that is putting everyone in the same end
position - then inequality of treatment disappears to be replaced by equality of result. In
James the House of Lords required that men and women be treated equally. Requiring
equal treatment meant that equality of result was impossible: men under the state
pension age would receive a concession which women under the state pension age
would not.98
Fredman, Sandra (1994) "Less Equal than Others...Equality and Women's Rights" Paper Delivered at
the 1994 WG Hart Legal Workshop on Understanding Human Rights p1, 23-25
Birds Eye Walls Ltd v Roberts [1994] IRLR 29
A full discussion of the ratio of Roberts is given at 7.4.2.
97 farnes v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751
98 Fredman, Sandra (1994) op. cit., p25
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1.7.2 Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Condition
It has been argued that equality of opportunity is dysfunctional because it produces
inequalities by placing a high social value on natural abilities. 99
 Equality of opportunity
suggests that we can all achieve success yet it does not say that all persons are created as
equal beings. The promise of equal opportunity leading to equal performance leading to
equal reward is alluring. However, reward is allocated by demand. Each society dictates
what knowledge and skills are valued. Skills that are often valued are natural talents of
no moral significance or acquired skills which have been shaped by social factors. Thus
we return to Singer's point that factors such as intelligence give us no intrinsic right to
the rewards of the good life. Intelligence is rewarded because it leads to goals such as
technological advance and economic growth. Schaar redefines equality of opportunity as
being, "equality of opportunity for all to develop those talents which are highly valued
by a given people at a given time." 100
 Only those who are endowed with the relevant
abilities can effectively enjoy equality of opportunity. Naturally gifted individuals
receive social recognition of their talents. The combination of natural and social forces
serves to reinforce the inequality in a society)°'
A reply might be made that the premise of equality of opportunity is to allow entry to
the race, not to guarantee uniformity of success. Equality of opportunity, says Flew, is
the equal chance to compete.'° 2
 Schaar believes the principles give false hope to those
not capable of such success. The loser is left to ponder his own lack of ability. The loser
could enter another race. Again society dictates how many races there are, and which are
the coveted, prestigious races, and which are put there as afterthoughts. Such
consolation measures are not helpful to real democratic equality, believes Schaar.
"When the fat boy who finishes last in the footrace gets the prize for 'best try' he has
lost more than he has won."103
Schaar, John (1971) "Equality of Opportunity and Beyond" in A. de Crespigny & A. Wertheimer
(Eds.), Contemporary Political Theory pp 135-153 (London, Nelson)
°o Ibid. p137
'°' The reader is also referred to Forbes, Ian (1991) "Equal Opportunity: Radical, Liberal and
Conservative Critiques" in E. Meehan & S. Sevenhuijsen (Eds.), Equality, Politics and Gender p17, 19
(London, Sage)
102 Flew, Antony (1981) Op. cit., pill
103 Schaar, John (1971) Op. cit., p142
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Policies promoting equality of condition partly address the criticism of equality of
opportunity detailed above. In 1.6.4 equality of condition was defined. For the purposes
of this section it is referred to as means-regarding equality of opportunity. Equality of
opportunity is referred to as prospect-regarding equality of opportunity; that is the equal
chance to compete for scarce resources. Means-regarding equality of opportunity is
when each person possesses the same tools for obtaining the scarce good they desire.'°4
"While it is possible for equal means and equal prospects to coincide, in many cases,
equal means will lead to unequal prospects and equal prospects will require unequal
means." 105 For example, if two people desire a good whose appropriation requires
physical strength, and one person is stronger, then the other is left with unequal
prospects for obtaining that good. The addition of equal means in the form of a strong
implement will not help, as the one person still remains the stronger. To achieve equal
prospects one has to institute unequal means.
The policy of equal allocation of means has to be delicately treated. if some competitors,
despite the equal distribution of certain means, are still left with a weak prospect of
success, then equal opportunity is a hollow principle.' 06 In the case of disabled people,
considerable unequal means will still result in them being disadvantaged. Yet how far
can the policy be allowed to go? It is not possible to compensate people for ever and
ever. Should self-induced unequal prospects be compensated? An example of this would
be an illness caused by smoking. Conversely, how far do you penalise someone who is
advantaged? If you raise tax the rich might opt for tax evasion or a tax haven. A
diminution in reward for intelligence could lead to a brain drain.
If the policy provides a just and fair procedure to allocate scarce goods, for example
jobs, then it is functional. If each job candidate has received an equivalent education,
then the competition will be fair. The candidate with the greater natural talents will be
selected. The candidates will possess an inequality of prospects. This is necessary for
the efficient functioning of job allocation.' 07 When equal allocation of means leads to
equality of prospects problems arise, if all candidates are equal in the necessary respects
'° The reader is referred to Rae, Douglas (1981) Op. cit., for a further definition of these concepts.
'° Rosenfeld, Michael (1991) O p. cit., p25
106 Ibid. p27
107 Ibid. p27
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how can a choice be made regarding their appointment? It would be difficult to arrive at
this position. To obtain equal prospects from equal means would require a huge
redistribution of basic goods. The narrower the definition of basic goods the easier it is
to achieve equal means leading to equal prospects. Does basic goods mean income,
health and education? Does it extend further to the family environment and even genetic
factors? Williams warns that the self will collapse under such interference. "In these
circumstances, where everything about a person is controllable, equality of opportunity
and absolute equality seem to coincide; and that itself illustrates something about the
notion of equality of opportunity." 08
 There is a conflict here; trying to give everyone
equality of opportunity and locating ability as a central aim actually laughs at the idea of
a common, but individuated humanity which is itself an ideal of equality. At this point
equality of opportunity reflects contrived equality but denies human difference.
1.7.3 Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Result
It is submitted that there is a distinction between the concepts of equality of opportunity
and equality of result. However, critical analysis of the former concept sometimes
results in the distinction being collapsed. A useful comparison of equality of result and
equality of opportunity is given by Rosenfeld. t °9 The former produces an equal
distribution of lots. The latter gives each person an opportunity to acquire scarce goods,
but it does not predicate equal lots. Rosenfeld uses an illustration of a rescue situation to
highlight the effect of different equality policies. If one hundred morally alike people are
trapped underground and because of scarce resources only fifty can be rescued, which
equality policy should be followed? Equality of treatment and equality of result would
require that all one hundred were rescued (which is impossible) or that none were
rescued (which appears morally abhorrent). Equality of opportunity based on a lottery
system would be a fair system of deciding who was to be rescued. "[E]quality of
opportunity may not result in equal treatment, but it does (in the context of the above
case) respect every person's right to treatment as an equal."°
108 Williams, Bernard (1962) op. cit., ppl28-129
'° Rosenfeld, Michael (1991) Op. cit., pp23-25
"° Ibid. p24
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In attempting to provide a radical conception of how the equal opportunity principle
might be transformed, Forbes blurs the distinction between equality of opportunity and
equality of result. To provide real equality of opportunity, he says, one must provide the
necessary means to achieve equal ends. Forbes is concerned with means-regarding
equality of opportunity to produce equal prospects and equal results. His definition of
radical equality includes the idea that individual liberty consists of freedom and ability.
If ability is lacking, freedom will be reduced. Forbes is collapsing his ideas into equality
of result policies instead of working within equality of opportunity.
Levin uses a probability account to explain why the two concepts are different. A
competitor's expectation is the sum of his or her chances over all jobs. Two individuals
have equal opportunity if they share the same expectation. This does not mean that the
two individuals will end up in the same position. "[I]ndividuals with probabilistically
equal opportunities can end up in quite different positions. They can have the same
expectation, even the same curve, yet scale very different heights of success. This is a
fact about probability." 1 Does Levin include equality of condition on the axes
measuring the probability of getting a job or is this merely confined to the equal chance
to compete? It appears that it is the latter. Levin makes an analogy between a
competition curve and property rights. Just as no-one has the right to interfere with your
property, no-one has the right to interfere with your competition curve. Any policy of
penalisation for advantage would be ruled out. Can compensation for disadvantage be
allowed? On this model all curves are connected, therefore helping one person will harm
another. On this basis he condemns preferential hiring on the basis of sex, as it interferes
with competition curves and harms innocent parties. t12 Could one raise a curve if there
has been a past injustice? If so, how far can one go back? If there is a claim of injustice
it must be empirically investigated, before reforming policies are initiated. The
disadvantaged group, it would seem, have the burden of proof of showing
discrimination, compounded by issues of history. Levin recognises the harshness of the
approach but he believes, "What is equal amidst all this inequality are the rules for
Levin, Michael (1981) op. cit., p114
Ibid. ppl2l-122
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securing competition curves on which individuals are perched when they come into the
world."
Flew develops the work of Williams to propose that equality of opportunity and equality
of result are incompatible. If one uses a strong version of equality of opportunity (that is,
including equality of condition) people will eventually be completely equal. Williams
notes that at this point equality of opportunity coincides with absolute equality. Flew
describes absolute equality as equality of result. Williams has unwittingly collapsed the
concepts. If outcomes are the same for all we no longer have equal opportunity because
there is no incentive to compete and there are no scarce opportunities to compete for."4
Flew dislikes Williams' contempt for competitive advantage and his reduction of the
individual to a ghostly figure with no identity of its own. Surely we have to work with
the actual individuals who are involved in the competition. It is to real world conditions
that Flew turns when he offers a cynical view of why it is useful to subsume equality of
result within equality of opportunity. The lure of money and social status attracts
individuals to the notion of equality of opportunity. Less attractive is the notion of a
reward on a level scale with everyone else. He quotes Confucius, "It is not easy to find a
man who has studied for three years without aiming at pay."5
This Chapter has analysed the meaning of equality. However, the theoretical framework
is far from complete. The opposite of equality is difference. In recent years feminist
jurisprudence has turned the focus away from ideas of equality to ideas of difference. In
Chapter Two the concept of difference as it relates to sex discrimination law is
examined.
" Ibid. p121
114 Flew, Antony (1981) op. cit., p113
Ibid. p49 quoting Confucius,Analects VIII, Section 2
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Chapter Two
Difference: A Philosophical Analysis
For two thousand years of Church history sexual difference prevented women from
becoming Church of England priests. Sex difference was an essential categorical feature
in the theology which prohibited women priests. The Synod vote, allowing women
priests, effectively says that sex difference is usually no longer a defining feature of a
priest. Hence male and female priests are equal as priests. However, there is still the
possibility that in some posts and parishes sex difference will remain an essential
characteristic. In this case women's difference is used to their disadvantage.
It is interesting to note that the traditional stereotypes of male and female roles which
have hindered women in certain areas of employment have previously been unable to
help women as regards the priesthood. For example, the priesthood is a sacrificial
ministry which involves skills often associated with women such as care and empathy.
Yet the priesthood remained exclusive to men for so long. At the Synod debate the skills
women would bring to the profession were noted as a positive contribution. Now that
the profession is mixed it will be interesting to see whether women priests, once in post,
are treated as equal to male priests or whether their sex difference results in differential
treatment.
2.1 The Equality-Difference Debate
The equality-difference debate has dominated sex discrimination literature in recent
years. Are men and women equal or are they different? "When equality and difference
are paired dichotomously, they structure an impossible choice. If one opts for equality,
one is forced to accept the notion that difference is antithetical to it. If one opts for
difference, one admits that equality is unattainable." 1 The two concepts are often
Pateman, Carole (1992) "Equality, Difference, Subordination: the Politics of Motherhood and Women's
Citizenship" in G. Bock & S. James (Eds.), Beyond Equality and Difference. Citizenship, Feminist
Politics and Female Subjectivity p17 (London, Routledge) quoting Scott, J.W. (1988) Gender and the
Politics of History p172 (New York, Columbia University Press)
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compared as irreconcilable ideas. As detailed in Chapter One, equality is a difficult
concept to define. Similar problems occur when one examines difference.
If equality is taken to mean equal treatment of men and women before the law (as it
often is in this debate) one must ask how equal treatment is defined. The usual criticism
is that equal treatment is defined in male terms. Under the mask of a universal, neutral
subject is in fact the male subject. "In Western political thought the self-evident and
privileged parameter of human action is man. At the same time the sexual difference of
woman is made insignificant....A woman finds herself with the destiny of Sisyphus. She
can try to become similar to men but the result of this effort can never be perfect."2
 If
female difference is taken as the dominant concept, this can itself lead to the
subordination of women. Difference can be used to justify the relegation of women to
the domestic sphere and into economic dependence. 3
 Women's exclusion from the
labour market, especially from certain types of jobs, can be legitimised.
There are dangers in the division of equality and difference. Writers promoting equality
have concentrated on women as employees. Writers prioritising difference have
concentrated on women as mothers. Phillips notes that as many women are in reality
workers and mothers, the division between equality and difference may not be a wise
one.4
 Perhaps a more useful approach is to examine men and women's personal
autonomy. 5
 How can men and women become autonomous citizens? Is this achieved by
being treated the same as one another or is different treatment required? Is it necessary
to include both policies in anti-discrimination legislation? Is it possible to define once
and for all the situations of equality and difference or should a more flexible approach,
responding to cultural changes, be taken? Although this returns the problem to the
equality-difference debate it focuses on the wider goal of securing autonomy for men
and women. Finally, the theorists who criticise the focus on equality versus difference,
2 Parvikko, Tuija (1991) OP. cit., pp36-37
Alexander, Sally (1987) "Women, Class and Sexual Difference" in A. Phillips (Ed.), Feminism and
Equality p160, 166 (Oxford, Basil Blackwell)
"Phillips, Anne (1987) "Introduction" in A. Phillips (Ed.), Feminism and Equality p1, 20 (Oxford, Basil
Blackwell)
Meehan, Elizabeth & Sevenhuijsen, Selma (1991) Op. cit., p1; Collins, Evelyn & Meehan, Elizabeth
(1994) "Women's Rights in Employment and Related Areas" in C. McCrudden & G. Chambers (Eds.),
Individual Rights and the Law in Britain p363, 407 (Oxford, Clarendon Press)
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and who instead create models based on sexual disadvantage not sexual difference, will
be examined.
2.2 Philosophical Foundations of Difference
Having examined the philosophical framework of equality the focus now turns to the
foundations of difference. Philosophers have pointed to the difference between men and
women, and certain accounts are misogynistic. In some theories the position of women
is integral to the rest of the theory, whereas in others the inferior position of women
could be removed to leave the grand theory intact.6
2.2.1 Aristotle and the Issue of Difference
Aristotle believed in natural and historical differences between individuals. These
differences were represented in a hierarchical political order. He drew a division
between the political sphere and the private sphere of the household. 7
 The Aristotelian
self was a free, adult, male endowed with rationality. Those who did not conform to this
model such as women, slaves and adolescent males were regarded as different and
inferior. Each of these groups were seen to lack rationality. Adult males were regarded
as equal to one another in the sense that they were equally free. Males were unequal
amongst themselves regarding, "wealth, virtue or nobility." 8
 Women remained in the
private sphere, tending to the family which gave the man the opportunity to pursue the
highest goal; political life. Aristotle's philosophical theory regarding the ruling classes
needed women to be subordinate to men in order to free men for political life.9
2.2.2 Natural Rights and the Issue of Difference
Not until the seventeenth century, and the natural rights theories of Locke and Kant, was
the Aristotelian model challenged. Natural rights theorists believed that all individuals
6 Grimshaw, Jean (1986) Feminist Philosophers p37 (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf)
Cavarero, Adriana (1992) "Equality and Sexual Difference: Amnesia in Political Thought" in G. Bock &
S. James (Eds.), Beyond Equality and Difference. Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity
p132 (London, Routledge)
8 Ibid. p13
Grimshaw, Jean (1986) op. cit., p49
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are equal by nature and therefore everyone holds the same rights and powers. The
Aristotelian hierarchical model based on difference was purported to be illegitimate. It
would appear logical to abandon sexual difference at this point. Yet Cavarero argues
that there were two levels at which women were excluded from theory.
At an elementary level, women simply do not feature in state of nature theories, men are
the only visible characters. Women are not purposely excluded, they are forgotten. At a
complex level the idea of a male as a universal being is presented. This is a legacy of
Greek philosophy preserved through history. Both Aristotle and Plato make a
connection, "between 'man', understood as the human species in general, and 'male',
which was to pass into most Western languages as the universalization of the male."°
Instead of excluding women, at this level women are included by bringing them within
the male paradigm. To be equal women must abide by the male paradigm. On this view
a universal paradigm and a male paradigm are not separate concepts. The male subject
has become the universal paradigm. There is no true universal, neutral paradigm, only
one corrupted and infected by male values.
2.2.3 Human Nature
Depending upon which description of human nature is followed, arguments fall into the
equality-difference debate. Four versions of human nature have been identified;
universal human nature, universal male and female nature, concrete human nature and
concrete male and female nature. Details of their defining characteristics are
summarised in Table 1. It is the first and the last which are often pitted against one
another. The universal camp state that there are fixed characteristics which can be found
for all humans, or for males and females separately. The concrete camp believes that
human nature, or separate male and female natures, are shaped by social and historical
circumstances and are not fixed categories.
'° Cavarero, Adriana (1992) op. cit., p37
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(1) Universal Human Nature 	 (3) Concrete Human Nature
Abstract principles make all human 	 Historical and social circumstances
beings morally equal. 	 shape human nature. Male and female
seen as equal.
(2) Universal Male/Female Nature 	 (4) Concrete Male/Female Nature
Abstract principles make male and 	 Historical and social circumstances
females morally different. 	 have defined male and female
difference.
Table 1 Philosophical Models of Human Nature
On the first view men and women, being human beings, all share universal human
rights. Differences between the sexes, beyond biological differences, do not affect
human identity as they are "merely" social and historical. "On this view, being a woman
is an accidental, and neither a universal property of being human, since one may be
human and not female....women as such cannot constitute a philosophical notion or
category." This is the traditional liberal legalist view.
The second view supported by relational feminism is that there is not a universal human
nature, but that there are essential male and female natures. The woman question
becomes a philosophical one as sex difference is viewed as essential, as categorical.
Many feminists believe that universal human nature is constructed as male nature.
Universal principles have been formulated using characteristics associated with
maleness, whilst ignoring female values. Women have been viewed as incapable of
achieving full human excellence.' 2 Even if there is an essential female nature it can be
used to the woman's detriment. Concentration on fixed characteristics can lead to
stereotypical views of women as childbearers and men as participants in the public
world.
Gould, Carol (1980) "The Woman Question: Philosophy of Liberation and the Liberation of
Philosophy" in C. Gould & M. Wartofsky (Eds.), Women and Philosophy p5, 7 (New York, Perigee
Books)
' Kant, Immanuel, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, J. Goldthwaite trans.
(1965) (Berkeley, University of California Press)
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The dissatisfaction with abstract principles led commentators to look at concrete
situations. How do people develop in the social world? The third view holds that human
nature is shaped by social, historical and cultural factors. This is an appealing notion as
it allows for changes. The problem with this construction, Grimshaw says, is that if
society shapes human nature why do we have discrimination and injustice?' 3
 But could
this not be attributable to an evolving human nature which has not yet reached its peak
of morality? It is in the nature of things that evil will exist and with it injustice and
immorality. Civilisation does not conquer all it surveys, but this does not stop it trying
and improving on its record.
The final argument is that male and female nature respectively has been shaped by
social relationships. It is because of the gendering of men and women into certain roles
that differences have appeared. The construction and then misuse of difference has led
to the subordination of women. Feminists who use this strand of thought deny the idea
of an essential woman. The problem with this approach is that there are no parameters
left. The characteristics and problems of women may become so unmanageable and
subjective that the risk is that they will be struck off the political agenda.
2.3 Should Men and Women try to be Equal?
The demand for equality requires that the two individuals under observation be
essentially similar. Liberal natural rights theories recognised that individuals were
different but argued that individuals did share an essential sameness, which could, in the
public sphere, overcome natural differences. Liberal theorists conceived of a social
contract made between equal individuals in which power would be transferred to a
central government. It was a hypothetical contract which assumed that individuals were
free, equal and moral. The self represented in the hypothetical contract was supposedly a
universal gender-neutral being. It can be argued that the self was in fact a white, western
male.' 4
 An agent in a social contract was required to be rational. The criticism of
D Grimshaw, Jean (1986) Op. cit., p1 10
' Meehan, Elizabeth & Sevenhuijsen, Selma (1991) op. cit., p6; Flax, Jane (1992) "Beyond Equality:
Gender, Justice and Difference" in 0. Bock & S. James (Eds.), Beyond Equality and Difference.
Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity p193, 196 (London, Routledge)
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women's ability to reason by philosophers such as Aristotle and Kant had excluded
women from participation in philosophical theories. However, the liberal feminist Mary
Wollstonecraft believed that both men and women were rational. In fact reason was the
most important human characteristic, sex and gender were accidental features and of no
consequence to becoming fully human. Pateman believes that the constructs of emotion
versus reason, body versus mind, nature versus culture, which underpin the contractual
model must be deconstructed before any progress can be made.15
One way for women to be equal to men is to be assimilated into the public sphere. The
idea is that men and women are essentially similar. To achieve equality women must be
treated in the same way as men. This would not require great policy alterations, other
than the removal of irrational prejudices. On this instrumental view of equality, equality
is seen as a goal. Equal treatment of men and women will lead to equality of result. Here
autonomy is represented by rational individuals who participate in the labour market.
The child care responsibilities of employees are to be arranged outside the labour
market. 16 The assumption is that autonomy can only be achieved through paid
employment. It is argued that women are only included in the public sphere by asking
them to conform to a male standard. "Yet if women must cease being feminine to be
citizens, to speak of women's political emancipation would be an oxymoron since we
must eliminate our 'difference' before entering the public world." 7 Legislation which
aims to subjugate women into the male paradigm is not a benevolent gesture it is a
manipulative form of power. Such "equality" threatens to destroy sexual difference.
Women will not be free until they abandon the enveloping nature of the male norm.18
Before the practical application of assimilationist policies is discussed, another method
which sees men and women symmetrically situated will be briefly mentioned.
Androgyny suggests that men and women could be alike if social institutions picked out
a norm, or norms, located between the sexes and then based the treatment of both sexes
on this norm. The practicality of this would be onerous. "In order to be truly
Pateman, Carole (1987) "Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy" in A. Phillips (Ed.),
Feminism and Equality plo3, 112 (Oxford, Basil Blackwell)
16 Fredman, Sandra & Szyszczak, Erika (1992) Op. cit., p220
r Flax, Jane (1992) Op. cit., pp194-195
' Cavarero, Adriana (1992) Op. cit., pp39-40
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androgynous within a symmetrical framework, social institutions must find a single
norm that works equally well for all gendered characteristics."9
British and American feminists in the 1960's emphasised the similarity of men and
women in order to benefit from formal equality policies. Contemporary feminists see
equality policies as problematic. Under the direct discrimination provisions of the Sex
Discrimination Act a woman may not be less favourably treated than a similarly situated
man. An actual male comparator is not necessary. Detrimental treatment is measured by
comparison with treatment that a hypothetical man would receive. Fredman believes
that women's rights under the Act are limited because of the presence of the male norm.
The Act "is based on the assumption that gender can be simply subtracted from both
sides of the equation, leaving two similarly situated individuals." 20 In reality she
believes that an individual's experiences are affected by their gender. The values placed
on paid labour market work and unpaid family work serve to glorify the public, male
world and downgrade the private, female realm. A sharp division is made between the
public and the private, rather than any attempt to integrate the two. For example, many
employment rights require full-time continuous employment. Women who want to work
must find a way of separating private from public. Fredman believes that a re-
assessment of the value of family work is the only way to progress in this debate.
Complainants must come within the legislation. They must conform to the "normal"
standard. They are in no position to criticise that standard. 2 ' "Legal equality analysis
'runs out' when it encounters 'real' difference, and only becomes available if and when
the difference is analogized to some experience men can have too." 22 Difference, is
viewed by legal equality as natural within the woman and not shaped by social and
cultural factors. Critical legal theorists, along with many feminists, are challenging
liberal legal norms. Instead of supplying universality and objectivity such norms are
regarded as supplying bias towards certain groups and interests. Lacey suggests a
19 Grimshaw, Jean (1986) Op. cit., p113. The reader is also referred to Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1987)
"Against Androgyny" in A. Phillips (Ed.), Feminism and Equality pp 139-159 (Oxford, Basil Blackwell)
20 Fredman, Sandra (1994) Op. cit., p2
21 Lacey, Nicola (1992) "From Individual to Group?" in B. Hepple & E. Szyszczak (Eds.),
Discrimination: The Limits of Law p99, 104 (London, Mansell)
22 Littleton, Christine (1993) "Reconstructing Sexual Equality" in P. Smith (Ed.), Feminist Jurisprudence
p110, 119 (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
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working solution to the problematic male norm. If one steps away from the individual
legal subject and instead focuses on group claims, there is a greater chance that women,
blacks and ethnic groups will be recognised. 23 Her belief is that the concern of equality
has focused too much on the individual and not enough on the group.
2.4 Should Men and Women try to be Different?
If genuine equality is not achieved by equal treatment can it be achieved by recognising
differences between men and women? How should differences be incorporated into
public policy? Should there be preferential treatment for women? Would such a policy
play into the hands of assimilationists who use female difference as an obstacle to
participation in the public sphere? Should female values stand side by side with male
values in society? Some writers advocate this, whilst others deny the need for two sets
of values in society. Can man or woman be essentially defined? if not are similarities
and differences culturally relative? if so, flexible legislation will be necessary so as to
provide space for diverse male and female identities. Is there a position between these
two absolutist poles, where difference can be recognised, though not confined to an
absolute male or female identity?
What policies can be formulated using difference? First, an accommodation model
demands the differential treatment of biological differences. Women are to be given
special treatment so that they can be like men, for example, maternity leave followed by
the opportunity to return to work. However, social differences, such as skills, ought to
be compared under an equal treatment model. At the other pole, an empowerment model
eschews the relevance of difference, viewing it as a social construct that subordinates
women. Instead of celebrating difference, the practices of domination should be
removed. 24 Between these positions lies the seemingly moderate ground of women's
values.
The idea that women possess different values and talents to men is a popular one.
Women's experience with regard to pregnancy and childbirth is unique. Would the
23 Lacey, Nicola (1992) Op. cit., p108
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creation of a female norm be helpful in the present debate? There are two different
perspectives that this norm could reflect. It is submitted that either in isolation will
marginalise the women's movement. First, there is the idea of woman as the victim of
man's oppression who is now seeking liberation. Secondly, there is the description of
woman with different talents to man. This involves a deconstruction of the dominant
values in society. To describe women as victims ignores the talents and values which
they possess. Yet these talents and values have been partly shaped by the social
environment. Additionally, women encounter very different experiences to one another
which makes it difficult to construct one female norm.
There has been a backlash to the equality-difference debate. Even if women are different
to men, why is it that the male norm is paramount? To argue that because women are
different they require special treatment is to present normal treatment as a male
standard.25
 As a reaction to this Spender modelled a woman-centred culture which
asserted female values over and against male values. 26
 Running away from men will not
help women. A female norm of this type will serve to promote women's values at the
expense of men's. It is not a credible alternative.
The work of Carol Gilligan has received more support. 27 Working within the area of
relational feminism she analyses the different ethical approaches that men and women
take due to their psychological development. Her empirical research found that girls
tended to discuss moral problems by looking at the whole issue and the rest of their
experience; she labelled this an ethic of care. Boys tried to discover the essence of the
problem and worked from abstract principles taking a rights based approach. Gilligan
believes that female values should be re-assessed and incorporated into society as public
values. The appeal of her work is the recognition that women must be involved in the
public world, they must co-operate with men and not hide away from them. The
opportunities for a political commitment to feminism are far greater on this model.
Smith, Patricia (1993) "Introduction: Feminist Jurisprudence and the Nature of Law" in P. Smith (Ed.),
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Feminists have appropriated this concrete model. Scales believes that the abstract model
should be abandoned to be replaced by the concrete approach. She does not believe that
the rights-based and care-based approaches are compatible. Her fear is that the rights
based model would devour the ethic of care model. Her argument is that it is better to
use a model which incorporates many viewpoints rather than one which invites no
disagreement. Is this not just another way of describing democratic decision making, but
this time with a feminist slant? Feminists encounter problems when they seek to pursue
the relational model as being better than the rights model, rather than trying to reconcile
or incorporate the two. For example, Scales' description of why we prefer it is vague;
"because only it describes how we as language users actually and responsibly perform
according to truly meaningful criteria."28
There are difficulties with the description of a female norm. The woman can be
idealised, whilst the man is seen as a repressive force. It can situate the woman in a
vacuum, where she is consumed by female experiences such as childbirth, and hidden
from the public world. By emphasising female values of altruism and compassion and
male values of intellect and reason we return once more to the fixed liberal ideas of
body versus mind, nature versus culture and emotion versus reason. Historically, these
dichotomies have restricted opportunities for women. 29
 By saying that men should
develop their feminine characteristics and women their male ones leaves uncriticised the
initial classification of characteristics into male and female. 3° There is the point that it is
difficult to include women in philosophical models as they are often defined in
opposition to what is male. "What is female has been defined as what is excluded from
maleness, what is in opposition to it, what is complementary to it, what 'fills the gaps'
in male life or consciousness." 31
 Rhode questions how different is women's "different"
voice? Are women really bound together by these specific vaiues? How do factors such
as race, class, age and culture affect female values? 32
 We return to the question; is there
an essential woman or is there a pluralism of identities? I-Tow can one conceptualise
28 Scales, Ann (1993) 'The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay" in P. Smith (Ed.), Feminist
Jurisprudence p94, 100 (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
29 Rhode, Deborah (1992) "The Politics of Paradigms: Gender Difference and Gender Disadvantage" in
G. Bock & S. James (Eds.), Beyond Equality and Difference. Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female
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female qualities initially? How should this female norm be incorporated into society: as
a separate female norm, by integration with the male norm, or should difference be
abandoned to be replaced by a political concept such as justice or disadvantage?
2.5 The Public-Private Debate
Neatly intertwined with the equality-difference debate is the public-private debate. The
liberal theory of the state divides activities into public, political activities and private,
personal ones. The public sphere of the state is separate and independent from the
private sphere. The government is fully concerned with public affairs, but is unwilling to
intervene in private matters. In the private sphere distinctions of sex, race and class
exist. In the public realm people are undifferentiated, they are citizens, the bearers of
rights. Over the last two centuries advances have been made to remove as many
contingencies from the public world of work. Measures such as property rights and
discrimination law have promoted this end.33
Depending upon their political ideologies, feminists have either accepted or questioned
the public-private divide. Liberal feminists who support equal rights are less likely to
question the public-private divide. Secondly, the view of Elshtain is that the division is a
necessary one, but that the public sphere has failed to appreciate female values. Her
concern is not so much that the division prevents women's participation in public life
but that it fails to recognise female values. 34 Thirdly, the view of Pateman is that public
and private life should be interconnected and not kept separate. Finally, radical feminists
view the personal as political. 35 This is the idea that our private lives are controlled and
affected by social forces. "Where law has the capacity to intervene, the decision not to
do so is itself a political decision: omission, feminism argues, calls for justification as
much as does intervention, for it effectively legitimizes the status quo."36
Wolff, Robert Paul (1980) "There's Nobody here but us Persons" in C. Gould & M. Wartofsky (Eds.),
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2.5.1 Liberalism and the Public-Private Divide
The liberal basis for the separation of public and private can be traced back to Locke.37
In the public sphere, Locke stated that, political power could be exercised over free and
equal adult individuals. In the private sphere, paternal power could be exercised over
children. The husband's rule over his wife was taken for granted. Women were not
awarded the status of the individual and were excluded from public life. Behind this lay
the patriarchal idea that the division of public and private was due to the natural
characteristics of men and women. "Patriarchalism rests on the appeal to nature and to
the claim that women's natural function of childbearing prescribes their domestic and
subordinate place in the order of things."38
2.5.2 Problems with Liberalism
Some feminists argue that instead of a universal egalitarian model, liberalism presents a
patriarchal structure dominated by the male citizen. Women are not included in political
life because they lack the characteristics necessary for political citizenship. Because of
this, female difference is not included in the political sphere. The paradoxical
relationship between liberalism and patriarchalism has remained unnoticed for so long,
comments Pateman, because the two spheres are represented as separate but equal. She
believes that this hides the fact that women are dominated by men in the public and the
private sphere. 39
 Historically women were not totally excluded from the public sphere.
They had the political function of childbearing. Women were included because of their
different sex and their different function. Hence we return full circle to the equality-
difference debate. "The debate therefore continues to oscillate between 'difference'
(maternal thinking should be valued and brought into the political arena) and 'equality'
(citizenship not motherhood is vital for feminists)."40
 The dilemma for women, she
argues, is that motherhood is not viewed as a duty of citizens. To bring women within
the political arena, we should not focus on whether difference is politically relevant.
Locke, John, Second Treatise of Government
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Rather, the way that women have been incorporated into the political model should be
analysed in order to reformulate the equality-difference debate.41
A further paradox is at work here. Whilst many decry sex discrimination, they also
abhor the anonymity of capitalist work structures. The debate returns to human nature;
are we free or are we conditioned? If abstract principles are relied upon the individuality
of the person is eradicated. "To ignore the sex, race, age, culture, religion, or personality
of a person when hiring, or paying, or electing, or admitting that person is to accept the
public private split, and to shove into the private sphere out of sight and out of
consideration, everything that makes a person a human being and not merely a rational
agent."42 However, if we allow a conditioned view of human nature we may return to
the injustices of the past.
2.6 Solutions to the Public-Private Debate
2.6.1 The Personal is Political
Is there any solution to the equality-difference and public-private debate? Radical
feminists using the slogan, "the personal is political" believe a way can be found. They
believe that private structures are governed by the public realm. To resolve problems in
the private sphere political action must be taken. For example, Kate Millet in "Sexual
Politics" regards all power as political. The exercise of male power in the private sphere
becomes a political matter, a matter that the state has a duty to intervene in.
2.6.2 Pateman's Solution
To state that women are now fully included in the political sphere, via the
universalisation of liberal principles, cannot be the answer. It ignores male domination
within private life. "[T]he spheres are integrally related and that women's full and equal
membership in public life is impossible without changes in the domestic sphere."43
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Pateman is not saying that the personal is political, but rather that the two spheres are
interrelated. The relationship that men and women have between personal and political
life ought to be examined. The two realms are distinct, but they should not be set in
opposition to one another. The real issue is women's subordination not their difference.
Pateman's vision is a democratic citizenship in which men and women are equal
citizens who possess an equal worth of citizenship. For women to be free the definition
of sexual difference as subordination must be abandoned. "This does not mean that all
citizens must become (like) men or that all women must be treated in the same
way... .for citizenship to be of equal worth, the substance of equality must differ
according to the diverse circumstances and capacities of citizens, men and women."4
2.7 New Perspectives: A Departure from the Equality-Difference Debate
The seemingly irreconcilable equality-difference debate has forced writers to look for
other means to produce genuine equality. Gradually writers have moved away from the
idea of women's inequality; that women do not receive the same as men, to ideas of
oppression and subordination. Phillips defines oppression as, "a complex of ideological,
political and economic forces that combine to keep women in their place."45
Subordination is the next stage on. This is where men are identified as the cause of
women's oppression. How the concepts of disadvantage and domination are used to
promote equality will now be examined.
The constant scrutiny of characteristics into male or female is a tortuous, if not
ridiculous task. It requires that women must be either the same as men or different to
men. The concentration on this dichotomy, believes Fredman, cloaks us from the real
issue which is women's disadvantage. 46 Lacey believes that British legislation is far too
concerned with sexual and racial difference to the effect that the disadvantage of women
and ethnic groups is ignored.47 It is often the case that, because of past discrimination,
minority groups are not at an equal starting point. Formal, legal equality will not remedy
this position. Fredman uses the case of Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board to
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illustrate how the use of disadvantage might have produced a more useful result. 48
 The
case was brought under the Equal Pay Act 1970. Unequal pay is justified if it is due to a
genuine material factor other than the sex of the worker. There must be an objective
purpose for differential pay levels. The unequal pay must achieve that objective purpose.
In Rainey new entrants to a NHS department were paid more than existing employees.
The new employees were all male, whilst the existing employees were mainly female.
The employers, using the genuine material factor defence, submitted that market forces
required them to pay the new entrants a higher wage in order to attract them to the
department. The House of Lords accepted this argument. The defence covered
objectively justified grounds for women being paid less. Fredman believes that the use
of disadvantage would have prompted an assessment of why existing and new
employees were segregated by gender. 49
 This was not a relevant question under the
present legislation.
Rhode also uses the disadvantage framework. She creates a disadvantage model which
constructively uses sex/gender difference. She goes further than Fredman and Lacey in
her construction of how disadvantage should positively work in a legal framework.
Additionally, she does not pit disadvantage against difference as a conceptual tool.
Rather she uses difference and disadvantage in collaboration. Her model starts with the
assumption that men and women are not fairly situated. An analysis is made of the effect
that legal recognition of sexual difference would have. Is it more likely to reduce or
increase sexual inequality? The model is committed to gender equality via a recognition
that women ought not be disadvantaged as a group. "[I]n employment settings, the issue
becomes not whether gender is relevant to the job as currently structured, but how the
workplace can be restructured to make gender less relevant." 50
 The equality-difference
debate cannot be solved, but at least in this new perspective, difference is not seen as a
stumbling block to genuine equality.
Littleton believes that equality can be reconstructed to counter the negative emphasis
which has resulted from sex difference. Her concern is not the source of differences but
Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board [1987] IRLR 26
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the consequences of difference. Difference, whether real or assumed, should not make a
difference to the equality of people's lives. Littleton labels this "equality as
acceptance". 5 ' Equality should apply across differences that are gendered complements.
Therefore, an analysis of the valuation of skills would be necessary. As a policy option
she suggests that, "women and men who opt for socially female occupations, such as
child rearing, be compensated at a rate similar to those women and men who opt for
socially male occupations, such as legal practice." 52 As a policy, occupations should be
restructured to allow equal access to those whose inclinations are culturally conditioned
as male or female. The long run implications should be that socially male behaviour is
no longer seen as more important than socially female behaviour. A further reform
would be to attack the public-private divide by introducing private sphere interests into
the public world of work, and in consequence the private realm itself would be given
greater value.53
How does one decide what are gendered complements? Biological differences can be
subdivided into areas where there are ranges of differences such as height and areas
where there are definite differences such as pregnancy. Additionally, the social female
has developed because of men. Should we appropriate this description if we are trying to
help women? It is impossible to identify the essential woman, believes Littleton, as one
cannot abstract away from male influence. But by reconstructing equality women have a
chance to be included in the analysis. Should we be trying to eradicate the male
relationship with women anyway? It is submitted that the relationship between men and
women should be examined as opposed to removing one from the other.
Supporters of a meritocracy with a hierarchy of valued jobs will deny Littleton's ideas as
socialism at its worst. To pay professionals such as lawyers and doctors the same as
mothers and nannies is a difficult policy to follow through. The professionals might flee
to more hospitable shores where merit is rewarded. Working mothers would never have
the financial dilemma again, therefore a possible consequence would be the loss of (say)
women lawyers. It would be a smack in the face for those who have devoted years to
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study (and often financial commitment) to find that they are on a par with (say) a
teenage mother at the end of it all.
Like Littleton, MacKinnon is a radical feminist who believes that difference has been
constructed in order to oppress women. In her account of male domination she presents
women as the victims who are destined to be trampled on by the male norm. 54
 There is
no promise of free will or self determination. One can feel rather gloomy with
statements such as, "For women to affirm difference, when difference means
dominance, as it does with gender, means to affirm the qualities and characteristics of
powerlessness," and "women value care because men have valued [women] according
to the care [they] give them." 55
 Women, according to MacKinnon, have not been free to
choose what they want to do. Is it not foreseeable that some of the millions of women
world wide might have wanted to care for others, including their husbands, their
children and their parents? In Western culture women do have freedom of choice, which
means that many do have control over their lives.
MacKinnon focuses on experiences which only women suffer to show how domination
is presented as difference. For example, rape, domestic violence and prostitution,
happen almost exclusively to women, so they are treated as a sex difference, when in
actual fact they are issues of domination. She illustrates the deception; "if gender were
merely a question of difference, sex inequality would be a problem of mere sexism, of
mistaken differentiation, of inaccurate categorization of individuals....But if gender is an
inequality first, constructed as a socially relevant differentiation to keep that inequality
in place, then sex inequality questions are questions of systematic dominance."56
MacKinnon's focus on women's experience of rape and prostitution fails to
acknowledge that there are male equivalents that are equally damaging. The
phenomenon of male rape is less well documented but it exists as do male prostitutes
and the molestation of boys by paedophile gangs. In reply it can be argued that in the
main the aggressors are male. Nevertheless, the acknowledgement that males also share
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these experiences removes victimhood as the preserve of the female and it indicates that
men are not a homogenous class either.
2.8 The Feminist and Postmodernist Critique of Abstraction
The differences between abstract and concrete thinking will be explained and some
feminist concrete models will be presented. Feminists and postmodern theorists share
common ground when they deny that there is an objective reality. The equality-
difference debate becomes irrational in itself as it presents an essentialist view of human
nature. MacKinnon describes the use of abstract concepts as a tool to marginalise
women. "In the liberal state, the rule of law - neutral, abstract, elevated, pervasive - both
institutionalizes the power of men over women and institutionalizes power in its male
form."57 The alternatives suggested are variations of concrete thinking which bring both
relational and radical feminists together.
2.8.1 Abstraction
It is submitted that the critique of abstraction is inadequate in its description of what
abstraction actually is. There is general agreement that it involves a universal view of
human nature. By describing which differences matter and which do not one can
evaluate human action. Abstract norms are used to decide whether a society is treating
accidental differences as irrelevant or whether discrimination is rife. "It is the abstract
universals, and not the differences, which serve as a critical measure for existing social
reality."58 How do we use abstract universals when we make judgments? Grimshaw
identifies two different uses of abstract universality. First, we make an abstract moral
judgment if we apply to a situation a rule or a principle which will apply to all situations
of that sort. Thus one returns to the Aristotelian formula of treating like cases alike.
Secondly, an abstract moral judgment is when we make a judgment about a situation
without considering what human consequences this might have. 59 Arguably a fault of
feminist writings is the conflation of this distinction: the consequence being a vague
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critique of the perils of abstraction and a correspondingly vague solution of concreteness
which feeds off the conflation.
2.8.2 Concreteness
Feminists, disliking the result of formal equality policies, have turned their attention to
concrete thinking. "Where mainstream equality law is abstract, this approach is
concrete; where mainstream equality law is falsely universal, this approach remains
specific."6° Many ideas of concrete thinking flow from Gilligan's work. There is a belief
that female thinking is related to the context of the situation. It is argued that contextual
thinking should become part of moral thinking in general. This ties in with Gilligan's
ethic of care, with stress on the values of empathy and nurturance. There is a critique of
the liberal notions of will and choice being central to morality and of the separation of
fact and value. 6 ' As in the description of abstraction, there is a failure to properly define
concreteness. Two possible meanings of concreteness can be offered. The first definition
focuses on the particularity of a situation, which then must be assessed on that basis.
The second definition requires that one experience or empathise with the consequences
of a situation, either to oneself or others, and then make a judgment with this
information. It is easy to see why the two definitions might become confused or bonded
together. The second approach has the danger of being undetached and subjective,
making it an impossible model to work with. It is submitted that feminists should try to
develop the first approach. It is flexible yet it has potential for being used in a
reconstructed legal system.
2.8.3 The Critique of Abstraction
Abstract universality states that sex and gender are accidental properties and are not
philosophically relevant. Essential properties must be universal, necessary and unique to
that class of subjects or objects. Gould argues that abstract universality does have to
consider accidental properties as a philosophical issue. In order to decide which
properties are essential the theorist must examine all human properties, which will
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include accidental ones. To state that philosophy is only concerned with universal
principles and not particularities is a misnomer. 62
 The philosophical study of first
principles is contaminated with bias, believes Gould. For example, the male bastion of
reason does not mean that men will become rulers. It is because men are rulers that
reason is described as a male trait. On this reading, characteristics whether accidental or
essential, are shaped by social and political forces; they are not the product of a priori
knowledge. Reason may well be a universal property, but the hierarchy which places it
as a foremost property is socially constructed.63
Gould arguably takes the third position on human nature, which she describes as
concrete universality. 64
 Social and historical circumstances shape a human being's
essence. The idea is that universality should include differences. "[T]he criterion of
concrete universality is concerned also with human and social differences, and includes
them not simply as accidents, but as aspects which constitute the universal or the
essence itself."65
 Differences are part of the universal, thus the universal can change
over time. Concrete universality views sex difference as a contingency which has
developed via the historical and social relationships between men and women. The
power of concrete universality is that it can account for the differences which are the
causes of discrimination. The abstract model can determine if a universal human right
has been violated, but it cannot recognise that discrimination has taken place because of
a person's sex or race. Concrete universality is useful because it connects differences to
one another and allows for old differences to depart and new differences to enter the
model. In order to discover whether women are being subordinated, the actual standard
applied will vary according to the situation. "To worry in the abstract about which
standard should be applied at what time is to replicate the fallacy of the differences
approach."66
An omission thus far is how to stipulate concrete reality. MacKinnon attempts to
describe this. Initially women's situations must be described. The fact that women
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encounter unequal pay and sex discrimination and that they are exploited as prostitutes
and in pornography must be acknowledged. Secondly, male power over women
embodied in legislation must be identified and repealed. As an example of a necessary
reform, she cites the defence of mistaken belief in consent in the American rape law.
MacKinnon argues for substantive rights for women. This approach only serves to
replace male law with female law. Law based on a woman's point of view is not neutral.
She replies that the existing law is not neutral. Is it just special pleading for women? She
replies that the current law is special pleading for men. 67 Is MacKinnon's reasoning
process adequate? One feels that feminist jurisprudence has not been advanced by these
latter assertions.
Is it correct to make a distinction between abstract and concrete methods? Is it correct to
label abstract thinking as male and concrete thinking as female? Is the division
meaningful? Even if it is, will it help women or will it backfire and marginalise women
yet again? For example, even if women can see the real human consequences of an
action better than men (concrete thinking as opposed to an abstract judgment in isolation
from human consequences) is it always wise that she should practise this?68
Employment situations often require employees to engage in abstract judgments in order
to remain psychologically healthy themselves. Women are walking a tightrope. For
example, women generally are supposed to "care", nurses are supposed to "care", (and
many nurses are women) yet a female nurse should not, it is felt, care too much: if she
does, her capability as a worker is diminished.
Bartlett argues that it is difficult and less than useful to polarise abstract and concrete
methods. She notes that feminist methods require some degree of abstraction to work at
all. "Concrete facts have significance only if they represent some generalizable aspect of
the case....! abstract whenever I fail to identify every fact about a situation, which, of
course, I do always." 69 Additionally feminist practical reasoning uses rationality when
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analysing common features and differences. It takes the enterprise of rationality further
by examining a great variety of Weltanschaungs.
66
Chapter Three
The Anatomy of the Church of England
In this Chapter the constitutional status of the Church of England and its position as a
law-maker will be examined. The principal bodies and officers of the Church will be
examined, with particular emphasis being placed upon the parish priest. The formal
procedures which surround a priest's "employment" are discussed in detail. This covers
appointment, disciplinary action and dismissal.
3.1 Constitutional Position of the Church of EngJand
The Church of England is the established Church in England; meaning that the Church
is in a special legal relationship with the state. Phillimore J. described this unique
position. "A Church which is established is not thereby made a department of the state.
The process of establishment means that the state has accepted the Church as the
religious body in its opinion truly teaching the Christian faith, and given to it a certain
legal position." A clear explanation of establishment is given by "Moore's Introduction
to English Canon Law". 2 At one extreme is the USA which does not have an established
Church. Instead, there are many types of churches, including the Anglican Church
known as the Episcopalian Church. These churches are free associations, whose
government is regulated by contract. The state has no cause to interfere, unless the
contract contravenes national or state law. At the other extreme is ancient Jewry, where
the Church was seen as equal to the state and the state as equal to the Church. "There
was no law which was not regarded as divine, and there was no facet of the national
religion which was not regarded as part of the law."3
The Church of England today nestles between these two extremes. The monarch is the
Supreme Governor of the Church of England.4
 The monarch, as head of state and head
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of the Church, has the final decision in law-making, whether secular or ecclesiastical. In
practice royal supremacy is exercised by Parliament. As the established Church, the
Church of England must conform to limitations placed on it by Parliament. In England
there are many other churches, such as the Catholic Church and the Methodist Church,
who do not have this relationship with the state because they ' are not part of the
established Church. A disestablished church, such as the Church in Wales, has had state
control and patronage withdrawn. It is only within the Church of England that Church
officials are state officials and that Church government is part of state government. An
established Church must allow the state to have the final say in matters of Church
government. Nonconformist churches and disestablished churches do not have this
constraint. However, such churches are not totally free from state control. No individual
or body can be completely free from secular power. Moore describes this situation: "A
Free Church is free only in so far as the supreme secular authority is content to leave it
alone, and an Established Church is bound only in so far as the supreme secular
authority chooses to exert itself in the Church's affairs."5
3.1.1 The Church, the State and the Law
The law of the Church of England has various sources. Parts of the common law cover
church matters. For example, the office of incumbent is of common law origin. 6 Two
parliamentary sources are Acts of Parliament and statutory instruments. 7 Despite
Parliament's continued power to legislate on Church matters, most legislation is now
formulated by the General Synod, either by Measure or by Canon.
The Synod may pass a Measure on any Church matter. 8 It has the force of an Act of
Parliament and will bind the whole Church of England, clergy and laity alike. In order
for a Measure to receive final approval in the General Synod it must receive a majority
vote in each of the Synod's three Houses.9 Certain legislation requires two-thirds
Moore, E. Garth (1985) o p. cit., p16
6 For greater detail on this the reader is referred to; The Legal Advisory Commission of the General Synod
(1994) Legal Opinions Concerning the Church of England p121 (London, Church House Publishing)
' An example of the former being the Submission of Clergy Act 1533 and an example of the latter being
the Church of England Pensions Regulations 1988, S.I. 1988 No. 2256
Church of England (Assembly) Powers Act 1919 s 3 (6); Synodical Government Measure 1969 s 2 (2)
Synodical Government Measure 1969 Sch 2, Art 5(1)
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majorities in each House.'° An example of this was the Priests (Ordination of Women)
Measure 1993. Once it has been given final approval the Measure is passed to the
Legislative Committee of the General Synod, who then pass it to the Ecclesiastical
Committee with any comments which they deem appropriate. The Ecclesiastical
Committee comprises thirty members who represent both Houses of Parliament. They
submit a report to Parliament stating the nature and legal effect of the intended Measure
and comment upon the constitutional effect of the Measure on the citizen)' Once this is
complete, Parliament must vote on the legislation. They must either approve it without
amendment or reject it. Finally, it must receive the royal assent. Thus the General Synod
cannot legislate for the Church without Parliament's approval.
Canons are in part directives for the guidance of the Church in ecclesiastical matters and
in part subsidiary legislation made under the direction of the Crown by the General
Synod.' 2 They do not require the scrutiny of the Legislative or Ecclesiastical Committee
or Parliament. Matters of worship and doctrine can be passed by Canon. They are used
to make rules regarding the clergy and doctrinal matters. A Canon binds only the clergy
and laypersons holding ecclesiastical office, for example churchwardens.'3
3.2 Church Government
The Church of England is divided into units for ecclesiastical and administrative
purposes. There are two provinces, Canterbury and York, each with a separate
archbishop. Each province contains dioceses which are governed by a bishop. The
dioceses contain parishes which the priest presides over. For administrative purposes
several parishes are grouped together into rural deaneries which are overseen by a rural
dean. Rural deaneries are grouped together into archdeaconries which are overseen by
an archdeacon. For the purposes of this thesis the role of the bishop in his diocese, and
the priest in his or her parish will be the most relevant. To provide the foundations for
this, the functions of the bishop and the PCC will be examined. As part of the Church
° Ibid. Sch 2, Article 8; Church of England (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure 1978, s I
Church of England (Assembly) Powers Act 1919 s 3 (3)
12 Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition vol.14 para 308
13 For a comprehensive list of Canons the reader is referred to; "The Canons of the Church of England"
(1993) Fifth Edition (London, Church House Publishing).
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government structure the bishop and the PCC are likely to have continuous involvement
with the parish priest. Other important parts of Church government are the monarch, the
General Synod, diocesan synods and deanery synods. The working conditions of a
parish priest will also be influenced by the archdeacon, the rural dean and lay workers.
For completeness these will be briefly mentioned.
The monarch, as Supreme Governor of the Church of England, must assent to all
legislation concerning the Church. The monarch formally appoints the two archbishops
and the bishops. Additionally, the monarch exercises patronage over many benefices.
The General Synod was created as the principal ruling body of the Church by the
Synodical Government Measure 1969. It must meet at least twice a year to pass
Measures and Canons. It has three Houses; the House of Bishops, the House of Clergy
and the House of Laity. Diocesan synods must be instituted in each diocese. They
comprise three Houses as described regarding the General Synod. The diocesan synod
must make provision in its own diocese for matters concerning the Church of England.
Another function is the discussion of matters referred to them by the General Synod,
especially matters concerning Article 8 of the Church's constitution. Article 8 provides
that specified majorities are required in the General Synod before certain legislation can
be passed.' 4
 Deanery synods must be instituted in each deanery. They have two Houses;
the House of Clergy and the House of Laity. Deanery synods discuss the problems of
parishes in their deanery, and make provision regarding these matters. They may wish to
refer a matter to the diocesan synod. A core idea is the bringing together of parish ideas,
with the aim of formulating common policies and fostering a sense of community. Can
this be done now with the advent of women priests? Deanery synods consider any
matters that are before the diocesan synod, especially any matters so referred by the
General Synod and sound parochial opinion whenever it is required or it is appropriate
to do so.15
' Synodical Government Measure 1969 Sch 2, Article 8
15 Ibid. ss 5 (3) (a-e)
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3.2.1 Bishops, Archdeacons and Rural Deans
At present only men can become bishops. 16
 They are appointed by the monarch, on the
advice of the Prime Minister. Each diocese has a standing committee which submits a
short list of two candidates in order of priority to the appointments committee of the
General Synod, who in turn pass this list to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister can
recommend either name to the monarch, and in exceptional circumstances may ask the
standing committee for another name. 17
 Generally, the Prime Minister will recommend
the first person on the list.
The bishop undertakes the cure of all souls in his diocese. He alone ordains priests and
deacons, confirms the baptised and consecrates land and buildings. The bishop appoints
priests, rural deans and archdeacons in his own diocese.' 8
 The diocesan bishop can
request that an appointment of a suffragan bishop be made in his diocese. A suffragan
bishop is a subsidiary bishop who is appointed to help a diocesan bishop in a particular
part of his diocese. In certain dioceses, including London, the diocese is divided into
areas. Episcopal oversight of such areas is shared between the diocesan bishop and an
area bishop.' 9
 The diocesan bishop also has complete discretion to appoint a retired
bishop as an assistant bishop. The functions of suffragan, area and assistant bishops are
similar to those of a diocesan bishop. Importantly, they do not possess the power to pass
any of the declarations contained in section 2 of the 1993 Measure. This is reserved for
the diocesan bishop.
An archdeacon is an ordained priest. He or she works closely with the bishop. In
particular an archdeacon has responsibility, in his or her archdeaconry, for pastoral
oversight of the clergy. The archdeacon must monitor any difficulties which a priest is
experiencing and if necessary report this to the bishop. 2° A rural dean is appointed by
the bishop and the archdeacon and will usually be a beneficed priest in the deanery.2'
16 Book of Common Prayer, Preface to Form of Making, Ordaining and Consecrating Bishops, Priests and
Deacons; "The Canons of the Church of England" (1993) op. cit., Canon C2, para 5
17 Moore, E. Garth (1985) op. cit., pp 19-20
18 Ibid. p28
Dioceses Measure 1978 s 11
20 
"The Canons of the Church of England" (1993) Op. cit., Canon C22, para 4
21 Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, vol.14 para 524
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The rural dean must report to the bishop any problems in the deanery which he or she
considers are necessary for the bishop to know. 22 Certain dioceses, including London,
use the title area dean to refer to a rural dean.
3.2.2 The Parochial Church Council
Each parish has a PCC. At the annual PCC meeting the new members of the council are
elected. All Church of England members resident or worshipping in the parish can
attend and vote in new members. Lay members of the PCC must be actual
communicants aged sixteen or over. Lay members hold office for one year. At the next
meeting they are eligible for re-election. A lay member must retire after three years of
holding office. The incumbent of the parish is the PCC chairman. The vice-chairman is
a lay person elected by the council. The two churchwardens, if actual communicants, are
ex-officio council members. All clerks in Holy Orders beneficed or licensed to the
parish are council members. This includes priests in a team or a group ministry and
curates. Members of the deanery, diocesan and General Synod, if on the electoral roll of
the parish, are ex-officio members. The council may also co-opt clergy or lay members
provided that their number does not exceed one-fifth of the number of elected lay
representatives or two persons whichever is the greater.23
An important power of the PCC is their ability to pass Resolutions A and/or B. 24 In this
way a PCC can prevent the appointment of a woman priest in their parish. Whether or
not the Resolutions are in place, the parish representatives are involved in the
appointment of an incumbent. 25 The parish representatives are generally the
churchwardens of a parish, who are in turn usually PCC members. A prospective
incumbent cannot be offered the post until approved by the parish representatives. 26 The
laity have considerable influence over the appointment of a priest to a parish.
22 
"The Canons of the Church of England" (1993) op. cit., Canon C23, para 1
23 A complete list of qualifications for council membership is to be found in the Synodical Government
Measure 1969, Sch 3 - Church Representation Rules, Part II, rr 9, 12, 13, 14. The reader is referred to
Moore, E. Garth (1985) Op. cit., p38 and Haisbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition vol.14 paras 569,
570, 571 for a general discussion of council membership.
Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 s 3(1)
25 This is discussed in detail at 3.3.6.
26 Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986 s 13 (1) (b) (i)
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3.3 The Parish Priest
The parish priest can mean so many different things that it requires an explanation.
Various descriptions of those officiating as a priest in the parish church include;
assistant curate, curate, priest-in-charge, vicar, rector, incumbent or minister.
The parish priest is charged with the cure of all souls in his or her parish. "The parish
priest is, therefore, rightly called the curate, while his ordained assistants are only, at
most, assistant curates, despite the fact that in modern parlance the assistant curate is the
person to whom most people refer as the 'curate'." 27
 The modern phraseology is
adopted in this thesis. The legal position of curates and priests-in-charge will be
discussed at 3.4. First, the legal position of the incumbent will be examined. For clarity,
the word minister needs definition. It has different meanings according to the context. It
is wide enough to apply to a bishop, priest or deacon in the Church of England. 28
 It is
often used in the context of stipendiary and non-stipendiary ministry.
3.3.1 The Incumbent
The priest who does have considerable legal rights is the incumbent. "The 'incumbent'
is, strictly, the clergyman in possession of the benefice, or living; he may be rector or
vicar; and he has, under the bishop, the exclusive cure of souls in the benefice." 29
 The
incumbent is in possession of the freehold, and cannot, therefore, be moved on at will.
The incumbent may operate solely or as part of a team or group ministry. In a team
ministry there will be one rector and a vicar or vicars. The rector will be the incumbent.
The vicar will be given "a status equal to that of an incumbent of a benefice." 3° A vicar
in a team ministry has, for their term of years, the same security of tenure as the
incumbent of a benefice. A group ministry comes into existence when several benefices
are grouped together. An incumbent from one benefice can perform services in other
benefices within the group as long as he or she abides by any directions from the
27 Moore E. Garth (1985) op. cit., p35
28 Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, vol.14 para 654 n.1
29 Dale, Sir William (1989) The Law of the Parish Church p17 (London, Butterworths)
30 Pastoral Measure 1983 s 20 (1)
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incumbent of the other benefice. 31
 A group minister is not allowed to withdraw
completely from group duties without resigning his or her own benefice. 32
 A woman
incumbent in a group ministry does not have authority to preside at or celebrate the Holy
Communion or pronounce the Absolution in a parish which has passed Resolution A
andlor B.33
Finally, it should be noted that a male incumbent has the opportunity formally to prevent
the appointment of a woman priest to his benefice. The incumbent's role as chairman of
the PCC means that he can be influential when Resolutions A and/or B are under
consideration.34
3.3.2 The Benefice
The term benefice is integral to the definition of an incumbent. Before the appointment
of an incumbent is discussed the term benefice requires a definition. "A benefice is a
freehold office. The holder of a benefice is called the incumbent or minister, according
to the nature of his benefice, he is also styled rector (or parson) or vicar." 35
 It is the
incumbent who is in possession of the benefice. A benefice can be constituted in a
number of ways. For example, it might comprise a single benefice with one parish or
separate parishes, a single benefice with parishes united into one, a single benefice with
some parishes united and others left separate and finally benefices held in plurality.
An incumbent can only be removed from his or her benefice under the Incumbents
(Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977 or if he or she has committed an ecclesiastical
offence which warrants the vacation of the benefice. 36
 The General Synod instituted a
steering committee to consider the abolition of the freehold. The freehold has been
criticised for protecting inadequate and inefficient clergy. Arguably it is inappropriate to
have two different categories of clergy: freeholders enjoying security of tenure and
unbeneficed clergy reliant on the bishop's licence. However, the committee advised the
31 Ibid. s 21(1) (a-c)
32 Moore, E. Garth (1985) op. cit., p45
B Pastoral Measure 1983 s 21(1); Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 Sch 3, para 7
Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 s 3 (1)
B Haisbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, vol.14 para 689
36 The reader is referred to 3.6.1. and 3.6.2.
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General Synod not to pursue the issue. It was perceived that such a move would damage
clergy morale which was already low following the ordination of women priests and
financial difficulties in the Church. 37 Additionally, no consensus had been reached on
how to operate changes to the freehold system. First, how should the abolition be
introduced; should it be immediate or should existing freeholders retain their rights as
long as they remain in that office? Secondly, should abolition apply to all ecclesiastical
offices? For example, if it is appropriate to abolish the freehold with regard to
incumbents, why not apply it to bishops and archdeacons?
It is arguable that the introduction of women priests has downgraded the status of a
priest's office. Just as in other areas of employment, such as the armed forces, the
introduction of women is viewed by the profession itself as a devaluation of the job.
The identification of social class by occupation has always placed the clergy in the top
band. Despite receiving a modest stipend, the clergy have enjoyed a higher status than
wealthier employees. Might this change with the introduction of women priests? Was
the proposed abolition of the freehold an emanation of this progressive downgrading?
The calls for employee status detailed in the next chapter might result in a greater
levelling; which is why many clergy might resist secular protection.
3.3.3 Appointment as an Incumbent
Before an incumbent can exercise their ministry in a new post three legal procedures
must be complied with; presentation, institution and induction. Only the former will be
examined. To be admitted to a benefice, the person must be an ordained priest. 38 If the
priest lacks three years experience in Holy Orders the bishop may refuse appointment.39
The requisite experience in Holy Orders is normally gained by serving a curacy of three
or four years. 4° The first year of the curacy is spent as a deacon. After one year the
curate is priested and then completes the remaining two or three years of the curacy.
This is the usual position for men and it will be for women who have only just entered
' The Guardian, 7th November 1995
38 Act of Uniformity 1662 s 10; "The Canons of the Church of England" (1993) op. cit., Canon ClO, para
Benefices Measure 1972 s 1 (1); "The Canons of the Church of England" (1993) Op. cit., Canon ClO,
para 3
40 This is discussed in detail at 3.4.1.
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the ministry. However, in this transitional period, whilst there is a glut of experienced
women clergy, it is not necessary for these women to serve a full-length curacy provided
that they have comparable experience to a male priest with three years experience in
Holy Orders. Some women have years of experience as deaconesses dating back to the
1970's and experience as deacons from 1987 onwards. There are even those who have
thirty or more years of pastoral experience, who started their vocations as "licensed
women workers".
3.3.4 The Patron
Each benefice has a patron. This is often the bishop, or it may be a lay patron. In many
benefices the patronage is shared jointly between the bishop and the lay patron. The
right of presentation to a living, the advowson, is held by the patron. An advowson is a
property right which can be transferred by deed of gift or bequeathed. It cannot be
bought or sold.4 ' Regulations regarding the right of presentation to a living are governed
by the Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986.42
The patron has two primary functions. First, to invite prospective incumbents to visit the
benefice and secondly to present the living to the successful candidate. The patron has
considerable discretionary power regarding these decisions. For example, if a priest asks
to visit the benefice the patron can, as a matter of practice, refuse this. if the patron
invites the priest to visit the benefice, but following the visit believes him or her to be an
unsuitable candidate, the patron can inform the bishop of this (if it is a lay patron) and
the process usually stops there. This discretionary power is held in check by the fact that
the patron does not act alone. He or she will liaise with the bishop and importantly the
parish representatives. The latter will usually meet the priest when he or she visits the
benefice. It is normal practice that the parish representatives will have indicated
informally to the patron whether they think the candidate is suitable or not before the
41 Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, vol.14 para 776
42 Unless otherwise indicated references to the 1986 Measure in this Chapter refer to the Patronage
(Benefices) Measure 1986. For further information on patronage the reader is referred to Halsbury's Laws
of England, Fourth Edition, vol.14 paras 776-83 1 and Haisbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition,
Cumulative Supplement 1997, vol.14 paras 776-83 1
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formal approval stage is reached. If the patron wishes to present the living to a priest the
formal approval of the bishop and the two parish representatives must be given.
3.3.5 Procedure When a Benefice is Vacant
Sometimes when a benefice becomes vacant it is held in suspension. 43
 In this situation
no notice of the vacancy can be given. The patron's right of presentation to the
benefice is suspended. Instead the bishop can licence a priest-in-charge to the benefice.
Such a priest does not have a freehold office.45
 If the benefice is not to be held in
suspension, notice of the vacancy must be given by the bishop to the patron and the
secretary of the PCC. 46 Once notification has been given, the PCC must meet within
four weeks to fulfil various tasks. The PCC will send a letter to the patron and to the
bishop describing the particular needs of the benefice. They will elect two parish
representatives to act in connection with the appointment of an incumbent - these are
usually the two churchwardens. They must decide whether to ask the patron to advertise
the vacancy and whether to request a joint meeting with the patron and bishop under
section 12 of the 1986 Measure. Also whether they wish a written statement by the
bishop regarding the needs of the diocese must be decided. 47
 Finally, they need to decide
whether to pass Resolutions A and/or B and thereby prevent the appointment of a
woman priest.48
Where a benefice comprises two or more parishes certain of the provisions are modified.
For example, at the PCC meeting the councils must decide when preparing a statement
of the needs of the parishes whether to make a joint statement or whether each parish
will prepare a separate statement.49 As regards the appointment of parish
representatives, the councils must appoint, "such numbers of persons, but not less than
four, as will enable each of those councils to have at least one representative, to act as
Pastoral Measure 1983 s 67 (1)
Ibid. s 70; Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986 Sch 4, para 21
The reader is referred to 3.4.2.
46 Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986 s 7
47 Ibid.s 11 (1)(a-e)
48 Ibid. s 11(1) (0; Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 s 3 (7). The reader is referred to the
Introduction and the description of the Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993.
Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986 Sch 2. para 4 (1A)
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representatives of those councils in connection with the selection of an incumbent."50
Where a benefice comprises two or more parishes there may be a conflict of ideas
regarding the needs of the benefice. For example, one parish may desire a woman priest,
whereas a neighbouring parish might vehemently oppose this. Once a Resolution
forbidding the ministrations of a woman priest in a benefice has been passed, there is
nothing that the other parish can do. They can only hope that the neighbouring parish
revokes the Resolution, either by a change of heart or by a change in council
composition.
If the PCC have asked the patron to advertise the vacancy he or she can do so by two
methods. First, the patron could inform the Church of England clergy appointments
adviser who will place the vacancy in a bulletin which is received by clergy seeking a
new appointment. Secondly, an advertisement in a clergy newspaper such as the Church
Times will reach a wider audience. This may result in patrons being able to consider
candidates who otherwise would not have come to their attention. The decision not to
ask for the vacancy to be advertised means that informal contacts will flourish, and a
suitable candidate may not even enter the race.
Under section 12 of the 1986 Measure the PCC, the bishop or the patron may request
that a joint meeting is held. At this meeting the bishop must deliver a statement
outlining the needs of the diocese and the wider interests of the Church. The meeting
can comment upon the bishop's statement and the PCC's statement regarding the needs
of the parish. By assessing both statements the patron is in a better position to judge the
necessary job requirements. The patron should not only be aware of any distinctive
features of the office, but also features which are purposely excluded from the
statements.51
5° Ibid. Sch 2, para 4 (1) (b), see also Sch 2, paras 19, 20 regarding benefices having a team council or a
joint PCC.
Private Patrons' Consultative Group (1995) "Exercising Patronage in the Church of England" p6
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3.3.6 Selection of a Prospective Incumbent
As with many occupations, there is no single method of selection for the office of
incumbent. The patron has ultimate authority to decide how the selection of an
incumbent is to be conducted. Again they will act in conjunction with the parish
representatives and the wider body of the PCC. Both may have specific views as to how
the selection should be conducted. They may inform the patron of their wishes, but there
is no legal duty on the patron to acquiesce to these wishes. 52 Church appointments
appear to thrive on informality, but there is no reason why formal interviews should not
be used - indeed they are used. Because of the nature of group and team ministries,
certain procedures are required. Before an offer of presentation to a group ministry is
approved by the bishop and the two parish representatives the patron must consult with
other incumbents and any priests-in-charge. In the case of a team ministry, the
consultation can come at a later stage, before the presentation of the priest for
institution. However, it is recommended that this consultation is preferable at an earlier
stage, before an offer of presentation is made.53
A patron must not make an offer to present a priest to a benefice until the approval of
the parish representatives and the bishop is given. 54 Naturally the two parish
representatives will have specific ideas as to the type of incumbent they are looking for.
It is hoped that these views represent the needs of the parish and not solely personal
preferences. The involvement of the laity is an important check on the power of the
patron, whether they be lay or clerical. Lay involvement is seen as a step forward from
the days when patrons could import their friends and family into a benefice.
3.3.7 Disapproval of a Candidate
if the bishop or the parish representatives disapprove of the appointment they must
notify the patron in writing the grounds of their refusal. 55 What grounds are sufficient to
justify a refusal? The Code of Practice which accompanies the 1986 Measure suggests
52 Ibid. p6
Ibid. pp6-7
s Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986 s 13 (1) (b) (1), (ii)
Ibid. s 13 (4)
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two wide categories by which an offer of presentation could be refused. First, that "the
Bishop or PCC Representatives could withhold that consent if the priest failed to meet
some important requirement in the PCC statement or the Bishop's statement,
particularly if the Bishop and the PCC are agreed on that requirement." Secondly, that
"the Bishop or the PCC Representatives consider that the priest's personality make him
unsuitable for the parish and unlikely to be able to minister in it effectively." 56 The latter
ground is ripe for subjective assessments, stereotypes and sex discrimination. The
problem is how to uncover such discriminatory practices. The patron can request that
the archbishop review the matter. The archbishop, if he sees fit, may authorise the
patron to make the offer. 57 In an unreported hearing in December 1994 the Archbishop
of Canterbury held that the marital status of an incumbent was not an appropriate
ground for refusal either by the bishop or the PCC representatives. 58 Could a candidate's
sex be used as a ground for refusal? Clearly, Resolutions A and/or B justify sex
discrimination on theological grounds. Parishes which have not passed these
Resolutions do not have a justification for sex discrimination against women priests
unless they can rely upon the wider protections of section 6 of the 1993 Measure. 59 The
archbishop would need to establish that the disapproval was because of the candidate's
sex and not because of the candidate's personal characteristics (other than their sex).
Alternatively, the candidate might wish to pursue a sex discrimination claim regarding
recruitment in the civil courts.60
The patronage system consolidated in the 1986 Measure ensures lay as well as
ecclesiastical involvement in clergy appointments. The Church's credibility as an
impartial institution can only be increased by this. However, the process of benefice
suspension and the transfer of patronage to diocesan bishops and Diocesan Boards of
Patronage weakens this link. There is a perception that the tide is turning to create an
insular Church. The Private Patrons' Group believes that patronage transfer should be
Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986, Code of Practice, quoted in Private Patrons' Consultative Group
(1995) Op. cit, p8
Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986 s 13 (5)
58 Private Patrons' Consultative Group (1995) op. cit., p8
This is discussed in detail at 7.1.2. and 7.1.3.
60 This is subject to the legal obstacles to a sex discrimination claim discussed in Chapter Seven.
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avoided. To do otherwise "is to assist a process which is making the Church of England
more narrowly ecclesiastical and silences a lay voice."61
3.4 Unbeneficed Clergy
The position of beneficed clergy has been explained, now the focus turns to unbeneficed
clergy. These comprise curates and priests-in-charge. Unlike incumbents, unbeneficed
clergy do not hold a freehold office, instead they require a licence to officiate granted by
the bishop. First, the position of a curate will be examined before turning to that of a
priest-in-charge. For simplicity licensing rules will be described in relation to curates
only, but they are equally applicable to priests-in-charge.
3.4.1 A Curate
After finishing theological college, a student will seek their first curacy, the first year of
which is spent as a deacon. They are ordained as a deacon which is the first Holy Order.
Which comes first; ordination or acquisition of an ecclesiastical appointment? Before a
candidate can be ordained into the first Holy Order they must provide the bishop of the
diocese in which they seek ordination with a certificate stating their intended
appointment. The bishop must judge this post to be sufficient and the deacon must be
able to attend to the cure of souls and execute their ministry. This is known as "Title to
Orders". 62
 Even when a candidate can provide evidence as to the provision of an
ecclesiastical office, a bishop has absolute discretion as to whom he ordains.63
Additionally, the House of Bishops has ruled that candidates who are over 45 will not be
accepted for training for the stipendiary ministry. TM
 A candidate must possess a
sufficient knowledge of holy scripture, of the doctrine, discipline and worship of the
Church of England. They must satisfy the requirement as to learning and other qualities
which the bishop deems necessary for the office of deacon. 65
 These requirements are
met by studying at theological colleges or on part-time courses. A variety of
61 Private Patrons' Consultative Group (1995) op. cit., p2
62 
"The Canons of the Church of England" (1993) Op. cit., Canon CS, para 1
63 Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, vol.14 para 657
This is discussed at 7.6.3.
Haisbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, vol.14, para 657; Clergy (Ordination and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Measure 1964 s 1(1)
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qualifications are offered, some based on exams and others on continuous assessment.
Standardisation is achieved by the Advisory Board of Ministry (ABM), on behalf of the
House of Bishops, approving or disapproving of a course. Only an ABM approved
course of education will enable a candidate to undertake training for Holy Orders.
Despite being referred to generally as a deacon, they are licensed as a curate. 66
 Once
they have served their "Title to Orders" successfully (usually after one year) they will be
ordained as a priest, which is the second Holy Order. References to curates in the text
include deacons in the first year of their curacy, as well as curates who have been
priested.
When seeking a first curacy the process is usually fairly informal. Often the bishop who
has sponsored the application to theological college will know of vacancies. The
applicant meets the incumbent of the parish, who decides whether he or she is suitable
for the curacy or not. The incumbent has considerable power regarding the necessary job
requirements and the type of candidate that he or she wants to work with. The
incumbent will nominate the person to the bishop, then ordination as a deacon can take
place.67
 A curate who works with an incumbent owes to him or her certain duties. The
curate must act in accordance with the incumbent's directions, unless the incumbent has
been suspended or inhibited. Likewise the incumbent is responsible for the actions of
the curate whilst under his or her directions or whilst acting with his or her consent.68
A curate is licensed to officiate by the bishop. A licence can be for an unspecified term
or for a fixed term. A licence is granted at the will and pleasure of the bishop, "there is
no reason why it should not be limited to a given period, either for a given number of
years, or to expire on a particular happening, for instance on the person licensed
reaching a stated age."69
 When the period has ended or the age is reached the licence
will automatically expire. Then there is the possibility that it might be renewed or a
permission to officiate might be issued.
The Legal Advisory Commission of the General Synod (1994) Op. cit., p95
67 
"The Canons of the Church of England" (1993) Op. cit., Canon C12, para 3
68 Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, vol.14, para 711
69	 Legal Advisory Commission of the General Synod (1994) Op. cit., p229
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First, the ways in which a curate can have their licence revoked by a bishop will be
examined. A bishop can revoke a fixed term licence prior to its expiration, he can also
revoke a licence for an unspecified term. The revocation may be a summary one. "The
bishop of a diocese may by notice in writing revoke summarily, and without further
process, any licence granted to any minister within his diocese for any cause which
appears to him to be good and reasonable after having given the minister the sufficient
opportunity of showing reason to the contrary." 7° The curate may appeal against the
revocation within one month to the archbishop of the province. 71
 The provisions of
Canon C12, para 5 only apply to summary revocation and not when the revocation is on
notice. The Canon is a safeguard to prevent an unwarranted withdrawal of a licence. The
Legal Advisory Commission of the General Synod believe that the fact that a person has
reached a certain age, even if it is pensionable age, is not a good and reasonable cause to
warrant a summary revocation.
A bishop can revoke a licence on reasonable notice. In this situation, the fact that
someone has reached a certain age would be a legitimate ground for revocation. The
bishop must give reasonable notice. The criteria for judging this would include a
person's length of service in their post and the time needed to relocate the person. If
reasonable notice is not given the revocation becomes a summary one. Importantly, no
appeal lies against the revocation of a licence on reasonable notice.
An incumbent has limited powers to revoke a curate's licence. First, this can be done
with the curate's consent. Secondly, where there is no consent the incumbent can revoke
the licence provided that certain conditions are met. If the licence is a fixed term one the
incumbent may give the curate a notice to quit before the term is complete. 72
 Whether
the licence is for a fixed term or for an unspecified term the incumbent must give six
months notice to the curate and obtain the written consent of the bishop. 73
 If the bishop
refuses, the incumbent may within one month appeal to the archbishop of the province
who will decide whether or not to terminate the curacy. 74
 The incumbent's seemingly
70 
"The Canons of the Church of England" (1993) op. cit., Canon C12, para 5; Church of England
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure 1976 s 2 (1) (b)
' Church of England (Legal Aid and Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure 1988 s 14 (2), Sch 3
72 Church of England (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure 1976 s 2 (2) (a); Pluralities Act 1838 s 95
' The Legal Advisory Commission of the General Synod (1994) Op. cit., plO
Pluralities Act 1838 s 95
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formidable power over their curate should be kept in check by the overall control
exerted by the bishop and the archbishop. But these provisions do highlight the control
an incumbent exercises over their curate.
3.4.2 A Priest-in-Charge
The second category of unbeneficed clergy are priests-in-charge. They are similar to the
incumbent in that they must have at least three years experience in Holy Orders and they
are put in charge, but not possession, of the benefice. The important difference is that a
priest-in-charge does not hold a freehold office, rather they officiate under the grant of a
licence. As mentioned in relation to an incumbent, a woman priest with pastoral
experience can become a priest-in-charge without serving the traditional curacy: one
year as a deacon and two or three years as a priest. The office of priest-in-charge is a
recent one, and has emerged because of pastoral reorganisation schemes. A bishop may
suspend the presentation of an incumbent to any vacant benefice in his diocese as part of
a process of pastoral reorganisation. 75 Suspension of presentation should not exceed five
years. During this period the patron can no longer exercise their rights of patronage.
Instead the bishop may licence a priest-in-charge to the benefice. The licence will be for
five years or less.
Where a bishop proposes to appoint a priest-in-charge he must before making the
appointment consult the PCC of the parish or parishes and so far as is reasonably
practical the patron. 76 The Private Patrons' Group are monitoring the use of suspension.
They comment that it is hard to see why it would be impossible to consult a patron. It
could be argued that this clause is another attempt to remove power from lay patrons.
They comment, "there are those bishops.. .who present the Patron with a fait accompli
and make no effort to consult."77
The reason for appointing a priest-in-charge is to allow for pastoral reorganisation
without the complications of having an incumbent with a freehold office. The priest-in-
Pastoral Measure 1983 s 67; Church of England (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure 1992 Sch 3, para
21
76 Pastoral Measure 1983 S 68 (3)
Private Patrons' Consultative Group (1995) op. cit., plO
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charge is subject to the same rules regarding revocation of licences. In this case only the
bishop has the power to remove a priest-in-charge. Unlike the curate's position, there
will not be an incumbent involved. The Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union
(MSF), which formed a clergy section in 1994, argue that suspension is being used more
and more frequently and not for its original purpose of genuine pastoral re-organisation.
Rather it is being used to combat the Church's financial difficulties. 78 There is a fear
that the independence of the parish and the exercise of lay patronage rights are being
eroded by the creeping power of diocesan decision making. The use of suspension to
deprive a parish of a full-time incumbent is being questioned in the courts. The PCC and
churchwardens of St Luke's, Kingston-upon-Thames, have been granted leave to apply
for judicial review of a decision to suspend a living. The bishop wanted the parish to
accept a part-time priest-in-charge to be shared with another parish. The parish believed
that they were being denied a full-time incumbent because of their strong traditionalist
leanings. A spokesperson for the bishop denied this and stated that the reductions were
necessary so that diocesan staffing levels should more nearly comply with national
policies concerning the deployment of clergy.79
Vacancies for a post as a priest-in-charge are advertised in the same way as for other
clergy appointments; some are placed in newspapers or clergy appointments bulletins
others are circulated informally. Depending upon the benefice the selection process may
be formal, informal or a mixture of the two. A candidate usually meets with the two
parish representatives and possibly the patron (if the patron is a lay patron). However,
the patron does not have presentation rights and the parish representatives do not have
veto powers. The bishop has considerable powers to dictate the job requirements and the
type of person who is wanted. Nevertheless, usually the parish, through the parish
representatives, has chance to comment on the needs of the benefice.
MSF conducted a survey of clergy opinion on their conditions of service. 80 Unbeneficed
clergy were concerned with their fragile job security. At the time of the survey beneficed
clergy were faced with the proposed abolition of the freehold. They were worried that if
MSF (1995a) "Clergy Conditions of Service (OS 1126) Response by MSF Clergy Section Steering
Committee" p6
° Church Times, 17th November 1995
° MSF (1995b) "What do Church of England Clergy think about their Conditions of Service?"
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carried this might result in similar job insecurity. Instead of reducing the security of the
beneficed clergy should changes be introduced to give greater security to unbeneficed
clergy? There is no obvious justification for the discrepancy between the two categories
of clergy.
3.5 Non-Stipendiary Ministers and Lay Workers
Mention must be made of non-stipendiary ministers as they feature in the questionnaire
data. 8 ' They are essentially the same as stipendiary ministers but for the fact that they
are not paid. NSMs are usually curates and sometimes priests-in-charge. They may be a
deacon or a priest. Their duties will vary depending upon whether the post is a part-time
or a full-time one.
Many of the clergy have worked for the Church in a lay capacity before their ordination.
Not all lay workers go on to become ordained, but their influence on Church affairs is
worthy of note. Lay workers are involved with the clergy on a daily basis. Their
influence on a priest's working conditions is therefore considerable. Relevant lay
workers are; deaconesses, licensed lay workers, readers and churchwardens. 82
 Lay
workers may be stipendiary or non-stipendiary.
3.6 Disciplinary Action Against the Clergy
Disciplinary action against the clergy is relevant to sex discrimination in two respects.
First, male or female clergy might perceive sex discrimination if they are dismissed
from their post or disciplinary action is taken against them. Ii this situation disciplinary
and dismissal decisions might be questioned in a civil action for sex discrimination.
Secondly, disciplinary action might be taken against a fellow cleric where allegations of
sex discrimination are made by a male or a female priest. In this way sex discrimination
could be dealt with internally by ecclesiastical law. However, as will be seen, this would
SI To be referred to henceforth as NSMs.
82 For further information on these workers the reader is referred to; Haisbury's Laws of England, Fourth
Edition, vol.14 paras 759-761 (deaconesses), 762-765 (readers), 546, 551 (churchwardens) 766-767
(licensed lay workers); Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Cumulative Supplement 1997, vol.14
paras 766-767 (licensed lay workers); "The Canons of the Church of England" (1993) op. cit., Canons
Dl, D2, D3 (deaconesses), E4, E5, E6 (reader), El (churchwardens), E7, E8 (licensed lay workers)
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only cover sex discrimination where the source is a clerical one. It would not cover sex
discrimination, for example, by the PCC. In this section disciplinary action against the
clergy will be discussed starting with internal disciplinary action against incumbents.
Following this the regulation of both beneficed and unbeneficed clergy by the
ecclesiastical courts will be examined.
3.6.1 Internal Disciplinary Action Against Incumbents
An incumbent may be removed from office in two situations covered by the Incumbents
(Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977.83 Initially it must be shown that an incumbent is
involved. The 1977 Measure does not define incumbent but it does define benefice:
"benefice' means the office of rector or vicar, with cure of souls, including the office of
vicar in a team ministry established under the Pastoral Measure 1968 [as consolidated
by the Pastoral Measure 1983].84
The first situation to consider is where there is a "serious breakdown of the pastoral
relationship between the incumbent and his parishioners to which the conduct of the
incumbent or of his parishioners or of both has contributed over a substantial period."85
An enquiry can be requested by either the incumbent, the archdeacon, a two-thirds
majority of the lay members of the PCC, or where the incumbent is the archdeacon by a
majority of the members of the bishop's council and standing committee of the diocesan
synod of the diocese in which the parish is.86 An enquiry will only be instituted after the
persons involved have had an opportunity to resolve the pastoral situation. If the
archdeacon believes that there should be an enquiry, or if he or she had initially
requested one, or if he or she is the incumbent involved, the bishop will order an enquiry
to be held. 87 The enquiry will be held by a diocesan committee, unless the incumbent
elects for an enquiry by a provincial tribunal. The proceedings will come to an end if the
incumbent resigns and the bishop accepts this.
83 Unless otherwise indicated references to the 1977 Measure in this Chapter refer to the Incumbents
(Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977.
Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977 s 19
Ibid. s 1A (1) as amended by the Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) (Amendment) Measure 1993
86 Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977 s IA (1) (a-d)
Ibid. s 3; Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) (Amendment) Measure 1993 s 3
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In the second situation the bishop may order a diocesan committee of enquiry to
discover whether an incumbent is, "unable by reason of age or infirmity of mind or body
to discharge adequately the duties attaching to his benefice and, if so, whether it is
desirable that he should resign his benefice or be given assistance in discharging those
duties."88
The committee or tribunal will report back to the bishop with their findings and possible
solutions. In the case of a pastoral breakdown the most heavy penalty that can be
imposed is the declaration that the benefice is vacant. 89 There are other sanctions
available such as, "the imposition of disqualification on the incumbent, a rebuke to him
or the parishioners as may be appropriate, and pastoral advice and guidance."9°
It is more likely that the circumstances of a serious breakdown of the pastoral
relationship would have more bearing on sex discrimination than the age or infirmity
section. An incumbent might perceive that the resulting disciplinary action or dismissal
was on the ground of sex and hence might consider a sex discrimination claim. As an
internal mechanism for dealing with sex discrimination between fellow clergy the 1977
Measure is not a suitable device. Its purpose is to regulate pastoral relationships. This
becomes evident when one examines who can request an enquiry; it is the incumbent
and the PCC. Therefore, a curate who has a grievance against his or her incumbent
would not find the 1977 Measure an appropriate channel to use.
3.6.2 The Ecclesiastical Courts
Beneficed and unbeneficed clergy are regulated by the ecclesiastical courts, which
exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction. Within both of these branches of law are
doctrinal and non-doctrinal matters. The Church of England is the only religious body in
England that has its own law courts. For other religious bodies to enforce their rules
they must use the ordinary civil law of contract. No appeal lies from an ecclesiastical
88 Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977 s 6 (1); Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices)
(Amendment) Measure 1993 s 14, Sch 3
89 Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977 s 10 (2); Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices)
(Amendment) Measure 1993 ss 7, 14, Sch 3
9° Dale, Sir William (1989) op. cit., p32; Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977 ss 10 (5), 10
(6), 10 (7); Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) (Amendment) Measure 1993 s 14, Sch 3, para 7
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court to a temporal one. However, the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court
exercises a supervisory function ensuring that the ecclesiastical courts do not exceed
their jurisdiction.9'
The ecclesiastical courts were restructured under the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure
1963 . 92
 Only the criminal jurisdiction will be examined. The criminal jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts is concerned with clergy discipline. Issues are divided into doctrinal
and non-doctrinal issues. An incumbent is not easily removed from his or her freehold.
However, in some situations it may be necessary to take action against an incumbent. A
more sensitive course of action may lie under the Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices)
Measure 1977. Nevertheless, in some cases it may be necessary to use the ecclesiastical
courts. Also some cases will not involve an incumbent but a curate or a priest-in-charge
who are not covered by the previous Measure but who are incorporated in the 1963
Measure. In practice the 1963 Measure has only been used against incumbents. The
ability to revoke the licence of a curate or a priest-in-charge has prevented the
cumbersome procedure of the Measure being used.
Only the jurisdiction relating to non-doctrinal issues, which are often referred to as
conduct cases, will be examined. A conduct case against a deacon or a priest covers any
offence against ecclesiastical law except one regarding doctrine. For example, it
includes conduct unbecoming to the office of a clerk in Holy Orders and neglect of
duty.93 A case can be brought against an incumbent or a stipendiary curate by six or
more persons on the electoral roll of the parish, or by the incumbent against a
stipendiary curate, or (against any priest or deacon) by any person authorised by the
bishop.94 The bishop decides whether to refer the matter to an examiner; 95 a barrister or
solicitor drawn from a panel selected by the diocesan synod.96 If there is a case to
answer to it will be sent to the Consistory Court which comprises a Chancellor joined by
Moore, E. Garth (1985) op. cit., p130
92 Unless otherwise indicated references to the 1963 Measure in this Chapter refer to the Ecclesiastical
Jurisdiction Measure 1963.
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 14 (1) (b)
Dale, Sir William (1989) Op. cit., p124
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 23
Ibid. s 30, Sch 2, part 1
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two priests and two lay persons, who use a procedure as close as possible to that of the
Crown Court.97
Certain penalties can be issued against the priest by the Chancellor. 98 For less serious
offences the priest will be rebuked or have a monition order placed on him or her. Next
in the hierarchy comes suspension which disqualifies the priest from performing any
right or duty connected with the preferment without the bishop's leave for a specified
period or which prevents the priest from residing in the house of residence of his or her
preferment or within such distance of it as is specified in the censure. An inhibition
disqualifies the priest from exercising the duties of a cleric for a specified period.
Finally, deprivation is an order to remove the priest from clerical office and to prohibit
him or her holding clerical office in the future. 99 The sentence of deprivation can be
passed on a priest automatically, without trial in the ecclesiastical courts if he or she has
been involved in certain proceedings in the secular courts.100
If the priest perceived that the disciplinary action or dismissal taken under the 1963
Measure was on the ground of sex he or she might bring a civil action for sex
discrimination. The Measure might also be relevant to sex discrimination in the second
situation envisaged above. The Measure covers conduct unbecoming to a clerk in Holy
Orders. Arguably, if a priest perceived sex discrimination by a fellow cleric he or she
could use this part of the Measure in order to penalise the discriminator. However, the
Measure does not provide compensation for the victim of a priest's wrongdoing. A case
can be brought by parishioners, by an incumbent against his or her curate and by any
person authorised by the bishop. Thus if any priest, other than the incumbent, wanted to
bring an action against another priest, he or she would need to be authorised by the
bishop. The difficulties of bringing a case under the 1963 Measure mean that it is an
unsatisfactory method of dealing with sex discrimination cases. Ecclesiastical law is not
an adequate replacement for the private law protection against sex discrimination which
the clergy lack.
Ibid. ss 24 (4), 28 (a)
98 The term priest is used here to cover both priests and deacons.
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 49 (1) (a-e); Robilliard, St John A. (1984) Religion and the
Law p97 (Manchester, Manchester University Press)
'°° The reader is referred to the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 55 (1) (a-f) for a complete
description of when a priest may be deprived following certain proceedings in the secular courts.
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Only three disciplinary cases have been heard under the 1963 Measure.'°' It is
questionable that this is the level of clerical misconduct. This small number of cases
points to the fact that the system is not working effectively. MSF argue that the main
purpose of the 1963 Measure is as a threat to facilitate resignation. Instead of a formal
working procedure they suggest that it operates to transmit threats, "which form the
basis for unwritten, irregular and uneven informal processes to operate, which may serve
to deny justice rather than facilitate it."°2
A theme which recurs in the debates on clergy discipline is impartiality. Various stages
in the court process could be considered to lack impartiality. First, who institutes
proceedings? It could be the incumbent, six people registered on the electoral roll or a
complainant authorised by the bishop)° 3
 MSF argue that this procedure lacks the
impartiality necessary for an objective decision as to whether charges should be
brought.'°4
 But what would be objective? These people at least have a thorough local
knowledge of the situation. If their views are discerned to be malevolent this should be
discovered by the examiner when the facts are presented. Secondly, the bishop's
immense authority over the Consistory Court has been questioned. He appoints the
Chancellor, decides whether to refer the case to an examiner and can also authorise a
complainant to institute proceedings. It has been suggested that a priest who is
unpopular with his or her bishop has a greater chance of prosecution than a favoured
one. 105
 This may be true during the initial stages, but the use of an examiner to filter
cases surely prevents an abuse of power. The bishop is involved in sentencing. if the
accused consents the bishop can pass a sentence out of court. if the case goes to court
and a guilty verdict is found the bishop will be involved in passing one of the censures.
MSF point to a confusion between the pastoral and the judicial role of the bishop. At
this point MSF are keen to pursue classical theological roles. This is interesting as in
other areas they are less sensitive to theology and are more interested in the secular
credibility of the Church. They believe, quite rightly, that the bishop's primary office is
Revd. Michael Bland (1969-70); Revd. Thomas Tyler (1991-1992); Dean of Lincoln (1995)
102 MSF (1995c) "The Church and Disciplinary Issues Among its Clergy: Fair Process in a Modern
Context" p5
103 Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 s 19
'°" MSF (1995c) Op. cit., p6
105 Church Times Letters, 28th July 1995
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pastoral. This in turn contains an element of disciplinary oversight. "The role ought,
however, if it is to be a genuinely pastoral office, to be sufficiently detached from those
of manager, employer or judge, to enable the bishop to enter into counselling
relationships with the clergy." 06
 The general tenor of their report is that bishops should
be removed from the judicial role. It is interesting that they mention the role of employer
and manager. Do they likewise believe that these roles interfere, or are not compatible
with, the pastoral office of a bishop?'°7
Thirdly, the location of disciplinary action at a diocesan level has invited criticism. The
fact that the Consistory Court is personal to the diocese could cause problems of
impartiality. The four assessors are drawn from the diocese of the accused, two of whom
are clerical colleagues. Not only could this cause problems for a fair trial, it could store
up future problems for the diocese. Because so few cases are brought, the Chancellor
has limited experience in dealing with ecclesiastical offences, court procedure and
sentencing. This can only add to the vicious circle of unworkability. These general
points on court composition and procedure point to a need for a national disciplinary
system.
Finally, many of the ecclesiastical offences are matters of moral and professional
discipline, and are not of a criminal nature. It may be that the criminal nature of the
proceedings is preventing cases of sex discrimination being properly dealt with. A civil
tribunal could provide the forum for more cases to come to light, with less stigma being
attached to the final decision. There are various reasons why the Church will resist these
changes. First, the power of the diocese has increased in recent years. For example, each
diocese has control over their budget and their pastoral reorganisation. Diocesan power
regarding disciplinary action will not easily be forgone. Additionally, many see the
criminal nature of the proceedings as essential in the case of a priest. It is an important
reminder that they are different from the laity and that higher standards are expected of
them.
106 MSF (1995c) Op. cit., p7
107 The reader is referred to Chapter Four for an analysis of the employment status of ministers of religion.
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The freehold is an important protection in this type of case. A priest-in-charge or a
curate in similar circumstances might not reach the Consistory Court, instead their
licence might be revoked. As the freehold only covers a certain section of the clergy,
surely a protective mechanism which allows all clergy to remain in their office or post
until they have been proved guilty should be investigated.
3.6.3 The Hawker Report
A General Synod working party was instituted to review clergy discipline and the
working of the ecclesiastical courts. The resulting report is commonly known as the
Hawker Report. 108
 The Report recommends that a national tribunal should replace the
ecclesiastical courts as a means of dealing with clergy discipline. Organisation would be
centralised but the tribunal would sit locally as and when needed. A national team of
investigators, such as rural deans and archdeacons, would assemble evidence for
prosecutions. The bishop would retain his role in the passage of a case. The hearings
would normally be held in private. The proposed structures would make it easier to
bring a case against a cleric. Therefore, the number of cases should rise.
Discussing licences in the context of clergy disciplinary procedures the Report stated
that the existence of two classes of clergy, beneficed and unbeneficed, meant that the
present disciplinary system did not operate equally amongst those in Holy Orders.'°9
The Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977 applies only to incumbents and
the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 is largely designed to discipline
incumbents. Cases against curates and priests-in-charge are less likely to be brought
under this Measure because of the current ease of their removal. The new disciplinary
procedures proposed by the Hawker Report would apply equally to all clergy. In order
that this is possible adjustments need to be made to the rules on revocation of licences.
There will be cases that are unconnected to disciplinary matters where it is perfectly
proper that a licence is revoked. For example, when pastoral re-organisation is complete
a priest-in-charge is no longer required as an incumbent is to be instituted!' 0
 The
108 General Synod (1996) Under Authority. Report on Clergy Discipline (GS 1217) (London, Church
House Publishing) to be referred to henceforth as the Hawker Report.
'° The Hawker Report (1996) op. cit., p40
Ibid. pp4l-42
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following adjustments apply where the grounds for revocation are disciplinary. The
Report recommends that a fixed term licence should not be revocable by the bishop on
notice as it is at present. Ecclesiastical offences committed by unbeneficed clergy should
be dealt with in the same way as offences by beneficed clergy. Removal from office,
which would include revocation of licence, would be a penalty open to the tribunal."
Where the licence is for an unspecified term they recommend that the bishop ought to
use the disciplinary procedure, rather than using the notice procedure. If the licence was
likely to be revoked on certain grounds, such as when suspension of presentation is
lifted, this should be specified in the licence." 2 By using the disciplinary procedure and
not relying on licence revocation, all clergy are given the opportunity to defend
themselves against allegations of ecclesiastical offences. As they currently have no
private law protection against unfair dismissal or sex discrimination, such internal
protection is vjtal.''3
Ibid. p42
112 Ibid. p43
113 Draft legislation based on the Hawker Report's recommendations is expected to be debated at the
General Synod in November 1997.
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Chapter Four
The Employment Status of Ministers of Religion'
4.1 Employment Law and the Church of England
There are three areas of employment law which a priest might try to use; sex
discrimination, unfair dismissal and equal pay. Each area of law has its own test of what
constitutes employment. In this Chapter the legal employment status of ministers of
religion, traditionally relegated to the fringe of employment law, is examined.
Employment status is largely discussed in the context of unfair dismissal as this is the
only area where cases have been brought thus far. Church of England priests have
usually been held to be office holders with public law rights but not employees with
private law rights. Ministers in other Christian denominations and other religions have
no defined employment status. Whether a minister could be classified as an employee is
a question for the common law. Courts seem particularly reluctant to reverse legal
precedent when any issue of religion is involved. It is argued that issues should not be
struck off the judicial agenda because they are permeated by religion. The thesis of this
Chapter is that religious or spiritual duties are not incompatible with a contract of
employment.2 Additionally, the tendency of courts to treat all religions, and all posts
within a religion, as identical is criticised.
The area of law most often under discussion is unfair dismissal. To bring a claim the
worker must be classified as an employee. Under section 230 (1) of the Employment
Rights Act 1996, an "employee' means an individual who has entered into or works
under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of
employment." 3 Failure to prove employee status means that Church of England priests
A shorter version of this Chapter was published in the Industrial Law Journal; Brodin, Emma (1996)
"The Employment Status of Ministers of Religion" in Industrial Law Journal vol.25, no.3, pp2 11-224. A
copy of this paper is to be found in Appendix A.
2 The terms religious and spiritual have been used interchangeably, although undoubtedly there is a
distinction. Case law uses both terms which accounts for the usage. For simplicity duties are referred to as
spiritual unless the term religious has been preferred in a specific judgment, as, for example, in Coker v
Diocese of Southwark [199511CR 563
Employment Rights Act 1996; Halsbury's Statutes of England and Wales, Fourth Edition, 1997 Reissue,
vol.16
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will have to rely on the protections of office holder status and any internal Church
protection. For ministers of other Christian denominations or other religions it will mean
that they have to rely on their own Church's internal protections.
Focus is on priests in the Church of England. 4 The fragile nature of internal Church
protection has meant that increasing numbers are considering the possibility of
involving general employment protection rights. The recent cases of Coker v Diocese of
Southwark and Chaicraft v Bishop of Norwich highlight the debatable legal status of
Church of England priests. 5 When discussing the two fundamental questions: is there a
contract and is it a contract of employment, case decisions involving ministers of other
Christian denominations and other religions are used. Nonconformist ministers from the
Methodist Church, the Presbyterian Church and the Salvation Army have had their legal
status considered. 6 Sikhism and Islam have been discussed with regard to the same
issue.7 However, it is office holders in the Church of England that have most
consistently troubled the courts. A case which attempts to distinguish the different types
of office holder is Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance.8 There are
essentially three positions which deacons or priests can hold in the Church of England; a
curate, a priest-in-charge and an incumbent. The third Holy Order, the episcopate, is not
discussed in this thesis. There have been no unfair dismissal cases directly involving an
incumbent. Their strong security of tenure is one reason for the lack of cases. One case
has been brought concerning a priest-in-charge. 9 A larger body of case law investigates
the status of curates. 10 It is possible that curates will be the first group to gain the
protections of employment law, perhaps prompting a review of the status of priests-in-
charge, incumbents and other ministers of religion. Until this is done there will remain
Old authorities refer to the priest as he. This has been altered where appropriate to he or she as the case
principles now apply to men and women.
Coker v Diocese of Southwark n.2 supra; Diocese of Southwark v Coker [19961 ICR 896; Diocese of
Southwark and Others v Coker, The Times, 17th July 1997 (CA); Chalcraft v Bishop of Norwich 6/11/95
Case Number 32040/95
6 President of the Methodist Conference v ParJItt [1984] ICR 176; Davies v Presbyterian Church of
Wales [1986] IRLR 194; Rogers v Booth [1937] 2 All ER 751 respectively
Santokh Singh v Guru Nanak Gurdwara [1990] ICR 309; Guru Nanak Sikh Temple v Sharry EAT
21/12/90 (145/90) reported in IDS Brief 450 August 1991 pp4-6; Birmingham Mosque Trust Ltd. v Alavi
[1992] ICR 435
8 Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance [1979] ICR 900
Chalcraft v Bishop of Norwich n.5 supra
'° Re Employment of Church of England Curates [1912] Ch2, 563; Turns v (1) Smart (2) Carey (3) Bath
and Wells Diocesan Board of Finance, EAT 17/6/91 (510/90) reported in IDS Brief 450, August 1991
pp4-6; Coker v Diocese of Southwark n.2 supra
96
an incoherent assortment of reasons given to prevent the use of employment law
amongst a wide variety of "workers".
4.2 Is There a Contract?
Before deciding whether ministers hold a contract of employment the courts have asked
is there a contract at all? The arguments used fall into six categories. First, the strong
theme that a spiritual relationship is incompatible with a contract. Secondly, the idea
that ecclesiastical authority does not signify the existence of a contract. This is
confirmed by the complementary third idea that ministers of religion and their Church
do not intend to create legal relations. Two further arguments about consideration and
consensus ad idem are presented in specific cases. Sixthly, in regard to Church of
England priests, the argument that office holders cannot hold a contract is presented.
In Re Employment of Church of England Curates the High Court held that the curate did
not have a contract of employment." Parker J. stated that the duty of obedience a curate
owed to their incumbent was regulated by ecclesiastical authority and not by contract.
This is the source of the underlying idea that there is no intention to create legal
relations. It is submitted that it might be possible to combine the two types of authority.
One could retain ecclesiastical authority either as a part of ecclesiastical law alongside a
contract or incorporate it into a contractual document. Parker J. also stated that holding
an office prevented the existence of a contract.
Twenty five years after Parker J.'5 decision, the question was raised again. In Rogers v
Booth the Court of Appeal held that the relationship between an officer and a general of
the Salvation Army was a spiritual one.' 2
 By its definition, Sir Wilfred Greene MR said,
a spiritual relationship lacks the necessary elements for a contract. The intention of the
parties when entering the arrangement was not to enter into contractual relations.' 3
 The
two themes; that a spiritual relationship is incompatible with a contract and that
"ReEmployment of Church of England Curates n. 10 supra
12 Rogers v Booth n.6 supra
' Ibid. at p754, per Greene MR.
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ministers of religion and their Church do not intend to create legal relations, are fused
together in this judgment.
Sixty years after Parker J.'s judgment came a case which comprehensively dealt with the
question, "is there a contract?" The ratio decidendi of Barthorpe is that an office holder
is not precluded from being an employee. 14 This confirmed the decision in 102 Social
Club v Bickerton that some office holders can be concurrently regarded as employees.15
Barthorpe, a Church of England lay reader, brought a claim for unfair dismissal. The
industrial tribunal, applying Parker J.'s reasoning, held that a lay reader was in the same
category as a curate, that of an office holder and not an employee. The existence of an
office prevented a contract. On appeal the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) were
unsure whether a curate was an office holder due to the post's lack of continuity.
Disregarding office holder status, they held that the presence of ecclesiastical superiority
should not preclude clergy being engaged under a contract.16
In 1984 in the influential case of President of the Methodist Conference v Parfltt, the
Court of Appeal held that a Methodist minister was not employed under a contract of
employment.' 7 The reasoning was similar to that of Rogers v Booth. Dillon U. held that
the arrangements were non-contractual: "the spiritual nature of the functions of the
minister, the spiritual nature of the act of ordination. ..make it impossible to conclude
that any contract, let alone a contract of service, caine into being between the newly
ordained minister and the Methodist Church." 8 Dillon U. conceded that the
undertaking of spiritual work did not necessarily preclude a contractual relationship. A
contract of service could perhaps be drafted between a minister and the Church, but this
would be a departure from the norm. In the absence of a clear indication of contrary
intent in a document, the relationship between the minister and their Church will not be
one that is regulated by contract.'9
Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance n.8 supra
' 102 Social Club v Bickerton [1977] ICR 911
16 Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance n.8 supra at p906, per Slynn J.
17 President of the Methodist Conference v Parflu n.6 supra
18 Ibid. at p182, per Dillon U.
' Ibid. at p183, per Dillon Li.
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The judgment of May LI. is less general than that of Dillon U. He asks whether the
parties in this case intended to create legal relations. 20 It is unclear whether he believes a
contract could ever exist between a minister and the Methodist Church, or any other
Church. May LI. believed that the conditions of consideration and consensus ad idem
were met. Unfortunately he does not describe what the consideration was and from
which parties it flowed. The agreement, he said, was non-contractual as the parties did
not intend to create legal relations. A minister's work was incompatible with such a
legal relationship. 2 ' At this point his decision appears less case specific. Rather it is
grounded in the traditional reluctance of the courts to find a contract in this sphere.
There seems to be no sound policy reason to exclude an intention to create legal
relations as there is in arrangements between spouses.
The influence of Parfitt was realised two years later in Davies v Presbyterian Church of
Wales.22 The House of Lords held that there was no contract of employment because no
contract existed. Emphasis was placed on the spiritual nature of the pastor's duties
preventing a contract. "The duties owed by a pastor to the church are not contractual or
enforceable... .His duties are defined and his activities are dictated not by contract but by
conscience. He is the servant of God."23 Lord Templeman added, but did not develop
the point, that in some circumstances an employee or an independent contractor could
carry out duties which were exclusively spiritual.24
In Santokh Singh v Guru Nanak Gurdwara the Court of Appeal endorsed the industrial
tribunal decision that there was no contract of employment between the Sikh priest and
the temple.25 The tribunal took account of Dillon U.'s principle in Pa,fitt that the
relationship between a Church and a minister will not usually be a contractual one
unless a contrary intent is shown in a document. The labelling of the priest as an
employee in the constitution of the temple was not enough to satisfy Dillon U.'s idea of
contrary intent,26 although it is arguable that the constitution was not a document in the
20 Ibid. at p185, per May U.
21 Ibid. atppl85-186, per May U.
22 Davies v Presbyterian Church of Wales n.6 supra
23 Ibid. at p196, per Lord Templeman
Ibid. at p196, per Lord Templeman
25 Santokh Singh v Guru Nanak Gurdwara n.7 supra
26 This line of reasoning was later used in Birmingham Mosque Trust Ltd. v Alavi n.7 supra at pp44O, 444
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sense that Dillon U. intended: that is as a written agreement between the parties. The
Court of Appeal failed to distinguish between religions in its judgment. The cases it
applies, Davies and Parfitt, involve Christian Nonconformist ministers. It is by no
means clear, without further argument, that the same principles ought to be applied to all
ministers and all posts. The courts are using a reductive approach in order to dispose of
these cases. Whether ministers ought to receive the same or different treatment
depending upon their religion and post needs clarification.
In Guru Nanak Sikh Temple v Sharry the industrial tribunal analysed a document which
passed between the temple and the Sikh priest which was labelled a contract. 27 They
concluded that there was an intention to enter a contractual relationship. Reversing the
decision the EAT held that the tribunal should have given greater attention to the
parties' understanding of the documents. This could suggest a variety of problems; that
the parties were not ad idem, that there was insufficient certainty of terms or that they
did not intend to enter into a contractual relationship. It is unclear which factor or
factors the EAT believed were missing. The EAT do not discuss Dillon LJ.'s dictum of
contrary intent. Was such a discussion deliberately avoided? A definition of the nature
and extent of "contrary intent" would be useful. Unless a Church is free to exercise
contrary intent and retain its spiritual duties, Dillon LJ.'s words will sound hollow.
Turns v (1) Smart (2) Carey (3) Bath and Wells Diocesan Board of Finance in 1990,
circumvented the problems of spiritual duties by concentrating on consideration. 28 The
industrial tribunal did not state whether Turns, a Church of England curate, was an
office holder or not. They held that no consideration passed from the bishop or the
incumbent to Turns. Neither the bishop nor the incumbent paid Turns. The Diocesan
Board of Finance did pay Turns, but had no control over how he carried out his duties.
No contract existed between the parties. The EAT agreed that the consideration point
was conclusive in proving that there was no contract. But reference to a lack of
consideration alone is unconvincing as an argument against the holding of a contract by
a minister of religion. Even if lack of consideration is convincing in one set of
27 Guru Nanak Sikh Temple v Sharry n.7 supra
28 Turns v (1) Smart (2) Carey (3) Bath and Wells Diocesan Board of Finance n.1O supra
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circumstances, it is arguable that consideration could be found or achieved by design in
other cases.
In a recent case, Birmingham Mosque Trust Ltd. v Alavi, the EAT applied a reductive
approach to the whole issue of ministers of religion and contracts. 29
 Initially the
industrial tribunal held that there was a contract of employment between the khateeb and
the trust. Their finding was based upon there being sufficient certainty of terms in an
exchange of letters and there being an intention to create legal relations. 3° The
agreement defined salary, hours of work and the nature of the applicant's duties. They
believed that Alavi's appointment was different to that of Parfitt, Davies and Santokh
Singh in that it was governed exclusively by the exchange of letters. There was no
religious service at which he was appointed or any constitution or other document
governing his appointment.3'
The EAT agreed that the trust could enter into contracts, but were concerned that this
should not extend to religious personnel. "The problems arise where religious factors
are introduced and it seems to us desirable that the same broad brush approach should
be taken by all those faced with this issue."32
 Should such reductionism be followed?
Ministers of religion are not homogenous. They all share a spiritual function, agreed, but
they do differ in how they are appointed and dismissed and what duties they are required
to perform. Also, ministers of the Church of England are the only ministers to enjoy the
status of an office holder. Should not the approach be to proceed as specifically as
possible with regard to the religion and denomination one is dealing with, appreciating
that there will be different posts within that religion or denomination?
Referring to the question; "is there a contract?", Wood J. asked whether there was
sufficient certainty of offer and acceptance for the parties to be ad idem? Secondly, was
there an intention to create legal relations? 33
 The tribunal had failed to find these two
points. There is no discussion of whether the parties achieved consensus ad idem. It
29 Birmingham Mosque Trust Ltd. v Alavi n.7 supra
° Ibid. at p440
31 Ibid. at p443
32 Ibid. at p440, per Wood J.
B Ibid. at p441, per Wood J.
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might have been thought that they clearly had: Alavi had come to the UK on the
invitation of the trust on terms negotiated in a correspondence between them and had
worked on these terms until his dismissal. The EAT found that the tribunal had not
made a finding on the consensus ad idem point. This returns the focus to contractual
intention. The EAT noted the religious nature of the khateeb's duties. The presence of
"religious factors" prevented a contract. 34 Although Wood J. quotes Dillon LJ.'s dictum
regarding contrary intent, he does not himself expand the point. One is left with the
feeling that religious factors will be used in a broad brush way to prevent contracts.
The possibility of a minister of religion holding a contract was given hope in the recent
industrial tribunal decision in Coker, only to be dashed by the EAT and Court of Appeal
decisions which followed. 35 The tribunal chaired by Professor Rideout, held that a
curate could have a contract of employment with the Church of England.
Rideout criticised Parker J.'s first argument in Re Employment of Church of England
Curates, that the duty of obedience emanates from ecclesiastical authority and not
contract. The policy reasons given by Parker J. failed to convince Rideout. The fact that
the finding of employee status might impose common law liabilities on the incumbent
provides no genuine reason to prevent a contract. 36 Additionally, why does Parker J.
look only to the incumbent? A more appropriate contracting party, said Rideout, would
either be the bishop who has the power of appointment and dismissal, or the diocese
who pays the curate. However, Rideout does not firmly state who the employer is.
Parker J.'s second argument, that an office prevents a contract, is inconsistent with the
decisions of Bickerton and Barthorpe which state that some office holders can
concurrently be employees. This is not pertinent to Rideout's argument as he does not
consider a curate to be an office holder.37
Rideout interpreted the old authorities as developing a presumption that no contractual
relationship was intended in relationships involving religious personnel. He gained more
Ibid. at p443, per Wood J.
Coker v Diocese of Southwark n.2 supra
36 Re Employment of Church of England Curates n.lO supra at p570, per Parker J.
Whether curates are office holders is a moot point. Re Employment of church of England Curates,
Bickerton and the EAT in Coker state that a curate is an office holder. Barthorpe was unsure as to whether
a curate fell within the description of an office holder.
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comfort from Lord Templeman in Davies who stated that it would be possible for an
employee or an independent contractor to carry out exclusively spiritual duties. If
Davies could have pointed to a contract between himself and the Church, Rideout
believed that the contract might have been a contract of employment. Modern
authorities are moving towards the idea that spiritual duties can be the subject of a
contract. Rideout held that a contract of employment should be assumed, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, in the case of a Church of England curate.38
On appeal the EAT held that the curate was not an employee. 39
 Hull J. endorsed Parker
J.'s propositions that a curate's duties are not defined by contract but emanate from
ecclesiastical authority and that the holding of an office prevents a contract. Hull J.
interpreted Parfltt and Davies as endorsing the former proposition. Rideout, by failing to
consider authority and the formularies of the Church of England, made a personal
decision based upon what he thought modern policy ought to be. The position of a
curate is not res integra. The rights of the curate are not conferred by contract but by
ecclesiastical law."° This is a novel interpretation of the leading authorities. Discussion
had previously centred around spiritual duties preventing a contract. Where does Hull
J.'s decision leave the presumption of non-contractual intention? He states that it was
not a ground of previous decisions that the spiritual quality of the relationship could not
be regulated by contract. 41
 But this is what Parfirt and Davies said.42
The ecclesiastical authority argument bypasses the questionable idea of spiritual duties
preventing a contract, instead focusing on the source of law which regulates the clergy.
Ecclesiastical authority, although not contractual, does have legal significance. Could
one concurrently be regulated by ecclesiastical and contractual authority?43
 One must
look at the nature of ecclesiastical law. Denning categorised Church of England matters
into three groups. First, in its technical sense, ecclesiastical law means law solely
administered by ecclesiastical courts and persons. Secondly, law may be exclusively
Coker v Diocese of Southwark n.2 supra at p572
Diocese of Southwark v Colcer n.5 supra
° Ibid. at p910, per Hull J.
41 Ibid. at p909, per Hull J.
42 President of the Methodist Conference v Parfirt n.6 supra at p1 82; Davies v Presbyterian Church of
Wales n.6 supra at p196
A parallel can be drawn with the question; can one concurrently be an office holder and an employee?
Denning, A. (1944) "The Meaning of 'Ecclesiastical Law" in Law Quarterly Review vol.60 p235, 238
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administered by the temporal courts, despite its concern with ecclesiastical affairs; an
example being the criminal law of blasphemy. Finally, some laws are administered by
both ecclesiastical and temporal courts, for example in regard to sequestration. Hull J.
classifies clergy discipline as technical ecclesiastical law, implying that this category
prohibits the influence of a dual source of authority, such as contract. 'Whilst this is a
persuasive argument, it is arguable that the categories are not static; jurisdiction can be
transferred. Temporal courts have jurisdiction regarding divorce which previously was
the preserve of the ecclesiastical courts. 45 Additionally, this decision relates only to the
established Church with its unique form of ecclesiastical authority. Where does this
leave other Christian denominations and other religions? Also what would happen if the
Church were disestablished and ecclesiastical law became merely a body of rules agreed
by the members of the Church?46
On appeal the Court of Appeal likewise held that a curate cannot be an employee for the
purposes of unfair dismissal. 47 In the principal judgment, Mummery U. upheld the EAT
decision, stating that the industrial tribunal decision was legally wrong. The
presumption of non-contractual intention was used by Mummery U. He joined two
complementary themes, intention to create legal relations and ecclesiastical authority, to
prevent the existence of a contract. He avoided a discussion of whether spiritual duties
prevent a contract.
Mummery U. held that the industrial tribunal had wrongly assumed that there was a
contract between Coker and the Diocese of Southwark. In fact there was no intention to
create legal relations. Although not explicitly analysed in Parfltt and Davies, Mummery
U. stated that the reason for the absence of a contract was that there was no intention to
create legal relations. Even if the facts of Coker do not provide contractual intention,
what is to prevent other curates or indeed other ministers of religion from proving
contractual intention in particular cases? The prohibitive force is the presumption of
non-contractual intention where a minister of religion is involved, unless a clear
intention to the contrary is expressed.
Dale, Sir William (1989) op . cit., ppll8-ll9
46 Denning, A. (1944) Op. cit., p235
Diocese of Southwark and Others v Coker n.5 supra
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Mummery U. underlined this presumption in his discussion of ecclesiastical authority.
He stated that it is of critical significance that a curate is ordained and is called to an
office recognised by the law. As a result of this it is unnecessary for a curate to be
regulated by contract. The relationship between a curate and his or her diocese is more
appropriately regulated by ecclesiastical law. Mummery LI. cited the authority of Parker
J. in Re Employment of Church of England Curates which stated that a Church of
England curate was not an employee because the relationship was governed by
ecclesiastical authority and not by contract. The legal position of a curate is the same in
1997 as it was in 1912. As submitted in relation to the EAT decision in Coker, it is
arguable that a curate could concurrently be regulated by contractual and ecclesiastical
authority. However, Mummery Li. stated that for a contract to exist in addition to
ecclesiastical regulation, it would require clear evidence of an intention to create legal
relations. Such an intention was not present either generally on the appointment of a
curate or in the specific case of Coker.
The final case which discusses "is there a contract" is Chalcraft.48 An industrial tribunal
ruled that a priest-in-charge of the Church of England was not an employee. Coming
before the EAT decision in Coker the tribunal nevertheless maintained Rideout's
decision to be of no assistance. This may be because the decision related only to curates.
However, Chalcraft is couched in terms applying to all ministers, leaving the impression
that Rideout's decision was flawed.
First, the tribunal stated that the applicant had not established an intention to create legal
relations with the bishop or any other bodies of the Church. No thought was given to the
nature of the relationship until the dispute arose. This reasoning gives ministers and
their Churches an opportunity in future to think about their relationships and to argue
that they do have an intention to contract. Secondly, consideration was missing from the
agreement. The payment received by a Church of England priest was described as a
stipend to pursue a calling and not a salary. This is not remuneration in the conventional
sense. It was held that the stipend is incapable of establishing consideration.49
48 Chalcraft v Bishop of Norwich n.5 supra
49 Ibid. atp3
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The question "is there a contract?" divides the authorities into three camps. The old
authorities of Re Employment of Church of England Curates (1912) and Rogers v Booth
(1937) use a presumption of non-contractual intention, the former holding that duty
emanates from ecclesiastical authority not contract, the latter that a spiritual relationship
prohibits a contract. The EAT and Court of Appeal decisions in Coker return to this
presumptive stance.
Bridging the gap between spiritual duties and contract formation come modern
authorities starting with Pa,fitt. Dillon U., whilst accepting the usual parameter of non-
contractual intention, pointed to a situation where this might be overcome. A similar
statement was made in Davies by Lord Templeman. Both Santokh Singh (1990) and
Sharry (1990) followed ParJitt. Whilst following ParJitt and Davies, the EAT in Alavi
(1992) showed a reluctance to detail specific guidelines for ministers of religion.
The third group comprises two cases which have a positive view of contracts and
spiritual duties. Barthorpe (1979) was progressive for its time, holding that Church of
England curates were not prohibited from forming contracts. Barthorpe also
distinguished different Church of England posts. Not until 1995 and the industrial
tribunal decision in Coker was another progressive move made. The presumption of
non-contractual intention was turned on its head. The significance of the decision has
withered following the EAT and Court of Appeal decisions. The hope is that Rideout's
arguments will be taken up in a future case.
4.3 Is There a Contract of Employment?
If a contract has been established, one must decide whether it is a contract of
employment. Church of England priests, with the possible exception of curates, are
already office holders, but does this prevent them holding a contract of employment?
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4.3.1 Office Holders
An office holder is neither employed nor self-employed. The classic definition of an
office is found in Great Western Railway Company v Bater: "an office.. .was a
subsisting, permanent, substantive position, which had an existence independent of the
person who filled it, and which went on and was filled in succession by successive
holders."5° In Edwards v Clinch Lord Lowry added that an office holder holds a specific
post which he or she can vacate. 51
 The post must be permanent in that it has an
existence independent of the person holding it. The continuity required of the post is
that it can last beyond the holder Leaving it, with the opportunity of a new holder being
appointed.52
Traditionally office holders have had available the public law action of judicial review.
Office holders, including ecclesiastical office holders, are not given express statutory
protection by the Employment Rights Act 1996 regarding unfair dismissal. Office
holders must argue that they can concurrently be regarded as employees.
Bickerton held that some office holders would be regarded as employees, whilst others
would not. 53 One must look at the office and decide whether there is sufficient of the
nature of employment to hold that he or she is an employee. 54 Bickerton was the
secretary of a social club. The court was concerned with the payment involved. Was it a
honorarium or a salary? How large was the payment? Was it fixed in advance? Was the
payment made contractually for the services? 55
 In Sharry it was argued that too much
emphasis was being placed on wages, for this on its own does not establish a contract of
employment. The EAT said remuneration was a neutral issue. 56 In Rogers v Booth the
court was keen to find that the applicant received maintenance payments and not a
wage. This was one reason why the applicant did not have a contract of employment.57
The main reason for rejecting employee status was that there was no contractual
5° Great Western Railway Company v Bater [1920] 3 KB 266 at p274, per Rowlatt J.
' Edwards v Clinch [1981] 3 All ER 543
52 Ibid. at p558, per Lord Lowry
5° 102 Social Club v Bickerton n.15 supra
Ibid. at p919
5° Ibid. at p919. The case was remitted to be heard by a differently constituted tribunal.
56 Guru Nanak Sikh Temple v Sharry n.7 supra
Rogers v Booth n.6 supra at p755
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intention. The latter two cases, although not involving office holders, suggest that one
should not look to pay alone. Chaicraft shows that the courts are still preoccupied with
consideration.
Bickerton uses a control criterion to divide office holders into two groups: those who
exercise the functions of an independent office, in the way that a curate or a police
officer does, and those who are subject to the control and orders of another. 58 The first
group only have public law protection. The second group benefit from public and
private law. Bickerton makes no definition of the term "curate". It may refer to a curate
who is an assistant to the incumbent or it might be using the term in its old usage as
incumbent. Whichever meaning is intended, both a "curate" and an incumbent are
controlled via ecclesiastical authority, so neither is truly independent. A truly
independent office is hard to find. Bickerton does not clarify which office holders are
employees and which are not.
4.3.2 Case Decisions
The element of control has been regarded as of particular importance in cases involving
ministers of religion. Most ministers can find someone who controls their work.
Additionally, the idea of service seems equally applicable to ministers of religion who
arguably serve their Church as well as their God. It is only now that the problem "who is
the employer?" can be tackled. When asking "is there a contract?" one has to establish
that there are contracting parties that can be identified. The issue of consideration has
raised this problem. Who pays the minister? This overlaps with the question "is there a
contract of employment?" because one must ask; if X pays Y, does X control Y, or does
Y serve X?
In the earliest case considering this question, Re Employment of Ministers of the United
Methodist Church, the High Court held that Methodist ministers were not employed
under a contract of employment. 59 Joyce J. thought that even if they appeared to be
102 Social Club v Bickerton n. 15 supra at p920
Employment of Ministers of the United Methodist Church [19121 1O7LT 143
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employees, it was not possible to identify who was their employer. 60 There could not be
a contract of employment as no identifiable employer was found. By definition this
meant that a contract could not exist.
Later in 1912 came the ruling in Re Employment of Church of England Curates where
Parker J. stated that a curate was an office holder and not an employee. 6 ' The existence
of a contract of employment was dismissed by examining the appointment and dismissal
of a curate. The appointment of a curate is not made by the incumbent. Rather, the
incumbent nominates him or her and the appointment is made by the bishop. The
incumbent cannot dismiss the curate without the bishop's consent. Parker J's. reasoning
is that the incumbent does not employ the curate. He did not consider whether the
bishop or the diocese might employ the curate. The bishop does after all appoint, and if
necessary authorise the removal of a curate. The attitude of Parker J. is to work from the
premise that a curate cannot have a contract of employment and to find reasons to justify
this, rather than looking at the nature of the clerical relationship.
Twenty five years later a rigorous approach to the question "is there a contract of
employment?" was still lacking. Rogers v Booth looked at one factor which might
suggest a contract of employment. The money that was regularly paid to the officer was
held to be merely maintenance payments and could not be likened to a wage or salary
paid under a contract of employment. This seems to suggest that the presence of a wage
would be appropriate evidence of a contract of employment, If the court had answered
the question "is there a contract?" in the affirmative, the issue of remuneration alone
might not have prohibited the existence of a contract of employment. The court in
Rogers v Booth partially answered the question "is there a contract of employment?"
when they could have given judgment only on question one: "is there a contract?" The
partial answer serves only to cloud the confusion on the status of remuneration as a
function of a contract of employment.
In 1979, hope but little substance, was given to the idea that some office holders might
have a contract of employment. The EAT in Barthorpe believed that the holding of an
60 Ibid. at p144, per Joyce J.
61 Re Employment of Church of England Curates n.1O supra at pp568-569, per Parker J.
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office did not prevent a person having a contract of employment in some situations. The
categories should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. 62 The EAT reviewed office
holders whom they believed could not hold a contract of employment; incumbents,
bishops and deans.63 Others engaged in ministry such as curates and lay readers, might
be employees and office holders concurrently. 64 However, the EAT gave no clear
guidance on when a contract of employment might be found. Their only point was on
control and this was vague.65 There is no adequate explanation of why bishops and
incumbents are precluded from having employee status. The court viewed their
ecclesiastical superiority as preventing a contract of employment. It is arguable that all
priests and bishops belong to one Holy Order of presbyters and nothing should
distinguish them.
The notion of a contract of employment was examined in a limited way in Parfltt.
Dillon Ii. concentrated on the spiritual nature of the duties precluding a contract of
employment. An employee serves their employer. A minister serves God, and not the
Church, as his master. 66 But as a representative of Christ on earth the priest does serve
their congregation and parishioners. It is an interactive ministry, rather than being
confined to prayerful devotion as characterised by religious communities of monks.
Likewise, in Davies Lord Templeman's emphasis was on the pastor serving God, not an
employer. In all religions there is a personal commitment by the minister to serve their
God. Lord Templeman had suggested that an employee might carry out exclusively
spiritual duties. Does the personal service argument prevent this happening? Spiritual
duties, on this interpretation, will always lack the necessary element of service to
provide a contract of employment. Taking a wider view of service, there is no reason
why a priest serving their Church (their employer) has to prevent a priest serving their
God; the two types of service should coincide.
62 Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance n.8 supra at p904
Ibid. at p904
Ibid. at p906. They were undecided whether a curate was indeed an office holder.
65 Ibid. at p906
President of the Methodist Conference v Paifiti n.6 supra at pp 182-183, per Dillon Li.
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In both cases involving Sikh priests, evidence potentially pointed to a contract of
employment. In Santokh Singh the Court of Appeal congratulated the industrial tribunal
on its reasoning which rejected the existence of a contract of employment. The tribunal
balanced spiritual duties against factors which pointed towards a contract of
employment. This is an interesting approach suggesting that if indicators of a contract of
employment are strong enough they will outweigh a second presumption: the
presumption of no contract of employment where duties are principally spiritual. This
"presumption" is not identified as such, but it appears to be applied in case decisions.
In Sharry the industrial tribunal failed to distinguish between a contract and a contract
of employment. They used a multi-factor approach to decide whether there was
contractual intention. They considered; organisation, control, finance and mutuality of
obligation, thus collapsing the first and second questions. Emphasis was placed on the
fact that the priest was paid. The EAT disapproved of this emphasis on wages. This did
not establish a contract of employment. Contracts of employment were not discussed in
terms of control or service. The basis on which the EAT decided that there was no
contract of employment was by balancing spiritual duties against secular duties. Again
there seems to be the unspoken presumption of no contract of employment where duties
are principally spiritual. In itself this is bound up with the notions of control and service
and how these square with spiritual duties.
The applicant in Turns used the control test to argue that he had a contract of
employment. The incumbent exercised control over the manner in which Turns carried
out his duties and was in a position to discipline Turns if he failed to exercise his duties
properly. The industrial tribunal considered that the control the incumbent held over the
curate was not materially different from that exercised by the bishop over the
incumbent. They believed that because the incumbent was not subject to a contract of
employment neither would the curate be. The presence of control was not enough to
indicate a contract of employment. What preoccupies the tribunal is the presumption
against a contract of employment if a minister is involved.
Turns appealed to the EAT saying that the curate has a different relationship with the
incumbent, from that which an incumbent has with the bishop. Turns considered the
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curate was under greater control than the incumbent. The EAT, rejecting the appeal, did
not examine control as the consideration point was conclusive. On the control point, the
industrial tribunal were not arguing that control was not present, rather they said control
alone was not enough. Might it be that the EAT were using consideration to sabotage
the finding of a contract of employment? Consideration is not usually the hardest
contractual feature to find. The use of lack of consideration as the ratio decidendi of
Turns blocks the control point from being aired.
The control test was pursued by the industrial tribunal in Alavi. They held that there was
a contract of employment because in the performance of his religious duties he was
under the control of the trust. The EAT held that the tribunal had failed to look at the
religious nature of the relationship. The khateeb has religious duties and is a religious
appointment.67 Alavi uses the presumption of no contract of employment where duties
are principally religious.
In Coker, Rideout used a balancing approach to conclude that there was a contract of
employment. The elements of spirituality were insufficient to outweigh elements of
personal service. Service, control and organisation were all present in the relationship.68
The claim that personal spirituality runs counter to the idea of service is acknowledged
by Rideout. 69
 It is arguable that they are not conflicting aims, they may not be the same,
but this does not mean that they are in conflict. Rideout argues that the Church is
involved in dictating the results of that spirituality, thus spirituality does not outweigh
the idea of service.70
The EAT held that a curate is not employed under a contract of employment but is an
office holder. Hull 3. made a tentative, but undeveloped, point on the possibility of
concurrent employee status. "[lit is conceivable (but by no means clear) that
circumstances might exist in a particular case which showed that such a curate was
indeed employed by some person or other." 7 ' On the issue of whether spiritual duties
67 Birmingham Mosque Trust Ltd. v Alavi n.7 supra at p444
68 Coker v Diocese of Southwark n.2 supra at p573
69 Ibid. at p573
70 Ibid. at p573
Diocese of Southwcirk v Coker n.5 supra at p904, per Hull J.
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outweigh personal service, Hull J. describes Rideout as transgressing authority, but adds
no extra comments himself on spiritual duties.
The Court of Appeal in Coker held that there was no contract, therefore there could be
no contract of employment. Nevertheless, the Court did discuss "who is the employer",
which necessarily overlaps with the question "is there a contract of employment?" The
original respondent was the Diocese of Southwark. However, the appeal tribunal held
that the diocese had no legal capacity to sue or be sued. Therefore, it was ordered that
the bishop and the Diocesan Board of Finance be added as respondents. Although the
Diocesan Board of Finance pay the curate they do not control his or her duties, hence
they were not regarded as the employer. The bishop does control the appointment and
dismissal of curates. Nevertheless, this control was held to be based upon canonical
obedience and had no basis in contract. This approach concentrates on proving the
absence of an employer without first evaluating whether factors such as control and
service point towards a contract of employment.
Each case denies that a minister of religion can have a contract of employment. The
reasons for this can be placed into themes which have developed through the century.
The early cases, Re Employment of Ministers of the United Methodist Church and Re
Employment of Church of England Curates, work from the question "who is the
employer?" In the former case, Joyce J. held that although Methodist ministers may
appear to be employees the absence of an employer prevents a contract of employment.
In the latter case, Parker J.'s reasoning is to define the conclusion, that there is no
contract of employment and then work backwards to find evidence to support the
conclusion. His justification is the absence of an employer.
The leading modern authorities look for evidence which might support a contract of
employment. The EAT in Barthorpe uses the control test. Dillon LI. in ParJItt and Lord
Templeman in Davies concentrate on service. In each case the evidence does not match
the criteria needed for a contract of employment.
Recent, but less well known, decisions have refined the reasoning process. Santokh
Singh, Sharry, Ala vi and Turns all seem to apply an initial presumption of no contract of
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employment where duties are principally spiritual. Is this a throwback to Parker J.'s
reasoning? No. The intention is to balance spiritual duties against evidence of a contract
of employment. This is very different from deciding on a conclusion and finding
evidence to verify this conclusion. The industrial tribunal in Coker rebutted the
presumption with reference to Church of England curates. Rideout's arguments were
then overruled by the EAT and the Court of Appeal who return to Parker J.'s
presumptive stance. The modern approach of balancing spiritual duties against
indicators of a contract of employment is conveniently ignored by both courts.
4.4 Judicial review
The other cause of action open to Church of England clergy is judicial review of a
decision to dismiss. 72 As the established Church, the Church of England is a public body
exercising statutory power. Statutory restrictions on the dismissal of clergy are
contained in Measures and Canons. 73 The decision to dismiss a minister of a different
Christian denomination or religion could not be challenged by way of judicial review.
These are free associations, not public bodies, who agree upon their own rules.
Why have Church of England clergy declined to use judicial review? Reasons of
expense, location and time limits could provide part of the explanation. A major reason
might be the attractiveness of unfair dismissal as a cause of action. In such a case the
employer must reveal the reason for dismissal and show that it was a fair reason. 74 The
employer should have acted reasonably in treating the reason as a sufficient reason for
dismissal.75 The branch of judicial review termed "irrationality" uses a test of
reasonableness.76 To be capable of being reviewed a decision must be one that no
authority properly directing itself on the law and acting reasonably could have reached.77
It is thought that the test under unfair dismissal is easier for an "employee" to satisfy
72 Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, held that the decision to dismiss was capable of review.
Statutory restrictions include; Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977; Incumbents
(Vacation of Benefices) (Amendment) Measure 1993; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963; Church
of England (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure 1976 s 2 (1); Canon C12 paras 1, 5
Employment Rights Act 1996 ss 98 (1), (2)
Devis v Atkins [1977] ICR 662 at p676, per Viscount Dilhorne
76 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 WLR 1174 at p1196, per Lord
Diplock
Gordon, R.J.F. (1985) Judicial Review: Law and Procedure p19 (London, Sweet & Maxwell)
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than the test under judicial review, which could explain the use of private law. One
question remains: who would be the respondent? As a parallel to the question, "who
would be the employer in private law?" is the question, "who would be the respondent
in public law?"
Following O'Reilly v Mackman the distinction between public and private law has been
heightened. 78
 The court may now treat it as an abuse of process if an applicant uses
private law when it was appropriate to use public law. Conceivably the Church of
England might claim this if further private law actions are taken by clergy.
4.5 Sex Discrimination and the Meaning of Employment
To be in employment for the purposes of the Sex Discrimination Act, a person must be
employed "under a contract of service or of apprenticeship or a contract personally to
execute any work or labour."79
 The test is wider than that under the Employment Rights
Act which confines its ambit to employees; those employed under a contract of
employment. In Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd v Gunning the third limb of the
definition was discussed. 8° The phrase "a contract personally to execute any work or
labour" refers to a contract whose "dominant purpose is that the party contracting to
provide services under the contract performs personally the work or labour which forms
the subject matter of the contract." 81
 In Quinnen v Hovells it was said that this third limb
was included in the definition of employment in order to include those who are outside
the normal employee/employer relationship. 82
 "A contract for the personal execution of
work or labour was intended, in our judgment, on a proper reading of the legislative
purpose.. .to enlarge upon (as opposed merely to supplying an instance of) the ordinary
connotation of 'employment' so as to include persons outside the master-servant
relationship."831n Quinnen the contract that was involved was a contract for services. It
was held that employment under the Sex Discrimination Act can refer to the self-
employed as well as employees. Self-employed persons must pass the Quinnen test; that
78 O'Reilly v Mackman [19831 2 AC 237
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 82 (1)
80 Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd v Gunning [1986] IRLR 27
81 Ibid. at p31, per Balcombe U.
82 Quinnen v Hovells [1984] IRLR 227
83 Ibid. at p229, per Waite J.
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the applicant was engaged in work or labour, was engaged personally and was
discharging such functions under terms which were contractual.
Office holders are not generally covered by the Sex Discrimination Act. Sections 85 (2)
and 86 (2) make special provision for certain Crown office holders. Provision is not
made for ecclesiastical office holders. In Knight v A.G. the EAT held that the office of
justice of the peace is not "employment" within the meaning of the Sex Discrimination
Act, nor did it fall under the protection provided by sections 85 (2) or 86 (2).84 "[A]
justice of the peace is appointed to hold an office. He is not employed under a contract
of service or apprenticeship, nor does he make with the Crown a contract to execute
personally any work or labour." 85 The decision in Inland Revenue Commissioners v
Hambrook was applied.86 In this case both Denning U. and Parker U. expressed the
view that in ordinary circumstances a Crown official may not be employed under a
contract of service. In exceptional circumstances a contract might be found, even a
contract of service. The EAT did not believe that exceptional circumstances existed in
the case of Knight. Importantly, the EAT added that Parliament, in the Sex
Discrimination Act, had assumed a distinction between an office holder and an
employee. Otherwise they would not have inserted the specific protections for Crown
officials contained in sections 85 (2) and 86 (2).87 However, the tribunal limited the
effect of the decision to justices of the peace and refused to extend it to office holders in
general, submitting that there may be distinctions which may need consideration in other
cases.88
As stated, some Church of England priests may be classified as office holders whilst
others, for example curates, may not. Those priests who are held to be office holders
must convince the courts that for the purposes of the Sex Discrimination legislation they
can concurrently be employees. The unfair dismissal case of Barthorpe could be used to
support this position. Once the office holder argument is overcome the priest must then
establish that he or she has a contract; either a contract of service or a contract
Knight vA.G. [1979] ICR 194
Ibid. at p199, per Slynn J.
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Hambrook [1956] 2 QB 641
87 Knight v AG. n.84 supra at p199, per Slynn J.
88 Ibid. at p201, per Slynn J.
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personally to execute any work or labour. Under section 19 of the Sex Discrimination
Act an exemption from unlawful sex discrimination is given in regard to ministers of
religion. The implications of this exemption will be discussed in Chapter Seven.
The Equal Pay Act contains the same extended definition of employment as the Sex
Discrimination Act. 89
 Again office holders are not generally covered by the Act but
provision is made in section 1 (8) for protection to extend to certain Crown office
holders. The arguments regarding the employment status of ministers of religion used in
unfair dismissal cases and the suggested arguments outlined in relation to sex
discrimination would be pertinent in an equal pay context. Unlike the Sex
Discrimination Act, the Equal Pay Act does not provide an exemption for ministers of
religion in respect of unequal pay.
4.6 Conclusion on the Employment Status of Ministers of Religion
There are approximately 10,000 male and female priests in the Church of England. This
is a significant number of workers who are denied employment rights and who have no
satisfactory alternative procedure. The use of a broad brush approach to all cases
involving the clergy denies a comprehensive understanding of the different posts in the
Church of England. MSF acknowledges that the legal status of the clergy cannot be
treated in a reductive way. A survey conducted by MSF concerning clergy conditions of
service asks whether clergy would like to be classified in future as a homogenous body;
as employees. This would be in the interest of unbeneficed clergy (curates and priests-
in-charge), 57.5% of whom favoured the reform. This was against 38.1% of beneficed
clergy (incumbents). Many incumbents would consider employee status as a diminution
of status, if it were in place of freehold status. 90
 The abolition of the freehold was
mooted and rejected. It appears unlikely that incumbents will be "levelled down" to
employee status. The hope remains that unbeneficed clergy will gain employment rights.
Ministers of different denominations and religions have neither public nor private law
89 EquaJ Pay Act 1970 s 1 (6) (a); Haisbury's Statutes of England and Wales, Fourth Edition, 1997
Reissue, vol.16
9°MSF (1995b) Op. cit.,
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protection. A thorough definition of the legal status of this growing band of workers is
urgently required.
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Chapter Five
Methodology
5.1 Theory and Practice
The intention of this thesis is to present the theory and practice of sex discrimination
law as it relates to the Church of England. From this basis legal reform can be
suggested. The aim is to avoid the gulf between theory and practice which legal research
sometimes encounters. It is submitted that theory and practice should not be segregated
as separate processes but should be blended together. The methodology of the thesis is
drawn from this approach. Theoretical ideas are explained before describing women's
and men's experience. Experiences may fit with theory or theory may have to be
amended to incorporate experience.
5.2 Questionnaire Design
The questionnaire design and data analysis are constructed so as to integrate theory and
practice. The previous four chapters define the thesis title: Chapter One - discrimination,
Chapter Two - sex, Chapter Three - the Church of England and Chapter Four -
employment. Chapter One provides the theoretical ground for questions on sex
discrimination. The resultant data is used in conjunction with ideas from Chapters Three
and Four to construct recommendations for law reform. On the whole the approach to
the research is deductive. Theory is worked with before testing data against theory.
However, when analysing data it is permissible and it is submitted, necessary, to
sometimes soften the rigid scientific approach and instead use induction to generate
ideas.'
The choice of research method was to administer a pilot questionnaire followed by a
final questionnaire. The pilot questionnaire not only tested the strength of the
questionnaire, it provided a test run at data analysis. For a policy to be coherent the
Marsh, Catherine (1982) The Survey Method p96 (London, George Allen & Unwin); the reader is
referred to 5.7.
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theory and practice behind it must fit. The danger of leaving data analysis to the end of
data collection is that there will be no fit.2
The questionnaire asked specific research questions in order to discover whether sex
discrimination was a problem in the Church of England. As a fresh area of study there
were no previous empirical studies to compare the results with. In view of this it was
difficult to test a specific research hypothesis as one would do in science. Instead a
general hypothesis was tested; that a priest's sex contributes to their search for a post
and their treatment whilst in post. Stage one of the questionnaire design was to generate
research questions from theoretical ideas. The starting point was the meaning of sex
discrimination. At present priests are not protected by the Sex Discrimination Act or the
Equal Treatment Directive. One is thus inquiring about factual discrimination, not
unlawful discrimination. There are two interrelated but distinct questions. First, are
priests being badly treated because of their sex? Secondly, does this treatment fall
within the definition of sex discrimination, disregarding the exemption contained in the
legislation? If so, one can begin to argue that the law needs reforming in order that
individuals are given rights where they have a grievance. How does one define sex
discrimination in a questionnaire? The foundations of analysis lie in equality. Yet to get
direct answers about abstract concepts such as equality of opportunity, equality of
treatment or equality of result would be impossible. Instead these concepts are broken
down into a series of questions. 3 A definition of sex discrimination was given to avoid
the collection of irrelevant data. The phrase, "did you receive less favourable treatment
on grounds of your sex?", taken from the Sex Discrimination Act, was used. This only
captures direct sex discrimination. It is precisely this type of experience that priests will
be able to comment upon. The presence of indirect sex discrimination is less easily
investigated by questionnaire. Instead, it is easier to follow the continuing policy of the
Church. For example, a recent condition imposed by the House of Bishops is the "45
plus rule". 4 This states that candidates who are over 45 will not be accepted for training
for stipendiary ministry. This is arguably indirectly discriminatory to women, bearing in
mind the numbers of women previously denied their vocation.5
2 Marsh, Catherine (1982) op. cit., p124
The reader is referred to 5.4.
Church Times, 30th June 1995
This is discussed in detail at 7.6.3.
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The source and intensity of direct sex discrimination must be identified. Is it an isolated
act concerning individual clergy in individual parishes? Or is the attitude entrenched at
an individual level, a diocesan level or even at a national level? Is there evidence of
indirect sex discrimination in the conditions imposed on priests by their diocese or by
the General Synod? One wants to know why sex influences a person's treatment at
work. To test causal networks background variables which might influence an
individual's treatment were included in the questionnaire. If sex discrimination is
present, the next question is what ought to be done? The source of the sex
discrimination and the attitudes behind it, lay the basis for reform. Chapter Two
provided ideas for challenging sex discrimination. Some of these ideas are difficult to
encapsulate in legislation as one is seeking to change people's attitudes. This problem is
heightened where religion is involved. On one hand there is legitimate theological
objection to women priests, on the other sex discrimination. It is when these categories
come close or blur that there is great difficulty. Legislators, like the judiciary in unfair
dismissal cases, are unwilling to interfere where matters of religion appear.
5.3 Variables Used in the Questionnaire
Many factors influence the treatment of a priest in the Church of England. To cover all
relevant factors the analysis began with a structured level of variables starting with the
international level and moving down to the individual level. 6 Located at an international
level are policy decisions which span many nations, such as equality of opportunity and
the prohibition on reverse discrimination. At a national level lie policy decisions
emanating from the General Synod. These decisions include the content and application
of the Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993, the current reception process in the
Church of England and the increased use of NSMs. Financial considerations may
likewise dictate the use of NSMs at a diocesan level, If both spouses are priests some
dioceses state that only one may hold a stipendiary post. 7 The bishop exerts tremendous
influence over the selection of clergy in his diocese. He appoints the curate and the
6 This idea was adapted from Strauss and Corbin's description of a conditional matrix. Strauss, Anseim &
Corbin, Juliet (1990) Basics of Qualitative Research ppl6l-l64 (London, Sage)
The questionnaire revealed this was an accepted practice in the dioceses of Worcester and Guildford.
The reader is referred to 6.5. and 7.6.2. for more information on this.
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priest-in-charge and retains the right to veto the appointment of an incumbent. The
power of the bishop to prohibit women priests in his diocese remains unused. 8
 At a
parish level a chaotic mix of variables are at work. When selecting an incumbent the
patron and the parish representatives act on behalf of the parish. Theological objection
to women priests will be expressed in the passing of Resolutions A and/or B. Do the
Resolutions reflect the will of the parish as a whole? What influence, if any, does the
bishop exert over the parish representatives and/or the patron? Despite Resolutions A
and/or B not being in place, is there an unofficial feeling that a priest of a particular sex
is wanted? The influence of geography might uncover attitudes to women priests. Where
do women priests work? Are women priests found predominantly in (say) an inner city
area? If so, is this through chance, choice or because these were the areas most receptive
to change? Finally, located within the individual are the background variables which
serve to make us individuals. In relation to a priest these include; sex, age, race,
disability, churchmanship, pastoral experience, education and clergy connections.
Related to, and perhaps a constituent of, a person's sex is their marital status and their
responsibility for dependants. Feminists might argue that these two variables are part of
the social construction of woman. A man is less likely to have his sex described in
relation to his marital status and his responsibility for dependants.
5.4 A Brief Description of the Main Questions
The basic technique was to ask general questions before filtering down to specific
questions on a particular topic. To ensure factual validity definitions of concepts were
given where appropriate. Sometimes it is difficult to formulate definitions which will
cover all cases. Thus open questions allow respondents to write down their experiences
which can be classified into themes. This allows for factually irrelevant answers to be
screened out. With the exception of a question on mobility in the pilot questionnaire,
hypothetical questions were not used. As was discovered with the said question,
hypothetical questions are difficult to administer and get reliable results from. The main
questions will now be described.
8 Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 s 2 (1); Personal Communication, Professor David
McClean 24/2/96
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Do all priests have an equal opportunity to compete? The principle is that there should
be no exclusion from the competition on grounds other than appropriate and rational
ones. Equality of opportunity is most pertinent to job search. Which jobs does one ask
about? One cannot just ask about successful outcomes as this defeats the object of
discovering sex discrimination. Equally is it possible to ask respondents about each job
application? The approach was to ask priests about their present post; what it is, how
they got it and how they are presently treated. This serves to locate them now and it
stimulates respondents to think about sex discrimination. Past discrimination was then
surveyed. Priests were asked about their search for a first curacy, a second curacy and a
senior post.
Evidence of equality or inequality of opportunity can be ascertained in a number of
ways. The way a post is advertised is crucial. Before administering the questionnaire
the fact that informality was part of the Church of England's stock in trade was realised,
but the strength of informal channels and unique processes of appointment was
underestimated. If advertisement of a post has been informal the race may be won and
no interview is needed. In the case of a formal advertisement an interview may be held.
What criteria are used to select a short list? Are candidates informed of this? if a
candidate does receive an interview, are the interview questions appropriate and rational
ones; questions which people from all sections of society could comply with? If the
candidate did not obtain the post were reasons given and what were they? Equality of
opportunity was examined at different levels of a priest's "career path". One intention
was to see whether any particular post had a significant problem with equality of
opportunity.
Linked to equality of opportunity is the idea of equality of condition. If conditions are
equalised all can compete equally. Education is a prime condition to be equalised.
Conditions such as age, race, pastoral ability and churchmanship cannot be equalised.
However, they are vital conditions to identify as they enable one to compare like with
like on Aristotelian principles. For example, the treatment of male and female priests
with a certain level of pastoral experience can be compared. Sex prevents men and
women priests competing equally. Biological sex cannot be equalised. Biology has
created theological division regarding the issue of women priests. Despite the move to
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ordain women priests, theological objection has been preserved in law. Biological sex
leads directly to the legal inequality of women. The social construction of woman,
which in part builds on biology, involves her marital status, her responsibility for
dependants and extends to general attitudes regarding women's roles. Theory suggests
that the social construction of woman causes sex discrimination. This aspect of sex can
be equalised if attitudes are altered. The questionnaire surveyed the respondents'
background variables. When assessing sex discrimination in the Church of England,
concentration is placed on the social attitudes which prevent equality of condition rather
than on theological arguments against women priests.
Equality of result demands that all disadvantageous variables are swept aside in order to
achieve an equal outcome. In the case of employment the outcome will be the holding of
a job. The disadvantageous variable is commonly a person's sex. Other disadvantageous
variables could include age, race or job experience. In the Church of England an
example of equality of result would be an equal number of male and female priests
holding specific posts in a diocese. The question would then be, is this chance or is this
design? A research objective was to see whether priests were being selected solely on
the basis of their sex. In the case of a male priest, his selection could legitimately be
based upon the presence of Resolutions A and/or B. If a male priest was required for
other reasons this could point to sex discrimination in the form of unequal opportunity
to compete. In the case of a female priest being selected solely because of her sex the
policy might be one of reverse discrimination. Reverse discrimination is unlawful in
Britain. 9
 Reverse discrimination is also contrary to EC law, specifically the Equal
Treatment Directive 1976.10 Yet with all good intentions, employers might practise it to
achieve equality of result, or as they might put it - a balanced workforce. In a
questionnaire men may not openly report sex discrimination. Yet if there is evidence of
reverse discrimination, either as an isolated incident or as a diocesan policy, at least
some men are being discriminated against; they are not having their interests included in
the decision. These may be male priests other than those included in the sample group.
Sex Discrimination Act (1975) ss 1(1), 2 (1), 6 (1), 6 (2); The Act does allow reverse discrimination in
limited circumstances; s 48. It is offered only in relation to training and not employment. The provision of
training is not pertinent to this thesis.
'° Kalanke v Freie Hansestaadt Bremen [1995] IRLR 660
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Equality of result can crush equality of respect. The latter states that one ought to give
equal weight to the interests of others. In an ordinary employment situation the interest
of an employer is weighed alongside the interest of candidates. When assessing
candidates the employer should not pick out arbitrary factors such as sex or race; they do
not form part of a person's interest. In the Church of England the rules are different. The
"employer" may or may not count sex as part of their interest. Additionally, the lay and
clerical involvement in the appointment of a priest means that there is the problem of
weighing several interests. To some a priest's sex is a theological issue, to others it is
not. In parishes where Resolutions A and/or B are in place, a priest's sex does form part
of an "employer's" interest. Sex is a theological issue and not a mere arbitrary factor.
Women will not apply to these parishes. They will apply to places where at least official
sanction is given to the appointment of women priests. In these parishes sex should not
form part of an employer's interest. In these cases, if women or men receive less
favourable treatment on grounds of their sex, their interest is not being weighed
properly. Here, a person's sex is arbitrarily used in the decision process.
Throughout this thesis the phrase "treatment of priests" is constantly used. This is a
convenient phrase covering the general position of male and female priests; what
opportunities they receive, what attitudes they encounter and whether they feel
discriminated against. Equality of treatment specifically refers to the equal distribution
of some opportunity or resource. It is used in the questionnaire to examine treatment
once in post. Once past the hurdle of obtaining a post how are women treated? This
brings one back to the equality/difference debate. Do women want equal treatment with
men in the way that the Sex Discrimination Act promotes or do they want to be treated
differently? What is their perception of how they are treated?
Unequal pay between the sexes is a specific form of sex discrimination. Is this a
problem in the Church of England? Without detailed case information no firm
statements as to this can be given. Instead, an objective was to gain insight into the
patterns of stipendiary and non-stipendiary ministry. Who holds non-stipendiary posts?
Are such ministers mainly women? Are they young women at the start of their vocation
or women who have served the Church for many years? Are priests in non-stipendiary
posts through choice or because of factors beyond their control?
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5.5 The Sample
The empirical work is a comparative analysis of the treatment of men and women
priests. Focusing solely on women priests would prevent a comparative analysis with
male priests and it would prohibit any speculations on what it is to be a female and a
female priest." Priests were divided into two groups. Group one comprised male and
female priests with relatively little pastoral experience who had been priested since
1994. All would be at curate level. A comparison of like with like is straightforward in
this case. The second group posed a greater difficulty. These comprised male and female
priests with greater pastoral experience than group one. Whilst waiting for sanction to
become priests, women served the Church as licensed women workers, deaconesses and
deacons. In some cases women had up to thirty years of pastoral experience. In view of
this a bishop has discretion to reduce a woman's curacy to one year to allow her to apply
for senior posts. Finding an adequate comparison group of men was difficult. In the pilot
questionnaire it was calculated that men who were priested in 1992 would have served
their curacy and would be in a position to apply for senior posts. When the
questionnaires were returned it was found that most men were still serving their curacy,
whilst more women were in senior posts. In the final questionnaire male priests who had
been priested since 1988 onwards were sampled.
Priests with posts in the Church of England were sampled. It is necessary to remember
that there are those who have trained for the ministry but who do not hold a post. This
may be so for a variety of reasons such as; ill health, retirement, lack of mobility, a
change of mind or sex discrimination. This is a disparate group of people and a difficult
group to compare. Ordinands will have completed their training at many different times,
they may never have entered active ministry, if they did they will have left at different
times for a variety of reasons. Ascertaining any pattern of treatment would be tortuous.
With this in mind plus the problems associated with contacting people, this avenue of
" Marsh, Catherine (1982) op. cit., ppll2-ll3 refers to a study where all the subjects are female. Brown,
G.W. & Harris, T. (1978) The Social Origins of Depression: A Study of Psychiatric Disorder in Women
(London, Tavistock). The survey, Marsh says, can say nothing about the effects of being female.
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inquiry was not pursued.' 2
 The sample only includes clergy. The opinions of those
involved in the appointment process such as bishops, patrons or parish representatives
were not sought. This is an appropriate methodological step provided it is made clear
that the questionnaire answers include the subjective opinions of priests as well as their
objective answers.13
5.5.1 Pilot Sample
Basic stratified sampling was used in the pilot questionnaire. This requires the study
population to be placed into groups called strata. The study population comprises men
and women priests.' 4 Ripon diocese was chosen as the pilot study population. The
relevant strata are the priest's sex and their pastoral experience. A random sample is
selected from each stratum. Stratified sampling ensures the representation of groups
which are important to the research.' 5
 In this case it ensures an adequate representation
of the sexes and a comparable experience match. Because the number of priests which
fell within the population group was only 49 the whole group was sampled. Ripon
diocese was thought to provide good conditions for a pilot questionnaire. Diocesan
policy appeared moderate on the issue of women priests. Ripon diocese is
geographically diverse, including the city of Leeds and the dales of North Yorkshire. It
was hoped that the achieved sample would be similar in terms of characteristics such as
sex and pastoral experience to that of the initial sample. Naturally, those who were
interested in the issue of sex discrimination were more likely to return the questionnaire.
Would women, and not men, see it as their issue?
12 Attempts were made to locate members of this group. The College of the Resurrection at Mirfield and
the Vocations Officer of the Advisory Board of Ministry were contacted. They could provide no records
of ordinands who had failed to secure, or stay in, a post in the Church of England.
' For the justification of such a method the reader is referred to; Leonard, Alice (1987) Pyrrhic Victories.
Winning Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay Cases in the industrial Tribunals 1980-84 p8 (London,
HMSO)
The term priest is used at 5.5.1. and 5.5.2. to cover both priests and deacons. Where the distinction
between the two is relevant this is noted.
15 For a detailed discussion of stratified sampling the reader is referred to Henry, Gary, T. (1990)
Practical Sampling pp28-29, 99 (London, Sage)
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5.5.2 Final Sample
In order to move from specific case histories to general statements a larger survey of the
study population was conducted using stratified sampling. In the next section validity is
discussed; the sample sets the scene for validity assessments. The sample is used to
represent the study population in order that generalisations can be made. "Given that
there is probably a causal relationship from construct A to construct B, how
generalizable is this relationship across persons, settings and time?" 6 The dioceses were
chosen by examining the range of diocesan attitudes to women priests, ranging from
strongly against in Chichester, London and Truro to strongly in favour in Gloucester,
Guildford and Worcester. Blackburn and Newcastle were sampled as dioceses with
balanced views on women priests. The latter two dioceses were thought to be similar in
attitude to Ripon, thus giving three dioceses in each category of attitudes to women
priests.' 7 The total sample population comprised male and female priests with
comparable pastoral experience. All women priests in the diocese and all women
deacons ordained in 1994 or 1995 were included in the sample population. "Long term"
deacons were not included; that is deacons who have no intention of being priested. A
comparable group of male priests was required. Male priests ordained deacon in 1987
and priested in 1988 were canvassed. As women have been able to serve as deacons
since 1987 a good experience match was achieved. This experience period gave male
priests the opportunity to have obtained a senior post, making them comparable with
female priests who have leapfrogged to senior posts. As far as possible only parish
priests were sampled. Parochial as opposed to sector ministry is the focus of this thesis.
Different working environments and structures are involved in sector ministry such as
prison chaplaincy work. Cathedral and other diocesan appointments were likewise
avoided. The stipendiary status of the priest could not always be ascertained from the
diocesan directories. It was therefore recognised that NSMs would form part of the
sample population.
16 Ibid. p12
These sampling decisions were made following a personal communication with Professor David
McClean, 24/2/96. He suggested these dioceses by reference to the voting pattern at the Synod debate on
women priests. As he cautioned, the movement of clergy, and bishops, may have altered the balance of
attitudes in a diocese since 1993.
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The total sample population of priests was 806, 578 males and 228 females. A final
sample size of 400 was decided upon, comprising 200 male and 200 female priests. This
was based on the expectation of at least a 50% response rate. From the total sample
population 28 female and 378 male priests were deleted. To keep the size of each
diocese proportionate in the final sample a percentage calculation was used to decide
how many priests to delete from each diocese. The calculation is given in equation (1);
x*Y
(1)
where,
- A is the number of male/female priests to delete from the diocese.
- X is the number of male/female priests to delete from the total sample
population.
- Y is the number of male/female priests in the diocese.
- Z is the number of male/female priests in the total sample population.
- * = multiplication.
It was necessary to keep the pastoral experience of priests proportionate to the total
sample population. Percentage calculations were used again to determine how many
priests from each year of priesting ought to be deleted. The calculation is given in
equation (2);
A*W
B=	 (2)
where,
- B is the number of male/female priests to delete from the year in question in
the diocese.
- W is the number of males/females priested in the year in question in the
diocese.
In the case of the male sample this procedure was used for each year of priesting
between 1988 and 1995 and ordination as a deacon in 1994 and 1995. In the case of the
female sample the procedure was with reference to priestings and ordinations to the
diaconate in 1994 and 1995. The relative size of each diocese was preserved by this
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process. The male/female ratio was not preserved as many men were deleted from the
population.'8
5.6 Validity
McNeill makes a distinction between reliability and validity.' 9
 A method is reliable if
anybody else using the method, or the same person using it at another time, would
produce the same results. Unlike ethnographic research, a questionnaire can easily be
repeated and unless the conditions under investigation were to change there is no reason
why the results ought not to be the same. A method is valid if the data represents reality.
McNeill believes that validity is a problem when dealing with people's attitudes. He
concludes, "It must be accepted that what we are collecting is people's answers to the
questions, which isn't necessarily a true picture of their activities."20
 On the whole, the
questionnaire used here asks about the experiences of priests. It is only in some open
questions and in the optional comment section that attitudes appear.
The majority of the questionnaire consisted of closed questions. Respondents were
forced to tick a box or boxes. In terms of validity, closed questions can be criticised for
delimiting choice. One wonders, did the respondent really mean what they ticked? To
avoid this a choice of categories is provided, importantly including a "don't know" and
an "other" category. When a small number of answers are given to closed questions
there is a danger of quantitative data manipulation. When put into percentage form data
appears more significant than in reality it is. Where the data set is particularly small the
approach is to present the figures in ratios. Where data is more substantial percentages
are used.
Open-ended questions allow the respondent to say what they mean. Reality is intact. Not
all respondents will answer these questions. Leonard notes that it is then difficult to
predict whether the responses are representative of that category of respondents.
"However the frequency with which a given topic was mentioned can surely serve as
IS For the final sample sizes the reader is referred to Appendix C, Table C-i.
McNeil, Patrick (1990) Research Methods pp 14-15 (London, Routledge)
20 Ibid. p15
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some indication of its typicality; moreover, even regarded strictly as comments from
individuals, they provide a wealth of information about applicants' experiences." 2 ' The
use of both open-ended and closed questions in the questionnaire should clarify what
people really mean. An over emphasis on open-ended questions could result in
individual case studies rather than a comprehensive study of the treatment of male and
female priests.
5.7 Data Analysis
The criteria used in the questionnaire design and the sample choice have been described,
the choice of data analysis method is now explained. Throughout the research a
deductive approach is taken. Theoretical concepts are examined and broken down into
questions for an appropriate sample group. The empirical findings are tested against
theory in order to make general statements about the phenomena. Phenomenologists
argue that concentration on theory ruins the development of inductive, grounded
research which produces rich qualitative data taken directly from the field. Admittedly,
the conceptual framework of the questionnaire is tight. This will enable the making of
cross case comparisons and generalisations. The negative effect of this tight framework
could be a loss of context and a lack of qualitative data. In order to combat this, several
open-ended questions which produce qualitative data are included. By allowing the
subjects to provide their own concepts, albeit guided by the research question, a semi-
inductive analysis is achieved. Thus the claim of phenomenologists, that one is asking
the wrong questions, is quashed.22
Involved in the quantitative v qualitative, deduction v induction debate are feminists.
Division as to research technique divides liberals and postmoderns. Liberal feminists
employed traditional quantitative techniques to examine women's employment.
Armstrong & Armstrong used these techniques in their early work but were frustrated to
find that women's experience at work and in the household remained invisible. One was
left with cross tabulations regarding sex and employment but nothing to describe the
21 Leonard, Alice (1987) op. cit., pp4l-42
22 For a further discussion of methodological stances the reader is referred to Miles, M.B. & Huberman,
A.M. (1984) Qualitative Data Analysis pp2O- 21 , 28-33 (London, Sage)
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nature and conditions of the work, whether public or private. 23
 A backlash to this
approach came from radical and postmodern feminists. Both groups promote equality
between men and women via a re-examination of gender. Quantitative analysis was
shunned as it failed to account for women's experience in the private realm. Instead
what was most easily measured became theorised. "What is most difficult to translate
into numbers that can be statistically analyzed is women's work experiences outside the
formal economy, as well as the nature and conditions of work in all areas." 24 Qualitative
methods are used to examine women's experience. Sex difference is located as an
explanation of women's experience. Three problems are associated with this approach.
First, how should female experience be integrated into theory? Should it replace or
work with male experience? Indeed is male experience accurately recorded? Feminists
argue that traditional theory simply reflects male experience. Is this correct? Is a new
analysis of male experience needed too? The purpose of using male priests in the sample
is to record what their experiences actually are. Secondly, the concentration on
experience can produce fragmented data which relates only to individual cases. Deep
rooted processes of sex discrimination might be lost in the clutter of everyday life
experience. The philosophical concept of knowledge is the final problem. Is there one
female experience or types of experience or are there many? Which are analytically
important experiences and which are not? How does one measure, weigh and compare
experience? Many feminists reject the idea of an essential woman. Emphasis is placed
on women being different from one another. For example, the experience of
motherhood, if experienced at all, differs for each woman. Its effect will range from
liberating to confining, with most women located in the middle of the spectrum. Bartlett
assesses the validity of feminist knowledge. 25 Radical feminists use standpoint
epistemology. Women's position as victims gives them special knowledge, which non-
victims cannot participate in. Immediately, the problem of varying perceptions is raised.
Additionally, Bartlett believes that the idea of privileged knowledge is misconceived.
Her belief is that the experience of oppressors and innocent bystanders should be
included in order to gain a complete picture. 26 Postmodernists decry universal
Armstrong, Pat & Armstrong, Hugh (1990) Theorizing Women's Work p135 (Toronto, Garamond
Press)
24 Ibid. p16
25 Bartlett, Katherine (1994) op. cit., pp1 125-1135
26 Ibid. pp1 127-1129
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knowledge, preferring concrete analysis. This poses a paradox, "Adherents are left in the
awkward position of maintaining that gender oppression exists while challenging our
capacity to document it."27 Postmodern feminists rely on experiential analysis, working
from the ground up. For example, "it insists that the subject, is constituted through
multiple structures and discourses that in various ways overlap, intersect, and contradict
each other."28 This is in contrast with abstract universalism which deduces a theory from
abstract principles. However, by its rejection of objectivity postmodernism has difficulty
in proving the oppression of women and in supplying a reconstructive theory.
This thesis attempts to steer a via media between extreme positions. A middle ground is
found between deduction and induction, quantitative and qualitative analysis and
objective and subjective knowledge. To obtain an accurate description of the experience
of a Church of England priest a complementary blend of quantitative and qualitative
methods is used. The data analysis method involves a blend of simple quantitative cross
tabulation and exploratory qualitative methods. The aim is to discover what
discriminatory practices are being exercised, who are the victims and who are the
perpetrators. Processes which are either directly or indirectly discriminatory on grounds
of sex are searched for. Quantitative analysis will describe the current treatment of men
and women priests in the Church of England. In addition to description one wants an
explanation of why this is happening An exploratory, qualitative approach is used to
examine general trends and to account for local variation. There is a need to isolate sex
as a causal factor. Two methods are used to do this; first by looking at factors other than
sex, such as age and churchmanship, to decide whether sex is indeed the causal factor.
Secondly by examining the construction of gender. Sex equals anatomy but gender is a
growing concept based on perceptions of men and women's roles. Variables such as
marital status and responsibility for dependants are tested as separate components of
sex. Finally, tentative comments are made on the interaction of sex with other variables,
for example, age.
27 Rhode, Deborah (1993) "Feminist Critical Theories" in P. Smith (Ed.), Feminist Jurisprudence p594,
595 (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
28 Bartlett, Katherine (1994) Op. cit., p1 129
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What can be concluded from the quantitative figures and the qualitative analysis? On
the descriptive side statistical methods can be used to count the data and to find patterns
in the data. Pursuing these patterns further, relationships between variables can be
noted. Once this exploratory stage has been reached one can start thinking about cause.
This is an emotive word not only in social science but in the natural sciences. Hage &
Meeker stress that causality is a probabilistic idea not a deterministic one - thus one
makes speculations rather than describing precise laws. 29 There are two distinct aspects
of causal thinking. "It is. ..easy to confuse the theoretical aspect of causal thinking
(thinking about why and how something causes something else) with the assessment of
evidence for causal thinking (having formulated a hypothesis about a causal process,
what data do we look for to support or reject this hypothesis)." 3° The latter is an easier
process to operate. For example, when the causal hypothesis is that a person's sex
causes their treatment at work, one simply compares the data on sex and treatment at
work. The identification of separate causes in a causal network involves inductive work.
It requires one to look at the data and ask why was that happening? The open-ended
questions are intended to provide data for this sophisticated level of analysis. 31 The
concentration on testing and constructing causal networks in this thesis is not just a
sociological whim, it is the foundation for law reform. "We cannot make changes
without understanding the reasons for a change having one effect rather than another,
and the conditions under which the change we want may occur."32
5.8 Quantitative Methodology
The first aim of the data analysis is to collect facts. This strengthens the description of
the working practices of the Church of England and sets the scene for pattern finding.
Quantitative patterns can give credence to qualitative statements too. For example,
several respondents might indicate that older women are being discriminated against.
This is of no statistical relevance but it shows the general perception of certain
respondents. Quantitative analysis can test whether this is the practice of the Church of
29 Hage, J. & Foley Meeker, B. (1988) Social Causality p5 (Boston, Unwin Hyman)
30 Ibid. p12
31 The empiricai work in this thesis extends only to questionnaires. This provides a springboard for further
research. In future work interviews and case studies could follow to develop the construction of causal
networks.
32 Hage, J. & Foley Meeker, B (1988) op. cit., p1
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England. The opinions of the few may indeed reflect current practices. Again, this is
part of the deductive process of hypothesis, testing and deduction.
The next step is to test causal networks. A definition of terms relating to causal
networks must be given. 33 A factor that is a cause is an independent variable, an effect is
a dependent variable. Both independent and dependent variables are state variables. "[A]
state variable is a condition that we can observe, which is stable enough for us to
measure, and which is either the beginning or end of a causal process."34 A state
variable, such as sex or age, can usually be refined to form different components. A
person's sex is biological but added to this are labels of what it is to be a man or a
woman. When comparing variables, especially sex, as it is the focus here, it is important
to recognise that variables are layered, and one layer may be a greater cause than other
layers. A process variable is the causal mechanism which explains why A causes B. As
an interactive process it is difficult to measure. When one asks, "why does being female
result in sex discrimination?", one is searching for process variables. Being female does
not equal being discriminated against per se. If empirical data shows a greater likelihood
of women being discriminated against on grounds of sex in the Church of England, it is
necessary to push the analysis forward and ask why.
In science an experimental design can randomly assign variables to cases. The effect of
an independent variable on a dependent variable can be accurately recorded. This is not
possible with Church of England priests. The closest one can get to an experimental
design is to compare like cases with like. This reduces the risk of spurious relationships
being formed between variables. 35 The research questions on search for a post and
treatment whilst in post are the dependent variables. The independent variables often
relate to the attributes of an individual such as sex and age, but also cover factors
external to the individual such as geographical location. One outcome often has multiple
causes. Sex alone, certainly biological sex, may not be the only cause of less favourable
treatment at work. A comparison of the main outcomes and their gravity with the
The following definitions are equally applicable to qualitative methodology, discussed at 5.9.
Hage, J. & Foley Meeker, B. (1988) op. cit., p19
Ibid. p69
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dependent variables of respondents will suggest whether sex discrimination is a problem
and which groups of priests, if any, are its victims.
The research methods used to test causal networks must be described. One starts with a
theoretical statement, for example, "Female priests are treated less favourably on
grounds of their sex." This itself contains a causal assumption. Secondly, one has a
statement of initial conditions, which could be a sample set of answers on the treatment
of male and female priests. From these two statements one derives a research hypothesis
that female priests claim sex discrimination more than male priests do. This represents
an empirical regularity not a causal assumption. If the research hypothesis is rejected by
the actual data, then one or both of the first two statements must be rejected. One can
test whether the initial conditions are accurately represented and whether the hypothesis
matches real world conditions, but there is no way of observing the theoretical
statement. Even if the research hypothesis is not rejected, the theoretical statement is not
necessarily true. if either statement one or two is incorrect a false premise may be
derived. For example, if the answers of the clergy are inaccurately recorded it may
appear that female priests are claiming sex discrimination more than male priests when
in fact they are not.
At this stage one is concerned with finding evidence of a causal relationship between
sex and the treatment of priests. The method of cross tabulation was used by J.S. Mill.36
One derives as many research hypotheses as possible from the first two statements and
then tests all the hypotheses against the data. The research hypotheses could be;
(I) Female priests are treated less favourably on grounds of their sex.
(2) Male priests are not treated less favourably on grounds of their sex.
(3) Some female priests are not treated less favourably on grounds of their sex.
(4) Some male priests are treated less favourably on grounds of their sex.
Once relationships between independent and dependent variables are recorded the
strength of that relationship must be assessed. Is the relationship direct, indirect or
spurious? A spurious relationship is when two variables seem to represent a connected
36 Miii, J.S. (1872) A System of Logic (London, Longmans)
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cause and event but are actually caused by the same prior cause. The two variables
belong in a causal network, but one does not cause the other. "[ho find evidence for a
spurious causal relationship introduce a control variable which is causally prior to both
the independent and dependent variable, and see if the relationship between the
independent and dependent variable disappears." 37
 Where A and B are causally
connected there may be indirect causal links along the chain. Indirect links will provide
information on why a priest's sex causes less favourable treatment. One has to think of
the reasons why a person's sex might result in less favourable treatment and introduce
them into the analysis. An intervening variable might be marital status or childcare
responsibilities. Once one introduces this as a control variable one can monitor whether
the original relationship changes. After testing various background variables in
conjunction with a person's sex and their treatment, one can eliminate those that do not
affect the original relationship. They will not form part of the main causal network
relating to sex and treatment, but they may form separate networks concerned with
different research hypotheses. Causal connections are working theories. They operate as
theories until they are disconfirmed or until a change of social conditions removes the
problem.
5.9 Qualitative Methodology
When testing causal networks one is essentially confined to quantitative analysis. The
construction of causal networks produces a qualitative response to the data. At this level
the question is "why" as opposed to "what". Relationships between state variables like
sex and treatment of a priest do not describe what process has related these variables.
Through the analysis of open-ended questions suggestions are made as to the processes
at work.
An open-ended question invites open answers which must be coded. The idea of coding
is to create categories into which analytically similar cases are put. If one uses very
broad codes, for example, discrimination, important sub-categories will be lost.
Conversely, if one creates detailed codes the result will be a multiplicity of codes which
will yield no analytical results. The way to construct a useful code, says Fowler, is to
r Hage, J. & Foley Meeker, B. (1988) op. cit., pp58-59
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consider what characteristics of answers are of analytic significance. One asks: what are
the kinds of differences among answers to each question which are important from a
researcher's point of view? 38 Miles & Huberman describe three types of code. 39 A
descriptive code can classify what was done and by whom, for example, what act of sex
discrimination occurred and by whom. An interpretative code looks for the motive
behind an action. An explanatory code suggests an emerging pattern, for example
patterns of sex discrimination in certain dioceses. Because a deductive approach is taken
many codes are derived from the conceptual framework. It is useful to let some codes
appear for themselves. This is the inductive approach that lets reality speak for itself.
This allows the researcher to be context sensitive. Conversely, it has the danger of
producing non-comparative single case information and data overload. 40 The danger of
losing the context of a particular response is significant. When one is using a non-
experimental design there will be relevant differences among the respondents. Despite
trying to construct a sample group of like men and women there are differences that
must be borne in mind during qualitative research.
The final stage is to construct a causal network which explains why a person's sex
causes them to be less favourably treated. At this level, focus is on the theoretical idea
of causality: why is it that sex causes less favourable treatment? This is not the same as
empirical evidence for causality: that a person's sex does cause their treatment. A
possible criticism is that only priests are asked for their description of sex discrimination
in the Church of England. Those involved in selecting priests for posts are not asked for
their comments. Practically speaking, this would be difficult as officials are unlikely to
admit to discriminatory practices. Additionally, unlike a court or tribunal, it is not the
function of this thesis to inquire into the decision making in a particular case. Officials
could at most respond in general terms. Does the elimination of one side of the equation
result in a biased causal network? All the causal network can do is indicate the problems
that Church of England clergy face and point to areas that are ripe for reform. The best
way to introduce change is to understand the initial problem. "If we are to produce
38 Fowler, Floyd, J. (1993) Survey Research Methods p126 (London, Sage)
Miles, MB. & Huberman, A.M. (1984) op. cit., p56
° Ibid. p57
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change in some variable we must understand both the causal networks that do this and
those that work in the opposite direction."4'
' Hage, J. & Foley Meeker, B. (1988) Op. cit., p200
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Chapter Six
Data Analysis1
6.1 The Pilot Questionnaire
Because there were already fewer men than women in the initial sample, it was hoped
that a good male response rate would be achieved. Of the 20 male priests who received
questionnaires 13 replied, a response rate of 65%. Of the 29 female priests who received
questionnaires 23 replied, a response rate of 79%. In a sample group this small little
significance should be placed on percentage values. The major lesson learnt from the
sample returns was that there was a lack of information on senior posts and indeed on
second curacies, especially in regard to men. In order to rectify this the final
questionnaire was sent to men who were priested as far back as 1988.
The pilot survey responses to questions on sex discrimination are briefly charted. Any
major or interesting findings are noted. First, it should be noted that no male priests
claimed sex discrimination at any point in the questionnaire. The pilot survey was
confined to female experiences only. The first question asked, "Whilst working in your
present post do you think that you have ever received less favourable treatment on
grounds of your sex?" 36% (8/22) of the female sample answered yes, half of whom
cited the incumbent as the discriminatory source. As far as search for a first curacy was
concerned, results were encouraging. A resounding 77% (17/22) denied sex
discrimination with only 4 women making such claims. In this sample, initial entry to
the post of curate was on the whole free of sex discrimination. Compared to other
results, this is encouraging. Ordinands are given assistance in finding a training parish
and this may explain the patterns. One reason why women's experience was positive
may have been their established position in a parish. Many women simply transferred
from being a deaconess in a parish to being a curate. It will be interesting to see how
women who come straight from theological college in search of a post will fare in the
'The data analysis is presented in table form in Appendix B (The Pilot Questionnaire) and Appendix C
(The Final Questionnaire). In view of the large number of questions asked and cross tabulations
performed, only the main data findings are presented in each Appendix.
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future. Women's treatment once in their first curacy deteriorated with 33% (6/18)
claiming sex discrimination. It is unwise to make generalisations about the data
regarding second curacies and senior posts as the data sets are so small. Sex
discrimination was reported at these levels. Even with these individual case studies it
can be seen that women priests believe that their sex influences their search for, and
their treatment in, a post.
A question which was included in the pilot survey, but not in the final questionnaire,
concerned reverse discrimination. Whilst men reported no direct sex discrimination, are
appointments made which do not weigh their interests? Is equality of respect denied to
male priests? Are they discriminated against in this way? The conflicting ideals of
equality of result and equality of respect were examined by asking respondents about
sex as a criterion of selection for the post. This was a difficult question to ask a
respondent. First, it assumes a considerable degree of knowledge about the selection
process, which may be why 4/12 men and 9/22 women answered don't know. Secondly,
it asks people to admit or deny that they obtained their post because of their sex. In the
case of men this may be perfectly legitimate. 6/12 men said that they were selected
because of their sex, only 2/12 denied this. It was thought that the most likely reason
would be that Resolutions A and/or B were in place. In fact only one priest stated this.
Two other answers stated that the PCC wanted a male priest. No indication is given that
this desire, whether theological or prejudiced, was enshrined in resolution form. Two
other male priests commented that their sex did play a part in the decision but they could
not be more specific. On the other side, were women priests being deliberately selected
rather than male priests? 4/22 women answered yes, 3 of whom believed the policy to
be one of reverse discrimination. In two cases this was the subjective assessment of the
respondents. The third described being told informally during the selection process that
it was a reverse discrimination policy. Thus male priests who were equally qualified to
apply for that position were being discriminated against.
The process of Church appointments was probed in the pilot questionnaire. The
apparent air of informality which surrounds the advertisement of, and appointment to,
posts was borne out by respondents' informal comments. One respondent stated, "we do
not apply for many jobs - there is a more informal appointment system." Another
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suggested that one should look at "the way clergy come into post. It is not necessarily by
the process of replying to an advertisement and being interviewed. More archaic
methods are still practised."
Another method of probing equality of opportunity was to look at the number of
applications made to secure a post, whether it was a first curacy, a second curacy or a
senior post. Were any patterns revealed among the number of applications made by men
and women priests? This might have been an easier task if one was analysing an
ordinary employment situation where jobs are publicly advertised and candidates apply
and hope to be interviewed. Using the word 'application' in the pilot questionnaire
caused difficulty. The question, "how many applications did you make before you
received your first curacy?" was left unanswered by some, others commented, "none, we
do not apply". A female incumbent in the optional comment section attempted to clarify
the situation. "References to applying for posts caused difficulties... .In answering the
questions I have interpreted 'application' as referring to any post in which I expressed
an interest and either applied formally or at least paid a preliminary visit to the parish."
In view of the difficulty of interpretation it was not possible to make any reliable
statements about this data. Suffice it to say that whilst advertisement and applications
for posts can potentially be formal or informal they tend towards the informal. The
reasoning behind decisions is all the more difficult to ascertain and attack. In the final
questionnaire questions about the number of applications made were not included.
Sex discrimination was examined by asking about the search for and treatment in a post.
Less favourable treatment was analysed using two methods. First, who was the source of
the discrimination? Was it a clerical or a lay source? This is important in establishing
factual sex discrimination. In ordinary employment situations an employer will be liable
for their own and their employees discriminatory acts against another employee. If
priests were categorised as employees, who would be their employer and who would
count as fellow employees? if the discrimination has a clerical source there is at least the
possibility of establishing factual sex discrimination, if it emanates from the PCC there
is the possibility that the council might count as employer or as agent of the employer.
Members of the laity such as congregation members or the general public, usually play
no part in the "employment" relationship between a priest and their Church. This source
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of discrimination is generally outside the ambit of factual sex discrimination. However,
if the laity formally take part in the recruitment process it could be specifically provided
that they are agents of the employer. The less formal the recruitment process the more
difficult such an interpretation would prove. 2 Secondly, what type of experience did the
respondent have? Was it capable of constituting a "detriment" as defined by the Sex
Discrimination Act? Was it a concrete incident of ill treatment or was it the perception
of attitudes against women in general andlor women priests in particular? Concrete
incidents are more likely to fall within factual sex discrimination. Attitudes are a
difficult category to examine. Theological attitudes against women priests are permitted
by the legislation. Stereotypical attitudes against women which result in less favourable
treatment are not legitimised. The problem here would be proof.
Two incidents stemming from a clerical source are recounted as examples. One case
concerned the very concrete issue of pay. A female curate, aged 64, described the
bishop's attitude to her stipend as discriminatory. "My post is on half stipend. I am sure
that if I were a man the bishop would have offered me a full stipend job. My colleague
as chaplain now has one." The respondent desires equal treatment with men. Involved in
this claim is the lesser but necessary goal of equality of respect. The problem, she says,
is a continuing one for women priests in her age group, hereby raising questions about
the interaction of sex and age. Another female curate perceived the attitude of her
incumbent as discriminatory on the ground of her sex. "He found it hard to accept that I
had twenty years of work experience (and life experience) before ordination." The
continuing problem was reported to the rural dean and bishop. The solution, her moving
post, did not match the problem. The failure to tackle the main problem perhaps
illustrates the desire to appease all sides. It means that underlying attitudes, whether
discriminatory on grounds of sex or lacking in respect for men or women, remain
unresolved.
Two incidents stemming from a lay source are noted as examples. A NSM curate
described how the PCC were unwilling to pay expenses incurred by her. The council
might be classed as an employer or agent so this was an interesting example. The
2 Alternatively they might be construed as third parties. In certain circumstances an employer can be
directly liable for the actions of third parties. This is discussed at 7.7.1.
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solution of the council, to increase her husband's expense to include the amount of her
expense, showed a distinct lack of respect. In another example a female curate described
the attitudes of church members. "A few have anti-women priest views, some have
stereotypical views of women's roles." Stereotypical views confined to church members
prejudices are hurtful but are unlikely to be discriminatory. If these views were to limit
the work which she could do, a claim of factual sex discrimination might be made.
6.2 The Final Questionnaire: The Initial Sample and the Achieved Sample
It is useful to compare the characteristics of the initial sample with those of the achieved
sample. A 72% overall response rate was achieved. The 69% male response and 74%
female response gave quantitative analysis firm foundations. It was encouraging that
male priests did not regard the issue of sex discrimination as a female preserve. 6% of
men and 9% of women indicated that they could not or would not complete the
questionnaire. Non returns totalled, males 24% and females 16%. All dioceses provided
a solid response rate between both sexes. The highest rate was 93% by males in
Newcastle the lowest was 50% by males in Chichester.3
The second vital characteristic was pastoral experience. Did the returns reflect the
weighting of pastoral experience included in the initial sample? This was ascertained by
collating information about present status and ordination dates. Regarding the former,
the status of being a deacon or a priest reflects pastoral experience. A curate spends one
year, usually, as a deacon before they are priested. The initial male sample group
comprised; 12% deacons and 88% priests. This was closely matched by the initial
female sample; 11.5% deacons and 88.5% priests. The achieved sample reflected a
balanced return of questionnaires by priests and deacons. The achieved male sample
now comprised 10% deacons and 90% priests. The achieved female sample comprised
12% deacons and 88% priests. The slight swing in the male ratio towards priests is
probably not due to the lesser response of priests but due to deacons being priested after
the compilation of initial sample data. This is a problem when comparing the initial and
achieved sample group characteristics. The study population is not static, characteristics
change. Comparing like with like can be a tortuous task.
The reader is referred to Appendix C, Table C-2 for a complete breakdown of the response rates.
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In the initial sample the ordination of male priests was evenly spread between 1988 and
1994. Each year represented between 10-13% of the total sample. Only 6.5% of the male
sample had been priested in 1995. Finally, those males made deacon in 1994 and 1995
accounted for 3% and 9% of the male sample respectively. 79.5% of the initial female
sample were ordained to the priesthood in 1994. This was due to the glut of women
waiting to be priested. Only 9% were so ordained in 1995. Women made deacons in
1994 and 1995 made up 4.5% and 7% of the sample respectively. The ratios held fairly
evenly between the initial and the achieved sample. The ordination of male priests was
evenly spread between 1988 and 1994. Each year now represented between 8-15% of
the total sample. The highest percentage of male priests (15%) were ordained in 1994.
The higher percentage of males priested in 1995 and the lower percentage of deacons
reflected a number of priestings since data sample compilation. Similarly regarding the
female sample, whilst the ratios held fairly evenly, 18% of female respondents were
now found to be priested in 1995.
6.3 Quantitative Analysis
6.3.1 Present Sex Discrimination
To stimulate respondents to think about sex discrimination, the first major question
asked, "Whilst working in your present post, do you think that you have ever received
less favourable treatment on grounds of your sex?" The solid base of 286 answers gave
meaning to the percentage values. Of the male sample 1% answered yes, 3% don't
know, with a resounding 96% answering no. The experience of female priests was
somewhat different with 30% claiming sex discrimination, as against 66% who denied it
and 4% who answered don't know. As far as which dioceses were affected by sex
discrimination initially the results ran to form. Leading the table was Chichester with
52% (11/21) of its female priests claiming sex discrimination. This was followed by
another anti-women priests diocese, Truro, with 45% (5/11) of its women making
claims. Surprisingly the next villain was Blackburn who were thought to be a moderate
However, some deacons may have been priested post data compilation.
The reader is referred to Appendix C, Table C-4 for a complete breakdown of ordination dates.
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diocese regarding women priests. Its high 43% female claim rate was due to 3/7 women
making claims. The small number base may be viewed as inflating the figures.
However, it should be remembered that there were only a handful of female priests to
canvass in Blackburn as compared to hosts of male priests, perhaps itself saying
something of the situation in Blackburn for women. Also higher than expected was
Guildford where 27% of women claimed sex discrimination despite being in a diocese
which strongly favours women priests. Holding the middle ground was London. 10
women and I man complained of sex discrimination giving its women priests a 23%
claim rate. From this point the dioceses ran to form; Newcastle recording a 21% female
claim rate, Worcester a 20% female claim rate and finally Gloucester with a low female
claim rate of 14%.
The discriminatory source was varied. The incumbent (14%) and the bishop (16%) were
prominent sources. Other clergy sources; team ministry members, diocesan officials,
area bishop and other clergy colleagues accounted for a further 30% of claims. The laity
also figured in the statistics; PCC members (14%), lay church workers (5%) and the
wider category of congregation/parishioners (18%). A potential problem for priests is
the number of people who are involved in their work. Evidently this is a problem in
regard to sex discrimination. There are multiple sources of discrimination, only certain
of which could hope to be tackled by employment law. The discrimination was
perceived as a continuing problem by the male priest and by 86% of women priests.
This perhaps indicates that sex discrimination is deep seated within individuals and
possibly that it permeates church structures to a diocesan level. In the majority of cases
the problem was reported. Their present post as well as the incident itself determined
who respondents spoke to. Some approached officials whilst others approached the
"discriminators" themselves. The incumbent provided an important channel for
complaint. Interestingly, clergy work groups and work appraisers were mentioned,
indicating that the Church is borrowing ideas from secular employment. Remedial
action was only taken in 28% of female cases, leaving problems festering for the
majority. 6 In 4/10 cases the action prevented a recurrence of the problem as against 5/10
cases where action had no effect. One problem is that there is no uniform way of dealing
with disputes between clergy, especially those between a curate and an incumbent.
6 The type of action taken will be examined in the qualitative section at 6.6.9., 6.6.10. and 6.6.11.
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Decisions are made on an ad hoc basis. The advantages of flexibility and the ability to
deal with different contexts in turn prevents a coherent system of rights and redress.
6.3.2 Past Sex Discrimination: Search for a First Curacy
The following questions focused on past sex discrimination, starting with a priest's
treatment in their search for a first curacy. Information about vacancies were relayed by
various methods. Respondents were asked to describe all the ways that they had heard
about the post, thus the number of answers given exceeds the number of respondents.
44/138 men and 49/149 women described the bishop helping them find their first
curacy. The role of the theological college and principal were relevant to men, with
32/138 men acknowledging their help as against 14/149 women. Only 2 respondents had
used newspaper advertisements. The role of NSMs is important to note. 17/138 men and
24/149 women described training as NSMs and returning to their home and training
parish as priest. For these respondents the difficulty of searching for a first curacy was
non-existent. Likewise this was so for the 15/149 women who were already in post as
deaconesses or lay workers and stayed in the same parish when ordained. It is usual
practice for the diocese which sponsors an ordinand through theological training to offer
the ordinand a title to orders; a first curacy. This will be so whether the training has been
stipendiary or non-stipendiary. If this is not possible it is the diocese's duty to release
the ordinand so that they can seek a post elsewhere.
Against this factual background, the claims of less favourable treatment during search
for a first curacy are examined. Depending upon a respondent's experience this could be
as recent as 1996 or as long ago as 1987. 2% of males and 19% of females claimed sex
discrimination. The male affirmative response was greater at this level than it had been
in regard to present treatment. The female response, although much lower than the 30%
in regard to present treatment, must be read in conjunction with the ease of entry into
post by female NSMs and deaconesses. The vast majority of males (96%) denied sex
discrimination. Female priests were slightly less decisive with 69% answering no and
12% don't know. In the case of the 3 males and most females the discrimination only
applied to one post. 4 females described it applying to two posts whilst one described
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three or more posts being involved. 7 Female priests identified five main discriminatory
sources. The curate's incumbent, perhaps unsurprisingly, came out as the villain;
mentioned by 32% of females. The other categories were fairly even; bishop (18%),
area/suffragan bishop (18%), lay members (churchwardens, PCC members, parish
representatives) (18%) and the diocesan director of ordinands (14%). The heavy clerical
involvement in the appointment of first curates would be useful in an employment
context as there would be a greater likelihood of an employer being identified.
6.3.3 Past Sex Discrimination: Treatment in a First Curacy
The third major question asked, "Whilst working in your first curacy, do you think that
you have ever received less favourable treatment on grounds of your sex?" Respondents
were not to answer this question if this was their present post, as they had already
provided the requisite information regarding treatment in present post. 8 2.5% of men
and a substantial 48% of women perceived sex discrimination. The remainder of the
sample were unequivocal answering no to discrimination, with only 2.5% of the male
sample answering don't know. Once in their first curacy women's treatment appears to
deteriorate radically. Why is this so? To answer this one must investigate the
discriminatory source and the incident itself. The two male priests indicated that the
incumbent was the perpetrator. 26% of females likewise described the incumbent as the
source. PCC members caused difficulties for female priests, with 19% mentioning them.
It is difficult to know whether this was always in their role as PCC members or as
congregation members who happen to be PCC members. The role of the PCC can
become blurred when they are congregation members also. The bishop (11%) and
members of their team ministry (6%) were prominent sources. As the "other" category
proved substantial, categories were created out of it. For example, a category labelled
congregationlparishioners comprised 13% of complaints. Lay workers, in this case a
reader and ministers of sacrament, added to complaints against the laity. Agencies
working with the Church, in this case funeral directors and the choir, were mentioned by
4 respondents. Female curates faced multiple sources of sex discrimination. The issues
The instances of sex discrimination will be discussed in the qualitative analysis section at 6.6.3., 6.6.4.,
6.6.5., 6.6.9., 6.6.10. and 6.6.11.
8 This point also applies to questions on treatment in second curacy and in senior post where the person
holds that post. The respondent will already have provided information on treatment in that post.
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to tackle are; which sources of discrimination can be attacked and by which method
ought this be done? As to the nature of the incident it was described as continuing by
one male priest and isolated by the other. For female priests problems were deep seated
with 86% describing the problem as continuing. As to reporting the incident one male
did and one did not. Female priests were ready to report their incidents with 82% doing
so. Clerical sources were approached for help including the incumbent, the bishop and
the archdeacon. 4 women approached their diocesan adviser for women's ministry.
Action was taken in the case of the male priest and in 15/26 (58%) of female cases. The
action was only effective in preventing a recurrence of the problem in 6 female cases.
6.3.4 Past Sex Discrimination: Search for a Second Curacy
The next question asked, "To all clergy who have applied for a second curacy, whether
successful or not, have you at any stage received less favourable treatment on grounds of
your sex?" 37 males and 54 females had sought a second curacy. 2 males and 2 females
had been unsuccessful in their search. Male priests were contented with their job search
with 94% denying sex discrimination and 6% answering don't know. Female priests
were likewise happier. 16% perceived sex discrimination as against a majority of 79%
answering no and 5% answering don't know. However, 16% represents 7 women priests
who believe sex discrimination was exercised against them. The incumbent was the
discriminatory source in 3 cases. The 4 remaining sources were; the bishop, PCC
members, those responsible for advertising clergy posts and an incumbent's wife.
6.3.5 Past Discrimination: Treatment in a Second Curacy
Those who were no longer in their second curacies were asked about their past treatment
in post. 15 males and 16 females answered the question. 9 Of the male sample 14/15
(93%) denied sex discrimination whilst 1/15 (7%) answered don't know. Answers by
the female sample were decisive, 7/16 (44%) perceiving sex discrimination, 8/16 (50%)
denying discrimination and 1/16 (6%) answering don't know. Again the pattern appears
to be a deterioration of treatment once in post. With the exception of the incumbent,
mentioned 4 times, sources were varied. They comprised; bishop, deanery clergy, PCC
The answers are written in ratios as well as percentages as the number base is fairly small.
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members, a congregation member and the incumbent's wife. All respondents described
it as a continuing problem which they reported. Senior clergy, including the area bishop,
the archdeacon, the suffragan bishop and the rural dean were approached. In 2/7 cases
action was taken but the problem remained.
6.3.6 Past Sex Discrimination: Search for a Senior Post
The final section asked about senior posts. Senior posts were defined to comprise the
posts of vicar/rector, team vicar, team rector and priest-in-charge. 47% of the male
sample and 28% of the female sample had sought senior posts. 5 of each sex had been
unsuccessful in their searches. Did they encounter sex discrimination during their
search? Of the 62 male answers, 3% said yes, 94% no and 3% don't know. For female
priests, their experience was diverse. A bishop has the discretion to reduce a woman
priest's curacy in this transitional period. This obviously had happened as a substantial
number of women held senior posts. Although allowed access to the competition, of the
39 female answers, 39% perceived sex discrimination as against 51% who did not and
10% who did not know. At this job search level the perception of sex discrimination by
women is higher than that at first or second curate level. Is there a glass ceiling for
women priests which makes them acceptable at curate level but not at senior post level?
In fact in the majority of cases less favourable treatment only occurred in regard to one
post, giving the impression that there are problem parishes but that women are not
completely prevented from obtaining senior posts.'° However, 1 male and 2 female
priests indicated that discrimination arose in regard to three or more posts.
Discriminatory sources naturally included those involved in the hiring process; parish
representatives were mentioned 7 times illustrating the formidable power of the laity.
For the first time the lay patron figured, being mentioned 3 times. The influence of team
ministry members in the hiring process had not been fully realised previously. They
were labelled as the perpetrator 4 times.
'° The reader is referred to 6.6.9. where the policy of the Chichester diocese is detailed.
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6.3.7 Past Sex Discrimination: Treatment in a Senior Post
Treatment whilst at work in a senior post, other than their present post, was only
answered by a small number of respondents. Most respondents were only in their first
senior post and had thus given the information regarding present post. Of the 4 male and
2 female answers, 1 female claimed sex discrimination, whilst the 5 others denied it.
The details of the less favourable treatment relate to one data set only. The perpetrator
was the bishop. It was a continuing incident which was reported. Action was taken but it
did not prevent a recurrence of the incident.
6.4 Analysis of Present Treatment
Causal networks were tested by comparing present treatment with independent
variables. Respondents' answers to questions such as age and marital status were
reliable and relevant to their present status. The same assumption could not be made for
past sex discrimination; variables such as age would have changed, variables such as
responsibility for dependants might have changed. Present discriminatory treatment was
analysed by cross tabulating sex and another chosen variable against claims of present
sex discrimination. 1 male (1%) and 30% of females claimed present sex discrimination.
When cross tabulating sex, present treatment and a variable it was important to see
whether the percentage values varied greatly. If they did it would indicate that the
variable was an important influence on treatment. It could be that the interaction of the
variable with sex was causing an increase or decrease in the percentage. Secondly, and
less likely, it could be that the variable alone was causing the treatment. Being treated
less favourably on grounds of sex was the situation asked about. Being male or female
was thus always going to be the dominant variable. Additionally, with so few men
claiming sex discrimination it seemed more likely that female sex was indeed the
dominant variable."
The only difficulty with percentage value comparison is when the number base is so small that it makes
comparison with a large number base unwise. These situations have been noted in the text.
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6.4.1 Cross Tabulation: Pastoral Experience
The first cross tabulation was between pastoral experience, sex and present treatment.
The idea of pastoral experience is important in comparing like with like. Respondents
were matched using two main methods; level of present post and ordination dates. The
sample group contained the standard parochial offices. 10% of males and 12% of
females were deacons serving the first year of their curacy. 45% of males and 63% of
females were curates who had been priested. Thus a large part of the sample were in
posts under the training and supervision of another. The majority of curates were in their
first curacy. 5% of males and 9% of females were priests-in-charge. The office of
vicar/rector was held by 27% of men as against only 5% of women. Why is this so? Are
women being denied preferment or do they simply not want these posts? Of the female
sample who sought senior posts only 5 were unsuccessful. However, the sex
discrimination encountered during search was high. 10% of males and 5% of females
were team vicars. The only team rector was female (1%). These latter three categories
represented incumbent status. 37% of males held incumbent status as against 11% of
females. Finally, 3% of males and 5% of females were classified in the "other" category.
What was the stipendiary nature of these posts? Of the total sample 21% of males and
39% of females were NSM curates. This was a surprisingly high figure and not one
capable of revelation before sampling. Additionally, the issue of NSMs was not properly
raised by the pilot survey where only 3 women were NSMs. 2% of both male and
females were NSM priests-in-charge. This left 77% of males and 59% of females as
stipendiary ministers.
Which were the posts affected by present sex discrimination? All relevant posts from a
first curacy through to an incumbency were affected by discrimination. Female deacons
reported 29% present sex discrimination and female curates who had been priested
reported 31%. Likewise if curacies were subdivided into first and second curacies the
figures remained fairly constant. Being a curate was not a dominant factor in less
favourable treatment. Information on curacies was also obtained in regard to past sex
discrimination. Was there any pattern between present and past discrimination? The
treatment of present curates was better than the treatment of female first and second
curates in the past. Past discrimination whilst in post had ran at 48% and 44% for female
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first and second curates respectively. An explanation for these figures could be that the
treatment occurred pre the Synod vote or shortly afterwards when there was concern
regarding the implications of women priests. This might suggest that new entrants to the
Church are being treated more favourably.' 2 Being a priest-in-charge improved the
situation for women priests with only 3/13 (23%) claiming present sex discrimination.
The small number base involved should lend caution to any general statements here.
Similarly the statistic that 3/7 (43%) of female vicars/rectors claimed present sex
discrimination should not be distanced from its small number base. Exactly the same
statistic was recorded for female team vicars, adding a little more weight to the
supposition that female priests receive worse treatment when they are in senior posts.
However, when women's treatment in all senior posts was totalled together it was
evident that the percentage value only increased slightly to 32% (9/28). Present
treatment in senior post cannot be compared with past treatment as there is only one data
set available for the latter. Finally, NSM status was cross tabulated with present
treatment to see if stipendiary status influenced treatment. Female NSM curates
recorded 33% present sex discrimination. This rise above the initial percentage value
indicated that NSMs might be a marginalised group. It did not suggest that being a NSM
or being a female NSM equalled being discriminated against. Being female remained
the dominant characteristic.
In terms of ordination dates the majority of the female sample (70%) were priested in
1994, followed by 18% priested in 1995. Of the 17 female deacons, 2 were priested in
1994 and 15 in 1995. Did date of entry into ministry make any difference to present
treatment? Of those priested in 1994, 29% claimed present sex discrimination. The
problem of sex discrimination has not disappeared during the reception process. Of
those priested in 1995, 38% (10/26) claimed present sex discrimination. However, those
made deacon in 1995 only had a claim rate of 27% (4/15). In order to probe pastoral
experience in greater depth, experience as a deacon and deaconess was examined. The
glut of women priested in 1994 hides their formidable pastoral experience spanning
many years. For example, women admitted as deaconesses could have up to thirty years
experience of ministry. 28% of the female sample had worked as deaconesses. 24% of
these women claimed present sex discrimination. It appeared that those who had worked
12 However, for an alternative reading the reader is referred to the next paragraph.
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for the Church longest were happiest. They have had to fight for change and perhaps
now that they have achieved this they are fairly content. New female entrants have not
had the pressure of fighting for reform, so perhaps they are more willing to voice their
complaints in a Church which ostensibly accepts them. In 1987 women were allowed to
become deacons. Each respondent had experience as a deacon, this varied from one year
(those made deacon in 1995) to seven years (those made deacon in 1987). 147 women
gave their ordination dates to the diaconate. The greatest numbers were ordained in
1987 and 1994. Those who had been ordained deacon longest seemed happier than
recent entrants. For example, 23% (12/51) of deacons ordained in 1987 claimed sex
discrimination as against 35% (8/23) of those ordained in 1994.
6.4.2 Cross Tabulation: Age
The next cross tabulation was between age, sex and present discrimination. The spread
of clergy ages revealed the majority of male clergy (53%) in the 30-39 band. Female
clergy represented only 12% in this band. The presence of childcare responsibilities
during this age band might explain the statistics. Female priests were found in solid
numbers in the next two bands, 40-49 and 50-59. This reflected the fact that women had
waited a long time to test their vocations. It might also mean that older women are
attracted to the priesthood for a variety of reasons, perhaps when they no longer have
responsibility for dependants. Surprisingly 17% were located in the age band 60-69 as
against only 8% of men. The only male who claimed present sex discrimination was in
age band 50-59. Sex discrimination against females spanned the age bands. In the small
band of 20-29, 1 female claimed sex discrimination. The next band, 30-39, saw women
priests at their happiest with only 4/17 (24%) claiming sex discrimination. In the next
two large age bands, 40-49 and 50-59, 34% and 27% of females claimed sex
discrimination respectively. The final band, 60-69, experienced greater sex
discrimination. The percentage female value rose to 36% (9/25). 6/9 of these women
were also NSMs. Less favourable treatment occurred in all age bands. Being a female
priest is still the dominant factor. However, older women priests appear to have a further
handicap.
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6.4.3 Cross Tabulation: Personal Characteristics
The next series of cross tabulations involved characteristics personal to the respondent,
the first of which was disability. Of the sample group 4 males and 6 females described
having a disability. 2 female priests then went on to report present sex discrimination.
The small figures prevent any causal link between sex, disability and discrimination
from being established. The interaction of race with other variables was at the outset
thought to be of little significance. Church of England priests are virtually homogenous
in their whiteness. 99% of priests were white. The other 1% represents one Afro-
Caribbean, one Asian and one priest of mixed race. All claims of present sex
discrimination were made by white priests. Race did not appear to be involved in the
causal network.
A certain type of churchmanship if often a required characteristic for a post. Parishes
might advertise for a priest who can offer "central churchmanship" or
"evangelical/charismatic worship". How are priests with different theological views
treated? One would expect a priest's present parish to accept his or her churchmanship
as they have chosen them for the post. The variable of churchmanship is probably more
pertinent to job search. The spread of clergy churchmanship located most male and
female clergy in three categories; moderate catholic, central churchmanship and
evangelical. Female priests were found in greater number in the moderate catholic
category. Male priests were split evenly between moderate catholic and evangelical
(33% respectively). 10% of males described themselves as strongly catholic as against
2% of females. The presence of women priests in this category was unexpected, having
regard to the catholic stance on women priests. The male priest who claimed present sex
discrimination described his churchmanship as central. Of the female sample, the
happiest group were the evangelicals with only 24% claiming sex discrimination. This is
in contrast with the moderate catholic category where 38% claimed sex discrimination.
Why this particular category of churchmanship revealed a greater percentage of sex
discrimination is difficult to judge.'3
13 Interviews would be needed to gain further insight into this finding.
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6.4.4 Cross Tabulation: Family
The next series of tabulations concerned the respondent's family connections and
responsibilities. Of the male sample 20% were single and a large majority of 78% were
married. Of the female sample, marital status was more diverse; 37% were single, 51%
were married, 7% were separated or divorced and 5% were widowed. The male priest
who claimed sex discrimination was married. Of the female sample experiences were
evenly divided with 30% of single women and 32% of married women claiming sex
discrimination. 2/10 separated or divorced women and 3/8 widowed women completed
the discrimination statistics. The lack of variation regarding marital status was
surprising. It had been thought following the pilot survey that married women priests
might fare worse than their single colleagues.
Independently cross tabulated with present treatment was the question, "If you are
married does your spouse currently hold a clerical office in the Church of England?" Of
the male sample 3 were married to female priests, whilst 20% (15/75) of married
women were married to a cleric. The male priest who claimed sex discrimination was
not married to a cleric. Claims of present sex discrimination by females fell to 4/15
(27%) when married to a cleric, whereas they rose to 33% when they were not so
married. One possible explanation for the percentage fall could be that these women are
working as curates with their husband as the incumbent. With this kind of working
structure sex discrimination is less likely to happen.
As an exploratory idea the question was asked, "Do you have any other relatives who
currently hold a clerical office in the Church of England?" Might clergy connections
help or hinder present treatment? Without detailed case histories one cannot make any
categorical statements on this. However, it would be interesting to see if there was any
general pattern. 18% of the male sample had clergy relatives as against 12% of female
priests. The male priest who claimed present sex discrimination did not have clergy
relatives. Surprisingly, the existence of such relatives appeared to hinder women priests
with 7/17 (41%) claiming present sex discrimination as against 29% of females without
clergy relatives. The presence of clergy relatives was previously thought to be a factor
which might help women. Again being a woman was the dominant factor.
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The next question attempted to operationalise the social construction thesis. Family
responsibilities and social roles were tentatively examined by asking about
responsibility for dependants. The vast majority of dependants were children. 8
respondents described looking after other relatives. 65% of males and 40% of females
had dependants. The lower figure for females is explained by the large number of single
women and by the presence of women in the older age bands. By this age women who
had responsibility for dependants in the past are free to pursue their vocation. The male
priest who claimed present sex discrimination had dependants. The presence or absence
of dependants had little effect on the percentage female value. The stereotype of the
female priest treated badly because she is neglecting her children/job was not prominent
in the statistics.'4
6.4.5 Cross Tabulation: Education
The next category of cross tabulation concerned education. As a whole the clergy are
well educated. Training for the priesthood can be full- or part-time. Courses vary in
content, structure and qualifications offered. Often candidates have a degree before
theological college, although this is not necessary. Some colleges and courses offer
degrees and postgraduate degrees as part of their training. Naturally while the formal
qualifications required to become a priest remain diverse, inequality of condition will
prevail. However, equality of condition does not necessarily lead to equality of respect
or more fundamentally to equal treatment.
The first cross tabulation asked; are there any patterns between the type of training and
present sex discrimination? 74% of men but only 40% of women took a full-time course
at theological college. The large numbers of women taking the part-time course is
largely explained by their NSM status. It is usual for NSMs to take a part-time course.
The male who claimed present sex discrimination had undertaken full-time training.
There was a discernible difference between female experiences. Those who had trained
full-time reported 22% sex discrimination, whilst those on the part-time course reported
14 However, the reader is referred to the comments made by mothers in the qualitative data section, at
6.6.3., 6.6.5. and 6.6.10.
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36%. However, full-time training still did not equalise women's experiences with men,
illustrating the idea that equality of condition will not lead to equal treatment or indeed
equality of result unless discrimination is eliminated. Equality of condition did not exist
regarding the variable of holding a degree. 70% of the male sample held degrees as
against 49% of women. The male priest who reported sex discrimination did not hold a
degree. Females with or without degrees reported an identical level of 31% sex
discrimination. The presence or absence of a degree appears not to influence a priest's
treatment. Additionally, holding a degree does not equalise women's experiences with
men or with one another. Postgraduate degrees were held evenly between male and
female priests at 18% and 16% respectively. The male priest who reported sex
discrimination did not hold a postgraduate degree. Expecting the percentage value of
female sex discrimination to fall it was surprising to find that it rose to 33% (8/24)
where women had postgraduate degrees. Those without such qualifications retained the
constant 30% percentage value.
6.4.6 Cross Tabulation: Geographical Location
The next set of cross tabulations involved an exploratory, albeit superficial,
investigation of the effect of geographical location on a priest's treatment. The
percentage of male and female priests in different geographical locations was evenly
matched. By far the highest concentration of priests were found in suburban areas at
34% and 32% for males and females respectively. Solid representation was found in
rural areas too; 18% of males and 22% of females. From the answers given to the
"other" category a new category of town was created. The two categories of inner city
and mixture of inner city and suburbs often did not cover the traditional market/country
town. The different regions showed greater sex discrimination variation than other
variables. The male priest who indicated sex discrimination worked in an area defined
as a suburban and a rural area. Women priests who described their parish as being
situated in a town proportionately suffered the most sex discrimination at 55% (6/11).
No particular discriminatory source was prominent here, although team ministry
members were mentioned 3 times. Such ministries are more likely to be situated in
towns. Two words of caution. First, a small number base is involved, therefore
generalisations are difficult to make. Secondly, this was a recoded category. It may be
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that other respondents in towns ticked inner city or inner city and suburbs. It is possible
that this statistic is unnaturally inflated. However, female priests in the inner city
likewise suffered proportionately higher sex discrimination at 36% (5/14). These priests
were situated in the London and Guildford dioceses. On the whole the discriminatory
source was clerical. Perhaps this is inevitable in London diocese, a diocese which is
generally less supportive of women priests. In descending order of discriminatory
reports are; rural areas, inner city and suburbs and suburban areas all clumped around
the 30% constant. Who was the discriminatory source in rural parishes? Did it stem
from the laity, who often have considerable influence in rural districts? 7/10 respondents
indicated a lay source, confirming the suspicion of lay influence. The area where women
are markedly happier is in the mixture of suburban and rural areas, with only 21% (4/19)
reporting sex discrimination.15
When considering the priest's parish, one must consider their working structure. Do
they operate singly as an incumbent, as a two-some of curate and incumbent, as a team
ministry or as a group ministry? Did the latter two forms of organisation provide more
ammunition for sex discrimination? As regards team ministers, 21% of the male sample
and 26% of the female sample were engaged in such work. These were important
categories of respondents to investigate. The male priest who claimed sex discrimination
was not a team minister nor indeed a group minister. 34% (13/38) of female team
ministers claimed present sex discrimination, thus pushing the percentage value up. To
discover whether the team ministry structure itself was the problem, or whether this was
just a coincidental feature, the discriminatory source was cross tabulated. 7/13 cited
team members as the source, suggesting that the team ministry structure was not
working well. One reason for this could be the division of team members regarding
women priests. Group ministers formed a smaller percentage of the sample, comprising
6% of males and 12.5% of females. Again the female percentage value of present sex
discrimination rose, this time to 33% (6/18). However, the discriminatory source was
not other group members. The group ministry structure was not the problem area.
This had also been an interesting finding in the pilot study.
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6.5 Non-Stipendiary Ministry
The final quantitative area of study was non-stipendiary ministry. With 22% of males
and 41% of females working as NSMs it was necessary to look at the factors which
decided their stipendiary status. The majority of NSMs were part-time ministers,
although some disliked being categorised as a part-time priest. The reasons for part-time
posts fell into three categories; retirement ministry, having another job or being
designated as a minister in secular employment.' 6 The latter's primary focus of concern
is their ministry whilst in secular employment rather than their parochial ministry. The
vast majority of men had chosen NS ministry rather than being forced to accept it.
Women priests were divided in experience. 58% described choosing NS ministry as
against 42% who became NSMs because of factors beyond their control. Those who
ticked choice were asked to tick all the reasons which motivated their choice. On the
practical side many had another job or source of income. Other reasons of choice given
by males centred on the importance of NS ministry. Respondents believed that they had
a contribution to make to the Church. They viewed NSM status, whether as a
straightforward NSM or as a MSE, as a positive model of priesthood. Other reasons of
choice given by females covered a wide area. Those who were MSEs promoted NSM as
an ideal form of ministry. Others had family commitments and ties which made
stipendiary ministry difficult, if not impossible. For example, one stated that family
resistance to full-time vicarage life was a factor in her choice to become a NSM. Others
gave reasons of "choice" which were in reality connected to church policy. The
statements, "Because I married a clergyman," and "There are so few stipendiary jobs
given to women in Chichester diocese," are in reality factors beyond their control.
Only 3 males stated that they were in NSM posts because of factors beyond their
control, as against 30 women. One male priest gave health as the reason, the other two
stated that it was because of their age. Again female answers varied. 5 stated that there
were no stipendiary posts which they were qualified for in the area they wanted to apply
to. 3 of these respondents came from Newcastle diocese, the other two were from
Chichester and Guildford. 2 stated that their spouse is a priest and diocesan policy states
that only one spouse may hold a stipendiary post. The one respondent was from
16 From henceforth the latter will be referred to as a MSE.
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Worcester, the other who was from Guildford said, "I do not think there is a 'stated'
diocesan policy, but there is an accepted practice." Only one described her applications
for stipendiary posts being rejected. Of the 22 answers to "other" factors beyond your
control, the one most frequently cited was age. 12 mentioned age acting as a barrier to
obtaining a stipendiary post. Respondents explained how age acted as a direct
disqualification, "I was past the age limit for stipendiary posts when I started training,"
and "The Church of England imposed a 45 year limit on new stipendiary clergy,
therefore too old." Family commitments such as husband's job and children's schooling
acted to limit the geographical area of work available. NSM posts were taken as the area
did not offer stipendiary work.
6.6 Qualitative Data Analysis
The codes were derived from the theoretical framework. New themes, stressed by the
respondents, were introduced. The analysis began with three broad categories into which
sub-categories were placed. The first category covered search for a post and included
sub-categories on the way that posts are advertised and the reasons given for non-
selection. The second category covered treatment in post. The final category was an
expansive one which attempted to locate individual responses and world-views on sex
discrimination. The aim was to discover perceptions of women and men through
respondents' own experiences. Each sub-category was given a short code name which
was written alongside the relevant data. For example, post advertisement is coded as
"post-adv". Each code has a research objective. In this case, the aim was to discover
how posts are advertised in the Church of England. A fact finding motive is also tied to
theoretical interest in the concept of equality of opportunity.
6.6.1 Advertisement of Posts
The first category is post advertisement.' 7
 The question asked, "how did you hear about
your present post?" Respondents were asked to tick all the ways that they had heard
' At the pilot questionnaire stage little was known about the way posts were advertised in the Church of
England. After this information was obtained the question became a semi-closed one in the final
questionnaire.
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about the post, thus the number of answers given exceeds the number of respondents.
They were given 5 categories; bishop, incumbent, theological college, newspaper
advertisement and mailing list. A sixth category "other" in turn provided 5 new
categories. In each category male and female respondents were evenly matched. The
most usual method of communication was via the bishop, with 6 1/138 males and 57/149
females citing this source. Newspaper adverts were mentioned by 21 respondents. As
such advertisement is less likely for first curacies, this probably applied to second
curacies and senior posts. 10 respondents used mailing lists. The most frequently cited
was the list of the clergy appointments adviser, Canon Hardaker. 23/149 women
described being NSM priests who did not have to apply for their posts, but simply
returned to their training parish. 8 male priests but only 1 female priest described the lay
patron approaching them. The apparent air of informality which surrounds the
advertisement of, and appointment to, posts was borne out by the 2 final categories. 14
male and 11 female respondents gave answers which could be described as the clergy
grapevine or informal clergy contacts. For example, 4 males described their post being
created for them. Another 2 filled vacancies in the parishes where they were already
curates. Female curates likewise transferred from being the curate in a parish to a more
senior post. Other female answers included, "approached by dean informally", "husband
suggested me to his vicar" and "post in neighbouring parish in which my husband is
curate". 11/138 males and 18/149 females gave answers which remained classified in
the "other" category. They served to further illustrate the diverse nature of Church of
England appointments. For example, female answers included, "request of
churchwardens" and "had to be moved because incumbent would not accept women
priests."
6.6.2 Job Interviews
The next area of investigation was job interviews. Which posts, if any, operated a
system of formal interviews? Who were the interviewers? This was a fact finding
exercise, linked to theoretical ideas. The objective was to discover who had the real
power of hiring. Potentially this power can be abused in the form of sex discrimination.
Unlike secular employment, hiring decisions remain unaccountable. 65% of males and
51% of females received formal interviews for their present post. Bearing in mind the
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informal advertisement process this was thought to be a high number. The lower
percentage of women interviewed may be explained by their NSM status and their
presence in the parish as deaconesses. The majority of interviews were conducted on a
sole interviewee, not a short list, basis. However, often the practice of parishes is to
select candidates individually for consideration. Candidates come separately to the
parish. It may be that 4 or 5 are interviewed before a suitable candidate is found.
Therefore, it can be an elongated stream of sole interviewees. When short lists were
administered they were used predominantly for the senior posts of vicar/rector and team
vicar.
All levels of post used a formal interview. Curates in their first post received the fewest
formal interviews, with 48% of males and 41% of females receiving interviews. At
second curacy level this rose to 60% of males and 42% of females. The decreased use of
interviews at first curacy level can be explained by the informal appointments system at
this level and the presence of NSM curates. NSM curates were less likely to be
interviewed, although 8/27 males and 10/56 females were. Interviews were increasingly
used at senior post level. For example, 89% (33/37) of male vicars/rectors were
interviewed. Team vicars likewise came under interview scrutiny. Fewer men were
interviewed at this stage. 69% (9/13) of males had interviews as against all 7 female
team vicars.
Who administered the interviews? This was worded as an open question. It would have
been difficult to make this a closed question, bearing in mind the different posts
involved. Respondents recorded all the relevant personnel involved, therefore, the
number of answers exceeds the number of respondents. At curate level it was expected
that the incumbent of the parish and perhaps the bishop would be present. The former
expectation was borne out by both samples. In 32/38 male cases and 33/43 female cases
the incumbent was present at the interview. The bishop only attended 3 male and 1
female curate's interviews. The presence of the suffragan bishop, the archdeacon and the
area dean at interviews represents the delegation of duties by the bishop. The laity, as
well as being officially involved in the appointment of an incumbent, were involved at
curate level too. 15/38 males and 20/43 females described the parish representatives
being present at the interview. A variety of other personnel were cited including an
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incumbent's wife who attended alongside the incumbent, lay readers and in one female
curate's case the interview was open to all lay people in the parish.
The principal personnel involved in the interview of a priest-in-charge were; the parish
representatives, the bishop, the archdeacon and the patron. In one male respondent's
case the present incumbent's wife attended. The parish representatives' presence in all
male cases and 9/10 female cases is not surprising as the priest-in-charge is the
unbeneficed version of the incumbent. However, the statutory requirements which
pertain to the appointment of an incumbent are not necessary in regard to a priest-in-
charge.' 8 Appointment as an incumbent formally involves the patron, the bishop and
parish representatives. Who would conduct the interview? Parish representatives were
involved in all 6 female interviews and in 30/33 male interviews. The patron was
involved to a lesser extent; interviewing 10/33 males and 3/6 females. The bishop
attended some interviews in person, in other cases he delegated his powers to the area
dean and the archdeacon. Finally, team vicars were consistently interviewed by the
parish representatives, the team rector and other team members such as team curates and
NSM team members. Lay involvement at interview is seen at all levels of post. At curate
level diverse personnel are involved. It is only at the higher levels of post that a more
structured composition of interviewers is found.
6.6.3 Discriminatory Treatment During Search for a First Curacy
The next sub-category was a major one. It was called post search discrimination. The
research objective was to discover whether sex discrimination existed during search for
a post. This relates to past sex discrimination during search for a first curacy, a second
curacy and a senior post.' 9
 Respondents were asked to tick all the ways in which they
felt they received less favourable treatment on grounds of their sex. As regards search
for a first curacy, 3 females perceived sex discrimination when not selected for
interview. I male and 5 females felt likewise when not selected for the post.
IS The reader is referred to the provisions relating to the appointment of an incumbent in the Patronage
(Benefices) Measure 1986 detailed at 3.3.3.-3.3.7.
As these questions concern past sex discrimination, diocesan trends are not ascertainable, as one has no
way of knowing which dioceses are involved.
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Discriminatory interview questions, which centred on a woman's role in the family,
were reported by 4 women. One was questioned by the diocesan director of ordinands
about whether she was going to start a family. Two respondents, who were married to
priests, were questioned about their family and workplace roles. One was asked
questions about the priority of her husband's ministry and her inability to minister
properly because of children. The discriminatory sources were the incumbent, the
bishop's representative and lay interviewers. The other was told by the incumbent that
she should be staying at home as other clergy wives do, and was asked about plans for a
family. The fourth respondent complained of aggressive questioning by PCC members
regarding the fact that she was divorced.
Discriminatory informal comments were reported by 3 males and 8 females. Male
complaints centred around the preference for women priests or for those supporting
women priests. One respondent was told by the area bishop that the "area" had to meet a
quota of female appointments and since he was a man this was not helping. In another
case the incumbent and his wife made it known that they wanted a pro-women's
ordination male curate. The third male respondent was told by the woman curate whom
he would be replacing that, "if it were my choice the job would go to a woman rather
than you." Of the female answers informal comments covered; not being wanted
because of being a woman, social roles and pay. The former reason was mentioned by 3
women. One respondent described how it became clear that her incumbent did not wish
to have her as a NSM curate. She thought, but could not prove, that this was on grounds
of sex. Another described how the incumbent tried to put her off by saying things like,
"Talk to X, she will tell you how awful I am to work with!" The third respondent
described how the churchwardens and PCC members made no attempt to sell the post,
giving her a distinct feeling that she was unwanted. As far as social roles are concerned,
one incumbent gave into stereotypical attitudes by hesitating about the ability of a
candidate to manage family and work. Theological justification might have been
claimed by one incumbent when he stated to another respondent, that women do not go
into the sanctuary. 2 respondents who were married to clergymen were questioned about
the need to have two stipends. It was thought that the woman priest ought to work for
free if her husband was receiving a stipend. These comments on pay came from; the
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diocesan director of ordinands, the incumbent, the bishop's representative and lay
interviewers.
Other discriminatory incidents during search for a first curacy were mentioned by 15
female respondents. These reasons have been sub-divided into; diocesan level reasons,
parish level reasons and social roles. Starting with the former, complaints involved
problems in finding a suitable post because of a lack of information and help from the
sponsoring diocese. Comments included, "No posts advertised", "Diocese never sent
any details or helped in any way to find a post," and "It was clear that very few parishes
in my area were open to me." Problems of lack of communication arose in relation to
the sponsoring diocese or area. For example, "My sponsoring bishop's refusal to
consider me for any stipendiary post, without formally notifying me that he was
releasing me," and "I was made to change from one area diocese to another; no answer
to letters to first area bishop or diocesan director of ordinands." One priest experienced
negative quota limits, "I was sponsored for training by Stepney area. I received a letter
to say that I was not being offered a post in Stepney because there were too many
women."
At parish level, despite Resolutions A and/or B not being in place, some incumbents
were wary of women curates. One incumbent recommended a woman for training but
then became unwilling to have her work in his parish. Another incumbent had
experienced difficulty with a female curate in the past and did not want to risk the
aggravation again. Would bad experience of a male curate carry such a risk? Another
incumbent employed subtle means to prevent working with a female curate; "The
incumbent seemed to be too busy to take the time to interview me, as if he was
manipulating the situation so that I would feel that it would not be a viable proposition
to work there and I would be the one to say 'no' and thus allow him to save face by not
having to turn me down."
The final two complaints concerning search for a first curacy involve social roles. One
female respondent described how it was seen as more important that her husband found
a good post. The source of this attitude was not identified. Another respondent described
how the incumbent expected her to work with children as a matter of course.
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6.6.4 Discriminatory Treatment During Search for a Second Curacy
In regard to search for a second curacy, respondents were likewise asked to tick all the
ways in which they felt they received less favourable treatment on grounds of their
sex. 20
 One respondent ticked not being selected for interview, another ticked treatment
at interview, without specifying the content of the interview questions. The remaining
answers related to other discriminatory incidents which were sub-divided into diocesan
level reasons and parish level reasons. Regarding the former one respondent complained
of a lack of episcopal guidance. She had to take the initiative in finding a second post
while she observed that her male colleagues received invitations from the bishop to look
at parishes. A second respondent described how a bishop insisted on 100% support from
the PCC of the parish she was applying to. She wondered how many male clergy would
be in post if 100% PCC support was required.
At parish level incumbents and laity were wary of female curates. One respondent
described her search taking place at the time the 1993 Measure went through. She faced
less favourable treatment from potential incumbents who were alarmed at, "what they
might end up with!" Another respondent described how few parishes were open to her
as a woman. Parishes which had not passed Resolutions A and/or B nevertheless stated,
"We are in favour of women but would prefer a man this time." The final respondent
experienced hostility from lay members of the committee of a daughter church because
she was a woman priest. However, she did secure the post and the hostility abated after
a short time.
6.6.5 Discriminatory Treatment During Search for a Senior Post
In regard to search for a senior post, it was interesting to see what the complaints were.
Were they similar to the experiences of curates, or did different considerations apply at
senior post level? I male and 5 females complained of not being selected for interview
and 7 females described not being selected for the post. Complaints of treatment at
20 All answers here relate to female priests.
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interview fell into 2 main categories; social roles and job description. 2 ' Regarding the
former, stereotypes of single women as well as married women were raised. The
difficulty of living alone in a vicarage was questioned in two cases. The questioning
came from the lay patron and team ministry members. Three married respondents were
asked about their ability to manage the job and their family. Questions were asked about
what happens if children are ill. It is often presumed that it is the woman's role to look
after sick children. These questions came from parish representatives and the
archdeacon. Regarding job description, one respondent was asked about her ability to
"fit in" by parish representatives and team ministry members. She was asked whether
she would be introducing liturgical change, abandoning the prayer book and conducting
same sex marriages. Her belief was that a man would not have been asked these
questions. A respondent applying for the position of team vicar was questioned about
her ability to do the job. Her attitude to authority was questioned by team ministry
members. As a team vicar she would necessarily fall under the control of the team
rector. Is it being suggested that she is incapable of having this kind of working
relationship? Could this be because she was already "senior" in age or experience?
As regards informal comments, single women were asked informally about their ability
to cope alone in a large vicarage. Clearly this reason was related to sex. Did it represent
realism or sex discrimination? These comments came from parish representatives and
team ministry members. The double standards operating in the Church of England were
illustrated by one female respondent who described how the parish representatives told
her husband that they were against women priests. They failed to tell her of their
position. Other forms of sex discrimination were divided into diocesan and parish level
reasons.22 Women are clearly prohibited from equality of opportunity in Chichester. The
bishop will not allow any woman to have responsibility for a parish as incumbent.
Additionally, where he is patron he will not appoint a woman to any post. If women
want senior posts they must move outside the diocese, which is not always a feasible
option. From diocesan policy level to diocesan decision making. In one case 5
candidates were shortlisted, 2 men and 3 women. The two men withdrew, leaving a
woman only shortlist. Instead of proceeding to interview, the lay patron and the
21 All complaints of treatment at interview were made by female respondents.
22 All answers but one relate to female respondents. The male answer is clearly indicated.
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archdeacon (acting for the bishop) re-advertised the post. 23 Perhaps this adds weight to
the comment of another woman who said, "You usually get selected for interview
because you are a woman, even when they know they won't appoint a woman!"
At parish level divisive views on women priests caused problems. One woman was
encouraged to apply for a post with the backing of the parish only to find that the lay
patrons would not entertain a woman. In another case pressure from neighbouring
churchwardens with a Forward in Faith incumbent prevented a woman securing a post.24
Why were these latter personnel so influential? A parish ought to be independent as to
whom it appoints unless a group ministry is involved. It was unclear whether this was
the case or not. One male priest experienced problems at parish level. Ideally the team
ministry wanted a woman for the team vicar post. He was a potential candidate already
working in the team, but it was considered something of a disadvantage that he was a
man. However, in the end he was offered the post and has since had no cause for
complaint.
6.6.6 Official Reasons for Non Selection for Post
The next sub-category of post search was "post-reasons"; official reasons for not getting
an interview or not being selected for a post, excluding the use of Resolutions A and/or
B. The research objective was to discover whether the reasons are appropriate and
rational or are they discriminatory. Are the reasons discriminatory in regard to sex or
perhaps to other factors such as age? The perception of respondents answering these
questions was that they had encountered sex discrimination. 25 5 respondents stated that
their sex alone caused them not to be interviewed or given the post. Whilst objection to
women priests is allowed under Resolutions A and/or B it should not otherwise operate
as a disqualification.26 In one case sex did interact with theological reasons.
"Eventually.. .the person concerned admitted that he could not appoint a woman because
23 The diocese which made this decision is unknown.
Forwasd in Faith are an anglo-catholic group in the Church of England who oppose the ordination of
women priests.
25 The reasons are analysed without reference to the level of post unless this is thought necessary. All
answers but one relate to females. Where a male respondent is involved this is indicated.
26 However, the reader is referred to the Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 s 6 discussed at
7.1.2., 7.1.3. and 7.1.4. for a discussion of the legitimacy of sex discrimination against male and female
priests.
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of reasons of authority even though he had allowed the church to advertise the job for a
man or a woman. He admitted lying to me in order to cover up his reasons for not
appointing me." Two women applying for senior posts experienced the "time is not
right" syndrome. The reason given to one was that, "at this stage in our development we
are not ready for a woman priest." This happened to her at least twice, where the
newspaper advert had not indicated men only. The "time is not right" argument parallels
the theological argument used against women priests at the Synod debate. Women are
now eligible to become priests. Parishes who still believe that the time is not right ought
to encapsulate that stance in Resolutions A and/or B, rather than constructing a "glass
ceiling" for women priests. A problem emerges where decision makers remain divided
over women priests. Three women experienced the "time is not right for another
woman" syndrome. Bad experience of one woman priest coloured the judgment when
another was considered. The candidate was seen as a woman first and as a priest second.
For example, "Recent experience of a woman was a little difficult so they did not want
to try again. It was felt that the local community would respond better to a man," and "It
seemed to be the case that the incumbent and the previous woman curate had not always
found it easy to work together. He seemed worried by the possibility that.. .a woman
might end up in a too senior position in the team. The incumbent seemed to be fearful of
his own standing with elements of the congregation who were not entirely happy to have
women ministers in the parish." Where women were acceptable one respondent found
that there were already enough women in a team ministry, therefore she did not get the
post. Conversely, one male respondent discovered that he had applied for a post where
being a woman was an advantage because the central Church and diocesan authorities
were putting pressure on the parish to appoint a woman. Finally, 2 other factors were
mentioned as interacting with sex. Age and divorced status prevented 2 women
obtaining interviews.
6.6.7 Candidate's Reasons for Non Selection for Post
The final sub-category of post search were the candidate's own reasons, other than their
sex, for not obtaining a post. A research objective was to see if these reasons were
totally independent of sex or if they interacted with sex. No patterns emerged. Male
priests gave 7 different answers for being unsuccessful in obtaining a post; singleness,
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churchmanship, pastoral inexperience, being gay, plans to marry, it not being God's
choice and lack of scholarly knowledge. Female priests gave 5 different answers; age,
churchmanship, pastoral inexperience, too much competition in response to a newspaper
advert and non recognition of priestly abilities.
6.6.8 Discriminatory Treatment in Post
The second broad category was treatment in post. Two sub-categories, treatment in
present post and treatment in past posts, had several research objectives. First, what kind
of sex discrimination was taking place? Was it factual sex discrimination which would
be included under the Sex Discrimination Act but for the exemption regarding ministers
of religion? The experience of respondents was also linked to equality of opportunity,
equality of respect and equal treatment. Two other sub-categories are action taken in
response to present sex discrimination and action taken in response to past sex
discrimination. The aim is to see how treatment which is perceived as discriminatory is
dealt with internally. It is necessary to see what internal protections the Church offers
when there is no private form of legal redress.
6.6.9 Discriminatory Treatment in Present Post
Treatment in present post and the following action response are examined together. A
distinction is made between past and present sex discrimination. Variables relating to an
individual will be relevant to a priest's present post, whereas they might not apply to a
past post. The description of a respondent's present experiences is likely to be accurate
and complete. These questions were answered by respondents who perceived that they
had encountered sex discrimination in their present post. The less favourable treatment
was analysed using three criteria; which diocese did the treatment occur in, what was the
nature of the incident and who was the discriminatory source? Only one male priest in
London claimed present sex discrimination. He described, "A general imbalance in the
sexes towards the feminine over a whole range of issues." No discriminatory source was
ticked. From hereon all present sex discrimination incidents relate to women.
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(a) Blackburn
In Blackburn diocese there were 3 complaints, all centring around working in the parish.
At most concrete was the restriction of a female priest's activities by her incumbent. His
prohibition on her celebrating some Eucharist's denies her equal opportunity to exercise
her ministry. Another encountered "bad behaviour" from male colleagues which was
tolerated by her incumbent and the bishop. The third respondent reported rudeness and
belittling from congregation members.
(b) Chichester
Chichester diocese recorded the highest rate of present sex discrimination. Incidents
were divided into; diocesan level incidents, parish level incidents (working
relationships), and parish level incidents (theological objection). The bishop fought hard
to prevent women priests. His approach now is to ignore women priests where possible
and make their inclusion in Church life difficult when their presence is inevitable. Three
areas of difficulty were mentioned; clothing, ordination as a priest and access to senior
posts. At a specific level women are prohibited from wearing a priest's stole at bishop's
services, for example at confirmations and inductions. This is another way to diminish
women's equal status with men as priests. Women deacons complained about the
bishop's attitude to their impending priesting. They were given additional interviews for
priesting which the men did not have to undergo. The bishop will not ordain women
priests or allow his suffragans to do so. They will be priested by a visiting bishop after
the male deacons have been priested. "The men being priested this summer have known
since last autumn the times and dates. The women have had to wait months to know,
and their priesting is delayed for four weeks past the traditional Petertide date when the
men are being ordained." This respondent said to one diocesan officer that it felt as
though she was "persona non grata" in the diocese and he agreed that she was! Finally,
as already noted, Chichester diocese does not allow women access to senior posts, they
must remain at curate level.
As far as parish working relationships went there were numerous complaints. Many
focused on problems caused by the negative attitude of clergy colleagues to women
172
priests. One woman simply stated, "I work with Forward in Faith clergy", which should
be enough to indicate that her working relationships are strained. There were instances
where work experience was limited. One woman described how she was passed over for
public/combined services by clergy colleagues. Two male clergy who came later were
asked immediately. However, when no male priest was available for VJ Day she was
asked. Another respondent believed that funeral directors might be reducing her
opportunities to take funerals by asking the bereaved, "Do you mind having a woman?"
She has asked them to rephrase the question to include men, that is, "Do you mind
whether it is a man or a woman?", but has no means of ensuring that this is done. At
parish level, theological objection to women priests is evident amongst the laity.
However, only one respondent described this as the only type of sex discrimination
which she faced. Although women priests are concerned about lay attitudes, it is clear
that they do not generally classify these attitudes as discriminatory, rather it is viewed as
a matter of personal conscience.
(c) Gloucester
Gloucester diocese saw only 2 complaints of sex discrimination. The first incident
concerned theological objection by sidespersons so seemed unlikely to fall under factual
sex discrimination. Action was taken in this case. There was a mutual agreement that the
sidespersons should transfer to the next parish. The second incident concerned the
concrete issue of maternity pay. Maternity pay is a new issue which the Church has to
face at diocesan level. The respondent had problems sorting out eligibility for maternity
pay, "because the diocese did not seem to have a clue."
(d) Guildford
In Guildford diocese only one incident was reported at diocesan level. The respondent
described how clergy couples are difficult to place. Against her wishes the bishop did
not consider her for stipendiary ministry. 27 Two incidents during parochial work
highlighted a fear held by incumbents that women would not be acceptable in parishes.
27 For a discussion of indirect sex discrimination in relation to Church policy on married clergy couples
the reader is referred to 7.6.2.
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In one case, the incumbent waited 9 months before inviting the woman priest to
celebrate the Eucharist on the grounds that a few potential objectors could get to know
her first. The incumbent had increasing pressure from the PCC so he stopped his
delaying tactics. She now celebrates there monthly with no overt complaints, his fears
appearing groundless. Was this realism or sex discrimination? The lack of
discriminatory motive does not prevent a claim of direct sex discrimination being made
out.28 In the second case the incumbent and a congregation member were the connected
problem. The latter did not recognise the woman as a priest. The incumbent appeared to
collude with this by not timetabling her for the man's favourite service. The incumbent
did not admit to taking any action, but the current rota appears to ignore the man's
wishes. Theological objection by the laity was cited by 2 respondents. Whilst refusal to
accept communion is quite acceptable, being heckled and verbally abused in the street
by parishioners and PCC members is pushing at the boundaries of theological objection.
(e) London
In London diocese it was expected that, as a diocese which is anti-women priests,
complaints might arise at diocesan level. This was only so in one case. The respondent
described how the bishop and diocesan parsonages board officials ignored her security
needs and her requests for information regarding ongoing building works to the
vicarage. Her belief was that a male priest would not have been treated in this way.
Action was taken in that the relevant people were spoken to, but the problem remained
unresolved. Parish working relationships between female curates and their incumbents
suffered in two cases because of the reluctance of the incumbent to give the curate any
responsibility. In one case the incumbent justified his decision on grounds of evangelical
headship. In 3 other cases working relationships faltered because of a refusal by one
party to work constructively with the female priest. In 2 cases the sacristan found it
difficult to work with and help the priest. For example, one sacristan attempted to
undermine the respondent's authority by informing parishioners that "she [the
respondent] is not in charge when the vicar is away." The third respondent described
how she was unable to get colleagues to take services during her vacation. Also when
she asked for help in a specialist field she was refused. The discriminatory sources were
28 The reader is referred to 7.4.2.
174
the incumbent, clergy colleagues in the deanery and the area dean. Theological objection
was mentioned in 4 cases. Additionally, instances of rudeness and insults by male clergy
were mentioned twice. Are these attitudes based on theology or prejudice? Even if they
are based on the former, surely this is not what was expected during the reception
process? In one case action was taken. The respondent received an apology from a
senior priest on behalf of the other clergy.
(I) Newcastle
In Newcastle diocese there were 2 instances of present sex discrimination both at parish
level. The first incident illustrates two themes; theological objection leading to
inequality of opportunity and secondly the problems caused by divided team ministries.
In the first case the opposition of a fellow team curate means that the respondent is not
allowed to robe and assist or preside at team clergy Eucharist's. For the first time when
examining treatment in post, social roles are touched upon. The second respondent
complained about, "The general attitude of some older people towards a professional
woman. Some male chauvinism amongst male colleagues towards me as a member of
bishop's staff meetings."
(g) Truro
In Truro two complaints were made. The first concerned the non-recognition of the
respondent as a deacon (let alone a priest) by congregation members, retired clergy and
a server. She is not allowed to act as deacon in one church more than once a month
except for saints days and other special occasions. The churchwarden continues to press
the incumbent to allow her to act as deacon all the time and to fulfil a full priestly
ministry when priested. After her priesting she will only be acting as deacon in the
aforementioned church. The second respondent described the anti-women priests
attitude of clergy chapter members. The brief description does not clarify whether this is
solely theological or if it is grounded in prejudice.
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(h) Worcester
In Worcester diocese problems were located at parish level. Two cases involved parish
working relationships. In one case there was a lack of consultation in decision making
by team ministry and PCC members. Team ministry members were likewise involved in
the second case. They "refused to do certain things" if the respondent was present. The 2
other cases involved theological objection by parishioners. This was compounded in 1
case by chapter clergy ignoring the presence of the female priest. Clearly, even though
women are legally part of the Church of England, they are still made to feel invisible
and excluded.
6.6.10 Discriminatory Treatment in First Curacy
The next major sub-category is past treatment whilst in post, starting with a first
curacy.29
 Two male respondents reported sex discrimination at this level. Both described
female preferment causing them less favourable treatment. "My female colleague when I
arrived became incumbent after priesting. My ordination as priest was before hers and
this caused resentment," and "It was politically expedient for my woman colleague to be
made senior curate when in terms of time it should have been me." In the former case
the male priest was assisted to move. A less sinister explanation for female preferment
is that they might have greater pastoral experience than men, despite not being priested
until 1994. If preferment is only seen in terms of priesting dates it may distort the
picture in this interim period.
Many female answers refer back to when women were first made deacon in 1987. For
many female respondents this was their first "curacy", although they were unable to
become priests until 1994. Two major themes were identified: female exclusion from
certain areas of parochial ministry and secondly female inclusion in Church life made
difficult. However, before focusing on the parish, diocesan decisions are examined. The
most concrete example of a diocesan decision resulting in perceived sex discrimination
concerned responsibility for a parish. "In the interregnum the bishop would not consider
me for deacon in charge position, saying it was his policy never to put curates in charge
29 The answers given do not relate to identifiable dioceses.
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of the parish where they had trained. This he has since done with several men in the
area." In 2 cases lack of pastoral support by the bishop was mentioned. This related back
to the struggle of women to become priests. The lack of contact by the bishop left
women feeling ignored. Finally, at diocesan level, one respondent felt discriminated
against because of the bishop's attitude to her stipend. Until the birth of her children she
held a stipendiary post. At this point the bishop held that she was non-deployable and
cut her stipend.
A problem which 9 women faced in their first curacies was exclusion from certain areas
of parochial ministry. This took three forms. First, ignoring the woman's ministry
altogether was one tactic of exclusion. One woman described how the deanery chapter
failed over a period of 4 years to discuss her area of ministry or even ask about it
socially. Her problem was resolved through patient negotiation with the new rural dean.
She now has the opportunity to present her work as a MSE. Secondly, limitations were
placed on the work curates were allowed to do. This involved limitations on leading
worship and preaching. One woman described how at times she was not trusted with the
same jobs as male curates in the team by the incumbent. Another described not being
nominated for diocesan committees by members of the deanery chapter. In one case the
curate complained to her incumbent that she was not being given enough responsibility.
He had good intentions about giving her greater responsibility for worship and
preaching but in the event she saw no significant change. Thirdly, exclusion during
decision making was mentioned by 4 respondents. At one level was an implicit, general
exclusion of women. The respondent stated that team ministry and PCC members often
overlooked her in decision making but it was, "A question of the use of language and
terms rather than a conscious decision to discriminate." At the other extreme were
explicit, specific cases of exclusion. For example, an incoming incumbent refused to
hold staff meetings, engage in teamwork or listen to what the female curate and previous
incumbent had done before. The curate believed that this was on the ground of her sex.
Another respondent was unsure as to whether her sex was the cause of the treatment.
She stated, "Not included in team staff meetings, ostensibly because NSM, perhaps
because of sex?" Finally, one incident highlighted how lack of thought causes women to
remain invisible. "On one occasion when I was due to celebrate a member of the
congregation whose birthday it was asked specifically to have a man and the team
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agreed without me." She pointed out the lack of consultation to the team, who were
apologetic and refrained from making that mistake again.
When women priests are not being blatantly excluded from parochial ministry it appears
that their inclusion is not an easy one. This can be split into three overlapping themes.
First, a general obstruction of duties was reported by two women. In one case the source
was a fellow curate, a founder member of Forward in Faith, in the other it was a
congregation member. Secondly, the competency of women priests was questioned on 3
occasions. The discriminatory sources were the incumbent, the bishop, PCC members
and parishioners. In one case a steady psychological assault and fault finding by an
incumbent, with the support of the bishop, brought a woman priest to breaking point. A
rescheduling of her duties did not resolve the problem. Another woman stated that
parishioners and PCC members made comments about her, "These were never voiced
openly in a public forum where I could have answered them, and I allowed them to
undermine my confidence." She met, at the incumbent's invitation, with the
churchwardens and their wives (one of whom was a principal antagonist). It helped, but
did not completely resolve the problem. Thirdly, various instances of personal
comments were recorded. Rudeness, humiliation, patronising comments, sexist jokes
and offensive remarks were the words used to describe the less favourable treatment.
The sources of the personal comments were; the incumbent, diocesan clergy, the
deanery chapter (twice mentioned), and the PCC. In one case the curate received
bullying and verbal abuse from her incumbent. The only way to resolve the problem was
to move to another parish.
Most publicity has focused on theological objection to women priests. However,
between 1987-1994 women deacons suffered theological objection too. For example,
"Incumbent refused to accept that I was clergy, asked to leave 6 months after deacon's
ordination." Theological objection to women priests followed the 1992 Synod vote. In
some cases women deacons were forced to move parishes if they desired ordination to
the priesthood. For example, "I had to leave my first parish when a new priest came
because he would not accept my intended ordination to the priesthood," and "After the
vote for women priests my then incumbent told me he could not work with me if I
desired ordination to the priesthood." In the latter case she was moved to another parish
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by her bishop and not priested until July 1995. In another case the fair administration of
the 1993 Measure was doubted. The respondent described PCC members making
derogatory comments about women's ministry when the PCC were about to vote on
Resolution A. Inclusion of women in Church life was made difficult by clergy
colleagues whose theological position led them to treat women priests less favourably.
In one case a curate, who was also a diocesan youth officer, spent more time doing
youth work and guesting at other parishes in the diocese because of her incumbent's
views on women priests. The diocesan director of education was informed and it was
agreed that she should avoid the situation and get on with diocesan work. Another
respondent described various instances of a lack of courtesy from clergy colleagues,
including one particular incident. "An invitation to my incumbent and me to attend a
festival service at another church was withdrawn when the priest found Out I was a
woman." She understands that the bishop later reprimanded the priest. Clerical objection
is strongest amongst Forward in Faith members. Their presence at clergy meetings
causes problems. For example, "Members of Forward in Faith in chapter meetings
ignored me, refused to share the peace, would not appear on a photograph with a woman
priest." 9 respondents mentioned the laity as the source of theological objection.
However, 4/9 of these respondents mentioned additional incidents which were not based
upon theological conscience. Thus the final statistics are not unduly inflated by genuine
theological objection.
The sex discrimination perceived by 4 respondents involved social roles. One curate
experienced a general ethos connected to tradition and hierarchy coupled with pervasive
non-specific sexism which made it hard for women, lay or ordained, to flourish. A
second experienced a confusion of roles. She believed that she was being treated as
secretary, mother and confidante and not as a priest. Another found her expected role
was pre-defined by her incumbent. "My incumbent expected my role to be a pastoral
and a supportive one, as his wife's role in their marriage. There was also a male curate
in his first title curacy and we were treated quite differently, using the incumbent's
stereotyped images of male and female roles. When an ordinand came on placement in
the second year of our curacy, he was placed with the male curate. Only after my angry
objection was it suggested he might work shadow me at all... .The incumbent became so
angry when I pointed out my role and my marriage were not like his wife's, that he
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eventually got rid of me, telling the congregation that they could not afford me. It was a
lie, as they have continued to have 2 curates, at least until December 1995." The fourth
respondent faced cultural opposition. Her Asian congregation could not come to terms
with a woman as a leader. In view of this she transferred to a different parish.
6.6.11 Discriminatory Treatment in Second Curacy
Incidents of past sex discrimination whilst in a second curacy were likewise
investigated. 30
 7/16 women reported sex discrimination at this level. 6 described the
incidents. Only one located the problem at diocesan level. She ran an interregnum when
the incumbent was ill. No support was given by the bishop apart from the suggestion
that he send a retired, "caretaker" priest, who was opposed to women priests, for the
whole interregnum. Most frequently cited were incidents involving parish working
relationships. On a personal level one curate reported being ignored, and when not
ignored, patronised, by deanery clergy. Another described how the PCC refused to pay
her working expenses. Her belief was that a man would not have been treated in this
way. 3 respondents described limitations being placed on their work by their incumbent.
For example, "I was not allowed to take baptisms nor weddings in spite of up to 5 years
experience as a deacon. I was not allowed to help in marriage preparation, despite being
happily married myself and having a celibate incumbent. I was not involved in baptism
preparation unless it became necessary when the incumbent was on holiday." In this and
another case it was clear that the limitation on duties actually flowed from theological
objection. The reason why this objection was not encapsulated in Resolutions A and/or
B was because the women were already serving in the parish before the 1993 Measure
was passed. Resolutions A and/or B cannot be considered if a woman priest or deacon is
already present in the benefice. 3 ' The only way to show one's objection is to limit her
duties and fail to acknowledge her vocation to the priesthood, thus forcing the woman to
move. The line between straightforward theological objection and unfavourable parish
working relationships is fine. It is especially so when one is considering limitations
placed on a priest's duties. Straightforward theological objection from clergy sources
was mentioned by two respondents. In one case the respondent was a deacon at the time
° Answers relate to women priests only.
31 Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 s 3 (3)
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the ordination of women was being discussed. Her incumbent held meetings against the
ordination of women to the priesthood, with no space for the opposing view. She
described the working atmosphere as, "a continuing fearful attitude which increasingly
hardened." In the second case, the respondent's incumbent became the deanery clergy
representative for Forward in Faith. He could not accept a woman as a priest. She
informed her area bishop that she would need to be moved to another parish if she were
to have her vocation to the priesthood acknowledged. It took over a year to find another
parish. Finally, one woman described how her incumbent believed that all women were
inferior beings. Whether this was related to theology, in the form of the creation stories,
or whether it was founded on prejudice was not explained.
Past treatment whilst at work in a senior post was only answered by 6 respondents. Only
1 female priest claimed past sex discrimination. The description of the less favourable
treatment, unfortunately, was unclear.
6.7 Sex as a Cause of Discrimination
The final category has two sub-categories. The first sub-category covers comments on
sex as a cause of discrimination, the second covers the interaction of sex with other
factors. In the first sub-category many disparate comments and ideas were located which
involved sex discrimination as the common factor. These are divided into two groups;
working conditions in the Church of England and general attitudes to sex
discrimination.
6.7.1 Working Conditions in the Church of England
A research objective was to discover what working conditions are like in the Church of
England. Substantial comment has already been made regarding search for a post and
treatment whilst in a post. These comments and extra remarks provided by respondents
in the optional comment section are drawn on to build a picture of the problems that
men and women priests face. Comments were made regarding appointment to posts,
working conditions in post and pay.
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Respondents highlighted problems of appointment which emanate from diocesan level.
Clearly Chichester diocese has its own problems. All women priests hold an
archbishop's licence and are ordained by a commissary. There are no women
incumbents or canons in the diocese. Stipendiary women are leaving the diocese not
because they want to but because they have to if they want posts parallel with men of
similar experience. Forward in Faith clergy from outside the diocese are filling
vacancies in Chichester. One respondent stated that one-third of clergy in Chichester
belong to Forward in Faith. Male priests who accept women priests are sometimes told
that there is no vacancy for them in the diocese. The situation in Truro, a diocese with
the reputation of being anti-women priests, seemed somewhat better. "Women have
been given posts in recognition of their experience. In the main they are 'difficult'
parishes, which others have refused. But that does not mean that we are only given the
dregs. It may be that only a woman's touch can heal years of bitterness." The
appointment of women in Worcester, a diocese with the reputation of being pro-women
priests, was expected to be favourable. However, one respondent described a different
situation. "It is denied by the hierarchy but perceived by a number of women.. .that
women are nevertheless not getting equal job opportunities. Our guess is that there is a
prejudice in favour of employing men which the diocese does little formally to combat
so the balance is still against us." A direct reply to this complaint came from a female
respondent who is a member of the Bishop's staff meeting in Worcester. She warned
against biased perceptions. "I know, for a fact, that there are very few situations in
which a woman priest has failed to find a post in this diocese because of her sex.
However, several women feel, or perceive, that this is a reason." She continued, "The
male priests answering the questionnaire will not, I suspect, reply that they feel they
were discriminated against in failing to find a post because they were men, but I know
that there are at least as many men having difficulty in moving from one post to another
as there are women."
Respondents highlighted particular problems which hamper appointment to posts. First,
the number of parishes open to women priests is restricted beyond those who have
passed Resolutions A and/or B. This is at the incumbent's discretion and is supported by
the 1993 Measure, section 6. Secondly, some posts appear reserved for women. Reverse
discrimination in recruitment is not supported by the Sex Discrimination Act or the
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1993 Measure. If sex discrimination legislation applied to Church of England priests
male priests could question the use of reverse discrimination. Thirdly, in cases where
pastoral experience is counted from the date of priesting and diaconal and pre-diaconal
experience is ignored, women are disqualified as being too old and without sufficient
experience. This should be combated by the discretionary power of the bishop to
appoint women to senior posts despite their short priestly experience. A number of
respondents who were happily working in curacies wondered if their experiences would
have been different if they had applied for senior posts. Clearly there is a feeling that
ambitious women have to struggle. A research objective was to uncover the willingness
or unwillingness of parishes, including those in favour of women priests, to accept a
woman as an incumbent. The instances of less favourable treatment in search for a
senior post have already been charted. It is important to mention positive experiences in
this respect. For example, "When applying for a senior post, I made some 20 inquiries,
12 firm job applications, and was shortlisted for 6 and offered 2. I was not aware of any
bias, in fact, after the experience of my curacy, was surprised by the open mindedness I
found. I did not use Canon Hardaker's list, relying solely on advertisement, and
answering those where it was indicated that a woman could apply." As regards the
number of women in senior posts, one male priest warned against quick conclusion
drawing. The low numbers of women priests in senior posts may not indicate a lack of
preferment but may reflect how women view the priesthood. "Many women clergy who
are friends of mine have no desire to become incumbents and senior office holders. This
may well reflect a much more laudable and appropriate work ethic than that of the
career ladder, i.e., the ability to do the job described in the ordination service....Jn my
experience to date, women are more ready to lay the kudos of office aside in pursuit of
their true vocation." However, one should not quickly accept this explanation as, unless
widely expressed by women priests, it can mask sex discrimination.
Good working conditions were described by 6 respondents in the optional comment
section. The working of team ministries had been doubted, but for 2 male and 2 female
respondents their structure was beneficial. The cohesion of the team in decision making
and the support for team members was advantageous. A female priest in Guildford
stated, "As a member of a team with four men I have found them very supportive and
protective. They are not patronising about this, merely resistant to allowing situations to
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arise where opposition would occur, i.e., with clergy in a neighbouring parish." A male
priest in Chichester stated, "As a team we unite in that any discrimination against one is
rejected by all. We would not participate in a service in which one of our number is
excluded on grounds of sex." Women priests recounted favourable treatment in other
working conditions. A female priest in Guildford praised the diocese's treatment of her
following childbirth. The maternity leave arrangements, once clarified, were most
favourable. A part-time post was found for her to suit her needs. Another female
respondent believed that she had positively benefited from being a woman. "I have
found being a woman in the Church of England means I get extra attentionljobs....MaIe
curates did not get this 'accelerated promotion."
As far as less favourable treatment in post went, much has already been discussed. 3
respondents questioned whether being female is the problem or whether being a curate
is the real problem. The curate is under the control of the incumbent, who may have
little training in acting as a supervisor. This can cause problems on both sides. One
respondent described how several priests have said to him that, "The worst period of life
is when one is a curate," and "there is only one thing worse than being a curate and that
is having one." He described how a female colleague had a difficult time with her
incumbent, to the extent that she had a nervous breakdown. He assumed that it was an
example of sex discrimination. However, the male curate who followed her found the
incumbent difficult to work with and likewise moved. He now believes that the first
curate was experiencing a straightforward personality clash, as did her successor. This is
certainly not to say that all problems are free from sex discrimination. Rather, "It is just
that male curates seem to have difficulties with vicars as well. Clergy appear for the
most part to operate most easily in a solo situation."
Pay is another area which might deteriorate working conditions. Each diocese appears
fairly autonomous in its policy decisions as regards stipendiary status. At one stage
dioceses could prohibit a priest moving from non-stipendiary status to stipendiary status.
By the time this policy was altered many women were too old to contemplate
stipendiary positions. Marital status dictated stipendiary status in at least one diocese. A
female priest was non-stipendiary because the diocese would not employ married
women, whether married to a cleric or not, in full-time posts. She became a stipendiary
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minister when the policy changed. A woman priest in Truro believed that marital status
was a consideration in her deployment even if it was not acknowledged officially as a
policy. "The fact that I have a husband who supports me must have influenced the
thinking of the bishop and the staff involved in deploying me, they did not need to find
me a stipend." When one is married to a priest the situation becomes even more
difficult. Some dioceses do not allow a married clergy couple to receive two full
stipends. 32 London diocese has a policy of not allowing married couples to work
together, in other dioceses this is happily permitted. 33 A female priest married to a priest
described being paid a one-third stipend for full-time work, as compared to her
husband's full stipend. A female priest in London commented, "It seems that when a
woman cleric is married to a male cleric then generally it is the woman who loses out... .1
felt my area bishop was more concerned about my husband's job." She described the
confusion over policies concerning married clergy couples. "The Church of England has
not thought out how it will deal with women. Dioceses have differing policies, if they
have them at all. Where are these policies written down?" Appointment decisions in
Chichester diocese mean that stipendiary women are leaving the diocese and new
women entrants are being deployed into NSM posts. Gradually, a suffocation on
stipendiary posts for women in the diocese will mean that most women are NSMs and
are thus less prominent in the diocese.
6.7.2 General Attitudes to Sex Discrimination
A substantial number of respondents made general comments on sex discrimination in
employment within the Church of England. These cover; denying the relevance of sex
discrimination to the Church, the interpretation of less favourable treatment, Church
attitudes to sex discrimination and legal reform. On the catholic wing, indication was
given that the issue of women priests is not one of sex discrimination. This was a strong
point at the Synod debate, and it was a true one; the debate was about theology and not
equal opportunities. But now women have been ordained the matter can be associated
with sex discrimination, albeit at a factual not a legal level.
32 The reader is referred to 6.5. where non-stipendiary ministry is discussed.
For example, in Ripon.
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The interpretation of the phrase "less favourable treatment" was questioned by 3
respondents. First, it requires a comparison to be made with a priest of the opposite sex,
which is not always an easy task. Second, once this judgment has been made the less
favourable treatment can be either real or wrongly perceived. Unsuccessful candidates
might feel unfairly treated and hence claim sex discrimination. Subjective judgments
will of course only tell one side of the story. What is important is the perception of
respondents, who after all have nothing to gain by claiming sex discrimination on an
anonymous questionnaire. 7 respondents gave broad descriptions of the form that less
favourable treatment takes in the Church of England. Three themes emerged. First, less
favourable treatment was subtle rather than blatant. For example, "Mostly
discrimination is by innuendo, or under guise of other issues, like concern for family,"
and "It's very hard to quantify sex discrimination....There are nuances in other people's
conversations, questions, attitudes which I'm sure would not be there if a male clergy
person were being addressed." Secondly, the less favourable treatment was characterised
in informal, not formal, structures. A male respondent suggested that much sex
discrimination is unseen because of the conscious or sub-conscious preference which is
exercised by the passing on or withholding of information about posts. The way that
informal networks work may not be discriminatory in intent but their effect amounts or
could be seen to amount to sex discrimination. Thirdly, the inclusion of women in a
male orientated system was seen as problematic. At an implicit level women remain
invisible, an example of this being the use of exclusive language in meetings.
Conformation by women priests to the male norm was suggested by another female
respondent. "There are expectations that women who become priests will 'join the boys'
i.e., behave 'male' like, instead of developing a priestly role within their own self
defined sexuality." A male respondent thought that problems involved not a male norm
but a gender free norm. "The most insidious [sex discrimination] being the
discrimination against a person of either gender who dares to be what they are - man or
woman - in favour of a neutered, politically-correct clergy-clone."
The attitude of the Church of England to sex discrimination is varied. The attitude was
described as, "a peculiar mixture of enlightened and extremely prejudiced attitudes
towards discrimination. Certainly the Church does not speak with one voice on attitudes
to discrimination, and so each individual's opinions are shaped by factors that are
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essentially random." The experience of clergy in other careers as well as their personal
background and theological beliefs will mould their attitudes. One female respondent
summarised the situation, which probably applies to women in all spheres of life,
"There is I feel a prevalent difference in people's heads and hearts. Many believe in
women's equal status intellectually but yet continue to engage in behaviour that is
inconsistent with equality." It is submitted that even if equal intellectual status is not
accepted, equality of respect ought to be carried out both in thought and action. A worry
was that remedial action might be taken which could result in sex discrimination against
men. The use of reverse discrimination in selection procedures was a concern of one
male respondent.
Whilst sex discrimination was acknowledged as an issue in need of attention,
respondents were cautious as to how this might happen. Admittedly, respondents were
not asked to consider the feasibility of law reform. One respondent stated that a change
of legislation and an exposure of sex discrimination has to come. She and others warned
against trying to change deep seated attitudes by legislation. A male respondent, who
returned his questionnaire uncompleted, was unequivocal in his response to law reform,
"I regard the idea of the intrusion of.. .sex discrimination laws into the working out of a
vocation to the diaconate or the priesthood as grotesque."
6.7.3 The Interaction of Sex with Other Variables
The final sub-category is the interaction of sex with other variables. The idea of age
interacting with sex has already been aired. Although women's retirement age in the
Church has been extended to 65, one respondent believes that it is still harder for a
woman in her 50's to obtain a post, than for a man in his 50's, despite the experience
gained prior to being priested. A male priest in Chichester described discrimination on
grounds of age in his diocese. The stipend cuts in Chichester, he says, have partly led to
many older women being given NSM posts. 34 Being single was mentioned by 3
respondents as a factor affecting appointment decisions. This affected men as well as
women. For example, a male respondent stated, "Incredible things are said and posts
blocked if one is single." A female respondent stated, "Older [clergy] and unmarried
The reader is referred to 6.6.9. and 6.7.1. for a discussion of other factors at work in Chichester diocese.
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clergy [of] any age (especially men) are discriminated against more, I suspect than
women." Less favourable treatment on the grounds of legitimately held views
concerning women priests is another form of discrimination. Both clergy supporters and
clergy opponents of women priests perceive discrimination. It is sometimes male clergy
who fully accept and work with female colleagues who are discriminated against. A
male priest in Chichester who will be seeking a second curacy has already been warned
that there are parishes in the diocese where he will not be acceptable because he has
worked with a female priest and is thus "contaminated". This is a particular problem for
those in the catholic wing of the Church, who by their support for women priests risk
limiting their own equality of opportunity. Finally, in 2 cases the combination of
disability and being female and sexual orientation and being female led to a perception
of sex discrimination. Both respondents were unsure whether it was their sex that was
the dominant factor in their treatment.
188
Chapter Seven
Sex Discrimination Law and the Church of England
The application of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 andlor the Equal Treatment
Directive to Church of England priests poses three overlapping questions. First, should
such priests be protected by the legislation? Secondly, can they be protected by the
legislation? Thirdly, if included under the legislation what particular problems would
priests face trying to use the legislation? The first two questions have partly been
examined in Chapter Four when the employment status of ministers of religion was
considered. Additional arguments from national and EC law will be discussed in
relation to these questions. Then the accommodation of Church of England priests
within sex discrimination legislation will be discussed in light of the questionnaire data.
7.1 Inclusion of Church of England Priests Under the National Legislation
Section 19 (1) states;
"Nothing in this Part applies to employment for purposes of an organised religion
where the employment is limited to one sex so as to comply with the doctrines of
the religion or avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of a significant
number of its followers."
It will be argued below that when priests were excluded from the national legislation, it
was not because of their employment status, but was because of doctrine. Additionally,
the scope of section 19 (1) will be examined. Whether section 19 (1) is still applicable to
Church of England priests depends on whether the section is given a wide or a narrow
interpretation.
7.1.1 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 section 19 (1)
Judicial arguments regarding the employment status of Church of England priests, and
ministers of religion generally, are crucial to establishing a claim for inclusion under the
legislation. However, these arguments can sometimes cloud the purpose of the
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legislation. What was the legislator's intention when section 19 (1) was passed? Does
the Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 render section 19 (1) inapplicable to
the Church of England? How does section 6 of the 1993 Measure fit into the picture?
The White Paper, "Equality for Women", which preceded the Sex Discrimination Act,
outlined the specific exceptions to be made from the employment and training
provisions of the Act.' No indication was made that ministers of religion were to be
exempted from the legislation because of their office holder status. Discussion
proceeded on the basis that ministers were capable of employment for the purposes of
the wider definition of employment contained in section 82 (1) of the Sex
Discrimination Act. It is unlikely that they were regarded as employees who held
contracts of employment. It is more likely that they were regarded as capable of having a
contract personally to execute any work or labour. For example, the section 19
exemption was said to refer to, "the clergy and religious orders whose membership
involves employment." 2 At the third reading of the Sex Discrimination Bill it was
explained that section 19 had been extended further to cover other cases where
employment is, "for the purposes of an organised religion." 3 The very fact that the Sex
Discrimination Bill contained an exemption in relation to employment for the purposes
of an organised religion suggests it was thought that priests could be in employment for
the purposes of section 82 (1). Whether this was the reason for the inclusion of section
19 remains an inconclusive point. Additionally, the different posts within the Church of
England could cause difficulties in determining whether a priest was in employment.
The employment emphasis increases if one looks at the amendments to section 19
suggested at the third reading. 4 The proposed amendments had three aims. First, they
sought to limit the exemption from the provisions of the Act to employment in the
ministries of religious bodies. The ambit of section 19 ought only to apply to ministers
of religion and not to other employees of an organised religion. Mr Clemitson objected
to the heading "Ministers of Religion etc." which accompanies section 19. In his view
'"Equality for Women" Cmnd. 5724
2 Ibid. plO
Official Report Fifth Series Parliamentary Debates [Commons] 1974-75 vol.893 Jun 9 - Jun 20 1429 at
col.1539 Dr Summerskill
' Ibid. cols.1535-1542. The amendments were put up by Mr Ivor Clemitson (Luton, East) and Mr Walker
(Kingswood)
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"etc." had the potential to encompass a wide variety of personnel. The phrase "Ministers
of Religion" at least could be defined. This was the appropriate category of personnel to
be covered by section 19. Secondly, the phrase, "offending the religious susceptibilities
of a significant number of its followers" was questioned on the ground that this could
legitimise sex discrimination where inappropriate. Again emphasis was placed on a
definition of terms. Whilst the doctrines of the religion are quite capable of definition,
Mr Clemitson suggested that the religious susceptibilities of its followers are not.
Thirdly, the restriction of the exemption to those religious bodies which had submitted
their reasons for exemption to the Equal Opportunities Commission was sought. It was
hoped that this amendment would enable only bona fide religions and doctrines to
operate outside sex discrimination law.
All three amendments were rejected. The reasons given highlight that section 19 is there
because of doctrine and not because of any inability of ministers of religion to be
classified as in employment under the Sex Discrimination Act. Regarding the first
amendment, it was explained that the exemption should cover all cases where
employment is for the purposes of an organised religion. The exemption would only
extend to personnel other than ministers of religion, "where the tasks to be performed
are such that their performance by a person of the other sex offends against the religious
doctrine or susceptibilities." 5
 An example of this would be a gardener in an enclosed
order. Those employed in a post where the sex of the worker did not offend doctrine or
religious susceptibilities would be covered by the Act. An example of this would be a
secretary working for the Church in question. Regarding the second amendment, little
was said other than that the wording was as good as the drafters could manage in regard
to difficult clauses. It was stated that section 19 is reserved for religions and doctrines
where it is central that the person employed is of the appropriate sex. "The main purpose
of the exemption is to ensure that the Bill does not cut across the doctrinal requirements
of any organised religion." 6 Arguments on the question of the religious susceptibilities
of the followers of a religion were avoided. The submission of doctrinal reasons to the
Equal Opportunities Commission in order to substantiate the use of section 19 was
Ibid. col.1539 Dr Summerskill
6 Ibid. col.1541 Dr Summerskill
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considered to be inappropriate. It is not their function to adjudicate on matters of
doctrine. The motivation behind section 19 is to respect doctrine.
Section 19 (1) prevents sex discrimination being unlawful in all employment situations
where the employment is limited to one sex so as to comply with the doctrines of the
religion or avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of a significant number of its
followers. The Sex Discrimination Act is applicable to men and women equally.7
Section 19 (1) is not in place because ministers of religion are office holders. Indeed
only Church of England priests are office holders. It is in place because of doctrine. The
Church of England seemingly has put itself outside section 19 (1) by allowing women
priests. Taking a wide interpretation of section 19 (1), it is arguable that the section no
longer applies to the Church of England. If "employment" as a minister is interpreted as
meaning the general position which the Church of England holds on the sex of its priests
then section 19 (1) is irrelevant. If employment as a minister is interpreted narrowly as
meaning employment in a particular post in a particular parish section 19 (1) might
remain operative. A parish could use the "religious susceptibilities" argument of section
19 (1) to act as an exemption to a claim by a woman priest relating to recruitment. It is
possible, but less likely, that the narrow interpretation could also apply to dismissal.
This situation would occur if a female priest was dismissed in order that a male priest
could be appointed. However, if the parish had previously accepted a woman priest it
would be difficult to show that the reason for the dismissal was to "avoid offending the
religious susceptibilities of a significant number of its followers." A narrow
interpretation of section 19 (1) would not act as an exemption to a claim of sex
discrimination relating to working conditions. It is submitted that the narrow
interpretation is an unlikely construal of section 19 (1).8 If section 19 (1) is inapplicable,
and ignoring for the moment the 1993 Measure, a further question would need to be
answered. Which posts, all or only some, would be capable of being defined as
employment for the purposes of the Sex Discrimination Act?
Sex Discrimination Acts 2(1)
8 Personal Communication, Hilary Slater, 1/11/96, 19/3/97
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7.1.2 Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 section 6
The focus of discussion turns to section 6 of the Priests (Ordination of Women)
Measure 1993. The wording of section 6 reflects the uncertain status of section 19 of the
1975 Act. It states:
"Without prejudice to section 19 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, nothing in
Part II of that Act shall render unlawful sex discrimination against a woman in
respect of-
(a) her ordination to the office of priest in the Church of England;
(b) the giving to her of a licence or permission to serve or officiate as such a
priest;
(c) her appointment as dean, incumbent, priest-in-charge or team vicar or, in the
case of a woman ordained to the office of priest, as assistant curate."
The drafters of the Measure were perhaps unsure as to the applicability of section 19
post the Synod vote. Regardless of the status of section 19, section 6 acts as an
exemption to sex discrimination against women priests regarding ordination and
recruitment. Section 6 is a defence to the passing of Resolutions A and/or B. Section 6
only applies to women priests. There is no equivalent provision to that of the Sex
Discrimination Act section 2 (1) which states that the provisions of the Act are to be
read to apply equally to men and women. It was presumably not thought necessary for
section 6 to apply to men as the Resolutions can only be passed against women. There
was therefore perceived to be no need for an exemption to sex discrimination against
male priests. However, if section 19 is no longer applicable to the Church of England,
this conclusion might be doubtful, and the possibility of actionable sex discrimination
against male priests is raised.9
Does section 6 cover all Holy Orders? It does not need to cover bishops, as women are
still prohibited from becoming bishops. It clearly covers priests up to the level of dean.
It does not cover the senior posts of archdeacon and residentiary canon which women
This is discussed at 7.1.4. The data analysis confirms that some male priests perceived that they were
being discriminated against.
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are now eligible to apply for. The legal status of deacons raises an interesting point of
statutory interpretation. Section 6 only applies to priests. The first year of a curacy is
spent as a deacon. Only after this period can the curate be priested. Section 6 (c)
specifically restricts its ambit to those curates who have been priested. Section 6 does
not apply to curates who are deacons. The Deacons (Ordination of Women) Measure
1986 carries no provision regarding the status of section 19 (1). Therefore, if section 19
(1) is inapplicable it would appear that male and female deacons could make claims of
sex discrimination regarding recruitment, working conditions and dismissal. A woman's
legal position changes once she is priested. This is a strange state of affairs, when the
intention of most deacons is to be priested. However, it is consistent with the Church's
position on women clergy; quite content with women as deacons, but still divided over
women priests.
Women may be employed by the Church of England in a lay position, for example, as a
licensed lay worker or a reader. Such lay workers may find sex discrimination claims
easier to bring. First, the establishment of employment status is likely to be more
straightforward. Secondly, their employment is not limited to one sex so as to comply
with doctrine or avoid offending religious susceptibilities. Thirdly, they are not covered
by section 6 of the 1993 Measure.
7.1.3 Legal Position of Women Priests Under the National Legislation
What is the position of women priests under the legislation if section 19 (1) is
inapplicable and they are deemed to be in employment for the purposes of section 82
(1)? Section 6 only legitimises sex discrimination in relation to ordination and
recruitment to a post. Section 6 does not cover less favourable treatment whilst working
in a post. It would require a strained interpretation for the giving of a licence and
appointment to a post to be read as including dismissal. Therefore, it would appear that
the Sex Discrimination Act and the Equal Pay Act do apply once a woman has a post
subject to the status of section 19 (1) and her employment position. Regarding
ordination and importantly recruitment, no sex discrimination claims are possible under
194
national law because of section 6. Any claims would need to be made under the Equal
Treatment Directive.'0
Regarding recruitment, section 6 applies very widely. It means that regardless of the
presence of Resolutions A and/or B, sex discrimination against a female priest during
selection for a post is legitimised. Theological objection encapsulated in concrete
Resolutions relies on doctrine and belief. However, parishes which do not pass the
Resolutions can rely on the wider protection of section 6 which legitimises preference
for a male priest, whether based on theology or prejudice. Section 6 may be relied upon
not only by the PCC, but others involved in the hiring process; for example, bishops,
other clergy and the patron.
The wide application of section 6 is useful when the Resolutions cannot be passed.
Resolution A cannot be considered by a PCC if the incumbent, priest-in-charge, team
vicar or assistant curate is a woman priest." However, under section 6 the refusal to
appoint another woman priest to the same parish would be legitimised, despite
Resolution A not being in place. The passing of Resolutions A and/or B appeared to be
a useful benchmark for prospective job candidates. Section 6 defeats the usefulness of
these Resolutions. Under section 6 opportunities can be restricted in a less formal
manner and with no legal redress. Any claim of sex discrimination would not appear
possible in national law under the present structure until a woman priest is in post or has
been dismissed from her post. The whole process of recruitment is side-stepped by the
legislation.
7.1.4 Legal Position of Male Priests Under the National Legislation
Section 6 does not apply to male priests. If section 19 (1) is inapplicable and if priests
are deemed to be employed for the purposes of section 82 (1) male priests could use the
Sex Discrimination Act if they encounter sex discrimination in recruitment, working
conditions or dismissal. If a male priest was refused a particular post in favour of a
woman, there would be a possible exemption if the sex of the priest was a genuine
'° EC Council Directive 76/207 (Equal Treatment)
'' Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 s 3 (3)
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occupational qualification. Under section 7 (2) (d) of the Sex Discrimination Act it
might be argued that the nature of the establishment requires the work to be done by a
woman priest, for example, a chaplaincy post in an all female prison or hospital. This
would be a problematic argument as men have traditionally been priests in all types of
post. Under section 7 (2) (e) of the Act the argument might be made out that the post
requires the provision of personal services promoting welfare or education which can
most effectively be provided by a woman. For example, under this heading might come
a Diocesan Officer for Women's Ministry. This argument is more likely to succeed than
arguments based on 7 (2) (d) as the presence of women priests has created new posts in
the Church of England such as the aforementioned one. Regarding contractual pay and
benefits a male priest, as for a woman priest, would have a potential claim under the
Equal Pay Act.'2
7.1.5 Comparison of Priests' Legal Rights
Before women priests were permitted, the issue of sex discrimination did not arise. Male
priests were in the protected position of an all male priesthood, where no sex
discrimination could take place. Women had no rights in domestic sex discrimination
law as the law prevented them from being priests. Under EC law the priesthood was
identified as an excluded occupation for the purposes of Article 2 (2) of the Equal
Treatment Directive.' 3
 Now that women priests are permitted, if section 19 (1) is
inapplicable and if priests are in employment under the 1975 Act, male priests have
potential rights under the Sex Discrimination Act in all employment situations. Women
priests have fewer potential rights under the Act than male priests. Their potential rights
are confined to working conditions and dismissal. Claims regarding ordination and
recruitment would need to be brought under the Equal Treatment Directive. Both male
and female priests have potential rights under the Equal Pay Act.
The only difference in potential legal rights between men and women concerns
ordination and recruitment. One can see why the difference is present because it
preserves theological objection to women priests. The problem comes where sex
12 This is discussed in detail at 7.8.
This is discussed at 7.2.2.
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discrimination in ordination and recruitment is not for theological reasons but is because
of prejudice against women.
7.2 Inclusion of Church of England Priests Under Community Law
The inclusion of Church of England priests has been discussed with reference to
national law. Now the focus turns to European Community law. What status, if any, do
priests have under Community law? This question is answered by examining three
aspects of EC employment law; the meaning of an employee, the derogation against the
Equal Treatment Directive contained in Article 2 (2) and the purpose of EC employment
law. When examining the Equal Treatment Directive special reference will be made to
the difficulties a priest might encounter when trying to rely on the Directive. The
doctrine of direct effect will be discussed with reference to the concept of "emanation of
the state". The ways in which the Directive might be enforced will be discussed.
7.2.1 The Meaning of Employee in Community Law
The employment status of ministers of religion, particularly Church of England priests,
has been discussed with reference to national definitions of an employee. Does EC
employment law provide its own definition of an employee? Directives are silent as to a
precise definition. It appears that Member States are often allowed to interpret terms
such as "worker" and "employee" in their own way. For example, in the Pregnant
Workers Directive, Article 2 defines a pregnant worker to mean, "a pregnant worker
who informs her employer of her condition, in accordance with national legislation
and/or national practice." 4
 When the British government implemented this Directive in
the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993, now restated in the
Employment Rights Act 1996, a pregnant worker became defined as a pregnant
employee. Under section 230 (1) of the 1996 Act an employee means an individual who
has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a
contract of employment. By allowing a Member State to define such terms there is the
risk of a narrow interpretation of Community law.
' EC Council Directive 92/85 (Pregnant Workers)
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In relation to the meaning of worker for the purposes of Article 48 of the Treaty of
Rome, dealing with free movement of workers, the ECJ gave a Community meaning to
"worker".' 5 "Objectively defined, a 'worker' is a person who is obliged to provide
services to another in return for monetary reward and who is subject to the decision or
control of the other person as regards the way in which the work is done." 6 Because
Article 48 contained one of the fundamental principles of the Community, the term
"worker" in the Article should not be interpreted differently according to the law of each
Member State but was to be given a Community meaning.' 7 The nature of the legal
relationship between employee and employer was said to be immaterial as regards the
application of Article 48.18 The relationship might be one founded in a private law
contract or it might be one of public law rights.' 9 In Steymann the applicant did not
claim that his activities were those of an employed or a self-employed person. 2° Rather
the case involved the EC concept of freedom to provide services. The question before
the ECJ was whether activities performed by members of a religious community were
economic activities as defined by Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome. The pursuit of an
activity as an employed person or the provision of services for remuneration is regarded
as an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2.21 The ECJ held that the
activities performed by the members of the community constitute economic activities,
"in so far as the services which the community provides to its members may be regarded
as the indirect quid pro quo for genuine and effective work." 22 Additionally, the
Commission in its opinion considered that the activities of a religious community might
be regarded as employed activities within the meaning of Article 48. A member of the
community fulfils the criteria characterising an employment relationship set out in
Lawrie Blum. "The employment relationship in this case is comparable, in particular, to
a contract of employment for an indefinite period, namely the length of stay in the
community. ...the reference to the rules of the community implies that the members of
the community are subordinated to a certain extent to the community as a whole.
' Case 66/85 Deborah Lawrie B/urn v Land Baden-Wurrtemberg [1986] ECR 2121
Ibid. at p2143
17 Ibid. at p2144
18 Article 48 applies to free movement of employed persons and Article 52 applies to self-employed
persons.
' Deborah Lawrie Blum n.15 supra at p2145
20 Case 196/87 Udo Steyrnann v Staatssecretaris van Justine [1988] ECR 6159
21 Case 13/76 Dona v Mantaro [1976] ECR 1333
22 Udo Stevmann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie n.20 supra at p6173
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Finally, what is involved in this case is services provided for remuneration."23
Alternatively, they thought that Mr Steymann might be regarded as a person pursuing a
self-employed activity within the meaning of Article 52.24 It was not necessary for the
ECJ to decide whether the applicant was employed or self-employed. Another case held
that a missionary priest was self-employed for the purposes of social security for
migrant workers.25
 The national social security provisions at issue had been adopted to
guarantee freedom of movement for workers; both employed and self-employed
persons. The question was whether a priest who is not paid by his order but is
maintained by his parishioners is self-employed in regard to the free movement of
workers. It was held that, "the concept of 'self-employed person' is intended to
guarantee to such persons the same protection as is accorded to employed persons and
must therefore be interpreted broadly." 26
 To establish self-employment here the person
must be engaged in an occupation in respect of which they receive an income which can
meet all or some of their needs, even if this is paid by a third party, as in this case.27
These cases refer to the free movement of workers. There is no Community definition of
employment in regard to the Equal Treatment Directive. Although an important part of
EC law it is not one of the fundamental principles contained in the Treaty of Rome. It is
arguable that the ECJ would allow the term "employment" contained in the Directive to
be interpreted according to the law of each Member State.
However, a British case does attempt to draw principles from the Equal Treatment
Directive regarding the meaning of employment. The issue in Jepson v Labour Party
was whether section 13 of the Sex Discrimination Act covered adoption as a prospective
parliamentary candidate. 28
 It was held that it did because the adoption of a prospective
candidate involves an "authorisation" which "facilitates engagement in a particular
profession". Section 13 is not confined to sex discrimination in employment but is
drafted to cover any vocation, occupation or business. 29
 The industrial tribunal stated
23 Ibid. at pp6164-6 165
Ibid. at p6165
25 Case 300/84 A.J.M. Roosnzalen v Bestur de Bedrzjfsvereniging sooT de Gezonheid, Geestelzjke en
Maatschappelijke Belagen [1986] ECR 3097
26 Ibid. at p3123
27 Ibid. at p3 124
28 Jepson v liibour Party [1996] IRLR 116
29 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 ss 13 (1), 82 (1)
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that support for a wide interpretation of the term employment is to be found in the Equal
Treatment Directive. 30 The Directive, stated the Chairman, can be used as an aid to
construction of the national legislation provided, as Lord Keith emphasised in Webb v
Emo Air Cargo (UK) Ltd, that in doing so we do not distort the meaning of the British
legislation. 3 ' Whilst the Directive frequently uses the ordinary word "employment",
Article 3 invites a wide interpretation of the term: "Application of the principle of equal
treatment means that there should be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex in
the conditions including selection criteria for access to all jobs or posts whatever the
sector or branch of activity and to all levels of the occupational hierarchy." Article 3 was
held to support the wide interpretation of section 13. However, whether Article 3 could
be used to support a wide interpretation of the meaning of employment in sections 1 and
6 of the Sex Discrimination Act is a moot point. An Article 177 preliminary ruling
might be necessary to decide whether a wide interpretation of employment can be used
to include ministers of religion within national legislation.
7.2.2 The Equal Treatment Directive
The purpose of the Equal Treatment Directive is to ensure the equal treatment of men
and women as regards access to employment, including promotion, and to vocational
training and as regards working conditions. 32 The Directive applies to all types of
employment, including employment in the public service. 33 Article 2 (1) prohibits any,
"discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference
in particular to marital or family status."
By way of recap, section 19 (1) of the Sex Discrimination Act is now arguably
inapplicable to Church of England priests. Section 6 of the 1993 Measure only exempts
sex discrimination against women in regard to ordination and appointment; it does not
cover working conditions and dismissal. With this in mind, it is possible to review the
potential impact of the Equal Treatment Directive on Church of England priests. There
30 iepson v Labour Party n.28 supra at pit 8
Webb v Emo Air Cargo (UK) Ltd [1993] IRLR 27 at p32. For a further discussion of the interpretation
of national law using EC law the reader is referred to 7.2.5.
32 Equal Treatment Directive Article I
Case 248/83 Commission v German y [ 1985] ECR 1459
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are three exceptions to the principle of equal treatment: where the sex of the worker
constitutes a determining factor, where because of pregnancy or maternity women need
protection and where the state has implemented a positive action programme. 34
 It is
considered by the British government that the former exception covers Church of
England priests. Member States are allowed to, "exclude from its field of application
those occupational activities and, where appropriate, the training leading thereto, for
which, by reason of their nature or the context in which they are carried out, the sex of
the worker constitutes a determining factor."35
 The British government has excluded
ministers of religion from the operation of the Directive. The exclusion predated the
Synod vote to allow women priests. It is arguable that the inclusion of ministers of
religion under the derogation suggests that they are capable of inclusion under the
Directive in the first place. It is not the type of job (being a minister) which prohibits
protection but the fact that sex is a determining factor.
The existence of an exemption does not automatically provide a defence to claims
brought under the Equal Treatment Directive. An exemption may be set aside if it
exceeds the limits of the exceptions permitted by Article 2 (2).36 An exemption is
justified if it comes within either of two situations. First, does the nature of the work
mean that the sex of the worker is a determining factor? Or second, does the context of
the work mean that the sex of the worker is a determining factor? In regard to the
Church of England, whilst an all male priesthood existed, the sex of the worker did
constitute a determining factor. The nature of the priesthood required that a priest was
male. Following the 1993 Measure, what is the status of this exemption? This depends
on how "context" and "determining factor" are interpreted. In parishes which have
passed Resolutions A andlor B the sex of the worker is a determining factor. In other
parishes a male or a female priest is welcomed. Is theological objection enough to
satisfy "context" under Article 2 (2)? Does Article 2 (2) suggest that the exemption is
permissible if the sex of the priest is a determining factor in some, but not all, parishes?
This would square with the provisions of section 6 of the 1993 Measure. This
Equal Treatment Directive Article 2 (2), (3), (4)
Ibid. Article 2 (2)
M Case 165/82 Commission v UK [19831 ECR 3431
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interpretation of context would justify the exemption to operate as long as the sex of the
worker is a determining factor some of the time.
Case law provides some guidance on the interpretation of Article 2 (2). However, the
idea of "determining factor" remains vague. The predictability of a case decision in this
area is problematic. The Commission instituted infraction proceedings against the UK
for failure to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 (2). Three areas of exemption were
under scrutiny; employment in a private household, employment in small undertakings
with not more than 5 employees and employment as a midwife. The first two
exemptions were held to go beyond the limits of Article 2 (2) because they were too
general in their application. 38 In relation to employment in a private household it was
stated that the provision at issue was intended to reconcile the principle of equality of
treatment with the principle of respect for private life. It was argued that reconciliation
of that kind is one of the factors which must be taken into account when determining the
scope of Article 2 (2). The ECJ replied, "Whilst it is undeniable that, for certain kinds of
employment in private households, that consideration may be decisive, that is not the
case for all the kinds of employment in question." 39 The private household exemption
was subsequently narrowed down in the Sex Discrimination Act. 4° On this basis it could
be argued that whilst particular posts in particular parishes require a male priest, this is
not the case for all the kinds of posts in question. The generality of the exemption
regarding ministers of religion would provide a ground of objection. As a result of this
the exemption might be narrowed to cover only posts and parishes where the
Resolutions are in place.
At the time of the Commission action midwives were excluded from the general
protection of the Sex Discrimination Act. The ECJ held that the UK government had not
gone beyond the scope of Article 2 (2) in relation to midwives. At that time the
restriction on male midwives was about to be lifted. However, the present legislation
which discriminated against men in this field was under scrutiny. The UK government
believed that the introduction of male midwives and the accompanying idea of equal
Ibid.
38 Ibid. at p3448
Ibid. at p3448
° Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 7 (2) (ba) as amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1986 ss 1(1), 1(2)
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treatment in the occupation of midwife should be introduced gradually, in order to take
account of the sensitivities and beliefs of different cultural groups in Britain. 4 ' The
Commission suggested that account could be taken of the preferences of women in
confinement and added that male midwives woLild remain a small group anyway. The
Advocate General likewise agreed with the Commission, believing that free choice was
sufficient to allay the fears of the UK government. The reply of the UK was that this
tended to permit sex discrimination "in practice" but not in law. 42 The ECJ did think
that the exemption was justifiable, stating, "It must however be recognized that at the
present time personal sensitivities may play an important role in relations between
midwife and patient." 43 An analogy could be drawn between male midwives and women
priests. Traditionally members of the opposite sex have filled these posts. Once a mixed
sex profession is accepted in principle, practical problems of accommodation appear.
The Commission and the Advocate General attempted to embrace change by including
midwives under the legislation with the balancing factor of freedom of choice. This
argument could be used to support the inclusion of ministers of religion under the
legislation with the balancing factor of theological objection.
The best guidance on the meaning of "context" and "determining factor" was given in
Johnston v The Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Mrs Johnston was
employed by the RUC on a fixed term contract. It was the policy of the Chief Constable
of the RUC not to issue women with firearms or give them training in their use because
of the perceived risk of assassination. It was decided that women would not be offered
contracts of full-time employment in the RUC. This was because a substantial part of
general police duties involved the use of firearms. Mrs Johnston's contract was not
renewed, as a result of which she brought a sex discrimination claim under the Sex
Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976 in relation to her employment and access
to training. Policing in Northern Ireland was open to men and women, therefore the
nature of the occupational activity was not at issue. The Commission in their opinion
stated that a derogation must be justified in relation to specific duties and not in relation
'' Commission v UK n.36 supra at p3459
42 Ibid. at p346O
Ibid. at p3449
Johnston v The Chi ef Constable of the Ro)'al Ulster Constabulary [19861 IRLR 263
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to an employment considered in its entirety. 45 The ECJ examined the context in which
the duties were performed. They held, "it should first be observed that that provision,
being a derogation from an individual right laid down in the Directive, must be
interpreted strictly. However, it must be recognised that the context in which the
occupational activity of members of an armed police force are carried out is determined
by the environment in which that activity is carried out....the context of certain policing
activities may be such that the sex of police officers constitutes a determining factor for
carrying them out."46 The ECJ added that in determining the scope of the derogation, the
principle of proportionality must be observed. The exemptions must remain within the
limits of what is appropriate and necessary for achieving the aim in view. 47 If there are
other non-discriminatory means for achieving this aim these should be used. It was for
the national court to decide whether the reasons for the Chief Constable's decision were
justified and based on proportionality. Ellis believes that the Johnston decision leaves a
great deal of discretion in the hands of national courts to decide which situations are
permitted by Article 2 (2).48
In Commission v France the practice of using a quota based on sex for recruitment into
different ranks of the police force was at issue. 49 It was held that exemptions provided
for in Article 2 (2) may only relate to specific activities. The fact that certain police
functions cannot be performed by both men and women does not justify discriminatory
treatment in admission to the police force in general. "The application of Article 2 (2) of
the directive cannot be based on a general assessment of police activities as a whole; it
requires a specific consideration of the specific duties to be performed in individual
cases."50 The exemption must be "sufficiently transparent" so as to permit effective
supervision by the Commission. In principle the exemption must be capable of being
adapted to social developments. 5 ' These arguments could be applied to the exemption
covering Church of England priests. Just because some parishes have passed
Resolutions A and/or B does not mean that there should be a general exemption from
Ibid. at p276
46 Ibid. at p277
Ibid. at p277
48 Ellis, Evelyn (1991) European Community Sex Equality Law p166 (Oxford, Clarendon)
' Case 3 18/86 Commission v France [1988] ECR 3559
° Ibid. at p3580
51 Ibid. at p3581
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unlawful sex discrimination against priests. Rather the exemption should cover the
specific case of theological objection to women priests. This complements the
adaptation to social developments argument.
The idea of review has been mentioned in case law, it is also part of the Equal
Treatment Directive. Article 9 (2) of the Equal Treatment Directive requires Member
States to periodically assess the excluded occupational activities in order to decide, in
the light of social developments, whether there is justification for maintaining the
exemptions concerned. They must notify the Commission of the results of their
assessment. This two-fold supervision ought to eliminate out-dated exemptions. In
terms of law reform through review, the individual priest must hope that the Synod vote
is seen as a social development which in turn requires priests to be included in the
principle of equality.
The scope of Article 2 (2) in relation to occupations of a religious nature has not been
considered by the ECJ. It is impossible to tell whether the ministers of religion
exemption would be successful in any action. In a report requested by the European
Commission which looked at excluded occupations, exemptions made within a religious
framework were not considered. 52 It was thought that these occupations were incapable
of assessment by a layman. It is possible that the ECJ might take a similar approach
when faced with a religious occupation, and thus hold that the exemption was permitted
by Article 2 (2).
Article 3 (1) of the Directive, with its wide interpretation of employment, prohibits sex
discrimination regarding access to jobs or posts. 54 Section 6 of the 1993 Measure is
justified by Article 2 (2), as is section 19 (1) of the Sex Discrimination Act. Respect for
differing opinions on women priests is a necessary feature if Church unity is to be
preserved. However, the wide provisions of section 6 are unnecessary to achieve this
aim. Therefore, it might be possible to argue that a breach of Article 3 is not justified by
5,	 .	 .
- Commission of the European Communities (1981) Protective Measures and the Activities not Falling
within the Field of Application of the Directive on Equal Treatment, Analysis and Proposals, Monique
Halpern 331.1094 COM
Personal Communication, Hilary Slater, March 1995
The reader is referred to 7.2.1. for a discussion of Article 3 (1)
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Article 2 (2). The hoped for result would be a modified section 6 which only allowed
sex discrimination in access to employment where a conscience clause was operative.
Working conditions and unfair dismissal are covered by Article 5 (1) which states,
"Application of the principle of equal treatment with regard to working conditions,
including the conditions governing dismissal means that men and women shall be
guaranteed the same conditions without discrimination on grounds of sex." As section 6
of the 1993 Measure does not cover working conditions and dismissal it is arguable that
but for the current derogation provision and the uncertain employment status of Church
of England priests, Article 5 (1) might be used by priests in their national courts.
7.2.3 Direct Effect
How might the Directive be relied upon by an individual priest? First, the doctrine of
direct effect will be considered. Direct effect is a doctrine whereby an individual can
invoke Community law against the state (vertical direct effect) and against other
individuals (horizontal direct effect). The type of law determines whether direct effect
operates at all and if it does whether it is horizontal as well as vertical. Van Duyn v
Home Office established that Directives could be directly effective against the state.56
For this to be so the Directive must be unconditional and sufficiently precise following
the principles enunciated in Van Gend en Loos. 57 A Directive is not directly effective
against an individual or other body. If an individual believes that a Directive has been
improperly implemented, he or she can rely on the provisions of the Directive against
the state. In the case of the Equal Treatment Directive, the principle of equal treatment
as applied to access to jobs under Article 3 (1) and working conditions under Article 5
(I) was held to be directly effective against the state. 58 If it is not possible to use direct
effect it may be possible to use the doctrine of indirect effect developed in Marleasing.59
Marleasing held that the national courts have a duty to interpret national law in
accordance with Community law. The Marleasing principle brings Community rights to
Procedure under the Equa' Treatment Directive is discussed at 7.2.5.
56 Case 41174 Van Dun v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337
Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 1
58 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hants AHA [19861 IRLR 140
Case C- 106/89 Marleasing v La commercial International de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR 1-4135
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the citizen indirectly through national law. This is an indirect way of achieving
horizontal direct effects. 6° The successful use of the Marleasing principle by Church of
England priests is reduced when one looks at the level of obligation placed on the
national courts. They are only obliged to interpret national law "as far as possible" in the
light of Community law.6'
7.2.4 Emanation of the State
In Foster v British Gas the ECJ defined the state in a wide sense to include "emanations
of the state."62 It was held that, "unconditional and sufficiently precise provisions of a
Directive could be relied on against organisations or bodies which were subject to the
authority or control of the state or had special powers beyond those which result from
the normal rules applicable to relations between individuals."63 The ECJ added that a
Directive would have direct effect against, "a body, whatever its legal form, which has
been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the state, for providing a
public service under the control of the state and has for that purpose special powers
beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between
individuals."64 How is the test set out in Foster to be interpreted? Is the first more
general test followed or is the second test involving three specific criteria followed? In
Doughty v Rolls Royce the Court of Appeal favoured the latter approach. 65 Mustill U.
adopted the three stage test set out above. First, was the body made responsible,
pursuant to a measure adopted by the state, for providing a public service? Secondly,
was the service it provided at the material time under the control of the state? Thirdly,
did the body possess or claim to exercise any special powers? Therefore, the power of
control is only one criterion in deciding whether a body is an emanation of the state. If
all three criteria are met it will be difficult to argue that the body is not an emanation of
the state. If one criterion is missing, this does not prevent such status being achieved.
However, it will require the addition of another factor, not present in the Foster formula,
° Barnard, Catherine (1995) EC Employment Law p38 (Chichester, John Wiley)
61 Marleasing v La Commercial International de Alimentacion SA n.59 supra at p4159
62 Foster v British Gas [1990] IRLR 353 at p356
63 Ibid. at p356 para 18
Ibid. at p356 para 20
65 Doughty v Rolls Ro)ce [19921 IRLR 126
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to achieve such status.66
 Mustill U. believed that if there is any inconsistency between
the two paragraphs, paragraph 20 should prevail. 67
 This view is not shared by
Rubenstein who believes that paragraph 20 was inserted so as to reflect the status of
British Gas at the relevant time and was not meant to alter the statement made at
paragraph 18.68 The control test of paragraph 18 can be applied fairly easily believes
Rubenstein. The control test and the three stage test are both used to establish that a
body can be compared to the state. An alternative approach, says Rubenstein, is to
abandon state comparison and instead establish that the body is not a private one. "[T]he
better starting point is at the other end: Directives cannot bind private undertakings or
persons, but.. .they can be relied upon against everyone other than a private undertaking
or person."69
 As private and public are natural opposites a private test is arguably going
to encounter as many problems as a public test. Because the line between public and
private has been blurred in some cases, for example privatised public utilities, a test
based upon the public or private nature of an undertaking will be difficult. In GrJfin v
South West Water Services the three stage test was applied. 70
 Because South West Water
were a privatised utility the focus was on whether the company was under the control of
the state. It was held that, "The question is not whether the body in question is under the
control of the State but whether the public service in question is under the control of the
State."7 ' Therefore, the legal form of the privatised company was irrelevant.
Whether the Church of England is an institution which can be classified as an
"emanation of state" is a question for the national courts. The problem for a priest would
be two-fold. First, an employer needs to be identified and second that employer would
need to be classified as an emanation of the state. The diocesan bishop or the Diocesan
Board of Finance are the most likely candidates for employer status. If the employer
hurdle is cleared it is likely that the court would employ the three stage test to establish
whether either the bishop or the board were an emanation of state. The Legal Advisory
Commission of the General Synod believe that such a finding is unlikely. 72
 It is
'' Ibid. at p132, per Mustill Li.
67 Ibid. at p132, per Mustill U.
68 Rubenstein, Michael (1992) "Editorial Comment" IRLR p106
Ibid. p106
70 Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd [1995] IRLR 15 at p25. per Blackburne J.
' Ibid. at p27, per Blackburne J.
72 Legal Advisory Commission of the General Synod (1994) Op. cit., p232
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submitted that the conditions required to satisfy the three stage test do exist. First, the
Church of England has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure made by the state,
for the provision of a public service. As a result of the Act of Supremacy 1558 the
Church of England is the established Church in England. 73 The state has accepted the
Church of England as the religious body truly teaching the Christian faith in England.74
The Church is providing a public service of teaching the Christian faith. Archbishops
and bishops are appointed by the Crown through Parliament to further this end.75
Secondly, the service is under the control of the state. The Church of England must
conform to the limitations placed on it by Parliament. For example, because Church
legislation is part of the law of the land it requires parliamentary and royal assent. The
state has the final say in Church matters. The Church is not a completely independent
organisation; senior Church officials are appointed by the state and the state has the
power to interfere in the passage of Church legislation. Thirdly, the Church does possess
special powers. The Synodical Government Measure 1969 established the General
Synod as the principal ruling body of the Church of England. The Synod has the power
to formulate and pass (subject to state approval) Church legislation which will become
part of the law of the land. No other religious body in England has such power. Instead
they rely on private law to regulate their institutions. As a result of the established status
of the Church of England, their priests would be better placed to establish a state
employer than ministers in other religions and denominations. Failing this if a priest
could identify a private employer (which seems less likely than establishing a state
employer) they might be able to use the doctrine of indirect elfects developed in
Marleasing.
7.2.5 Enforcement
There are various ways in which the Equal Treatment Directive might be enforced. If
EC law is involved and British law is unclear an industrial tribunal or court may make a
reference to the ECJ under Article 177. if British law is clear but there is a conflict with
For more information on establishment the reader is referred to 3.1.
Marshall v Graham Bell [1907] 2 KB 112 at p126, per Phillimore J.
Appointment of Bishops Act 1533
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EC law one must ask whether there is direct effect. If there is, individual proceedings
can be initiated, arguing that the Equal Treatment Directive is directly effective.76
If there is no direct effect two options are available, depending upon whether the
conflict of law can be overcome. Where there is no direct effect it is the task of the
national court to interpret domestic legislation in the light of the wording and the
purpose of the Directive. 77
 However, national interpretation must not distort the
meaning of the domestic legislation. 78
 Individual proceedings based on British law can
be brought, arguing interpretation in line with EC law. 79
 In Marleasing the ECJ held
that in applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before or
after the Equal Treatment Directive, the national court called upon to interpret it is
required to do so, as far as possible in the light of the wording and for the purpose of the
Directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the Directive. The distortion
argument was unsuccessfully pursued by the respondents in a gender identity disorder
case. 80
 They argued that the incorporation of gender identity disorder into the Sex
Discrimination Act was a distortion of the national legislation. The tribunal held that
this could be applied without distortion to the 1975 Act, as according to the ECJ such
discrimination is based essentially, if not exclusively, on the sex of the person
concerned.8'
if British law remains incompatible the national court cannot apply EC law. It would
rest with the government to introduce legislation to bring Britain into compliance. In the
meantime it is left to the individual to bring an action for Francovich damages. 82 If an
individual is not employed by the state but has suffered loss as a result of the Member
State's failure to implement a Directive they can sue the Member State for damages. For
76 Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hants AHA n.58 supra
Case 18/83 Von Colson and Kamman v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [19841 ECR 1891
78 Duke v GEC Reliance Ltd [1988] IRLR 118; Webb v Emo Air Cargo (UK) Ltd [19931 n.31 supra. For
further information on the doctrine of indirect effect and the decision in Duke the reader is referred to
Fitzpatrick, Barry (1989) "The Significance of EEC Directives in UK Sex Discrimination Law" in Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies vol.9 pp336-355; Howells, Geraint (1991) "European Directives - the Emerging
Dilemmas" in Modern Law Review vol.54 pp456-463
Marleasing v La Commercial International de Alimentacion SA n.59 supra
80 Elnies v (1) Exeter and District Council (2) Home Office (3) Exeter and North Devon Health Authority
Case Number 1548/95 (Industrial Tribunal)
81 P v Sand Cornwall County Council [1996] IRLR 347
82 Cases C-6 and C-9/90 Francovich v Italy [1991] ECR 1-5357
210
example, under Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Equal Treatment Directive the state is obliged
to abolish laws which contravene the Directive; failure to do this could result in a
Francovich action. There must be a causal link between the breach of the State's
obligations and the damage suffered. As Barnard notes the degree of fault on the part of
the Member State is left unspecified by Francovich. if the ECJ were to unexpectedly
include Church of England priests under the protections of the Directive, liability for
their former exclusion by the British government might seem unduly harsh. A
Francovich action might be accompanied with a judicial review claim, which is
discussed below. Alternatively, there is the possibility (albeit unlikely) of Commission
proceedings against the UK under Article 169, for failure of a state to fulfil its
obligations under the Treaty.
The EOC also help to enforce the Directive. They have a duty to keep the national law
under review. 83
 Such review will involve an examination of the principles of the Equal
Treatment Directive in relation to the Sex Discrimination Act. The EOC or indeed any
other individual or body granted locus standi can bring a judiciai review action in the
Divisional Court to enforce Community rights. 84
 A judicial review action can be used to
obtain a ruling as to whether provisions of national legislation and/or administrative
practices are contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive. R v Secretary of State for
Employment, ex p EOC, held that it falls to national law to determine what type of
organisations have the necessary standing in a particular case to request judicial review.
7.2.6 The Purpose of European Community Law
It is likely that the ECJ would be wary of claims brought by Church of England priests.
Economic objectives form the basis of Community law. Laws which regulate social
policy, although influenced by human rights, are ingrained with economic
considerations, such as the promotion of a competitive market place. Priests do not fit
comfortably into this structure, 85
 but neither do public service employees like teachers,
nurses and social workers. These employees are given protection by the Equal
83 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 53 (1) (c)
R v Secretary of StateforEniployment, exp EOC[1994] IRLR 171
In relation to the free movement of workers, cases involving religious workers have been examined by
the ECJ; A.J.M. van Roosmalen n.25 supra; Udo Steyrnann n.22 supra
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Treatment Directive. It is arguable that this Directive moves away from the competitive
model to a human rights model. One could argue for the inclusion ol priests under the
Directive on the ground that they are human beings and that the purpose of the Directive
is to give protection to human beings when they are working. This may be difficult in
the European Community where Catholicism is the norm and where such priests may be
even less likely to be classified as employees.
One hope for Church of England priests is that the ECJ has adopted a purposive
approach which is to be contrasted with the narrow approach of employment law in
Britain. The purposive approach was established in Van Gend en Laos. 86 A recent case
which uses the purposive approach is P v S and Cornwall County Council. 87 The Equal
Treatment Directive, stated the ECJ, has economic and social justice goals. Its aim is to
ensure equal treatment between workers. "Moreover. ..the right not to be discriminated
against on grounds of sex is one of the fundamental human rights whose observance the
Court has a duty to ensure." 88 In view of its purpose and the nature of the rights it
covers, the Directive should cover all workers, including those who have undergone
gender reassignment surgery.
Can the purpose behind Directives help explain how priests fit into the structure?
Directives are used to achieve the approximation of national laws within the
Community. The law on a certain topic may vary slightly from state to state. Absolute
uniformity is unnecessary as long as the general provisions of the Directive are
implemented. This enables national traditions to shape the implementation of
Community law. This explains how the Pregnant Workers Directive has been
implemented in Britain to apply to employees only. It is traditional that Church of
England priests are regulated by ecclesiastical law and not generally by secular law.
When implementing Community law this is one of the traditions the British government
takes account of. We return to the argument that the traditional view of priests'
employment ought to be reviewed and replaced with secular employrrient protection.
86 Van Gend en Loos n.57 supra
87 P v Sand Cornwall County Council n.81 supra
88 Ibid. at p354
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The absence of Community legislation regarding religious matters can be explained by
the principle of subsidiarity. This states that the Community should only legislate where
Community action will be more effective than individual Member State action. 89 The
European Commission can argue that employment protection for ministers of religion is
best provided by individual Member States. The subsidiarity principle operates with
reference to law making not interpretation. The principle should not be invoked to
prevent legal interpretation of a tricky issue. However, the ECJ might use Article 2 (2)
of the Directive to leave religious problems to national tradition.
7.3 Accommodation of Church of England Priests Under the Legislation
The possible inclusion of Church of England priests under national and Community
legislation has been discussed. Whether the problems of priests can successfully be
accommodated by the legislation is the focus of the next sections. This will be done by
examining four main headings; direct sex discrimination, indirect sex discrimination,
vicarious liability and equal pay. Under direct sex discrimination areas of examination
will be; intention, detriment and pregnancy. Under indirect sex discrimination areas of
examination will be; policies involving manied clergy couples and age rules on
admission to training.
A problem which affects sex discrimination cases generally, and which could affect
Church of England priests to a greater extent than ordinary employees, is the problem of
proof. The informal appointments procedure often used when recruiting to Church posts
compounds the usual problems of proof. 9° Candidates may not know why they have
been rejected. They may be unaware of who obtained the post and whether they had
comparable qualifications with the successful applicant. There is the selector's difficulty
of how to choose the best candidate based upon merit. What does merit involve:
qualifications, pastoral experience, seniority? Women priests pose a particular problem
when applying a merit test. Their prohibition from the priesthood has limited their
pastoral experience and their seniority. As stressed in the data analysis, it is difficult to
compare like with like. Once candidates have been evenly matched the use of an
Barnard, Catherine (1995) op. cit., p26
The reader is referred to 6.6.1. where the data findings on job advertisement are presented.
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interview is a good tool to differentiate between candidates. The very tool of an
interview goes some way to promoting fair procedure. In the questionnaire data a large
proportion of priests were not interviewed for their present posts.9'
An interview will only promote fair opportunity if the interview itself is fair. Interview
questions regarding family responsibilities and plans to have children were cited by
respondents as instances of perceived sex discrimination. The EAT in Saunders v
Richmond established that the asking of such gender related questions is not in itself
discriminatory.92 However, the questions may supply evidence of discriminatory
attitudes. if a candidate is refused or deliberately omitted from an employment offer he
or she can use this evidence to bring a sex discrimination claim under section 6 (1) (c)
of the 1975 Act. On the other hand, the questions will not provide evidence of
discriminatory attitudes if they are appropriate because they are related to the
candidate's ability to do the job. The EOC Code of Practice recommends that interview
questions should be confined to the requirements of the job. 93 Questions about marriage
plans or plans to have children should not be asked as this might be construed as
discriminatory against women. The problem area is where such questions are relevant to
a person's ability to do the job. In Hurley v Mustoe a blanket ban on employing women
with small children was held to be discriminatory. 94 However, it was stated that properly
worded questions regarding family responsibilities were permissible to ascertain a
woman's ability to attend work regularly. The Code states that where personal
circumstances will affect job performance, this should be objectively discussed without
questions based on assumptions about marital status and family responsibilities. It is
submitted that without further detail this is a difficult test for employers to apply. This is
reflected in the fact that the Code only gives guidance kind is not binding on employers.
91	 of female priests and 35% of male priests were not interviewed formally.
92 Saunders v Richmond BC [1977] IRLR 362
Equal Opportunities Commission Code of Practice for the Elimination of Discrimination on the
Grounds of Sex and Marriage and the Promotion of Equal Opportunity in Emplo yment, para 23 (c)
Hurley v Mustoe [1981] IRLR 208
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7.4 Direct Sex Discrimination
7.4.1 Definition of Direct Sex Discrimination
The questionnaire used the terminology of direct sex discrimination, borrowed from the
Sex Discrimination Act. Section 1(1) (a) defines direct sex discrimination;
"A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for the
purposes of any provision of this Act if (a) on the ground of her sex he treats her
less favourably than he treats or would treat a man."
The Act only makes sex discrimination unlawful in regard to specified areas. Part II of
the Act covers sex discrimination in the employment field. The purpose is to hold
employers liable, either directly or vicariously, for discriminatory acts that are
employment related.
Section 6 (1) covers discrimination in recruitment;
"It is unlawful for a person in relation to employment by him at an establishment
in Great Britain, to discriminate against a woman-
(a) in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of determining who should be
offered that employment, or
(b) in the terms on which he offers her that employment, or
(c) by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer her that employment."
Section 6 (2) of the Act covers sex discrimination in regard to working conditions and
dismissal;
"It is unlawful for a person, in the case of a woman employed by him at an
establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against her-
(a) in the way he affords her access to opportunities for promotion, transfer or
training, or to any other benefits, facilities or services, or by refusing or
deliberately omitting to afford her access to any such opportunities; or
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(b) by dismissing her, or subjecting her to any other detriment."
Section 6 (2), especially 6 (2) (b), offers greater potential to clerical complainants than
section 6 (1) as it covers working conditions which are not mentioned by the 1993
Measure.
Section 3 (1) of the Sex Discrimination Act covers direct marriage discrimination in the
employment field. Discrimination will be unlawful if, on the ground of marital status, a
person is treated less favourably than an unmarried person of the same sex would be
treated. Discrimination against single people on the ground of their marital status is not
unlawful. Discrimination against a single person will only be unlawful if it is on the
ground of sex and not on the ground of singleness per Se.
7.4.2 On the Ground of her Sex
The phrase "on the ground of her sex" has potential problems for women priests.
Women priests have two interconnected identities. The first identity is as a woman who
is capable of comparison with a man. The second identity is as a priest. To some people
the two identities are irreconcilable: according to doctrine women are incapable of being
priests. To others the fusion of the two identities remains uncomfortable: a woman
priest is viewed with trepidation. Finally, there are those who find the two identities
compatible. The three way division of thought in the Church makes an analysis of less
favourable treatment "on the ground of her sex" a tortuous task. Can theological
objection andlor uncertainty about women priests be used as arguments against sex
discrimination protection? In this way only sex discrimination by those openly in favour
of women priests would be actionable: an unhelpful scenario! The way to address this
problem is to divide the motive from the act of discrimination, using the principles
enunciated in James v Eastleigh. 95 To make James easier to apply to the Church of
England, section 6 of the 1993 Measure needs reforming.
James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751; see also Brennan v J. W. Dewhurst Ltd [198411CR 52; Grieg v
(1) Com,nunitv industry (2) Ahern [197911CR 356
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The meaning of "on the ground of her sex" was resolved by a 3-2 majority in the I-louse
of Lords in James. Mr and Mrs James were both 61. Mrs James was allowed free
admission to a swimming pooi, Mr James had to pay for admission. Free admission was
only permitted to those who had reached state pension age; 60 for women and 65 for
men. Eastleigh Borough Council did not intend to discriminate on grounds of sex.
James laid down an objective test to determine whether the action is done on the ground
of sex. Direct sex discrimination is present if the action causes less favourable treatment
of one sex, or the less favourable treatment would not have occurred but for the
complainant's sex. The intention, motive or purpose of the discriminator is irrelevant to
the issue of liability. In the principal judgment, Lord Bridge followed the authority of
the House of Lords in R v Birmingham City C'ouncil, exp EOC. 96 In James he applied a
simple "but for" test. The question to ask is, would Mr James, a man of 61, have
received the same treatment as his wife but for his sex? Clearly the answer is yes. Lord
Bridge continued, "the purity of the discriminator's subjective motive, intention or
reason for discriminating cannot save the criterion applied from the objective taint of
discrimination on the ground of sex."97
 Lord Goff explained the extent of the but for
test; "it embraces both the case where the treatment derives from the application of a
gender-based criterion, and the case where it derives from the selection of the
complainant because of his or her sex." 98
 A gender-based criterion would include state
pension age and pregnancy. Theological objection to women as priests is arguably a
gender-based criterion. The latter case would cover all other situations where a male or a
female priest are not selected because of their sex. For example, where a woman priest
is not appointed because of uncertain feelings about women priests. Lord Goff did not
state that the but for test was an absolute bar to intention being discussed in some cases.
The test, "avoids, in most cases at least, complicated questions relating to concepts such
as intention, motive, reason or purpose, and the danger of confusion arising from the
misuse of those elusive terms." 99
 This leaves open the door for theological objection to
be regarded as a relevant motive in a discussion of the phrase, "on the ground of her
sex".
R v Birmingham City Council, exp EOC [1989) AC 1155
Ja,nes v Eastleigh BC n.95 supra at pp765-766, per Lord Bridge
98 Ibid. at p774, per Lord Goff
Ibid. at p774, per Lord Goff
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Fredman describes the Sex Discrimination Act as a symmetrical model of formal
justice, where justice is decided in abstraction from the substantive cause of the
discrimination.'°° The minority view of Lord Griffiths in James uses a substantive view
of justice by examining why the sex discrimination occurred. The criterion of
pensionable age was used for a reason. The intention of the council was to give free
admission to pensioners and not to people because they were men or women. 101
 The fact
that the state pension was discriminatory itself was a separate issue. He believed that the
but for test was an insufficient test for determining less favourable treatment "on the
ground of her sex" in all cases. Although the motive behind an action is not
determinative, motive may need to be considered in some cases. 102
 In a race
discrimination case, R v Commission for Racial Equality, ex p Westminster City
Council, Woolf J. held that motive may be relevant in some circumstances. "Motive
may often be substantial evidence of why an action was taken and therefore indicate the
grounds on which it was taken. However, I fully accept that you can have discrimination
on racial grounds without there being an intention to discriminate on that ground."103
Similarly in James, Lord Lowry in dissent pointed to the failure of the causative
construction to ask "why"? Lowry focuses on the natural meaning of "on the ground of
sex". He describes a ground as a reason why a person acts in a certain way.'° 4
 He states
that a ground must not be confused with intention. 105
 He is aiming to produce a test
which is narrower than the but for test but not as narrow as intention to discriminate.
The faults of the causative construction are that it, "not only gets rid of unessential and
often irrelevant mental ingredients, such as malice, prejudice, desire and motive, but
also dispenses with an essential ingredient, namely, the ground on which the
discriminator acts. The appellant's construction relieves the complainant of the need to
prove anything except that A has done an act which results in less favourable treatment
for B by reason of B's sex, which reduces to insignificance the words 'on the ground
'°° Fredman, Sandra (1996) "Positive Action After Kalanke" Paper Delivered at SPTL Labour Law
Meeting, 27th ApriJ 1996, Cambridge
'°' James v Eastleigh BC n.95 supra at p767, per Lord Griffiths
102 Ibid. at p768, per Lord Griffiths
103 R v Commission for Racial Equality, ex p Westminster City Council [19841 ICR 770 at pTi7, per
Woolf J.
°' James v Eastleigh BC n.95 supra at pTl5, per Lord Lowry
Ibid. at p778, per Lord Lowry
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of."°6 The but for test is too wide as it disregards the fact that the less favourable
treatment must occur on the ground of her sex.
A recent EAT case involving dismissal on the ground of pregnancy uses the but for
test. 107 A distinction between pregnancy per se and pregnancy in the circumstances of
the case as motives was dismissed as legally erroneous. Pregnancy always has
surrounding circumstances. In this case all the other factors were related to the fact that
she was pregnant. Applying an objective test of causal connection it was held that the
plaintiff was dismissed on the ground of pregnancy, and therefore on the ground of sex.
The pregnancy need not be the only or even the main cause of the dismissal, though it
must provide more than just the occasion for the result complained of. It is enough if it
is an effective cause.108
When assessing sex discrimination in employment within the Church of England one
can arguably make a distinction between the act of discrimination and the motive for the
discrimination. Prejudice against women as women, prejudice against women as priests
and theological objection to women as priests are all motives which fuel the act of
discrimination. If one applies the but for test the less favourable treatment will be on the
ground of her sex. The primary aim of section 6 of the 1993 Measure and the
accompanying Resolutions is to allow sex discrimination in recruitment based on
theological conscience. It allows one motive to override the but for test. However, on its
present construction it allows two other motives to override the but for test; prejudice
against women and prejudice against women priests. At present the principles of James
cannot be applied to sex discrimination in recruitment within the Church of England.
Arguably they could be applied to working conditions and dismissal. It will be necessary
to reform section 6 and the Resolutions to allow James to operate at the recruitment
stage. Reform is needed to make theological objection a distinct and meaningful motive,
otherwise it will blur into prejudice against women and the Church will gain nothing.
106 Ibid. at pp779-78O, per Lord Lowry
107 O'Neill v (1) Governors of St Thomas More RCVA Upper School (2) Bedfordshire County Council
[1996] IRLR 372
106 Ibid. at p377, per Mummery J.
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British law prohibits justification in direct sex discrimination cases. The prohibition on
justification, although potentially there, is not as entrenched in EC jurisprudence. In
Birds Eye Walls Ltd v Roberts the ECJ showed that they were prepared to look at the
purpose of an action. 109 The company paid larger bridging pensions to male employees
than to female employees in order to combat the unequal treatment of men under the
discriminatory pension structure. The Court held that this arrangement was not contrary
to Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. The ECJ did not lay down a general principle that
direct sex discrimination could be objectively justified under EC law. Instead the Court
distinguished the financial position of men and women between the ages of 60 and 65
who had to retire because of ill health. The principle of equal treatment contained in
Article 119 presupposes that men and women are in identical situations. Because their
situations were not identical the arrangements were not "[Moreover,]
given the purpose of the bridging pension, to maintain the amount for women at the
same level as that which obtained before they received the state pension would give rise
to unequal treatment to the detriment of men who do not receive the state pension until
the age of 65." The ratio of Roberts appears to be that there is no sex discrimination
where the effect of the challenged act is to produce substantive equality." 2 Is this really
distinguishable from justification for direct sex discrimination? Effectively the ECJ is
saying that direct sex discrimination can be justified. 113 The opinion of the European
Commission in Roberts supports the use of justification. The concept of direct sex
discrimination does not prohibit the use of justification, "since the very concept of
discrimination, whether direct or indirect, involves a difference of treatment which is
unjustified." 4 Ellis does not believe that Roberts can be interpreted in this way." 5 She
believes that the ECJ dislike the idea of direct sex discrimination being justifiable. In
order to prevent this argument succeeding, the Court used the "similarly situated"
distinction to avoid the concept of justification being used. In Dekker v VJV-Centrum
the ECJ refused to consider justification, where on the facts there was a case for the
109 Birds Eve Walls Ltd v Roberts [1994] IRLR 29
°1bid. at p32
Ibid. at pp32-33
112 Rubenstein, Michael (1994) "Editorial Comment" IRLR p1
Personal Communication, Hilary Slater 1/1 1/96
114 Birds Eye Walls Ltd v Roberts n. 109 supra at p32
115 Ellis, Evelyn (1996) "Gender Discrimination Law in the European Community" in J. Dine & B. Watt
(Eds.), Discrimination Law: C'oncepts, Limitations and Justifi cations p14, 19 (London, Longman)
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appropriate use of justification.'' 6 The ECJ stated that the only defences to direct sex
discrimination were those contained in Article 2 (2) of the Equal Treatment Directive.
In Roberts the ECJ had the opportunity to clearly state the EC jurisprudence on
justification and direct sex discrimination. It chose not to do so. It is submitted that the
ECJ does not want to introduce justification in direct sex discrimination cases under EC
law. Such an extension might open the floodgates for defences against sex
discrimination. In certain cases, such as Roberts, the factual situation dictates that the
purpose of an action is relevant. In Roberts, as Ellis described above, the ECJ found a
way of treating the case which avoided the use of justification. Such tactics prevent
justification being used (at least openly) in direct sex discrimination cases.
The James but for test is favourable to complainants. It supports the tortious notion
which underpins sex discrimination law: the law is concerned with remedial action for
the victims of sex discrimination. A revision of the James test from causative
construction to subjective construction could work against clergy applicants. The
emphasis on substantive cause and asking why might be used by defendants to explain
that the less favourable treatment was on the ground of women as priests and not
women as women.
For completeness discrimination on the ground of another person's sex needs to be
mentioned. Male priests voiced fears that they might encounter discrimination because
of their support for women priests. If less favourable treatment did occur, for example
not being appointed to a post, it would not be on the ground of their sex but because of
the sex of another. Under the Race Relations Act section 1 (1) (a) discrimination on
racial grounds covers any action based upon race. The complainant's race may not be at
issue. It is sufficient if the race of another has caused the complainant to be treated less
favourably.' Under the Sex Discrimination Act section 1 (1) (a) discrimination on the
ground of sex must be founded upon the sex of the complainant, it does not extend to
the sex of another. The male respondents would therefore not be covered by the sex
discrimination legislation in this respect.
116 Dekker v VJV-Centru,n [1991] IRLR 27. The reader is referred to 7.5. for a discussion of Dekker.
117 Showboat Entertainment Centre v Owens [1984] 1 WLR 384
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7.4.3 Detriment
In order to establish sex discrimination one of the detriments specified in section 6 (1)
or 6 (2) of the Sex Discrimination Act must have occurred. In turn this is dependent
upon whether an action is employment related, if done by the employer, and in the
course of employment, if done by the employee.' 18 If the act is not done in these
contexts it does not come within the remit of the Sex Discrimination Act and cannot be
a detriment under the Act. This is the first problem which clergy complainants would
face. As will be seen, the approach of the courts to the test of course of employment has
been a restrictive one. If the complainant has been treated less favourably on the ground
of sex and the act is within the employment context one must ask, did the complainant
suffer a detriment contrary to section 6 (1) or 6 (2)? This covers job offers, access to
promotion and dismissal. In many cases involving working conditions the complainant
will rely on section 6 (2) (b) which prohibits sex discrimination which gives rise to "any
other detriment".
Respondents were asked whether they had experienced less favourable treatment on the
ground of their sex when searching for a post, excluding the use of Resolutions A andlor
B. Section 6 allows sex discrimination against women priests in recruitment regardless
of the presence of Resolutions A and/or B. As the law stands incidents relating to
recruitment will not be able to be classified as detriments to women priests, although
they would so count for male priests. Disregarding section 6 and proceeding on a factual
basis, some answers which accompanied these questions could amount to a detriment
under section 6 (1) (a) of the Sex Discrimination Act. This holds that it is unlawful for
an employer to discriminate "in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of
determining who should be offered that employment." Many women priests described
non-selection for interview as a detriment. One respondent described how parishes
which had not passed Resolutions A and/or B said, "We are in favour of women priests
but would prefer a man this time." Another incident involved a post being readvertised
when the male candidates shortlisted withdrew leaving a women only short list.
Interview questions were perceived as detrimental. Women priests were asked about
118 Vicarious liability is discussed at 7.7.
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how they would cope with a family and a priest's post, whether they had any marriage
intentions and how they would cope living alone in a large vicarage. A court might
interpret these questions as evidence of discriminatory attitudes, or the questions might
be seen as necessary to ascertain the candidate's ability to do the job. At a diocesan level
women priests complained of a lack of information and help from their diocese
regarding finding a post. Rather more concrete arrangements for the purpose of
determining who should be offered employment were found in the Chichester diocese.
The bishop will not allow any woman to have responsibility for a parish as incumbent,
despite the fact that he has not made use of the bishop's declaration contained in the
1993 Measure. Additionally, where he is patron he will not appoint a woman to any
post.
It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate in the terms on which he or she offers
employment." 9 Once "employed" any disparity in pay or conditions will be covered by
the Equal Pay Act. Several respondents mentioned problems relating to stipend at the
recruitment stage. The precise factual circumstances of these cases are unclear. For
example, two women priests who were married to male priests were questioned about
the need to have two stipends. It was thought that the woman priest ought to work for
free if her husband was receiving a stipend. It was unclear whether they were offered
posts on these terms or whether this viewpoint was merely discussed. if it were the
former a detriment as defined by section 6 (1) (b) might be established. It is unlawful for
an employer to discriminate by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer a candidate that
employment.' 20 12 females and I male perceived a detriment when they were not
selected for a post.
To enable a detriment to be established at the recruitment stage for women as well as
men, section 6 must be narrowed to cover only theological objection enshrined in a
conscience clause. In this way women priests would be able to point to detriments at the
recruitment stage which were not linked to theological objection to women priests but
which were discriminatory against women.
119 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 6 (1) (b)
120 Ibid. s 6 (1) (c)
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Theological objection to a woman priest is legitimate when recruiting. Once in post this
attitude is not a justification for treating women less favourably so that they suffer a
detriment. Section 6 does not legitimate sex discrimination against a woman once in
post. If women are treated less favourably one must look at the type of incident and ask;
is it a detriment? The source of the treatment must be examined; is the source an
employer, an agent of the employer or a fellow employee?
It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate by dismissing an employee or subjecting
him or her to any other detriment.' 2 ' No respondents had been dismissed from their
posts once priests. Some women deacons were required to move post when they
declared their intention to be priested. This detriment, although appearing to be
constructive dismissal, would probably be covered by section 6 of the Measure which
states that sex discrimination will not be unlawful in respect of "her ordination to the
office of priest in the Church of England". In other words, it was her intention to be
ordained which caused her the detriment of dismissal. Respondents were asked whether
they had received less favourable treatment whilst in post. Answers covered less
favourable working conditions which fell short of dismissal. The appropriate section to
examine here is the latter half of section 6 (2) (b) which refers to "any other detriment".
In Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah the Court of Appeal held that detriment means to be
put "under a disadvantage".' 22 A race discrimination case provided further guidance on
the test for establishing detriment. De Souza v The Automobile Association held that a
racial insult alone is not enough to be a detriment. 123 The less favourable treatment and
the detriment suffered by the complainant are not located in the abuse itself but in the
effect of that abuse. The treatment must be such that a reasonable employee would or
might have felt disadvantaged in the circumstances or conditions of their employment.
May U. held that if the working conditions or environment were affected this could be
enough to constitute a detriment.' 24 Establishing a detriment involves an inquiry into the
effect of the treatment. It is a questioning approach, which softens the blanket but for
test regarding causation. Detriments concerning working conditions have been grouped
121 Ibid. s 6 (2) (b)
122 Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah [198011CR 13
123 De Souza v The Automobile Association [1986] IRLR 103
124 Ibid. at p107, per May U.
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to illustrate on the one hand concrete detriments and on the other less classifiable
attitudes. First, the negative attitude of male colleagues to women priests has caused
restrictions to be placed on women priests' work. For example, women priests have not
been given the opportunity to do certain tasks, such as celebrating Communion and
taking occasional offices such as funerals, weddings and baptisms. It is arguable that a
detriment could be established under section 6 (2) (b). Once a woman is in post her
parish ought to accept her as a priest, therefore any less favourable treatment is not
protected by theological objection. However, the less favourable treatment often comes
from colleagues outside the immediate parish unit as the next set of examples illustrates.
Women priests perceived exclusion from aspects of Church life. For example, they were
excluded from deanery committees. When they were on committees their voices were
not listened to. Others reported a general lack of support at diocesan level. This
illustrates the problem of working together when the Church is divided. Theological
objection is only supposed to operate in regard to ordination and recruitment, but it will
affect working conditions too. What do you do to regulate this? The Church of England
does not want sex discrimination law to be used. Instead the General Synod has passed
the Episcopal Ministry Act of Synod 1993, the aim of which is respect for the integrity
of differing beliefs and positions concerning women priests. An Act of Synod only has
moral force, it does not give the individual priest any protective legal rights.
Negative attitudes to women and women as priests came from clergy and laity alike.
Some attitudes were based upon theological objection others on stereotypical views of
women's roles. The detriments complained of included; sexist jokes, patronising
comments, rudeness and belittling. Whether these would be sufficient to count as a
detriment would be determined by first looking at the effect of the abuse on the
individual priest. The subjective test requires the employee to establish that he or she
was disadvantaged in relation to his or her employment conditions. Did the employee
actually suffer a disadvantage? The treatment must then fall within the reasonable
employee test of De Souza: would a reasonable employee have suffered a disadvantage?
The problem with this type of detriment is that it is often difficult to quantify. For
example, one respondent complained that the general ethos of her working conditions
was one of pervasive non-specific sexism. This is a difficult situation to tackle by the
use of law.
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As well as establishing a detriment, the complainant must show that he or she has been
treated less favourably than an actual or hypothetical comparator in the same or similar
relevant circumstances.125
7.5 Sex Discrimination and Pregnancy
The Church of England faces the prospect of coping with pregnant priests. Because of
the requirement for a hypothetical comparator under section 5 (3) of the Sex
Discrimination Act, cases involving the gender specific criterion of pregnancy have
caused problems for the courts. 126 The issue of comparison was resolved by the ECJ in a
recruitment case, Dekker v VJV-Centrum. 127 The ECJ held that it was direct sex
discrimination contrary to Article 3 (1) not to appoint the best candidate to a post on the
ground of her pregnancy. "As employment can only be refused because of pregnancy to
women, such a refusal is direct discrimination on grounds of sex." 128 The national court
had to ask; was the ground of the refusal to recruit the fact that the woman was
pregnant?' 29 Therefore, where a person receives less favourable treatment for a gender
specific reason, that treatment is direct sex discrimination. There is no need to make a
comparative analysis in these circumstances.130
7.5.1 Pregnancy and Recruitment
There are three situations where a woman priest's pregnancy might provoke less
favourable treatment: recruitment, working conditions and dismissal. Unlike the
statutory protection against dismissal' 3 ' there is no comparable protection against failure
to recruit; complainants must use the Sex Discrimination Act or the Equal Treatment
Directive. Section 6 of the 1993 Measure prevents a woman priest using the Sex
Discrimination Act in relation to ordination and recruitment. The primary aim of section
125 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 5 (3)
126 For the early approach of the courts to this issue the reader is referred to Turley v Alders [1980] ICR
66; Haves v Malleable WMC [1985] ICR 703
127 Dekkerv VJV-Centrum n.116 supra
128 Ibid. at p29
129 Ibid. at p30
130 The comparison point was confirmed in Webb v Emo Air Cargo (UK) Ltd (No.2) [1995] IRLR 645
Il The reader is referred to 7.5.3.
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6 is to act as a defence to conscience clauses, yet as it stands it could be used to
legitimate sex discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy. In a survey in the Church
Times evidence of problems relating to ordination and recruitment were given. One
respondent was refused ordination as a deacon because she was pregnant. "Nothing was
ever said, but I think there was then a fear among some bishops about ordaining a
pregnant woman: what happens to the baby during the ordination?" 32
 Another
respondent was refused a licence when she was pregnant because she was told it would
be too upsetting for her to take funerals while she was pregnant. If a woman priest is the
best candidate for a post and she is not appointed on the ground of her pregnancy her
only potential protection is the Equal Treatment Directive.
7.5.2 Pregnancy, Working Conditions and Dismissal
Sex discrimination in working conditions and dismissal on the ground of pregnancy are
not legitimised by section 6. Women priests have potential rights under the Sex
Discrimination Act in this regard. These areas were mentioned as problem areas in the
Church Times survey. It was stated by a Bishop's Officer for Women's Ministry that
there is anecdotal evidence that some bishops expect the priest to resign when they have
a baby. Others met resistance when they suggested continuing in paid work after having
a baby.
The problem of less favourable working conditions and dismissal on the ground of
pregnancy has been greatly eased for most women since the implementation of the
Pregnant Workers Directive in the form of the Employment Rights Act 1996. These
statutory protections mean that complainants need not use the Sex Discrimination Act,
with the complications of section 5 (3), to make claims concerning working conditions
and dismissal. Recruitment is not covered by the Directive or the Employment Rights
Act, therefore the law as stated in Dekker is still applicable to this area. However, as
will be seen, women priests might find the Sex Discrimination Act, with its wider
definition of employment, easier to use than the new statutory protections.
t32 Church Times, 9th August 1996
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The aim of the Pregnant Workers Directive is to encourage improvements in the health
and safety at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are
breast feeding. A definition of these three types of worker is given by reference to
national law and practice and will always be dependent on the worker informing her
employer of her condition. 133
 It is noticeable that Article 11(2) refers to "employment
rights" and 11(2) (a) specifies "the rights connccted with the employment contract of
workers", suggesting that a contract of employment is expected. Protection against
unfair dismissal during pregnancy or maternity leave is required by Article 10. The
Directive protects working conditions by requiring maternity leave and maternity pay.'34
7.5.3 Protection Against Dismissal
The national law on pregnancy and dismissal, maternity leave and maternity pay will
now be discussed. Statutory protection regarding dismissal is provided by the
Employment Rights Act 1996. Section 99 renders all dismissals on the ground of
pregnancy automatically unfair regardless of the length of service or the length of the
contract, provided that there is a causal link between the pregnancy related reason and
the dismissal. A male comparator is not needed under the Act. The type of worker given
protection under national legislation is an employee. This is defined by section 230 (1)
to be, "an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment
has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment." This is narrower in scope than
the definition of an employee used in the Sex Discrimination Act which includes
additionally, "a contract personally to execute any work or labour." It is arguable that
the purpose of the Pregnant Workers Directive is to protect all workers from dismissal
on the ground of pregnancy. The Employment Rights Act should protect all workers,
including those covered by the extended definition of employment used in the Sex
Discrimination Act. Office holders are a distinct class of worker. They might also come
within the extended definition of employment contained in the 1975 Act. The
Employment Rights Act does specifically extend to some office holders, for example to
Crown employment. t35
 No mention is made of ecclesiastical office holders or ministers
IU Pregnant Workers Directive, Article 2
Ibid. Article 8, Article II
'Employment Rights Act 1996 s 191 (3)
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of religion in general in any part of the Act. Why is this so? It would have been possible
to formally exclude them from the operation of the Act, as is the case with police
officers.' 36 Is this an oversight or are ministers of religion deliberately left in an
ambiguous position under the Act because of their uncertain employment status?
7.5.4 Maternity Leave
Maternity leave is a problem which the Church is beginning to tackle. Some guidance
has been given to dioceses by the Church Commissioners on this issue. They are
recommended to follow guidelines adopted by the civil service system. Dioceses are
then free to make their own arrangements based on this.' 37 The Church of England is
responding on an ad hoc basis to maternity provision. The Synod vote was a great
victory for women. However, the debate and the following legislation failed to consider
the practicalities of their incorporation into the Church.
The Employment Protection Act 1975 introduced maternity leave whereby an employee
could return to work 6 months after childbirth. In order to qualify for this period of
statutory maternity leave the employee needed 2 years of continuous service. The
Pregnancy Directive required that all women workers are given at least 14 weeks
maternity leave. This was implemented in the Trade Union Reform and Employment
Rights Act 1993. Both rights are now found in the Employment Rights Act 1996. The
latter right is found in section 73. During the maternity leave period the employee is
entitled to all benefits under her contract of employment except pay which is dealt with
separately under the maternity pay provisions. The former right is preserved by section
79. Article 8 (2) of the Pregnancy Directive required that maternity leave must include
compulsory maternity leave of at least two weeks. This was implemented by the
Maternity (Compulsory Leave) Regulations 1994.138 All maternity leave provisions,
including the latter health and safety regulations, require the woman to be an employee
as defined by section 230 (1) of the Employment Rights Act.
136 Ibid. s 200 (1)
137	 -Church Times, 9th August 1996
' Maternity (Compulsory Leave) Regulations 1994, S.!. 1994 No.2479
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Are Church of England priests entitled to maternity leave? To answer this one must
establish the basis for the right. As they are not employees, the Employment Rights Act
cannot be used as the basis of the right to maternity leave. Independent of the statutory
protections of the 1996 Act may lie contractual maternity leave rights. If these are more
favourable than those under the Act or if no rights are given to the individual under the
Act, the contractual rights may be relied upon.' 39
 These rights may exist under "a
contract of employment or otherwise". Case law denies that Church of England priests
can hold contracts of employment. Their maternity leave rights must arise under the "or
otherwise" category. This would probably cover holding a contract personally to execute
any work or labour, the type of contract which priests are more likely to be classified as
holding. If a priest cannot establish private contractual rights, she might be able to
establish her right to these protections by using sex discrimination law. Instead of using
the 1996 Act and the Pregnant Workers Directive she might use the Sex Discrimination
Act and also the Equal Treatment Directive if necessary. In BP Chemicals Ltd v (1)
Gillick (2) Roevin Management Services Ltd a contract worker employed by Roevin
who carried out work for BP was dismissed by the employment agency following a
short period of maternity leave.' 40 The contract worker did not come within the new
national maternity legislation so she proceeded using the Sex Discrimination Act. The
EAT held that there was no direct contractual relationship between the worker and BP,
as required by the extended definition of employment contained in section 82 (1).
Instead the provisions of section 9 of the Sex Discrimination Act which give contract
workers protection against sex discrimination, including not allowing a woman to do the
work or continue to do so, are the relevant provisions. These provisions cover dismissal
following maternity leave.' 4 ' In this way maternity rights can be claimed under the sex
discrimination legislation by those workers who are not classified as employees under
the Employment Rights Act. Women priests would need to establish that they are
employed by the Church of England using the extended definition of section 82 (1).
They would additionally need to establish that section 19 (1) is no longer applicable.
' Employment Rights Act 1996 s 78
° BP Chemicals Ltd v (1) Gillick (2) Roevin Management Services Ltd [1995] IRLR 128
141 The case was remitted to the Industrial Tribunal to proceed to a hearing on the merits.
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Under sex discrimination law if a woman is not recruited or is dismissed because she is
pregnant there is no need for a comparator.' 42 If a woman is subjected to a detriment in
her working conditions on the ground of pregnancy, such as not being granted maternity
leave or not being allowed to take a funeral, is a comparator still required? The position
is unclear. EC decisions to date only relate to recruitment and dismissal. However, the
general tenor of EC law in regard to the sex specific criterion of pregnancy is that a
comparator is not needed.
7.5.5 Maternity Pay
The national provisions on maternity pay are contained in the Social Security
Contributions and Benefits Act 1992. There are two types of entitlement. First, under
Part XII of the Act, statutory maternity pay is payable to an employee who has fulfilled
the requisite conditions.' 43 The meaning of an employee under this Part is wide. An
employee means a woman who is, "gainfully employed in Great Britain either under a
contract of service or in an office (including elective office) with emoluments
chargeable to income tax under Schedule E." The clergy pay tax under Schedule E.'45
If the woman cannot claim statutory maternity pay she can claim state maternity
allowance.'46
A female priest is classified as an employee for the purposes of maternity pay. This is
not mirrored by maternity leave arrangements and protections against dismissal on
grounds of pregnancy. It is not unusual to be classified as an employee for tax and
national insurance purposes but not for other purposes. Whether priests could be
protected under the Sex Discrimination Act in regard to dismissal and maternity leave or
whether they must rely on private contractual arrangements is a judicial issue.
142 Dekker v VJV-Centrum n. 116 supra; Webb v Emo Air Cargo (UK) Ltd (No.2) [19951 n.1 30 supra
Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 s 164
" Ibid. s 171 (1) (a)
145 Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Reissue vol.23 paras 654, 693; Income and Corporation
Taxes Act 1988 s 19 (1) Schedule E, para 1; Personal Communication with HM Inspector of Taxes (North
East Three) 7/10/96
146 Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 s 35
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7.6 Indirect Sex Discrimination
7.6.1 Definition of Indirect Sex Discrimination
The definition of indirect sex discrimination is contained in section 1 (1) (b) of the Sex
Discrimination Act;
"A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for the
purposes of any provision of this Act if-
(b) he applies to her a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply
equally to a man but-
(i) which is such that the proportion of women who can comply with it is
considerably smaller than the proportion of men who can comply with it, and
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the sex of the person to
whom it is applied, and
(iii) which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with it."
Indirect marriage discrimination is covered by section 3 (1) (b). Indirect sex
discrimination only arises where the requirement or condition used by the employer is
applied equally to persons of both sexes. It occurs where an employei uses a barrier that
a particular group find more difficult to overcome than others. Indirect sex
discrimination may occur against persons of one sex, even though a (proportionately
smaller) group of persons of the opposite sex are also adversely affected in the same
way.' 47
 In Perera v Civil Service Commission the Court of Appeal held that a criterion
for recruitment should not be regarded as a requirement or condition unless it
constituted an absolute bar to appointment if one did not meet it. 148 In a later Court of
Appeal case it was stated, obiter, that the absolute bar test of Perera might not be
consistent with the tenor of the Sex Discrimination Act and that the law might need
reform.'49
James v Eastleigh BC n.95 supra at p774, per Lord Goff
148 Perera v Civil Service Commission [1983] IRLR 187
' Meer v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1988] IRLR 399
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The necessity of establishing a requirement or condition was questioned in Enderby v
Frenchay Health Authority, an equal pay case. 150 It was claimed that the pay structures
of the authority favoured male employees over female employees. Although no specific
requirement or condition was applied, the applicants claimed indirect sex discrimination
under Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. The ECJ held that where there is a prima facie
case of sex discrimination, Article 119 requires the employer to show that the difference
in pay is based on objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on the
ground of sex. No mention was made of establishing a requirement or condition. The
approach of the ECJ was to see whether the jobs were of equal value. When this was
shown it was necessary for the employer to justify the difference in pay levels. As a
result of Enderby, disparate impact alone will lead to an employer's liability, under EC
equal pay legislation.
Could the principles of Enderby be applied to indirect sex discrimination, either under
national law or under the Equal Treatment Directive? Enderby was construed narrowly
in Bhudi v IMI Refiners.' 5 ' The EAT ruled that there was still a need to find a
requirement or a condition under section 1 (1) (b) of the Sex Discrimination Act,
notwithstanding the decision in Enderby. Enderby was solely concerned with the
interpretation of Article 119 and the Equal Pay Directive.' 52 Rubenstein argues that
there is no reason in Community law why the same considerations cannot apply in equal
pay and equal treatment cases.' 53 He criticises Mummery J. in Bhudi, for pursuing a
literal interpretation of British law. The focus of Enderby is on a functional
interpretation of the issues of sex discrimination. Using a functional or purposive
interpretation one can read section 1 (1) (b) in the light of Enderby. One must ask; is a
policy or practice disadvantaging women so that they suffer disparate impact compared
with men? If the answer is yes one must ask, can the policy be justified?'54
° Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1993] IRLR 591
'' Bliudi vIM! Refiners [1994] IRLR 204
1S2 EC Council Directive 75/117 (Equal Pay)
Rubenstein, Michael (1994) "Editorial Comment" IRLR p203
Ibid. p203
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The employer has a defence if the requirement or condition is justifiable.' 55
 The ECJ has
stated that the test is one of objectively justified economic grounds.' 56 A practice will be
objectively justifiable on economic grounds where the means chosen for achieving that
objective correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking and are appropriate
with a view to achieving the objective and are necessary to that end. The defence will
not succeed if there are reasonable, alternative means available to the employer to
achieve the objective.
7.6.2 Church Policy to Married Clergy Couples
The questionnaire data revealed one or two possible instances of indirect sex
discrimination. The first example is when a woman priest, who is married to a male
priest, is refused a stipendiary post or a full-stipendiary post because she is married to a
male priest. The potential problem here is when it is not a stated diocesan policy but it is
an accepted practice. The informal appointments procedure may mean it is difficult to
identify this policy as a requirement or condition. The approach of EC law to indirect
sex discrimination, discussed below, may be of more use to women priests; this would
be especially so if the approach of Enderby was adopted.
Section 6 of the 1993 Measure prevents sex discrimination against women priests being
unlawful in regard to recruitment. A woman priest could not use the Sex Discrimination
Act to argue that the spouses policy is discriminatory, although a male priest might be
able to. The Equal Treatment Directive would be the only recourse for a woman priest.
EC law on indirect sex discrimination is unencumbered by the need to establish a
requirement or condition. It is free to establish adverse impact in whatever way is
appropriate in the circumstances. Ellis describes the ECJ referring to pay "practices" as
indirectly discriminatory.'57
15 For early case decisions on the meaning of justifiable the reader is referred to; Steel v Union of Post
Office Workers [1978] ICR 181; Singh v Rowntree Mackintosh [1979] IRLR 199; Ojutiku v Manpower
Services Commission [1982] IRLR 418
° Bilka-Kauflzaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz [1986] IRLR 317
'° Ellis, Evelyn (1996) op. cit., pp23-24; Bilka-KauJhaus GmbH v Weber Von Hartz n.156 supra; Case
109/88 Forbund I Daninark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (acting for Danfoss) [1989] ECR 3199
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Regardless of the impact of section 6 of the 1993 Measure, the possible use of indirect
sex discrimination under national law will be discussed. If a woman priest is offered a
non-stipendiary post or a part-stipendiary post because of the spouses policy she might
claim direct marriage discrimination' 58 or indirect sex discrimination. The latter is the
focus of concern. The requirement or condition for being offered a stipendiary or full-
stipendiary post is not being married to a priest who already has a stipendiary post. One
would want to know whether this is an absolute bar, thus satisfying the Perera test. The
requirement could equally be applied to a male priest. The proportion of women who
can comply must be considerably smaller than the proportion of men who can comply.
The pool for comparison can be established by applying the principles of Jones v
University of Manchester.' 59 One starts with the total of male and female priests who
can comply with all the other requirements of the post, for example this could be
pastoral experience, qualifications and churchmanship. Then one sees how many can
comply with the requirement of not being married to a priest already in a stipendiary
post. Those who can comply with the requirement are to be considered as a proportion
of the total of male and female priests to whom the requirement is or would be applied.
If there is a significant difference between these proportions a discriminatory effect is
established. The Court of Appeal has given guidance on how to assess disproportionate
impact.' 6° It held that, "there must be a considerable difference in the number or
percentage of one sex in the advantaged or disadvantaged group as against the other sex
and not simply a difference which is more than de minimis." 61 The Court continued, "It
is true that the test laid down by the European Court is whether a 'considerable
difference' exists. But the underlying principle is equal treatment... .Accordingly, the
weight to be attached to the word 'considerable' must not be exaggerated." 162 The case
was sent to the House of Lords who referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling
on certain questions on the construction of Article 119.163 The ECJ ruling is still
awaited. Because there are many more male than female priests, more male than female
priests will be able to comply with all the other requirements of the post. It is likely that
a larger proportion of male priests could comply with the requirement of not being
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 3 (I) (a)
b9 Jones v University of Manchester [1993] IRLR 218
° R v Secretary of State for Employment, exp Seymour-Smith and Perez [1995] IRLR 464
' Ibid. at p475, per Neill Li.
162 Ibid. at p476, per Neill U.
163 R v Secretary of State for Employment, exp Seymour-Smith and Perez [1997] IRLR 315 (HL)
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married to a priest already in a stipendiary post. Because women have only been
ordained as priests since 1994, and hence there are many older women who became
priests, it is likely that their husbands, if priests, will already hold stipendiary posts. If
the woman priest has accepted the post, but is still not happy with it, she might try to
claim indirect pay discrimination using the Equal Pay Act.
7.6.3 Age Rules on Admission to Training
The second example concerns age rules on admission to training for stipendiary
ministry.' 64 In 1995 the House of Bishops ruled that candidates for training for the
stipendiary ministry must be under 45. It is arguable that this is indirect sex
discrimination against women. Training for the priesthood is now open to both men and
women. In view of this can sections 1 (1) (b) and 13 of the Sex Discrimination Act be
used by women priests to render this policy unlawful?
Section 13 states;
"It is unlawful for an authority or body which can confer an authorisation or
qualification which is needed for, or facilitates, engagement in a particular
profession or trade to discriminate against a woman-
(a) in the terms on which it is prepared to confer on her that authorisation or
qualification, or
(b) by refusing or deliberately omitting to grant her application for it, or
(c) by withdrawing it from her or varying the terms on which she holds it."
Profession is defined to include "any vocation or occupation".' 65 Instead of struggling
with the definition of employment, section 13 is concerned with a qualification.
Arguably, Church of England priests could come within this section.
This thesis is primarily concerned with employment and not training, therefore only a brief outline will
be given.
' Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 82(1)
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The 1975 Act has built in protection in the form of Section 19 (2) which reads;
"Nothing in section 13 applies to an authorisation or qualification (as defined in
that section) for purposes of an organised religion where the authorisation or
qualification is limited to one sex so as to comply with the doctrines of the
religion or avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of a significant number of
its followers."
It is submitted that section 19 (2) is inapplicable to the Church of England. The same
reasoning as was applied to section 19 (1) can be used here.' 66
 Can section 6 of the 1993
Measure be used to prevent discriminatory admission rules being unlawful? Section 6
(a) states that it will not be unlawful to discriminate against a woman in respect of her
ordination to the office of priest. Does "ordination" only refer to the act of ordination by
a bishop or does it extend back to the training leading to ordination? If it uses the former
meaning then a woman could use national law to claim that the admission policy was
indirectly discriminatory. If it uses the latter meaning a woman could not use national
law and would have to rely on the Equal Treatment Directive.
If national law were to be used, the requirement or condition for being admitted to
training for stipendiary ministry is being under 45. This is an absolute bar and is
applicable to men and women. It is possible that the proportion of women who can
comply is considerably smaller than the proportion of men. Two factors can be
identified as affecting women's ability to fulfil the requirement. First, because of their
childcare responsibilities women may be unable to enter the priesthood until these
responsibilities have lessened. Secondly, the prohibition on women priests until 1994
has left a glut of women wanting to train for the priesthood, many of whom have waited
for years to be priested. It is arguable that because the rule was not introduced until 1995
this glut of older women have already had the opportunity to train and become priests
following the Synod vote and hence the second reason is inapplicable. A possible
justification for both the spouses policy and the training policy would be budget cuts
resulting in stipend Cuts which are a real need on the part of the Church and which are
unrelated to the sex of the priest.
166 The reader is referred to 7.1.1.
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7.7 Vicarious Liability
When discussing detriment it was seen that the sex discrimination must be employment
related to be actionable. The aim of the legislation is to hold the employer liable for
employment related sex discrimination. If the discrimination emanates from the
employer they can be held directly liable. Often the source of the discrimination is an
employee or agent of the employer. The principles of vicarious liability are extended to
employment law in order that the employer may be held liable.
"Anything done by a person in the course of his employment shall be treated for
the purposes of this Act as done by his employer as well as by him, whether or not
it was done with the employer's knowledge or approval."67
Similarly if a person is acting as an agent for another person that person will be
vicariously liable for the agent's acts. 168
 For example, persons involved in the hiring
process will not necessarily be the employer. When an incumbent is chosen the parish
representatives and the patron are involved. They could both be construed as agents of
the employer, whether this be the bishop, the Diocesan Board of Finance or any other
Church of England body. The employer will not be liable if they can prove that they
took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee from doing that
act, or from doing in the course of employment acts of that description.' 69
 A bishop
would need to establish that, other than in cases of theological objection, appointment
procedures were framed so as to prevent sex discrimination. Evidence of training or
instructions given to appointees about sex discrimination would help establish the
section 41 (3) defence. Regarding discriminatory treatment whilst in post, the Church
would benefit from a centralised or a diocesan based equal opportunities policy. Some
respondents did mention the current use of these policies in their dioceses. The
employee remains directly liable for their actions: "an employee or agent for whose act
the employer or principal is liable under section 41 (or would be so liable but for section
167 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 41
168 Ibid. s 41(2)
' 69 Ibid.s41 (3)
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4 1(3)) shall be deemed to aid the doing of the act by the employer or principal." 70 The
aider is held liable as the actor.171
7.7.1 Course of Employment
II the act is not done in the course of employment there will be no liability under sex or
race discrimination law. Until the Court of Appeal decision in Jones v Tower Boot
Company Ltd the meaning of course of employment in discrimination legislation was
held to be the same as it is in tort law. 172 Legal texts endorsed this approach.'73
Employment law cases approved the test set out in Salmond on Torts. 174 This states that
whether the employer is vicariously liable depends upon whether the act was an
unauthorised or prohibited mode of doing an authorised act (employer liable) or an act
which is outside the sphere of employment (employer not liable). Whether an act is in
the course of employment depends on how the court construes the employment
relationship. The court must ask; what is it that the employee is employed to do? This
may or may not be under the employer's control. A restrictive approach was taken in
Irving v The Post Office. A letter sorter wrote a racial insult on the front of a letter he
was sorting. The Court of Appeal held that the act was not an unauthorised mode of
performing an authorised act. The employment only provided the opportunity for the
misconduct. The EAT in Bracebridge Engineering Ltd v Darby referred to the wide
approach of Rose v Plenty where Scarman U. spoke of the need to look at employment
in the round rather than at the individual components of a job.' 75 In Bracebridge the
abuse of authority by an employee in a supervisory position was held to be sufficiently
connected to the task of supervision as to be a mode of performing the authorised duties.
In these cases the common law definition of course of employment was used. Vicarious
liability was seen as a product of tort law. Sex and race discrimination are statutory
'° Ibid. s 42 (2)
Ibid. s 42 (1). For a case which discusses these principles the reader is referred to Read v Tiverton
District Council [1977] IRLR 202
172 Jones v Tower Boot Company Ltd [1997] IRLR 168
' Ellis, Evelyn (1988) Sex Discrimination Law p142 (Aldershot, Gower); Smith, I.T. & Thomas, G.H.
(1996) Smith and Wood's Industrial Law, Sixth Edition, p224 (London, Butterworths)
174 Heuston, R.F.V. & Buckley, R.A. (1996) Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts, Twenty-First
Edition, p443 (London, Sweet & Maxwell); Aidred v Nacanco [1987] IRLR 292; Irving v The Post Office
[1987] IRLR 289
Bracebridge Engineering Ltd v Darby [1990] IRLR 3 at p5, per Wood J.; Rose v Plenty [1976] IRLR
60 at p63, per Scarman Li.
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torts. Therefore, it appeared logical that tort principles ought to apply to vicarious
liability under the discrimination legislation. The application of the common law test
troubled the courts. In reality arguments regarding whether to use a wide or narrow
interpretation of the test derived from the tension between tort law and discrimination
law. Irving applied a restrictive, tort-based approach, whereas Bracebridge
acknowledged that a purposive approach to vicarious liability was required in a
discrimination law context. It is submitted that principles regarding vicarious liability in
discrimination law should be developed independently from the common law. The Sex
Discrimination Act and the Race Relations Act contain a statutory definition of
vicarious liability which the drafters need not have included. The courts could have
applied the ordinary common law principles of vicarious liability without using a
specific definition in the Act. The inclusion of a statutory definition suggests that
employment law wished to develop its own principles regarding vicarious liability.
Indeed a recent Court of Appeal case has used this approach.'76
Two recent cases have taken a purposive approach to employer liability. In Jones v
Tower Boot Company Ltd an employee suffered severe racial harassment from fellow
employees. The EAT, using the common law test of course of employment, held that the
acts complained of, including deliberate branding with a hot screwdriver and racial
insults, could not be described as an improper mode of performing authorised tasks. The
Court of Appeal held that the EAT had erred by applying the restrictive common law
test for course of employment in a discrimination law context. Rather the phrase should
be interpreted using its everyday meaning.' 77 In deciding upon the relevant test, Waite
U. used two guiding principles; the purposive construction and the linguistic
construction. Regarding the former he stated that a statute is to be construed according
to its legislative purpose. Therefore, section 32 of the Race Relations Act and section 41
of the Sex Discrimination Act which govern vicarious liability ought to be given a broad
interpretation. In view of this course of employment must not "be construed in any sense
more limited than the natural meaning of those everyday words would allow." 78 The
purpose of these sections is to deter discrimination in the workplace by widening the net
176 Jones v Tower Boot Company Ltd n.172 supra
'' Ibid. at p172, per Waite Li.
' Ibid. at p171, per Waite U.
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of responsibility to cover the employer as well as the perpetrator. This will encourage
employers to operate policies which will prevent discrimination occurring in the first
place or at least provide them with a "reasonable steps defence" if it does occur. If
course of employment is interpreted using the common law test the result would be that
"the more heinous the act of discrimination, the less likely it will be that the employer
would be liable." 79
 This, submitted Waite U., is entirely inconsistent with the purpose
of the legislation.
The linguistic construction requires that words are to be given their normal, everyday
meaning unless the context requires a special or technical meaning. The issue was
whether there was sufficient similarity between the two contexts, tort and discrimination
law, to allow the phrase course of employment to be read as interpreted under the
common law. It was held that the two contexts are different. For example, vicarious
liability in tort requires that the act is done with the authorisation of the employer. To be
vicariously liable in discrimination law the act may be done with or without the
employer's knowledge or approval.' 80
 The Court of Appeal distinguished their previous
decision in Irving. Waite U. held that Irving did not decide that course of employment
must be interpreted using the common law test. There was no discussion of the
relationship between the common law and the statutory definition of vicarious
liability.'81
The test of everyday meaning must be applied as a question of fact by the tribunal. A
factual test by which to ascertain the ordinary meaning of course of employment is
suggested by Rubenstein. He suggests that course of employment means, "while
performing, or in connection with, the employee's job responsibilities."82
The second case concerned the test for establishing an employer's liability for third
party harassment. In Burton and Rhule v De Vere Hotels two black waitresses were
subjected to racial harassment whilst at work by third parties.' 83
 The issue before the
Ibid. at p I72, per Waite U.
180 Ibid. at p172, per Waite Li.
181 Ibid. at p172, per Waite Li.
182 Rubenstein, Michael (1997) "Editorial Comment" IRLR p139
Burton and Rhule v De Vere Hotels [1996] IRLR 596
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EAT was; did the employers discriminate against the applicants by subjecting them to
racial harassment from third parties in the course of their employment? Because the
treatment came from a third party vicarious liability was not appropriate. Instead the
question was whether the employer had subjected the person to the detriment. Smith J.
held that the word "subjecting" used in section 4 (2) (c) of the Race Relations Act 1976
connotes control.' 84 An employer subjects an employee to the detriment of racial
harassment if he or she causes or permits harassment which amounts to a detriment to
occur in circumstances which he or she can control. It was unnecessary to introduce any
particular degree of foresight on the part of the employer. Indeed the EAT were keen to
avoid the use of tort concepts in a discrimination context. 185 Rather one should look to
see whether the event was sufficiently under the control of the employer, that he or she
could, by the application of good employment practice, have prevented or reduced the
discriminatory treatment. If the parish representatives and the patron are not construed
as agents of the bishop (as employer) they might be construed as third parties. If the
"employer" causes or permits discrimination by a third party to occur in circumstances
which he or she can control, the employer will be liable. In this way the bishop could be
held accountable for the discriminatory hiring decisions of the parish representatives and
the patron.
Rubenstein believes that the judgment in De Vere goes far wider than liability for third
party harassment.' 86 It introduces a new test for establishing an employer's liability for
discrimination. It allows an employer to be held directly liable for subjecting an
employee to discrimination, if the event was under the control of the employer. On this
test the conduct complained of may be outside the course of employment or may be
engaged in by a third party. If the employer could have prevented the discrimination
taking place by good employment practice he or she can be held liable. If one accepts
Rubenstein's interpretation of De Vere then two tests exist for establishing an
employer's liability for the actions of employees and third parties; vicarious liability and
control. Under vicarious liability if an act is done in the course of employment the
employer will be liable even if it was beyond his or her control. Under the De Vere test
Ibid. at p600. per Smith J.
Ibid. at p600, per Smith J.
186 Rubenstein, Michael (1996) "Editorial Comment" IRLR p593
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if the act is within the control of the employer he or she will be liable regardless of
whether the act was in the course of employment. If De Vere is not appealed, the scope
of the decision might nevertheless be narrowed. De Vere could perhaps be distinguished
where the perpetrators of the discrimination were employees rather than third parties.
However, would this be a valid distinction? The idea of employer control is equally
applicable to employees as it is to third parties, indeed it is probably more so. The
influence of the decision may be less important following the purposive construction of
course of employment. Rubenstein considered that the De Vere test had filled the gap
left by the restrictive meaning of course of employment. It is submitted that the control
test will remain confined to third party discrimination. The decision in Tower Boot
ensures that the discriminatory acts of employees can be caught by the course of
employment test as envisaged by the statutory scheme.
The tenor of both cases is that tort concepts are unhelpful in a discrimination law
context. Additionally, the decisions ensure that the purpose of the legislation is fulfilled.
A purposive construction of the legislation enables the employer to be held liable for the
actions of employees, agents and third parties. Therefore, the onus is on the employer to
take "reasonable steps" or use "good employment practice" to prevent discrimination
occurring.
7.8 Equal Pay
7.8.1 Introduction to Equal Pay
Once a priest has accepted a post any complaint regarding pay or contractual benefits
would need to be brought under the Equal Pay Act. For example, some respondents
complained that they were receiving a half or one-third stipend for full-time work. They
perceived that their treatment was on the ground of sex.
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome contains a basic principle of equality for men and
women: "Each Member State shall during the first stage and subsequently maintain the
application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal
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work." 87
 Article 119 has horizontal and vertical direct effect.' 88
 After joining the
European Community, the Equal Pay Act was seen as sufficient (alongside the Sex
Discrimination Act) to fulfil UK obligations under Article 119. If the Equal Pay Act
proves to be too narrow, a complainant could rely upon Article 119 before the national
courts, or if necessary have his or her case referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
The Equal Pay Act aims to eliminate sex discrimination against men and women in
basic rates of pay and in all other contractual terms such as working hours and holiday
entitlement. if a claim involves the payment of money it must always be brought under
the Equal Pay Act as the Sex Discrimination Act does not extend to this. 189
 If the claim
involves other contractual benefits, one must determine if like work, work rated as
equivalent or work of equal value to an actual comparator is present. If it is proceedings
must be instituted under the Equal Pay Act. if it is not established, a claim could be
made under the Sex Discrimination Act, alleging that the complainant had been treated
less favourably than a hypothetical man would have been treated.' 9° The individual must
have a contract with their employer for the Act to apply. The definition of employed is
the wider definition used in the Sex Discrimination Act.' 9 ' if priests can come within
this definition they will be able to use the Act provided that they can satisfy its other
requirements. Unlike the Sex Discrimination Act, no specific exemption is given to
ministers of religion in respect of equal pay claims. Could the exemptions contained in
the Sex Discrimination Act be read into the Equal Pay Act? That the two Acts are
complementary and should be construed as one Code was the view expressed by Bridge
U. in Coomes E. (Holdings) v Shields. "[TJhe provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act
and the Equal Pay Act...provide in effect a single comprehensive code....both Acts
should be construed and applied as a harmonious whole and in such a way that the broad
principles which underlie the whole scheme of legislation are not frustrated by a narrow
interpretation or restrictive application of particular provisions." 92
 Despite this broad
interpretation the two Acts do use different principles. For example, the Sex
187 The reader is also referred to the Equal Pay Directive n.152 supra
188 Defrenne v SABENA (No.2) [1976] ICR 547
189 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 s 6 (6)
° For a fuller discussion of the practical relationship between the Equal Pay Act and the Sex
Discrimination Act the reader is referred to Bourn, Cohn & Whitmore, John (1996) Anti-Discrimination
Law in Britain ppIS.5-187 (London, Sweet & Ma*well)
191 Equal Pay Act 1970 s 1 (6) (a)
192 Coomes E. (Holdings) v Shields [1978] IRLR 263 at p269, per Bridge U.
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Discrimination Act allows hypothetical comparison whilst the Equal Pay Act does not.
The Equal Pay Act covers money payments whereas the Sex Discrimination Act does
not. Although the purpose of the Acts are the same, it is legitimate for the Acts to differ
in the methods employed to achieve this end. It might be argued that the exclusion of
ministers of religion from protection is a broad principle of sex discrimination
legislation which should prevail in both Acts. It is submitted that this is an unlikely
principle. As discussed at 7.1.1. the purpose of section 19 is to exclude on the basis of
doctrine, not employment status. Therefore, it would be quite legitimate for Church of
England priests to be covered by the equal pay legislation, now the priesthood is open to
both sexes. There is no provision in the 1975 Act which expressly incorporates section
19 into the Equal Pay Act, despite Schedule I of the 1975 Act incorporating some
amendments to the 1970 Act.
7.8.2 Like Work
If Church of England priests are employed as defined by section 1 (6) (a) they must then
establish that they are engaged on like work or work of equal value with an opposite sex
comparator in the same employment. There must be no genuine material difference
between their situations other than sex. Under section 1 (1) of the Act a worker's
contract is deemed to include an equality clause. If the worker's contract contains a less
favourable term than a similar term in a comparator's contract or if it does not contain a
beneficial term which is included in the comparator's contract, then the contract should
be modified so that the terms are equal. To bring the equality clause into action the
complainant must either be employed on like work, work rated as equivalent or work of
equal value to that of a comparator in the same employment.' 93 Section 1 (4) defines
like work to be work "of the same or a broadly similar nature". Differences between the
jobs must not be of "practical importance in relation to terms and conditions of
employment." When considering whether work is the same or broadly similar, tribunals
should take a wide view. 194 The duties carried out should be viewed in general terms, as
opposed to examining specific tasks. A similarly broad approach should be taken when
deciding whether any differences are of practical importance. Such a difference concerns
Equal Pay Act 1970 s 1(2) (a), 1(2) (b), 1(2) (c)
Capper Pass Ltd v Lawton [197711CR 83
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the actual work done by the man and the woman. Tribunals should look at the duties
actually performed as well as examining the contractual obligations.' 95 An example of a
difference of practical importance would be differing degrees of responsibility involved
in two otherwise broadly similar jobs. 196 Differences will not be of practical importance
unless they are such that the tribunal would expect that different terms and conditions of
employment would be reflected in practice.' 97 One or two female respondents described
doing full-time work for a half or one-third stipend. If they could establish that they had
a contract and that they were engaged on like work with a male priest in the same
employment, such priests could use the like work provisions to claim equal pay. This
would be subject to any defence the Church might bring under section 1 (3).
7.8.3 Equal Value
A complainant can bring an equal pay claim if he or she is employed in a job which,
although different to the comparator's job, has been given an equal value under a job
evaluation scheme.' 98 Equal value is assessed by examining the demands made on the
worker using headings such as effort, skill and decision.' 99 The Church of England does
not have a job evaluation scheme. As an alternative or addition to using the like work
provisions, a woman priest could use the equal value provisions. If a complainant
believes that he or she is employed on work of equal value to a comparator in the same
employment then an equal pay claim can be brought. 20° Again the value of the job is
assessed in terms of the demands made on the worker by using headings such as effort,
skill and decision.
A difficult area to discuss in relation to pay is non-stipendiary ministry. Because NSMs
are unpaid it may be even harder to establish a contract for the purposes of section 1 (6)
(a) of the Equal Pay Act or section 82 (1) of the Sex Discrimination Act than it is for
stipendiary priests. If a priest is offered a non-stipendiary post against their wishes he or
she may be able to make a sex discrimination claim. It will be difficult to claim equal
Dance v Dorothy Perkins Ltd [1978] 1CR 760; Coomes E. (Holdings) v Shields n. 192 supra
196 Eaton Ltd v Nutall [1977] ICR 272
Capper Pass Ltd v I_a wton n.194 supra at pp87-88, per Phillips J.
198 Equal Pay Act 1970 s 1 (2) (b)
199 Ibid. s 1 (5)
200 Ibid. s 1(2) (c) as introduced by Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983, S.!. 1983 No.1794
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pay once working in non-stipendiary ministry as NSM status has implications regarding
responsibility and the type of ministry itself. It would be difficult to put in a like work
claim. Who should a NSM priest use as a comparator in this situation? A NSM priest
does the same work, but their unpaid status prevents useful comparison. A stipendiary
minister is likely to have different responsibilities. A more favourable approach would
be for a NSM to compare themselves to a stipendiary minister using the equal value
provisions. The problem here might be challenging differentials which are too great. For
example, the stipendiary minister may have more duties which prevents there being an
equal value comparison. It could be argued that the greater duties prevent equal value
but are not enough to justify the difference between the pay of the stipendiary minister
and the NSM. If a comparison cannot be made using one of the three tests, the equal pay
legislation is powerless to challenge such differentials.
7.8.4 In the Same Employment
In order to compare two jobs, the two workers must be of the opposite sex. The
complainant must be "in the same employment" as the comparator. This means that they
must be, "employed by her employer or any associated employer at the same
establishment or at establishments in Great Britain which include that one and at which
common terms and conditions of employment are observed either generally or for
employees of the relevant classes." 20 ' The ECJ held that a woman has the right under
Article 119 to compare herself with her predecessor, provided that the nature of the job
has not changed substantially. 202 The EAT have held that a complainant can compare
herself with her successor, provided that the successor's contract was so proximate to
her own as to render him an effective comparator.203
Usually the complainant will make the comparison with a suitable comparator at the
same establishment at which he or she is employed. If the same employer and same
establishment are used there is no requirement to establish common terms and
conditions of employment. 204 If there is not a suitable comparator working at the same
201 Equal Pay Act 1970 s 1 (6)
202 Maca rthvs Ltd v Smith [1980] IRLR 210
203 Diocese of Halla,n Trustee v Connaughton [199611 IRLR 505
204 Lawson v Bri (fish Ltd [1988] IRLR 53
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establishment a complainant may make a comparison with a comparator employed by
his or her employer, or any associated employer, at a different establishment. In this
situation common terms and conditions of employment are required. A novel case on
same employment is Scullard v (I) Knowles and (2) Southern Regional Council for
Education and Training. 205 One way to establish same employment is to point to an
associated employer where common terms and conditions exist. The meaning of an
associated employer was examined by the EAT in relation to Article 119. British law
defined an associated employer as an associated company. 206 Public sector employees
could not make an associated employer comparison. Mummery J. stated that the class of
comparators defined in section 1 (6) (c) is narrower than that under Article 119. The
scope of comparison under Article 119 was discussed in Defrenne v SABENA which
stated that the comparator must be employed in the "same establishment or service" as
the applicant. No distinction was made in Defrenne between the work carried out in the
same establishment or service of limited companies and of other employers. 207 The
narrow definition of section 1 (6) (c) to associated employers was held to be displaced
by the wide "same service" provision of Article 119.208 Whilst trying to equalise the
rights of public and private sector workers, Scullard is open to criticism in that it fails to
define the "same service" provision of Article 119209
Little statutory guidance is given on the meaning of an "establishment". In the context
of redundancy, where the term is similarly not defined, the EAT has applied a common
sense approach. 21 ° The tribunal must decide whether it is an establishment by using
common sense with regard to the particular facts of the case. "[lit may be very difficult
to say what the line is which distinguishes an establishment from something which is
not an establishment, but perfectly easy to say on which particular side of the line any
particular set up falls."2t ' The ECJ gave more guidance as to the interpretation of the
term, holding that the protective intent of the redundancy legislation must not be
205 Scullard v (1) Knowles and (2) Southern Regional Council for Education and Training [1996] IRLR
344
206 Equal Pay Act 1970 s 1 (6) (c)
207 Scullard v (1) Knowles and (2) Southern Regional Council for Education and Training n.205 supra at
p346, per Mummery J.
208 The case was remitted on its facts to the industrial tribunal.
209 Bourn, Cohn & Whitmore, John (1996) op. cit., p216
210 Barratt Developments (Bradford) Ltd v (1 CA iT [1977] IRLR 403
211 Ibid. at p404, per Bristow J.
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hindered by a narrow construal of establishment. 212 The ECJ described the employment
relationship which exists because of the link between the employee and the part of the
undertaking to which he or she is assigned to carry out his or her duties. The term
establishment in Article 1 (1) (a) of the Collective Redundancies Directive must be
interpreted as meaning the unit to which the worker is assigned to carry out his or her
duties. 213 The Equal Pay Act does not define establishment. Halsbury's Statutes state
that the term is to be construed in accordance with the Sex Discrimination Act section
10 . 214 This states that employment is to be regarded as being at an establishment in
Great Britain unless the employee does his work wholly or mainly outside Great Britain.
Section 10 (4) states, "Where work is not done at an establishment it shall be treated for
the relevant purposes as done at the establishment from which it is done or (where it is
not done from any establishment) at the establishment with which it has the closest
connection." There seems to be no reason why case law on establishment in redundancy
consultation ought not be relevant to establishment in equal pay. Both sets of legislation
have a protective intent towards workers. The purposive thrust of Rockfon could be
applied to the further interpretation of "same establishment or service" as enunciated in
Defrenne v SABENA.
If the case involves a comparison of jobs at two different establishments then common
terms and conditions of employment are required. In Leverton v Clwyd County Council
the construction of the phrase, "at which common terms and conditions of employment
are observed either generally or for employees of the relevant classes" was examined.215
The issue was; between whose terms and conditions should the comparison be made?
The House of Lords held that the correct construction involved comparing the terms and
conditions at the establishment at which the complainant is employed with those of the
establishment at which the comparator is employed. These terms and conditions may be
applicable to all the workers at the relevant establishments or to a certain class of
workers to which the complainant and the comparator belong. The incorrect approach is
to compare the individual terms and conditions as between the complainant and the
212 RockfonASvNielsen [1996] IRLR 168 at p175
213 Ibid. at p175
214 Halsbury's Statutes of England and Wales, Fourth Edition, 1997 Reissue, vol.16, note accompanying
Equal Pay Act 1970 section 1(1)
215 Leverton v Ciwyd County Council[1989] IRLR 28
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comparator. Leverton identified the relevant parties for comparison of terms and
conditions. What is meant by common terms and conditions of employment was the
question at issue in British Coal Corporation v Smith.216 Did common terms and
conditions mean that there was complete identity of terms and conditions, subject to de
minimis exceptions, between the comparator at his establishment and those which
applied or would apply to a similar male worker at her establishment? Or did the phrase
require that the terms and conditions were sufficiently similar for a fair comparison to
be made?217 Lord Slynn held that the purpose of the legislation was to require
comparison of terms on a broad basis. It did not require the same terms and conditions
to exist subject only to de minimis differences.
A woman priest bringing an equal pay claim would need to establish that she was in the
same employment as a male priest comparator. First, one must ask who is the employer?
Second, one must ask what is an establishment? If the employer is defined as "the
Church of England" then all priests have the same employer. On this basis a woman
priest could choose a male comparator from any parish or diocese. It is less likely that
the Church of England as a whole would be construed as one establishment. The Church
of England as an organisation is split into dioceses which possess considerable financial
and organisational autonomy. It is likely that a diocese would be construed as an
establishment. Therefore, if her comparator came from the same diocese as her she
would not have to establish common terms and conditions because she is employed by
the same employer (the Church of England) at the same establishment (the diocese). If
her comparator came from a different diocese she would need to establish common
terms and conditions because she is employed by the same employer (the Church of
England) but at a different establishment to that of her comparator (another diocese). If
the employer is defined as the diocesan bishop or the Diocesan Board of Finance then
all priests in that diocese share the same employer. A comparator chosen from the same
diocese would have the same employer and be employed at the same establishment (the
diocese), hence common terms and conditions would not be necessary. A possible
argument would be that the diocese is not an establishment. Instead the parish should be
construed as an establishment. In this case priests in the same diocese would share the
216 British Coal Corporation v Smith [19961 IRLR 404
217 Ibid. at p408, per Lord Slynn
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same employer but would work at different establishments, hence common terms and
conditions would be required. Finally, if the bishop or the Diocesan Board of Finance is
the employer any comparison made outside the diocese will involve a different
employer. Whether a bishop or a Diocesan Board of Finance could be construed as an
associated employer is a moot point. If Scullard remains good law then arguably they
could be so construed. If Scullard is successfully appealed and section 1 (6) (c) remains,
associated employer status is highly unlikely. Clergy terms and conditions of
employment are not regulated by a collective agreement. Because a priest's post is
considered as a vocation they are less likely to have uniform terms and conditions such
as working hours and holiday entitlement. Thus it may be difficult to establish that
common terms and conditions exist either between two different dioceses or two
different parishes. The informal job structure makes employment rights more difficult to
establish.
7.8.5 Genuine Material Difference
Even if a complainant satisfies the comparative requirements, an equal pay claim may
fail if the employer has a defence under section 1 (3) of the Equal Pay Act. The defence
is made out if the employer can show that the variation in terms and conditions is due to
a genuine material difference other than sex. The defence allows the employer to show
the reasons for the difference in treatment between the man and the woman. On a strict
construction the defence differs depending upon which category of comparison the
complainant is using. If a claim of like work or work rated as equivalent is brought the
employer must show that a genuine material factor is a material difference between the
woman's treatment and the man's treatment. If the claim is one of equal value the
employer only has to show that the variation is a genuine material factor. 218 However, it
is considered that as a result of the House of Lords judgment in Rainey v Greater
Glasgow Health Board the gap between a "material difference" and a "material factor"
has been effectively removed.219
218 Equal Pay Act 1970 s 1(3) (a), 1 (3) (b)
219 Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board [1987] IRLR 26; Smith, I.T. & Thomas, OH. (1996) op.
cit., p243. From hereon only the phrase material difference will be used.
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Personal differences which a worker brings to a job can constitute genuine material
differences. For example, experience and qualifications may lead to one worker being
placed on a higher grade than another. The courts have refused to include certain
personal differences under the defence. For example, motherhood is not a genuine
material difference other than sex. 220 It is factors beyond the individual which cause
problems for the courts. These have included; economic needs of the undertaking,
financial constraints and part-time work.
In Rainey the employers argued that market forces required those entering employment
in a NHS department to be paid more than those already in the department. The new
entrants were all male and the existing workers were predominantly female. The
complainant's equal pay claim failed because the employers established the section 1 (3)
defence. The House of Lords held that the defence covered objectively justified grounds
for women being paid less. Lord Keith held that the test under section 1 (3) is the same
as under the Sex Discrimination Act section 1 (1) (b) (ii) for the justification of indirect
sex discrimination. 22 ' This is the test set out in Bilka.222 Lord Keith stated that he
thought the Bilka test, "would not exclude objectively justified grounds which are other
than economic, such as administrative efficiency in a concern not engaged in commerce
or business." 223 The courts have taken a strict approach to the establishment of
objectively justified grounds.224
A genuine material difference which might be claimed by diocesan bishops is financial
constraint. In Benveniste v University of Southampton financial constraints on a
university was held to be a defence to paying the complainant a lower salary than was
normal.225 However, once the financial constraints were removed the genuine material
difference defence could no longer be made out. Neill U. added obiter, that, "There may
be cases where the evidence will establish that, though the financial position of a
university or other employer improved after the date of appointment, some financial
constraints persisted, which made salaries at a lower scale imperative either for certain
220 Coyne v Exports Credit Guarantee Department [1981] IRLR 51
221 Raine'y v Greater Glasgow Health Board n.219 supra at p31. per Lord Keith
222 The reader is referred to 7.6.1.
223 Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board n.219 supra at pp3O-3 I, per Lord Keith
224 North Yorkshire County Council v Ratcliffe [199511CR 833
225 Benveniste v University of Southampton [1989] IRLR 122
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categories of staff or generally."226 Thus once dioceses are no longer financially
constrained they will be unable to justify pay differentials between male and female
priests working full-time.
Whether part-time work could be a genuine material difference was examined in Jenkins
v Kin gsgate. 227 The applicant claimed that a difference in pay between full-time and
part-time workers was prohibited by Article 119. The employers raised the section 1 (3)
defence. The ECJ held that being a part-time worker will only be a genuine material
difference if the employer can establish that the lower rate of pay for part-timers is
reasonably necessary to achieve some objective (probably economic) which is unrelated
to the sex of the worker. 228 The discussion of the section 1 (3) defence in Jenkins
introduced the idea of indirect discrimination into equal pay. The concept of indirect
discrimination was not expressly enacted in the Equal Pay Act. As a result of Jenkins
the Act is read to include indirect discrimination. 229 if a difference operates against
significantly more women than men the employer will only have a defence if the
difference is based on objectively justified factors other than the sex of the worker.
The introduction of the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination in the
Equal Pay Act was disapproved in North Yorkshire County Council v Ratcliffe. 23° There
is no provision in the Sex Discrimination Act which incorporates the distinction into the
Equal Pay Act. As a result of Jenkins and Bilka, EC law required objective justification
to be established in cases of indirect pay discrimination. National law was to use the test
in regard to cases of indirect pay discrimination, but did the test apply to direct pay
discrimination? Ratcliffe states that the objective justification test is to be applied to the
Equal Pay Act without bringing in the distinction between direct and indirect pay
discrimination.231
226 Ibid. at p126, per Neill U.
227 Jenkins v Kingsgate [19811 IRLR 228
228 Ibid. at p234
229 The reader is referred to the next paragraph for a further discussion of indirect pay discrimination.
230 North Yorkshire County Council v Ratcl(ffe n.224 supra at p839, per Lord Slynn; the distinction was
also avoided in British Coal Corporation v Smith n.216 supra
231 North Yorkshire County Council v Ratclzffe n.224 supra at p839, per Lord Slynn
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In equal pay cases discrimination must be on the ground of sex. This has caused
problems in "gender-plus" cases before the ECJ, where it has been argued that
discrimination on other grounds, unrelated to sex, does not contravene Article 119. The
ECJ has recognised that "gender-plus" cases are within the ambit of Article 119.232 For
example, in Liefting the contributions of an employer to a pension scheme discriminated
against women civil servants who were married to male civil servants.233 The pay of
male civil servants was different to that of female civil servants whose husbands were
also civil servants. The claim involved a particular category of female civil servants and
not women generally. It was held that the specific category was capable of protection
under Article 119.234 This is a situation that women priests who are married to male
priests find themselves in. Because of their marital status they are required to accept
non-stipendiary or part-stipendiary posts. This sometimes means working in a part-time
post, sometimes it involves full-time work on a part-time stipend. Women priests might
claim pay discrimination in this situation, using the principles set out in Jenkins. If being
married to a priest operates against significantly more women than men the employer
will only have a defence if the difference is based on objectively justified factors other
than the sex of the worker. The bishop or Diocesan Board of Finance would probably try
to rely on financial constraint as a defence.
232 Barnard, Catherine (1995) Op. cit., p181
233 Case 23/83 W.G.M. Liefling v Directie van het Academisch Ziekenhuis bij de Universiteit van
Amsterdam [1984] ECR 3225
234 For other "gender-plus" cases the reader is referred to; Case C-7/93 Besturr van het Algemeen
Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds v GA. Beune [1994] ECR 1-447 1; Case C-128/93 Fisscher v Voorhuis Hengelo
BV and Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Detailhandel [1994] ECR 1-45 83
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Conclusion
The questionnaire highlighted the perceived problem of sex discrimination in
employment within the Church of England. The sex of a priest was an important factor
in their treatment when seeking a post and when working in a post.' How can the law
intervene to improve the position of priests? Ministers of religion, including Church of
England priests, are excluded from sex discrimination legislation. Is this coherent with
the aim of the legislation which is to provide equality in the workplace? It is submitted
that once the priesthood became mixed, the exclusion of priests from the legislation
became unjustified. Inclusion under the legislation would not only provide priests with a
remedy against sex discrimination, it might change attitudes towards the treatment of
priests. The non-protection of priests in secular law fuels the perception that because the
discriminatory actions of "employers" and co-workers are not open to challenge they are
justified. The legal recognition of a priest's rights in sex discrimination law might result
in improved working conditions in the Church of England, without recourse to court
action. Their inclusion under the legislation would act as a deterrent to those who
currently benefit from the present structure.
Ministers in other denominations and religions are also not protected by employment
legislation. In certain denominations and religions sex discrimination rights are
inapplicable as ministers are required by doctrine to be male. However, their lack of
protection against unfair dismissal has created problems. The public law protection
which Church of England office holders possess does not extend to these ministers.
Instead they must rely on their own organisation's internal procedures governing
dismissal. It is submitted that statutory protection against unfair dismissal and, where
appropriate, sex discrimination, for all ministers of religion would ensure that private
regulation is not abused by "employers".
The uncertain employment status of Church of England priests requires a resolution.
The problem has two facets: first, the difference in internal protection given to beneficed
and unbeneficed clergy and secondly the denial that Church of England priests can hold
a contract of employment. The present division of the clergy into beneficed and
The term priest is used in the Conclusion to cover both deacons and priests.
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unbeneficed under ecclesiastical law creates a two tier approach to "employment"
protection within the Church. Freeholders have a strong security of tenure whilst
unbeneficed clergy have limited safeguards attached to their licences. The proposed
abolition of the freehold was abandoned. It is submitted that the mooted abolition was
not tackling the real problem which is the lack of security of unbeneficed clergy. The
Hawker Report acknowledges that changes need to be made to the licensing system in
order that unbeneficed clergy, as well as beneficed clergy, have access to an internal
disciplinary system. Whilst these changes to internal procedures are vital if unbeneficed
clergy are to be given protection against unfair dismissal, they do not provide an
adequate replacement for the private law protection against sex discrimination. Internal
actions under the Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977 and the
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 provide only limited opportunities for dealing
with sex discrimination claims. The only way for sex discrimination claims to be dealt
with adequately is to include Church of England clergy within the Sex Discrimination
Act.
The first step to inclusion under the Sex Discrimination Act requires that priests are
classified as in employment for the purposes of section 82 (1) of the Act. This requires
that a person must be employed "under a contract of service or of apprenticeship or a
contract personally to execute any work or labour." In Chapter Four unfair dismissal
cases were discussed in an analysis of the employment status of ministers of religion.
The division of legal reasoning into two questions; "is there a contract?" and "is there a
contract of employment?" is useful when one comes to apply the reasoning to a sex
discrimination context.
Barthorpe and the industrial tribunal decision in Coker held that a contract was not
incompatible with spiritual duties. Parjitr and Davies pointed to circumstances where
the usual parameter of non-contractual intention might be overcome. 2 The establishment
of a contract personally to execute any work or labour is sufficient for the wide
definition of employment contained in the Sex Discrimination Act and the Equal Pay
Act. It is submitted that if a sex discrimination action were to be brought by a Church of
2 The reader is referred to 4.2.
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England priest the arguments on "is there a contract?" might be successfully developed
in a sex discrimination context.
It is not necessary to establish a contract of employment for the purposes of the Sex
Discrimination Act (unless it is not possible to establish a contract personally to execute
any work or labour). However, a contract of employment is required when unfair
dismissal is alleged. Hence it is required if a claim involves unfair dismissal on the
ground of pregnancy under the Employment Rights Act 1996. A contract of employment
likewise is required to establish statutory maternity rights under the Employment Rights
Act. Case law has denied that ministers of religion can hold contracts of employment. It
is submitted that spiritual duties are not incompatible with a contract of employment. It
is to be hoped that the arguments of Professor Rideout, in the industrial tribunal in
Coker v Diocese of Southwark, on this question will be taken up in a future case and
applied to all posts in the Church of England, not just the post of curate.3
If Church of England priests cannot be classified as in employment under the Sex
Discrimination Act, then it is submitted that they ought to be specifically included in the
Act, in the way that Crown office holders are included. 4
 Likewise they ought to be
included under the Equal Pay Act and the Employment Rights Act. In such a situation
their employment status would probably be that of an ecclesiastical office holder. If this
were so it would be necessary to define all Church of England clergy as office holders.
At present, whether curates are office holders is a moot point. However, for such
specific inclusion under the Act to work effectively, all classes of clergy must receive
protection.
The second step which is required for inclusion under the Sex Discrimination Act is a
judicial ruling on the status of section 19 (1) of the Act following the ordination of
women priests. The motivation behind section 19 (1) is not concerned with whether
ministers of religion are employees, self-employed persons or office holders. Section 19
(I) operates to protect and respect doctrinal belief. Therefore, in isolation from their
Coker v Diocese of Southwark [1995] ICR 563 reversed by Diocese of Southwark and Others v Coker,
The Times, 17th July 1997 (CA); Diocese of Southwark v Coker [1996] ICR 896 (EAT)
' Sex Discrimination Act 1975 ss 85 (2), 86 (2)
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uncertain employment status, it is submitted that section 19 (1) is inapplicable now that
the priesthood is mixed. The section remains operative to all other religions and
denominations where the employment is limited so as to comply with the doctrines of
the religion or avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of a significant number of
its followers.
Regardless of the status of section 19 (1), section 6 of the Priests (Ordination of
Women) Measure 1993 acts as an exemption to sex discrimination against women
priests in ordination and recruitment. It does not justify sex discrimination in working
conditions and dismissal. Section 6 acts as a defence to the passing of Resolutions A
and/or B. However, section 6 can be relied upon to justify sex discrimination against a
woman in recruitment, regardless of the presence of Resolutions A and/or B. It is the
wide application of section 6 which is in need of amendment. The passing of the
Resolutions shows a commitment by a parish to a certain theological position. The
whole tenor of the Synod debate and the Episcopal Ministry Act of Synod supports
respect for theological integrity. Sex discrimination beyond the boundaries of what is set
down in resolution form seems manifestly unfair. A parish, via its PCC, has the
opportunity to declare its position on women priests. The absence of both Resolutions
would appear to indicate a willingness to consider male and female candidates. When
the reality is less favourable treatment, not on theological grounds, but on the ground of
her sex, the woman priest is denied legal redress.
With the Church of England still divided on the issue of women priests differing
doctrinal beliefs are vital to the selection process. There must be a justification in the
legislation for holding these views. Section 6 justifies the use of the Resolutions. It is
submitted that the exemption contained in section 6 should be narrowed to cover only
theological objection to women priests enshrined in declarations, in the case of bishops,
or in Resolutions, in the case of PCCs. This would prevent sex discrimination in
recruitment being lawful in situations where the declarations or Resolutions are not in
place. Women priests could then apply for posts in parishes where the Resolutions were
not in place without fear that double standards were operating. This might encourage
PCCs to discuss the issue of women priests properly, with the result that firm decisions
would be made as to the necessity or non-necessity of the Resolutions in a parish.
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As seen in the questionnaire data, different people are involved in the hiring process. In
the case of an incumbent the bishop, parish representatives and patron are formally
involved. The appointment of unbeneficed clergy is less formal but is likely to include
the bishop, other clergy presently working in the parish and lay representatives. The
bishop and the PCC have the power formally to object to a woman priest on grounds of
theology under the legislation. Thus, certain personnel involved in the hiring process
have had the opportunity to declare their theological position as members of the PCC.
The present incumbent of the benefice is the council chairman and all clerks in Holy
Orders beneficed or licensed to the parish are members of the council. In this way many
of the clergy involved in recruitment decisions have stated their position on women
priests. Similarly, lay members of the PCC who are involved in recruitment decisions
have had the opportunity to declare their position. 5 There are many others involved in
the hiring process who may or may not have had the opportunity to express their views
in resolution form. The patron is formally involved in the appointment of an incumbent.
However, unless the patron is also the bishop or a member of the PCC he or she is
unable to express views on women priests in resolution form. Senior clergy such as rural
deans and archdeacons are involved at the recruitment stage. They are not given the
opportunity to express their views in resolution form. Other lay personnel appeared to
be influential, such as readers and clergy wives. They too, unless members of the PCC,
cannot formally declare their position on women priests. This makes the idea of
narrowing section 6 problematic, because it would leave these people without a defence
to sex discrimination claims.
The solution would be to widen the use of the Resolutions. It would be necessary to
identify who is accountable for hiring decisions in order to decide who should be asked
to declare their theological position. Any person or body who could be construed as an
"employer", an agent of the "employer" or an "employee" of the Church of England
would come into this category, for it would be the decisions of these people which could
be challenged as discriminatory. Arguably the use of the Resolutions would need to be
extended to the patron (as an agent of the employer) and to senior clergy involved in
appointments (as employees of the Church of England). Patrons are involved with
It is to be noted that lay members may only hold office for three years.
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specific appointments to benefices. A Resolution in line with the PCC Resolution under
section 3 of the 1993 Measure would be appropriate in this context. In the case of senior
clergy such as archdeacons and rural deans who operate outside the specific parish unit
and who regularly make appointment decisions in their respective areas, a new
Resolution C could be created. This would state their position in regard to the
appointment of women priests in their deanery or archdeaconry. The use of Resolutions
would not extend to "third parties" such as members of the laity who are not PCC
members. A register of Resolutions could be held in each diocese, to be updated
regularly. The result of narrowing section 6 to cover only theological objection and
widening the use of the Resolutions might be increased formal opposition to women
priests. This would be preferable to the current position whereby women priests are
unsure as to which parishes and personnel support or oppose their vocation. A
comprehensive survey of the theological views of those involved in the appointment
process would reduce the mystique of Church appointments.
Provided that employment status is satisfied and section 19 (1) is inapplicable, the
narrowing of section 6 would facilitate increased employment rights for women priests.
If discriminatory treatment in recruitment occurred in a parish where neither Resolution
was in place, a woman priest could claim under the Sex Discrimination Act. The
employer would be directly liable for his or her discriminatory treatment, vicariously
liable for the actions of employees and agents in the hiring process and potentially
directly liable for the actions of third parties involved in the hiring process. The latter
category might include laity such as clergy wives and readers. If the actions of third
parties could be controlled by the employer, the employer would be liable for any
resulting discriminatory treatment.
An alternative option would be to provide an exemption to sex discrimination in
recruitment when the action was on the ground of theological objection to women
priests. In relation to the Church of England this would be a specific provision in the
Sex Discrimination Act. That the more general terms of section 19 (1) are inapplicable
to the Church of England would need confirmation. Justifying sex discrimination in this
way might prove difficult. The secular courts would be faced with religious issues. The
problems this causes have been seen in relation to unfair dismissal. To make things
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more problematic the court would need to separate theological objection from prejudice
against women. Questions of motive would become an integral part of the exemption.
Although it would be difficult for a secular court to evaluate a theological objection,
there is no reason why they should not be able to assess whether or not the objection is
genuine. In fact, industrial tribunals were required to perform such a task in relation to
trade union legislation. In the past it was unfair to dismiss an employee for not
belonging to a trade union where there was a closed shop. In 1980 an exemption was
introduced which made the dismissal of an employee in such circumstances unfair if he
or she genuinely objected on the grounds of conscience or other deeply held personal
conviction to being a member of any trade union whatsoever or of a particular trade
union.6 This covered religious objection. Industrial tribunals were required to assess
whether the objection was genuine, whether it was a matter of conscience or personal
conviction and whether it was deeply held. 7 Thus, there is a precedent for the
assessment of the genuineness of religious/theological objection by tribunals.
To relieve the problems of proof, the two options could be combined; that is the
increased use of Resolutions and an exemption for the Church of England in the Sex
Discrimination Act. This would strengthen the narrowing of section 6. The Resolutions
passed by the various parties would be justified not only by section 6 but by the new
exemption in the Sex Discrimination Act. In turn the Resolutions would provide the
requisite proof needed under the new exemption.
Amendments to national sex discrimination legislation would need to be mirrored in EC
law. Therefore, it is submitted that the exclusion of Church of England priests from the
operation of the Equal Treatment Directive be amended. The exclusion by the British
government predated the Synod vote to allow women priests. It is strongly arguable that
the sex of the worker is only a "determining factor" in parishes which have passed either
of the Resolutions. This interpretation of determining factor would square with the
reforms suggested in relation to section 6. The exemption from the Equal Treatment
Directive would only be justified in regard to parishes or posts where a Resolution had
6 Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 (as amended) s 58 (3). This was widened by the
Employment Act 1980 but finally repealed by the Employment Act 1988.
Home Delivery Services Ltd v Shackcloth [1984] IRLR 470; Sakals v United Counties Omnibus
Company Ltd [1984] IRLR 474
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been passed by a designated person or body. If no Resolution is in place and
discriminatory treatment occurs on the ground of sex a priest could try to use the Equal
Treatment Directive to establish sex discrimination rights. This might be necessary if,
for example, their employee status was questioned under national law.
In some areas the Church of England is taking a more secular approach to employment
problems. Is the Church moving closer to applying ordinary employment law practices
to their priests despite not being required to do so by law? For example, in regard to
maternity provision the Church is beginning to tackle the issue. Despite initial
difficulties it appears that women priests are receiving favourable provision. This is so
despite the lack of guidance on the actual legal basis for maternity rights for women
priests. The reform of clergy disciplinary procedures as recommended by the Hawker
Report borrows ideas from secular employment, most notably the establishment of a
national tribunal to deal with disciplinary actions. It is submitted that there are other
areas of employment practice where the Church of England could take lessons from the
secular world.
A principal theme which ran through the questionnaire data was the informal
appointment system of the Church of England. Clergy do not necessarily come into post
by replying to an advertisement and being interviewed. This means that the reasoning
behind appointment decisions is difficult to establish and hence criticise. It is difficult to
ascertain whether sex discrimination is taking place. It is submitted that changes could
be made to the appointment system which would make recruitment decisions more
transparent. This transparency would ease problems of proof if a sex discrimination
claim were to be made.
The data revealed the diverse way in which vacancies are communicated. First curacies
are rarely publicly advertised. Most candidates rely on the contacts of bishops and
theological colleges. Sex discrimination during search for a first curacy was a lower
figure for women respondents (19%) than at other stages in their "career path". This
might suggest that the informal appointment system works well. It is submitted that this
figure should be treated with caution, as many women respondents simply transferred
from being NSMs or deaconesses in a parish to holding their first curacy in the same
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parish. A more meaningful analysis at this level could only be made by assessing the
women who had to search for a post as opposed to transferring to a post in their present
church. Formal channels, such as newspaper advertisements and clergy bulletins, are
more likely to be used in relation to senior posts. The use of formal channels ought to be
increased for all posts. As a result notice of vacancies could reach a much wider
audience thus promoting equality of opportunity. Additionally, advertisements ought to
specifically state whether the parish has passed Resolutions A andlor B. In this way it is
clear at the outset whether a post is open to a woman.
35% of males and 49% of females did not receive a formal interview for their present
post. Most formal interviews were conducted on a sole interviewee basis. Short lists
tend to be used more at a senior post level. The use of formal interviews with short lists
is recommended for all levels of post. The use of such interviews not only promotes fair
procedure but it promotes the transparency of decisions. If a sex discrimination action
were to be brought evidence of discrimination might be easier to establish (or refute) if
an interview had been used. The use of a short list system would also save the Church a
great deal of time which is otherwise spent interviewing a succession of unsuitable sole
interviewees. It is recommended that training should be given to those involved in the
interview and appointment process. In the questionnaire, interview questions were cited
as instances of discriminatory treatment. In order to remedy this interviewers should be
made familiar with the guidelines on interview questions provided by the EOC Code of
Practice. The structure of personnel involved in interviewing for a senior post is fairly
well defined. At curate level an eclectic mix of personnel are involved. As regards
training, the variety of personnel involved might cause problems, but this would not be
insurmountable. However, it does lead on to another question: who should be involved
in the appointment process? Should there be stricter guidelines regarding which
personnel are involved or should the Church retain its discretion in this area? Does the
involvement of the laity help or hinder the process?
The involvement of the laity is a useful and necessary check on the power of the bishop,
the patron and other clergy. It also represents the independence that a parish has to
appoint whom they wish. Lay personnel are likely to have a close working relationship
with the priest, therefore it is important that they are involved in selection. However, it
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could be argued that their decisions are less easily held to be accountable. Unless they
are employees or agents of the employer they cannot be held directly liable for their
actions under the Sex Discrimination Act. It could be specifically provided that all lay
persons, not just PCC members and the lay patron, are agents when formally taking part
in the recruitment process. However, for such a classification to work it would require
all such agents to state their theological position in resolution form, as detailed above.
This might become a cumbersome, impractical task. Additionally, if lay involvement is
informal such personnel are unlikely to be agents of the employer. In this situation an
employer will only be liable for their actions if the tests of Burton and Rhule v De Vere
Hotels are satisfied. If decision making were left solely to the clergy, decisions might
prove narrowly ecclesiastical. 8 However, if a dispute arose their decisions are more
easily held to be accountable. It is submitted that lay, as well as clerical involvement, is
a necessary feature of the appointment process. To ensure that all decisions are
accountable, only lay members who are classifiable as employees or agents of the
employer should be involved. Hence this would include a lay patron and PCC members
but it would probably not include those members of the laity who are not on the PCC.
If a Church of England priest perceives less favourable treatment on the ground of sex
he or she cannot use private law to gain a remedy. Ecclesiastical law does not provide
any adequate channels of redress. The questionnaire data revealed that the Church does
not have an adequate internal grievance procedure for dealing with allegations of sex
discrimination. When respondents reported their complaints, often no action was taken
or when it was taken the remedy did not match the problem. It is submitted that in
addition to inclusion under the Sex Discrimination Act, clergy should have access to an
internal grievance procedure, which deals specifically with claims of sex discrimination.
This might prevent recourse to private law. The Hawker Report goes some way to
achieving this objective. It recommends that in addition to the formal disciplinary
process for ecclesiastical offences there should be an internal grievance procedure.9
However, this is aimed at clergy bringing complaints against senior clerics regarding an
aspect of their conditions of service. It does not extend to complaints against the patron
or the PCC. The report also does not mention the specific issue of sex discrimination.
8 The reader is referred to 3.3.7.
The Hawker Report (1996) op. cit., ppl3l-135
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With many women priests perceiving sex discrimination, perhaps this is an area which
ought to have been specifically addressed.
By allowing both integrities to operate in the Church of England the Priests (Ordination
of Women) Measure 1993 enshrines the principle of equality of respect. Because of this
women priests do not receive equal treatment when compared with male priests.
However, the wide application of section 6 combined with the provisions of section 19
of the Sex Discrimination Act and a priest's uncertain employment status mean that
even equality of respect is denied to women priests. The arbitrary factor of sex is still
allowed to influence decision making. Until the law is amended women priests will be
denied even this minimal principle of equality.
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APPENDIX A
Journal Publication - Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 25, No.3, September 1996
RECENT CASES
COMMENTARY
The Employment Status of Ministers of Religion*
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper the legal employment status of ministers of religion, traditionally relegated
to the fringe of employment law, is examined. Church of England priests have usually
been held to be office holders with public law rights but not employees with private law
rights. Ministers in other Christian denominations and other religions have no defined
employment status. Whether a minister could be classified as an employee is a question
for the common law, but courts seem particularly reluctant to re-examine legal
precedent when any issue of religion is involved. However, issues should not be struck
off the judicial agenda because they are permeated by religion. The thesis of the paper is
that religious or spiritual duties are not incompatible with a contract of employment.'
Additionally, the tendency of courts to treat all religions, and all posts within a religion,
as identical is criticised.
The area of law most often under discussion is unfair dismissal. To bring a claim
the worker must be classified as an employee. Under section 153 (1) of the Employment
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, an "employee' means an individual who has
entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a
contract of employment." Failure to prove employee status means that Church of
England ministers will have to rely on the protections of office holder status and any
internal Church protection. For ministers of other Christian denominations or other
religions it will mean that they have to rely on their own Church's internal protections.
The focus here is on priests in the Church of England. 2 The fragile nature of
internal Church protection has meant that increasing numbers are considering the
possibility of involving general employment protection rights. The recent cases of Coker
v Diocese of Southwark and Chaicraft v Bishop of Norwich highlight the debatable legal
* The author would like to thank Gwyneth Pitt for her help with this paper.
The terms religious and spiritual have been used interchangeably, although undoubtedly there is a
distinction. Case law uses both terms which accounts for the usage. For simplicity duties are referred to as
spiritual unless the term religious has been preferred in a specific judgment, as, for example, in Coker v
Diocese of Southwark [1995] ICR 563
2 When discussing priests in the Church of England the priest is referred to as he or she. Since 1994
women have been ordained to the priesthood. Old authorities refer to the priest as he. This has been
altered where appropriate to he or she as the case principles now apply to men and women.
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status of Church of England priests. 3 When discussing the two fundamental questions: is
there a contract and is it a contract of employment, case decisions involving ministers of
other Christian denominations and other religions are used. Nonconformist ministers
from the Methodist Church, the Presbyterian Church and the Salvation Army have had
their legal status considered. 4 Sikhism and Islam have been discussed with regard to the
same issue.5 However, it is office holders in the Church of England that have most
consistently troubled the courts. A case which attempts to distinguish the different types
of office holder is Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance. 6 There are essentially
three types of ecclesiastical post in the Church of England; a curate, a priest-in-charge
and an incumbent, with no cases directly involving the latter post. An incumbent may be
a rector or a vicar. He or she possesses a freehold living; consequently they cannot be
dismissed at will. Their strong security of tenure is one reason for the lack of cases.
Priests-in-charge and curates do not possess a freehold living. They are admitted to their
post by a bishop's licence. A bishop has power to revoke the licence either by notice or
by will if reasonable grounds are provided. One case has been brought concerning a
priest-in-charge. 7 A larger body of case law investigates the status of curates. 8 It is
possible that curates will be the first group to gain the protections of employment law,
perhaps prompting a review of the status of priests-in-charge, incumbents and other
ministers of religion. Until this is done there will remain an incoherent assortment of
reasons given to prevent the use of employment law amongst a wide variety of workers.
2. Is THERE A CONTRACT?
Before deciding whether ministers hold a contract of employment the courts have asked
is there a contract at all? The arguments used fall into six categories. First, the strong
theme that a spiritual relationship is incompatible with a contract. Secondly, the idea
that ecclesiastical authority does not signify the existence of a contract. This is
confirmed by the complementary third idea that ministers of religion and their Church
do not intend to create legal relations. Two further arguments about consideration and
consensus ad idem are presented in specific cases. Sixthly, in regard to Church of
England priests, the argument that office holders cannot hold a contract is presented.
In Re Employment of Church of England Curates9 the High Court held that the
curate did not have a contract of employment. Parker J. stated that the duty of obedience
a curate owed to his incumbent was regulated by ecclesiastical authority and not by
contract. This is the source of the underlying idea that there is no intention to create
legal relations. However, it might be possible to combine the two types of authority,
Coker v Diocese of Sourhwark n. 1 supra; Diocese of Southwark v Coker 25/3/96 Case Number
EAT/374/95, The Times 4th April 1996; Chalcraft v Bishop of Norwich 6/11/95 Case Number 32040/95.
President of the Methodist Conference v Parfitt [1984] ICR 176; Davies v Presbyterian Church of
Wales [1986] IRLR 194; Rogers v Booth [1937] 2 All ER 751 respectively.
Santokh Singh v Guru Nanak Gurdwara [1990] ICR 309; Guru Nanak Sikh Temple v Sharry EAT
2 1/12/90 (145/90) reported in IDS Brief 450 August 1991 pp4-6; Birmingham Mosque Trust Ltd. v Alavi
[19921 ICR 435
6 Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance [1979] ICR 900
' Chalcraft v Bishop of Norwich n.3 supra
8 Re Employment of Church of England Curates [1912] Ch2, 563; Turns v (1) S,nart (2) Carey (3) Bath
and Wells Diocesan Board of Finance, EAT 17/6/91 (510/90) reported in IDS Brief 450, August 1991
pp4-6; Coker v Diocese of Southwark n.1 and n.3 supra
Re Employment of Church of England Curates n.8 supra
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with ecclesiastical authority retained either as a part of ecclesiastical law alongside the
contract or incorporated into the contractual document. Parker J. also stated that holding
an office prevented the existence of a contract.
Twenty five years after Parker J.'s decision, the question was raised again. In
Rogers v Booth'° the Court of Appeal held that the relationship between an officer and a
general of the Salvation Army was a spiritual one. By its definition, Sir Wilfred Greene
MR said, a spiritual relationship lacks the necessary elements for a contract. The
intention of the parties when entering the arrangement was not to enter into contractual
relations." The two themes; that a spiritual relationship is incompatible with a contract
and that ministers of religion and their Church do not intend to create legal relations, are
fused together in this judgment.
Sixty years after Parker J.'s judgment came a case which comprehensively dealt
with the question, "is there a contract?" The ratio decidendi of Barthorpe' 2 is that an
office holder is not precluded from being an employee. This confirmed the decision in
102 Social Club v Bickerton that some office holders can be concurrently regarded as
employees.' 3 Barthorpe, a Church of England lay reader, brought a claim for unfair
dismissal. The industrial tribunal, applying Parker J.'s reasoning, held that a lay reader
was in the same category as a curate, that of an office holder and not an employee. The
existence of an office prevented a contract. On appeal the EAT held that the lay reader
was an office holder who potentially could hold a contract of employment. They were
unsure whether a curate was an office holder due to the post's lack of continuity.
Disregarding office holder status, they held that the presence of ecclesiastical superiority
should not preclude clergy being engaged under a Cofltract.14
In 1984 in the influential case of President of the Methodist Conference v
Parfitt,' 5 the Court of Appeal held that a Methodist minister was not employed under a
contract of employment. The reasoning was similar to that of Rogers v Booth. Dillon U.
held that the arrangements were non-contractual: "the spiritual nature of the functions of
the minister, the spiritual nature of the act of ordination.. .make it impossible to conclude
that any contract, let alone a contract of service, came into being between the newly
ordained minister and the Methodist Church." 6 Dillon U. conceded that the
undertaking of spiritual work did not necessarily preclude a contractual relationship. A
contract of service could perhaps be drafted between a minister and the Church, but this
would be a departure from the norm. In the absence of a clear indication of contrary
intent in a document, the relationship between the minister and their Church will not be
one that is regulated by contract.t7
Rogers v Booth n.4 supra
"Ibid. at p754
12 Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance n.6 supra
13 102 Social Club v Bickerton [197711CR 911
Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance n.6 supra at p906
IS President of the Methodist Conference v Parfitt n.4 supra
16 Ibid. at p182, per Dillon U.
'' Ibid. at p183
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The judgment of May U. is less general than that of Dillon U. He asks whether
the parties in this case intended to create legal relations. 18 It is unclear whether he
believes a contract could ever exist between a minister and the Methodist Church, or any
other Church. May LI. believed that the conditions of consideration and consensus ad
idem were met. Unfortunately he does not describe what the consideration was and from
which parties it flowed. The agreement, he said, was non-contractual as the parties did
not intend to create legal relations. A minister's work was incompatible with such a
legal relationship.' 9 At this point his decision appears less case specific. Rather it is
grounded in the traditional reluctance of the courts to find a contract in this sphere. Yet
there seems to be no sound policy reason to exclude an intention to create legal relations
here as there is in arrangements between spouses.
The influence of Parfitt was realised two years later in Davies v Presbyterian
Church of Wales. 2° The House of Lords held that there was no contract of employment
because no contract existed. Emphasis was placed on the spiritual nature of the pastor's
duties preventing a contract. "The duties owed by a pastor to the church are not
contractual or enforceable.. ..His duties are defined and his activities are dictated not by
contract but by conscience. He is the servant of God." 2 ' Lord Templeman added, but did
not develop the point, that in some circumstances an employee or an independent
contractor could carry out duties which were exclusively spiritual.22
In Santokh Singh v Guru Nanak Gurdwara23 the Court of Appeal endorsed the
industrial tribunal decision that there was no contract of employment between the Sikh
priest and the temple. The tribunal took account of Dillon LJ.'s principle in Parfitt that
the relationship between a Church and a minister will not usually be contractual unless a
contrary intent is shown in a document. The labelling of the priest as an employee in the
constitution of the temple was not enough to satisfy Dillon U.'s idea of contrary
intent,24 although it is arguable that the constitution was not a document in the sense that
Dillon U. intended: that is, a written agreement between the parties. The Court of
Appeal failed to distinguish between religions in its judgment. The cases it applies,
Davies and Paifitt, involve Christian Nonconformist ministers. It is by no means clear,
without further argument, that the same principles ought to be applied to all ministers
and all posts. The courts are using a reductive approach in order to dispose of these
cases. Whether ministers ought to receive the same or different treatment depending
upon their religion and post needs clarification.
In Guru Nanak Sikh Temple v Sharry25 the industrial tribunal analysed a
document which passed between the temple and the Sikh priest which was labelled a
contract. They concluded that there was an intention to enter a contractual relationship.
Reversing the decision the EAT held that the tribunal should have given greater
attention to the parties' understanding of the documents. This could suggest a variety of
18 Ibid. at p185
19 Ibid. at pp185-l86
20 Davies v Presbyterian Church of Wales n.4 supra
Ibid. at p196, per Lord Templeman
22 Ibid. at p196
23 Santokh Singh v Guru Nanak Gurdwara n.5 supra
This line of reasoning was later used in Birmingham Mosque Trust Ltd. v Alavi n.5 supra at pp44O, 444
Guru Nanak Sikh Temple v Sharry n.5 supra
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problems; that the parties were not ad idem, that there was insufficient certainty of terms
or that they did not intend to enter into a contractual relationship. It is unclear which
factor or factors the EAT believed were missing. The EAT do not discuss Dillon LJ.'s
dictum of contrary intent. Was such a discussion deliberately avoided? A definition of
the nature and extent of "contrary intent" would be useful. Unless a Church is free to
exercise contrary intent and retain its spiritual duties, Dillon LJ.'s words will sound
hollow.
Turns v (1) Smart (2) Carey (3) Bath and Wells Diocesan Board of Finance 26 in
1990, circumvented the problems of spiritual duties by concentrating on consideration.
The industrial tribunal did not state whether Turns, a Church of England curate, was an
office holder or not. They held that no consideration passed from the bishop or the
incumbent to Turns. Neither the bishop nor the incumbent paid Turns. The Diocesan
Board of Finance did pay Turns, but had no control over how he carried out his duties.
No contract existed between the parties. The EAT agreed that the consideration point
was conclusive in proving that there was no contract. But reference to a lack of
consideration alone is unconvincing as an argument against the holding of a contract by
a minister of religion. Even if lack of consideration is convincing in one set of
circumstances, it is arguable that consideration could be found or achieved by design in
other cases.
In a recent case, Birmingham Mosque Trust Ltd. v Alavi, 27 the EAT applied a
reductive approach to the whole issue of ministers of religion and contracts. Initially the
industrial tribunal held that there was a contract of employment between the khateeb and
the trust. Their finding was based upon there being sufficient certainty of terms in an
exchange of letters and there being an intention to create legal relations. 28 The
agreement defined salary, hours of work and the nature of the applicant's duties. They
believed that Alavi's appointment was different to that of Parfitt, Davies and Santokh
Singh in that it was governed exclusively by the exchange of letters. There was no
religious service at which he was appointed or any constitution or other document
governing his appointment.29
The EAT agreed that the trust could enter into contracts, but were concerned that
this should not extend to religious personnel. "The problems arise where religious
factors are introduced and it seems to us desirable that the same broad brush approach
should be taken by all those faced with this issue." 30 Should such reductionism be
followed? Ministers of religion are not homogenous. They all share a spiritual function,
agreed, but they do differ in how they are appointed and dismissed and what duties they
are required to perform. Also, ministers of the Church of England are the only ministers
to enjoy the status of an office holder. Shouldn't the approach be to proceed as
specifically as possible with regard to the religion and denomination one is dealing with,
appreciating that there will be different posts within that religion or denomination?
26 Turns v (1) Smart (2) Carey (3) Bath and Wells Diocesan Board of Finance n.8 supra
27 Birmingham Mosque Trust Ltd. v Alavi n.5 supra
28 Ibid. at p440
29 Ibid. at p443
30 Ibid. at p440, per Wood J.
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Referring to the question; "is there a contract?", Wood J. asked whether there
was sufficient certainty of offer and acceptance for the parties to be ad idem. Secondly,
was there an intention to create legal relations? 31 The tribunal had failed to decide these
two points. There is no discussion of whether the parties achieved consensus ad idem. It
might have been thought that they clearly had: Alavi had come to the UK on the
invitation of the trust on terms negotiated in a correspondence between them and had
worked on these terms until his dismissal. The EAT found that the tribunal had not
made a finding on the consensus ad idem point. This returns the focus to contractual
intention. The EAT noted the religious nature of the khateeb's duties. The presence of
"religious factors" prevented a contract. 32 Although Wood J. quotes Dillon LJ.'s dictum
regarding contrary intent, he does not himself expand the point. One is left with the
feeling that religious factors will be used in a broad brush way to prevent contracts.
The possibility of a minister of religion holding a contract was given hope in the
recent industrial tribunal decision in Coker, only to be dashed by the EAT decision
which followed. 33 The tribunal, chaired by Professor Rideout, held that a curate could
have a contract of employment with the Church of England.
Rideout criticises Parker J.'s first argument in -Re Employment of Church of
England Curates, that the duty of obedience emanates from ecclesiastical authority and
not contract. The policy reasons given by Parker J. fail to convince Rideout. The fact
that the finding of employee status might impose common law liabilities on the
incumbent provides no genuine reason to prevent a contract. 34 Additionally, why does
he look only to the incumbent? A more appropriate contracting party, says Rideout,
would either be the bishop who has the power of appointment and dismissal, or the
diocese who pays the curate, although he does not firmly state who the employer is.
Parker J.'s second argument, that an office prevents a contract, is inconsistent with the
decisions of Bickerton and Barthorpe which state that some office holders can
concurrently be employees. This is not pertinent to Rideout's argument as he does not
consider a curate to be an office holder.35
Rideout interprets the old authorities as developing a presumption that no
contractual relationship was intended in relationships involving religious personnel. He
gains more comfort from Lord Templeman in Davies who stated that it would be
possible for an employee or an independent contractor to carry out exclusively spiritual
duties. if Davies could have pointed to a contract between himself and the Church,
Rideout believes that contract might have been a contract of employment. Modern
authorities are moving towards the idea that spiritual duties can be the subject of a
contract. Rideout held that a contract of employment should be assumed, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, in the case of a Church of England curate.36
' Ibid. at p441
32 Ibid. at p443
Coker v Diocese of Southwark n.1 supra
Re Employment of Church of England Curates n.8 supra at p570
Whether curates are office holders is a moot point. Re Employment of Church of England Curates,
Bickerton and the EAT in Coker state that a curate is an office holder. Barthorpe was unsure as to whether
a curate fell within the description of an office holder.
36 Ibid. at p572
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On appeal the EAT held that the curate was not an employee. 37
 Hull J. endorsed
Parker J.'s propositions that a curate's duties are not defined by contract but emanate
from ecclesiastical authority and that the holding of an office prevents a contract. Hull J.
interprets Parfitt and Davies as endorsing the former proposition. Rideout, by failing to
consider authority and the formularies of the Church of England, made a personal
decision based upon what he thought modern policy ought to be. The position of a
curate is not res integra. Hull J. held that the rights of the curate are not conferred by
contract but by ecclesiastical law. 38
 This is a novel interpretation of the Leading
authorities. Discussion had previously centred around spiritual duties preventing a
contract. Where does Hull J.'s decision leave the presumption of non-contractual
intention? He states that it was not a ground of previous decisions that the spiritual
quality of the relationship could not be regulated by contract. 39
 But this is what Parfltt
and Davies said.4°
The ecclesiastical authority argument bypasses the questionable idea of spiritual
duties preventing a contract, instead focusing on the source of law which regulates the
clergy. Ecclesiastical authority, although not contractual, does have legal significance.
Could one concurrently be regulated by ecclesiastical and contractual authority? 4 ' One
must look at the nature of ecclesiastical law. Denning categorised Church of England
matters into three groups.42
 First, in its technical sense, ecclesiastical law means law
solely administered by ecclesiastical courts and persons. Secondly, law may be
exclusively administered by the temporal courts, despite its concern with ecclesiastical
affairs; an example being the criminal law of blasphemy. Finally, some laws are
administered by both ecclesiastical and temporal courts, for example in regard to
sequestration. Hull J. classifies clergy discipline as technical ecclesiastical law, implying
that this category prohibits the influence of a dual source of authority, such as contract.
Whilst this is a persuasive argument, it is arguable that the categories are not static;
jurisdiction can be transferred. Temporal courts have jurisdiction regarding divorce
which previously was the preserve of the ecclesiastical courts. 43
 Additionally, this
decision relates only to the established Church with its unique form of ecclesiastical
authority. Where does this leave other Christian denominations and other religions?
Also what would happen if the Church were disestablished and ecclesiastical law
became merely a body of rules agreed by the members of the Church?
The final case which discusses "is there a contract" is Chalcraft.45 An industrial
tribunal ruled that a priest-in-charge of the Church of England was not an employee.
Coming before the EAT decision in Coker the tribunal nevertheless maintained
Rideout's decision to be of no assistance. This may be because the decision related only
Diocese of Southwark v Coker n.3 supra
38 Ibid. at p17
Ibid. at p16
° President of the Methodist Conference v Pafitt n.4 supra at p1 82; Davies v Presbyterian Church of
Wales n.4 supra at p196
' A parallel can be drawn with the question; can one concurrently be an office holder and an employee?
42 Denning, A. (1944) "The Meaning of Ecclesiastical Law" 60 LQR 235 at p238
4° Dale, Sir William (1989) The Law of the Parish Church ppl 18-119 (London, Butterworths)
Denning, A. (1944) op. cit., p235
Chaicraft v Bishop of Norwich n.3 supra
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to curates. However, Chaicraft is couched in terms applying to all ministers, leaving the
impression that Rideout's decision was flawed.
First, the tribunal stated that the applicant had not established an intention to
create legal relations with the bishop or any other bodies of the Church. No thought was
given to the nature of the relationship until the dispute arose. This reasoning gives
ministers and their Churches an opportunity in future to think about their relationships
and to argue that they do have an intention to contract. Secondly, consideration was
missing from the agreement. The payment received by Church of England priest was
described as a stipend to pursue a calling and not a salary. This is not remuneration in
the conventional sense. It was held that the stipend is incapable of establishing
consideration.46
The question "is there a contract?" divides the authorities into three camps. The
old authorities of Re Employment of Church of England Curates (1912) and Rogers v
Booth (1937) use a presumption of non-contractual intention, the former holding that
duty emanates from ecclesiastical authority not contract, the latter that a spiritual
relationship prohibits a contract. The EAT decision in Coker returns to this presumptive
stance.
Bridging the gap between spiritual duties and contract formation come modem
authorities starting with Parfitt. Dillon U., whilst accepting the usual parameter of non-
contractual intention, pointed to a situation where this might be overcome. A similar
statement was made in Davies by Lord Templeman. Both Santokh Singh (1990) and
Sharry (1990) followed Paifltt. Whilst following Parfitt and Davies, the EAT in Alavi
(1992) showed a reluctance to detail specific guidelines for ministers of religion.
The third group comprises two cases which have a positive view of contracts and
spiritual duties. Barthorpe (1979) was progressive for its time, holding that Church of
England curates were not prohibited from forming contracts. Barthorpe also
distinguished different Church of England posts. Not until 1995 and the industrial
tribunal decision in Coker was another progressive move made. The presumption of
non-contractual intention was turned on its head. The significance of the decision has
withered following the EAT decision. The hope is that Rideout's arguments will be
taken up in a future case.
3. Is THERE A CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT?
Once a contract has been established, one must decide whether it is a contract of
employment. Church of England priests, with the possible exception of curates, are
already office holders, but does this prevent them holding a contract of employment?
A. Office holders
An office holder is neither employed nor self-employed. The classic definition of an
office is found in Great Western Railway Company v Bater: "an office was a
subsisting, permanent, substantive position, which had an existence independent of the
Ibid. at p3
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person who filled it, and which went on and was filled in succession by successive
holders."47 In Edwards v Clinch48 Lord Lowry added that an office holder holds a
specific post which he or she can vacate. The post must be permanent in that it has an
existence independent of the person holding it. The continuity required of the post is
that it can last beyond the holder leaving it, with the opportunity of a new holder being
appointed.49
Traditionally office holders have had available the public law action of judicial
review. Office holders, including ecclesiastical office holders, are not given express
statutory protection by the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 regarding
unfair dismissal. Office holders must argue that they can concurrently be regarded as
employees.
Bickerton5° held that some office holders would be regarded as employees,
whilst others would not. One must look at the office and decide whether there is
sufficient of the nature of employment to hold that he or she is an employee. 5 ' Bickerton
was the secretary of a social club. The court was concerned with the payment involved.
Was it a honorarium or a salary? How large was the payment? Was it fixed in advance?
Was the payment made contractually for the services? 52
 In Sharry it was argued that too
much emphasis was being placed on wages, for this on its own does not establish a
contract of employment. The EAT said remuneration was a neutral issue. 53
 In Rogers v
Booth the court was keen to find that the applicant received maintenance payments and
not a wage. This was one reason why the applicant did not have a contract of
employment. 54
 The main reason for rejecting employee status was that there was no
contractual intention. The latter two cases, although not involving office holders,
suggest that one should not look to pay alone. Chaicraft shows that the courts are still
preoccupied with consideration.
Bickerton uses a control criterion to divide office holders into two groups: those
who exercise the functions of an independent office, in the way that a curate or a police
officer does, and those who are subject to the control and orders of another. 55
 The first
group only have public law protection. The second group benefit from public and
private law. Bickerton makes no definition of the term curate. It may refer to a curate
who is an assistant to the incumbent or it might be using the term in its old usage as
incumbent. Whichever meaning is intended, both a "curate" and an incumbent are
controlled via ecclesiastical authority, neither is truly independent. A truly independent
office is hard to find. Bickerton does not clarify which office holders are employees and
which are not.
Great Western Railway Company v Bater [1 920J 3 KB 266 at p274, per Rowlatt J.
48 
Edwards v Clinch [1981] 3 All ER 543
Ibid. at p558, per Lord Lowry
° 
102 Social Club v Bickerton n.13 supra
' Ibid. at p919
52 Ibid. at p919. The case was remitted to be heard by a differently constituted tribunal.
Guru Nanak Sikh Temple v Sharry n.5 supra
Rogers v Booth n.4 supra at p755
102 Social Club v Bickerron n.13 supra at p920
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B. Case decisions
The element of control has been regarded as of particular importance in cases involving
ministers of religion. Most ministers can find someone who controls their work.
Additionally, the idea of service seems equally applicable to ministers of religion who
arguably serve their Church as well as their God. It is only now that the problem "who is
the employer?" can be tackled. When asking "is there a contract?" one has to establish
that there are contracting parties that can be identified. The issue of consideration has
raised this problem. Who pays the minister? This overlaps with the question "is there a
contract of employment?" because one must ask; if X pays Y, does X control Y, or does
Y serve X?
In the earliest case considering this question, Re Employment of Ministers of the
United Methodist Church,56 the High Court held that Methodist ministers were not
employed under a contract of employment. Joyce J. thought that even if they appeared to
be employees, it was not possible to identify who was their employer. 57 There could not
be a contract of employment as no identifiable employer was found. By definition this
meant that a contract could not exist.
Later in 1912 came the ruling in Re Church of England Curates. Parker J. stated
that a curate was an office holder and not an employee. 58 The existence of a contract of
employment was dismissed by examining the appointment and dismissal of a curate.
The appointment of a curate is not made by the incumbent. Rather, the incumbent
nominates him or her and the appointment is made by the bishop. The incumbent cannot
dismiss the curate without the bishop's consent. Parker J's. reasoning is that the
incumbent does not employ the curate. He did not consider whether the bishop or the
diocese might employ the curate. The bishop does after all appoint, and if necessary
authorise the removal of a curate. The attitude of Parker J. is to work from the premise
that a curate cannot have a contract of employment and to find reasons to justify this,
rather than looking at the nature of the clerical relationship.
Twenty five years later a rigorous approach to the question "is there a contract of
employment?" was still lacking. Rogers v Booth looked at one factor which might
suggest a contract of employment. The fact that money was regularly paid to the officer
was held to be merely maintenance payments and could not be likened to a wage or
salary paid under a contract of employment. This seems to suggest that the presence of a
wage would be appropriate evidence of a contract of employment. If the court had
answered the question "is there a contract?" in the affirmative, the issue of remuneration
alone might not have prevented the existence of a contract of employment. The court in
Rogers v Booth partially answered the question "is there a contract of employment?"
when they could have given judgment only on question one: "is there a contract?" The
partial answer serves only to cloud the confusion on the status of remuneration as a
function of a contract of employment.
56 Re Employment of Ministers of the United Methodist Church [1912] 1O7LT 143
Ibid. at p144
58 Re Employment of Church of England Curates n.8 supra at pp568-569
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In 1979, hope but little substance, was given to the idea that some office holders
might have a contract of employment. The EAT in Barthorpe believed that the holding
of an office did not prevent a person having a contract of employment in some
situations. The categories should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. 59 The EAT
reviewed office holders whom they believed could not hold a contract of employment;
incumbents, bishops deans. 6° Others engaged in ministry such as curates and lay readers,
might be employees and office holders concurrently. 6 ' However, the EAT gave no clear
guidance on when a contract of employment might be found. Their only point was on
control and this was vague.62
 There is no adequate explanation of why bishops and
incumbents are precluded from employee status. The court viewed their ecclesiastical
superiority as preventing a contract of employment. It is arguable that all priests and
bishops belong to one Holy Order of presbyters and nothing should distinguish them.
The notion of a contract of employment was examined in a limited way in
Parfltt. Dillon U. concentrated on the spiritual nature of the duties precluding a contract
of employment. An employee serves their employer. A minister serves God, and not the
Church, as his master.63
 But as a representative of Christ on earth the priest does serve
their congregation and parishioners. It is an interactive ministry, rather than being
confined to prayerful devotion as characterised by religious communities of monks.
Likewise, in Davies Lord Templeman's emphasis was on the pastor serving God,
not an employer. In all religions there is a personal commitment by the minister to serve
their God. Lord Templeman had suggested that an employee might carry out exclusively
spiritual duties. Does the personal service argument prevent this happening? Spiritual
duties, on this interpretation will always lack the necessary element of service to provide
a contract of employment. Taking a wider view of service, there is no reason why a
priest serving their Church (their employer) has to prevent a priest serving their God; the
two types of service should coincide.
In both cases involving Sikh priests, evidence potentially pointed to a contract of
employment. In Santokh Singh the Court of Appeal congratulated the industrial tribunal
on its reasoning which rejected the existence of a contract of employment. The tribunal
balanced spiritual duties against factors which pointed towards a contract of
employment. This is an interesting approach suggesting that if indicators of a contract of
employment are strong enough they will outweigh a second presumption: the
presumption of no contract of employment where duties are principal]y spiritual. This
"presumption" is not identified as such, but it appears to be applied in case decisions.
In Sliarry the industrial tribunal failed to distinguish between a contract and a
contract of employment. They used a multi-factor approach to decide whether there was
contractual intention. They considered; organisation, control, finance and mutuality of
obligation, thus collapsing the first and second questions. Emphasis was placed on the
fact that the priest was paid. The EAT disapproved of this emphasis on wages. This did
not establish a contract of employment. Contracts of employment were not discussed in
" Barthorpe v Exeter Diocesan Board of Finance n.6 supra at p904
60 Ibid. at p904
61 Ibid. at p906. They were undecided whether a curate was indeed an office holder.
62 Ibid. at p906
63 President of the Methodist Conference v Parfitt n.4 supra at ppl82-l83
276
terms of control or service. The basis on which the EAT decided that there was no
contract of employment was by balancing spiritual duties against secular duties. Again
there seems to be the unspoken presumption of no contract of employment where duties
are principally spiritual. In itself this is bound up with the notions of control and service
and how these square with spiritual duties.
The applicant in Turns used the control test to argue that he had a contract of
employment. The incumbent exercised control over the manner in which Turns carried
out his duties and was in a position to discipline Turns if he failed to exercise his duties
properly. The industrial tribunal considered that the control the incumbent held over the
curate was not materially different from that exercised by the bishop over the
incumbent. They believed that because the incumbent was not subject to a contract of
employment neither would be the curate. The presence of control was not enough to
indicate a contract of employment. What preoccupies the tribunal is the presumption
against a contract of employment if a minister is involved.
Turns appealed to the EAT saying that the curate has a different relationship
with their incumbent, from that which an incumbent has with their bishop. Turns
considered the curate was under greater control than the incumbent. The EAT, rejecting
the appeal, did not examine control as the consideration point was conclusive. On the
control point, the industrial tribunal were not arguing that control was not present, rather
they said control alone was not enough. Might it be that the EAT were using
consideration to sabotage the finding of a contract of employment? Consideration is not
usually the hardest contractual feature to find. The use of lack of consideration as the
ratio decidendi of Turns blocks the control point being aired.
The control test was pursued by the industrial tribunal in Alavi. They held that
there was a contract of employment because in the performance of his religious duties
he was under the control of the trust. The EAT held that the tribunal had failed to look at
the religious nature of the relationship. The khateeb has religious duties and is a
religious appointment. 64 Alavi uses the presumption of no contract of employment
where duties are principally religious.
In Coker, Rideout used a balancing approach to conclude that there was a
contract of employment. The elements of spirituality were insufficient to outweigh
elements of personal service. Service, control and organisation were all present in the
relationship.65 The claim that personal spirituality runs counter to the idea of service is
acknowledged by Rideout. 66 It is arguable that they are not conflicting aims, they may
not be the same, but this does not mean that they are in conflict. Rideout argues that the
Church is involved in dictating the results of that spirituality, thus spirituality does not
outweigh the idea of service.67
The EAT held that a curate is not employed under a contract of employment but
is an office holder. Hull J. made a tentative, but undeveloped, point on the possibility of
Birmingham Mosque Trust Ltd. v Alavi n.5 supra at p444
65 Coker v Diocese of Sourhwark n. 1 supra at p573
Ibid. at p573
67 Ibid. at p573
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concurrent employee status. "[I]t is conceivable (but by no means clear) that
circumstances might exist in a particular case which showed that such a curate was
indeed employed by some person or other." 68
 On the issue of whether spiritual duties
outweigh personal service, I-lull J. describes Rideout as transgressing authority, but adds
no extra comments himself on spiritual duties.
Each case denies that a minister of religion can have a contract of employment.
The reasons for this can be placed into themes which have developed through the
century. The early cases, Re Employment of Ministers of the United Methodist Church
and Re Church of England Curates, work from the question "who is the employer?" In
the former case, Joyce J. held that although Methodist ministers may appear to be
employees the absence of an employer prevents a contract of employment. In the latter
case, Parker J.'s reasoning is to define the conclusion; that there is no contract of
employment and then work backwards to find evidence to support the conclusion. His
justification is the absence of an employer.
The leading modem authorities look for evidence which might support a contract
of employment. The EAT in Barthorpe use the control test. Dillon U. in Parfltt and
Lord Templeman in Davies concentrate on service. In each case the evidence does not
match the criteria needed for a contract of employment.
Recent, but less well known, decisions have refined the reasoning process.
Santokh Singh, Sharry, Alavi and Turns all seem to apply an initial presumption of no
contract of employment where duties are principally spiritual. Is this a throwback to
Parker J.'s reasoning? No. The intention is to balance spiritual duties against evidence
of a contract of employment. This is very different from deciding on a conclusion and
finding evidence to verify this conclusion. The industrial tribunal in Coker rebutted the
presumption with reference to Church of England curates. Rideout' s arguments were
then overruled by the EAT who return to Parker J.'s presumptive stance. The modern
approach of balancing spiritual duties against indicators of a contract of employment is
conveniently ignored by the EAT.
4. JUDICIAL REVIEW
The other cause of action open to Church of England clergy is judicial review of a
decision to dismiss. 69
 As the established Church, the Church of England is a public body
exercising statutory power. Statutory restrictions on the dismissal of clergy are
contained in Measures and Canons.7° The decision to dismiss a minister of a different
Christian denomination or religion could not be challenged by way of judicial review.
These are free associations, not public bodies, who agree upon their own rules.
Why have Church of England clergy declined to use judicial review? Reasons of
expense, location and time limits could provide part of the explanation. A major reason
might be the attractiveness of unfair dismissal as a cause of action. In such a case the
68 Diocese of Southwark v Coker n.3 supra at pp9-iO, per Hull J.
69	
v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, held that the decision to dismiss was capable of review.
70 Statutory restrictions include; Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977; Incumbents
(Vacation of Benefices) (Amendment) Measure 1993; Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963; Church
of England (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure 1976 s 2(1); Canon C12 paras 1, 5
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employer must reveal the reason for dismissal and show that it was a fair reason. 71 The
employer should have acted reasonably in treating the reason as a sufficient reason for
dismissal. 72 The branch of judicial review termed "irrationality" uses a test of
reasonableness. 73 To be capable of being reviewed a decision must be one that no
authority properly directing itself on the law and acting reasonably could have reached.74
It is thought that the test under unfair dismissal is easier for an "employee" to claim than
the test under judicial review, which could explain the use of private law. One question
remains: who would be the respondent? As a parallel to the question, "who would be the
employer in private law?" is the question, "who would be the respondent in public
law?"
Following O'Reilly v Mackman75 the distinction between public and private law
has been heightened. The court may now treat it as an abuse of process if an applicant
uses private law when it was appropriate to use public law. Conceivably the Church of
England might claim this if further private law actions are taken by clergy.
5. CONCLUSION
There are approximately 10,000 male and female priests in the Church of England. This
is a significant number of workers who are denied employment rights and who have no
satisfactory alternative procedure. The use of a broad brush approach to all cases
involving the clergy denies a comprehensive understanding of the different posts in the
Church of England. The MSF union, who have a clergy section, acknowledge that at
present the legal status of the clergy cannot be treated in a reductive way. A survey
conducted by MSF concerning clergy conditions of service asks whether clergy would
like to be classified in future as a homogenous body; as employees. It is in the interest of
unbeneficed clergy (curates and priests-in-charge), 57.5% of whom favoured the reform.
This was against 38.1% of beneficed clergy (incumbents). Many incumbents would
consider employee status as a diminution of status, if it were in place of freehold
status.76
 The abolition of the freehold was mooted and rejected. It appears unlikely that
incumbents will be "levelled down" to employee status. The hope remains that
unbeneficed clergy will gain employment rights. Ministers of different denominations
and religions have neither public or private law protection. A thorough definition of the
legal status of this growing band of workers is urgently required.
EMMA BRODIN
University of Huddersfield
71 Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 ss 57 (1), (2)
Devis vArkins [19771 ICR 662 at p676
Council of Civil Service Unions v Ministerfor the Civil Service [1984] 3 WLR 1174 at p1196
Gordon, R.J.F. (1985)Judicial Review: Law and Procedure p19 (London, Sweet & Maxwell)
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APPENDIX B
The Pilot Questionnaire: Ripon Diocese
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Questionnaire One
Male and Female Clergy in Church of England Ministry
Please tick ONE box only in each question unless the question asks you to tick
ALL answers that are relevant to you. Other questions require short answers. If there
is inadequate space for any of your answers please continue on the blank side of the
questionnaire, indicating which question you are answering.
Please do not be put off by the length of the questionnaire. The questions are directed
to clergy at different levels of experience. Thus you will not be required to answer
every question. Instead the questions have been filtered so that you only answer
questions relevant to your circumstances. I have made the questionnaire as short as
possible, and each question has been used with a particular research objective in mind.
I hope that you will be able to complete all the relevant questions. However, if you are
unable or unwilling to answer a particular question please leave it blank and move
onto the next question. If there are details that you cannot remember exactly then
please give estimates when you can do so with reasonable confidence, otherwise leave
blank.
Your answers will' remain absolutely CONFIDENTIAL. Names will not be
associated with responses.
SECTION ONE: To be completed by ALL CLERGY replying to the questionnaire.
1.1 Sex	 Male Eli Female E
1.2 What was your age last birthday''.............
1.3 Description of present office held
Deacon (serving first year of curac )
Curate (who has been priested)
Priest-in-charge
Vicar/Rector LI
flt1-,.r	 crc.ifu\
'..JL1Jt#L	 jJIUO# O1J'S_ALJ /.......................................................................................................
1.4 Status of office
Beneficed LI	 Licensed for a term of years LI
Licensed under the bishop's discretion LI
Other(please specify).......................................................................................................
1.5 Dates of ordination. Please fill in month and year of ordination as applicable.
Deaconess(Admitted)......................................................................................................
Deacon(Ordained)...............................................................................................................................
Priest(Ordained)...................................................................................................................................
Team Rector LI
Team Vicar LI
NSM (Curate) LI
NSM (Priest-in-charge) LI
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1.6 How many clerical posts have you held in the Church of England? Please DO
NOT include work as a deaconess...................
1.6.a How many of these posts were stipendiary posts7................
1.7 Have you previously worked in a different occupation(s)? Yes El No El
1.7.a If you answered YES please give a brief description of the
occupation(s)....................................................................................................................
Education
1.8 How old were you when you left school7..............
1.8.a Was your theological training; 	 Full time Eli] Part time [I]
1.8.b Do you hold a university degree?	 Yes El No El
1.8.c Do you hold a postgraduate degree, such as a Masters de ree, MPhil or PhD?
Yes El No
Family
1.9 Marital status. Are you;
Single El
Married El
Separated or divorced El
Widowed El
1.9.a if you are MARRIED does your spouse currently hold a clerical office in the
Church of England?	 Yes El No El
1.9.b Do you have any other relatives who currently hold a clerical office in the
Church of England?	 Yes El No El
1.9.c Have you any dependants? 	 Yes Li No El
Arethese your children or other relatives7.......................................................................
You
1.10 Do you have a disability? 	 Yes El No El
1.11 Which broad ethnic group do you belong to?
White El	 Asian El
Afro-Caribbean El
Other(please specify).......................................................................................................
1.12 How would ou describe your churchmanship?
Strong catholic	 Central churchmanship El
Moderate catholic El	 Evangelical El
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Other(please specify).......................................................................................................
Mobility
(Please tick ALL answers which are relevant to you.)
Clergy who have held MORE THAN ONE post, GO TO 1.13.
Clergy who have held ONLY ONE post, GO TO 1.14
1.13 After leaving your first post where did you go to? If you have held several posts,
please tick all the boxes which appi to your different posts. Did you;
a) Stay within the same benefice
b) Move to a different part of the deanery you were already in El
c) Move outside the deanery, but inside the same diocese, you were already in El
d) Move to a different diocese LI
e) Other (please specify)...................................................................................................
Now GOTO 1.14
1.14 Present mobility
(Please tick ONE box for each question)
If a suitable post was offered to you now, could you take it if it were;
a) Within the same benefice.	 Yes LI No LI
b) In a different part of the deanery you were already in.	 Yes LI No El
c) Outside the deanery, but inside the same diocese you were already in.
Yes El No El
d) In a different diocese.	 Yes El No El
If you answered NO to any question why is this? Please tick ALL answers which are
relevant to you.
a) Spouse's job LI
b) Children's schooling LI
c) Responsibility for dependants other than children LI
d) Because you do not want to leave the area you live in LI
e) Other reasons (please specify)......................................................................................
Now go to section two
SECTION TWO: YOUR PRESENT POST: to be completed by ALL CLERGY
replying to the questionnaire.
The Benefice (tick ONE box only)
2.1 How would you describe your present benefice;
a) An inner city area LI	 d) A mixture of (a) and (b) El
b) A suburban area LI	 e) A mixture of (b) and (c) LI
c) A rural area LI
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fl Other (please specify) 	 .
2.2 Is the benefice;
a) A single benefice with one parish or separate parishes LI
b) A single benefice with parishes united into one LI
c) A single benefice with some arishes united and others left separate LI
d) Benefices held in plurality
e) Other arrangement (please specify)..............................................................................
2.3 How many parishes are you responsible for7..............
2.3.a Are you involved in a team ministry?	 Yes LI No LI
2.3.b Are you involved in a group ministry? 	 Yes LI No U
2.4 How did you hear about the post? if you heard about it in several ways please tick
ALL the relevant boxes.
Informal contacts LI	 Advertisement in a newspaper LI
Other(please specify).......................................................................................................
2.5 Did you have a formal interview? 	 Yes LI No LI
2.5.a if you did, who was present at the interview? Please indicate their status, e.g.
incumbent, parish representatives, not their individual names.........................................
2.6 Was your sex used as a criterion of SELECTION for the job?
Yes LI (GO TO 2.7 if ou are a man! 2.8 if you are a woman)
No LI Don't Know	 (GO TO 2.11)
2.7 Was this because;
(Please tick ALL answers which are relevant to you.)
a) Diocesan bishop's declaration against women priests in place LI
b) Resolutions A and!or B in place LI
c) Other reasons (please specify) LI
d) You don't know LI
Now GO TO 2.11
2.8 Was this a reverse discrimination policy?
Yes LI (GO TO 2.9)
No LI Don't Know LI (GO TO 2.11)
2.9 What makes you think that reverse discrimination was occurring?
a) This is your subjective assessment of the situation LI (GO TO 2.11)
b) You were told that the policy was in operation LI (GO TO 2.10)
2.10 When were you told about the policy?
(Please tick ALL answers which are relevant to you.)
a) In the job advertisement [1
b) Formally at the interview LI
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c) Formally after being selected El
d) Informally during the selection rocess El
e) Informally after being selected
2.11 TREATMENT WHILST AT WORK
Whilst WORKING in your present post, do you think that you have ever received
less favourable treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of the bishop's
declaration and Resolutions A and/or B)
Yes Ll(GOTO2.12)
No El Don't Know El (GO TO 2.14)
2.12 Who was the source of the less favourable treatment? If it came from more than
one source tick the relevant boxes accordingly.
Your incumbent El
Your diocesan bishop El
Members of your team ministry El
Members of your group ministry El
The patron of the benefice El
Parochial church council members El
Others(please specify status)...........................................................................................
2.13 If you ticked any of the boxes, please give brief details of the incident(s)...............
2.13.a Is it a continuing problem or an isolated incident'1................................................
2.13.b Did you speak to anyone about the incident?	 Yes El No El
Who'1................................................................................................................................
If yes, was any action taken? Yes El No El Don't Know El
Ifyes, what action was taken7..........................................................................................
Has this action prevented the treatment you complained of recurring?
Yes El No El Don't Know El
2.14 Financial position regarding present post.
If you are a NON-STIPENDIARY minister GO TO 2.15.
If you are a STIPENDIARY minister GO TO section three
2.15 Is your non-stipendiary ministry; Full Time El Part Time El
Are you in a non-stipendiary post through;
a) Choice El (GO TO 2.16)
b) Factors beyond your control El (GO TO 2.17)
2.16 Is it because;
(Please tick ALL answers which are relevant to you.)
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i) You have another job LI
ii) You have another source of income (either savings or a partner's income or a
pension) LI
iii) Other reasons of choice (please specify).....................................................................
Now GO TO section three
2.17 Is it because;
(Please tick ALL answers which are relevant to you.)
i) Your applications for stipendiary posts were rejected LI
ii) There were no sti endiary posts which you were qualified for in the area you
wanted to apply to
iii) Your spouse is a priest and diocesan policy states that only one spouse may hold a
stipendiary post LI
iv) Other factors beyond your control (please specify)....................................................
Now GO TO section three
SECTION THREE: FIRST CURACY - To be completed by ALL CLERGY
replying to the questionnaire
3.1 How many applications did you make before you received your first curacy7..........
3.2 At ANY stage in your SEARCH for a first curacy did you receive less favourable
treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of the bishop's declaration and
Resolutions A and/or B)
Yes LI (GO TO 3.2.a)
No LI Don't Know LI (GO TO 3.3)
3.2.a Did this happen in regard to;
One post LI	 Three or more posts LI
Two posts LI
3.2.b Please tick ALL the ways in which you feel you received less favourable
treatment on grounds of your sex. if this happened to you several times please tick
ALL the instances which you believe a ply to you;
a) Not being selected for interview
b) Treatment at interview (for example interview questions) LI
c) Informal comments LI
d) Not being selected for the post LI
e) Other reasons (please specify)......................................................................................
3.2.c If ou ticked (a) were reasons for non-selection for interview given?
Yes	 No LI Can't Remember LI In some cases yes in others no LI
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If YES what were they? If this happened to you several times please cite as many
examplesas possible........................................................................................................
3.2.d If ou ticked (d) were reasons for non-selection for the job given?
Yes	 No U Can't Remember U In some cases yes in others no U
If YES what were they? If this happened to you several times please cite as many
examplesas possible........................................................................................................
3.2.e Who was the source(s) of the less favourable treatment?
(Please tick ALL boxes which are relevant to you)
The incumbent U
The diocesan bishop U
Others(please specify their status)...................................................................................
3.3 TREATMENT WHILST AT WORK in first curacy. DO NOT answer this
question if this is your PRESENT POST, instead go to the end of the questionnaire)
Whilst WORKING in your first curacy, do you think that you have ever received less
favourable treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of the bishop's
declaration and Resolutions A andlor B)
Yes U (GO TO 3.4)
No U Don't Know U (GO TO section 4)
3.4 II you answered YES, who was the source of the less favourable treatment? If it
came from more than one source tick the relevant boxes accordingly.
Your incumbent U
	
Members of your group ministry U
Your diocesan bishop U	 The patron of the benefice U
Members of your team ministry U	 Parochial church council members U
Others(please specify status)...........................................................................................
3.5 If you ticked any of the boxes, please give brief details of the incident(s).................
3.5.a Was it a continuing problem or an isolated incident7.............................................
3.5.b Did you speak to anyone about the incident? 	 Yes U No U
Who7................................................................................................................................
If yes, was any action taken? 	 Yes U No U Don't Know U
Ifyes, what action was taken9..........................................................................................
Did this action prevent the treatment you complained of recurrin ? 	 Yes U
No	 Don't Know U
Now go to section four
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SECTION FOUR: SECOND CURACY - to be completed by ALL CLERGY who
have applied for a second curacy
4.1 Have you applied for a second curacy?	 Yes El No El
If you answered NO go to end of questionnaire
If you answered YES, were you successful?
Yes El (GO TO 4.2)
No El (GO TO 4.3)
4.2 How many applications did you make before you got your post' ....... . (GO TO 4.4)
4.3 How many applications have you made so far2.............
4.3.a Are there reasons OTHER THAN YOUR SEX, why you might have been
unsuccessful? E.g. your experience or style of churchmanship. Please give details........
........................................................................................... (GO TO 4.4)
4.4 To ALL CLERGY who have applied for a second curacy, whether
SUCCESSFUL OR NOT, have you at ANY stage in your search for a second curacy
received less favourable treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of the
bishop's declaration and Resolutions A andlor B)
Yes El (GO TO 4.4.a)
No El Don't Know El (GO TO 4.5)
4.4.a Did this happen in regard to;
One post El
Two posts El
Three or more posts El
4.4.b Please tick ALL the ways in which you feel you received less favourable
treatment on grounds of your sex. if this happened to you several times please tick
ALL the instances which you believe a ply to you;
a) Not being selected for interview
b) Treatment at interview (for example interview questions) El
c) Informal comments El
d) Not being selected for the post El
e) Other reasons (please specify)......................................................................................
4.4.c If ou ticked (a) were reasons for non-selection for interview given?
Yes	 No El Can't Remember El In some cases yes in others no El
If YES what were they? If this happened to you several times please cite as many
examplesas possible........................................................................................................
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4.4.d If ou ticked (d) were reasons for non-selection for the job given?
Yes	 No El Can't Remember El In some cases yes in others no El
If YES what were they? If this happened to you several times please cite as many
examplesas possible........................................................................................................
4.4.e Who was the source(s) of the less favourable treatment?
(Please tick ALL boxes which are relevant to you)
The incumbent El	 The diocesan bishop El
Others(please specify their status)...................................................................................
4.5 TREATMENT WHILST AT WORK in second curacy. DO NOT answer this
question if this is your PRESENT POST, instead go to end of questionnaire.
Whilst WORKING in your second curacy, do you think that you have ever received
less favourable treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of the bishop's
declaration and Resolutions A and/or B)
Yes El (GO TO 4.6)
No El Don't Know El (GO TO section 5)
4.6 Who was the source of the less favourable treatment? If it came from more than
one source tick the relevant boxes accordingly.
Your incumbent El	 Members of your group ministry El
Your diocesan bishop El	 The patron of the benefice El
Members of your team ministry El	 Parochial church council members El
Others(please specify status)...........................................................................................
4.7 If you ticked any of the boxes, please give brief details of the incident(s).................
4 .7.a Was it a continuing problem or an isolated incident7.............................................
4.7.b Did you speak to anyone about the incident? 	 Yes El No El
Who7................................................................................................................................
If yes, was any action taken?	 Yes El No El Don't Know El
Ifyes, what action was taken7..........................................................................................
Did this action prevent the treatment you complained of recurrin ? 	 Yes El
No	 Don't Know El
Now go to section five
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SECTION FIVE: SENIOR POSTS. To be completed by all clergy who have
applied for senior posts; vicar/rector, team vicar, team rector, priest-in-charge
5.1 Have you ever applied for any of the above posts?	 Yes LI No LI
If you answered NO go to end of questionnaire
If you answered YES were you successful?
Yes LI (GO TO 5.2)
No LI (GO TO 5.3)
5.2 How many applications did you make before you got your post"............. (GO TO
5.4)
5.3 How many applications have you made so far7...................
5.3.a Are there reasons OTHER THAN YOUR SEX, why you might have been
unsuccessful? E.g. your experience or style of churchmanship. Please give
details ................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................. (GO 	 TO
5.4.)
5.4 To ALL CLERGY who have applied for a senior post, WhETHER
SUCCESSFUL OR NOT, have you at ANY stage in your search for a senior post
received less favourable treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of the
bisho 's declaration and Resolutions A and/or B)
Yes	 (GO TO 5.4.a)
No LI Don't Know LI (GO TO 5.5)
5.4.a Did this happen in regard to;	
Two posts LIOne post
Three or more posts LI
5.4.b Please tick ALL the ways in which you feel you received less favourable
treatment on grounds of your sex. If this happened to you several times please tick
ALL the instances which you believe a ply to you;
a) Not being selected for interview
b) Treatment at interview (for example interview questions) LI
c) Informal comments LI
d) Not being selected for the post LI
e) Other reasons (please specify)......................................................................................
5.4.c If ou ticked (a) were reasons for non-selection for interview given?
Yes	 No LI Can't Remember LI In some cases yes in others no LI
If YES what were they? If this happened to you several times please cite as many
examplesas possible.......................................................................................................
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5.4.d If ou ticked (d) were reasons for non-selection for the job given?
Yes	 No LI Can't Remember LI In some cases yes in others no LI
If YES what were they? If this happened to you several times please cite as many
examplesas possible........................................................................................................
5.4.e Who was the source(s) of the less favourable treatment?
(Please tick ALL boxes which are relevant to you)
The diocesan bishop LI
Patron (if different than the bishop) LI
Parochial church council representatives LI
Members of the group ministry LI
Members of the team ministry LI
Others(please specify their status)...................................................................................
5.5 TREATMENT WHILST AT WORK in senior post. ONLY answer this
question regarding senior posts held OTHER than your PRESENT POST, otherwise
go to end of questionnaire.
Whilst WORKING in your senior post, do you think that you have ever received less
favourable treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of the bishop's
declaration and Resolutions A and/or B)
Yes LI (GO TO 5.6)
No LI Don't Know LI (go to end of questionnaire)
5.6 Who was the source of the less favourable treatment? if it came from more than
one source tick the relevant boxes accordingly.
Your incumbent LI	 Members of your group ministry LI
Your diocesan bishop LI	 The patron of the benefice LI
Members of your team ministry LI	 Parochial church council members LI
Others(please specify status)...........................................................................................
5.7 If you ticked any of the boxes, please give brief details of the incident(s).................
5 .7.a Was it a continuing problem or an isolated incident7.............................................
5.7.b Did you speak to anyone about the incident? 	 Yes LI No LI
Who9................................................................................................................................
If yes, was any action taken?	 Yes LI No LI Don't Know LI
Ifyes, what action was taken9..........................................................................................
Did this action prevent the treatment you complained of recurrin ? 	 Yes LI
No	 Don't Know LI
291
End of questionnaire: TO ALL RESPONDENTS
Thank you for your time spent in answering this questionnaire. Could I ask you to
check that no answers relevant to you have been left out. Please return the
questionnaire in the prepaid envelope. If research time permits I would like to conduct
a sample set of interviews. Please indicate whether you would be willing to participate
in a short interview with me.
Yes El No El
Space is provided below for additional comments on sex discrimination in
employment within the Church of England. Please feel free to comment on the
questionnaire design too. (E.g. questions which I could have asked, badly worded or
ill designed questions, layout of questionnaire.)
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Pilot Questionnaire Data Analysis
(1) Sample Size: Males 20, Females 29, Total Priests 49
(2) Response Rate: Males 13/20 = 65%, Females 23/29 = 79%, Total Priests 36/49 = 73%
Table B-i Perceptions of sex discrimination whilst working in and searching for a post
YES	 NO	 DON'T KNOW
Working in present
post
Males	 0/13	 10/13=77%	 3/13=23%
Females	 8/22 = 36%	 12/22 = 55%	 2/22 = 9%
Search for a first
curacy
Males	 0/13	 10/13=77%	 3/13=23%
Females	 4/22 = 18%	 17/22 = 77%	 1/22 = 5%
Working in first
curacy
Males	 0/4	 3/4=75%	 1/4=25%
Females	 6/18=33%	 10/18=56%	 2/18=11%
Search for a second
curacy
Males	 0/1	 1/1 = 100%	 0/1
Females	 2/12= 16%	 7/12=58%	 3/12=25%
Working in second
curacy
Males	 -	 -	 -
Females	 1/2 = 50%	 1/2 = 50%	 0/2
Search for a senior
post
Males	 0/2	 0/2	 2/2 = 100%
Females	 3/9 = 33%	 4/9 = 45%	 2/9 = 22%
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YES	 NO	 DON'T KNOW
Working in senior
post
Males	 -	 -	 -
Females	 1/2=50%	 1/2=50%	 0/2
Table B-2 Was sex used as a criterion of selection for your present post?
YES	 NO	 DON'T KNOW
Males	 6/12=50%	 2/12=17%	 4/1233%
Females	 4/22 = 18%	 9/22 = 41%	 9/22 = 41%
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APPENDIX C
The Final Questionnaire
50-59 LI
60-69 LI
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Male and Female Clergy in Church of England Ministry
Please tick ONE box only in each question unless the question asks you to tick
ALL answers that are relevant to you. Other questions require short answers. If there
is inadequate space for any of your answers please continue on the blank side of the
questionnaire, indicating which question you are answering.
Please do not be put off by the length of the questionnaire. The questions are directed
to clergy at different levels of experience. Thus you will not be required to answer
every question. Instead the questions have been filtered so that you only answer
questions relevant to your circumstances. I have made the questionnaire as short as
possible, and each question has been used with a particular research objective in mind.
I hope that you will be able to complete all the relevant questions. However, if you are
unable or unwilling to answer a particular question please leave it blank and move
onto the next question. If there are details that you cannot remember exactly then
please give estimates when you can do so with reasonable confidence, otherwise leave
blank.
Your answers will remain absolutely CONFIDENTIAL. Names will not be
associated with responses. In order to get a balanced return I would urge male as well
as female clergy, to return the questionnaire. I am concerned with the presence or
absence of discrimination in regard to both sexes.
SECTION ONE: To be completed by ALL CLERGY replying to the questionnaire.
1.1 Sex	 Male LI Female LI
1.2 Which age band do you fall within?
20-29 LI
30-39 LI
40-49 LI
1.3 Description of present office held
Deacon (serving first year of curac
Curate (who has been priested)
Priest-in-charge LI
Vicar/Rector LI
Other(please specify)............................
Team Rector El]
Team Vicar LI
NSM (Curate) LI
NSM (Priest-in-charge) LI
1.3.a	 If	 you	 are	 a	 curate	 is	 this	 your	 first	 or	 second
curacy9.....
1.4 Status of office
Beneficed LI	 Licensed for a term of years LI
Licensed under the bishop's discretion LI
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Other(please specify).......................................................................................................
1.5 Dates of ordination. Please fill in month and year of ordination as applicable.
Deaconess(Admitted)......................................................................................................
Deacon(Ordained)...............................................................................................................................
Priest(Ordained)...................................................................................................................................
1.6 How many clerical posts have you held in the Church of England, including your
present post? Please DO NOT include work as a deaconess...................
1.6.a How many of these posts were stipendiary posts7................
1.7 Pre-Diaconal Experience. Please give details of experience as a lay worker or a
deaconess	 or	 other	 Church	 work	 before	 ordination
Education
1.8. Was your theological training; 	 Full time U Part time U
1.8.a Do you hold a university degree? 	 Yes U No U
1.8.b Do you hold a postgraduate degree, such as a Masters de ree, MPhiI or PhD?
Yes U No
Family
1.9 Marital status. Are you;
Single U
Married U
Separated or divorced U
Widowed U
1.9.a If you are MARRIED does your spouse currently hold a clerical office in the
Church of England?	 Yes LII No U
1.9.b Do you have any other relatives who currently hold a clerical office in the
Church of England?	 Yes U No U
1.9.c Have you any dependants? 	 Yes U No U
Arethese your children or other relatives' .......................................................................
You
1.10 Do you have a disability?	 Yes U No U
1.11 Which broad ethnic group do you belong to?
White U	 Asian U
Afro-Caribbean U
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Other(please specify).......................................................................................................
1.12 How would ou describe your churchmanship?
Strong catholic	 Central churchmanship LI
Moderate catholic LI	 Evangelical LI
Other(please specify).......................................................................................................
Now go to section two
SECTION TWO: YOUR PRESENT POST: to be completed by ALL CLERGY
replying to the questionnaire.
The Parish (tick ONE box only)
2.1 How would you describe your present parish(es);
a) An inner city area LI	 d) A mixture of (a) and (b) LI
b) A suburban area LI	 e) A mixture of (b) and (c) LI
c) A rural area LI
f) Other (please specify)...................................................................................................
2.2 Are you involved in a team ministry?	 Yes LI No LI
2.3. Are you involved in a group ministry?	 Yes LI No LI
2.4 How did you hear about the post? If you heard about it in several ways please tick
ALL the relevant boxes.
Diocesan bishop LI	 Theological College LI
Incumbent LI	 Newspaper Advertisement LI
MailingList (please specify which).................................................................................
Other(please specify).......................................................................................................
2.5 Did you have a formal interview? 	 Yes LI No LI
2.5.a If you did, were you interviewed as part of a short list or were you the sole
interviewee9......................................................................................................................
2.5.b Who was present at the interview? Please indicate their status, e.g. incumbent,
parish	 representatives, 	 not	 their	 individual	 names
2.6 TREATMENT WHILST AT WORK
Whilst WORKING in your PRESENT post, do you think that you have ever
received less favourable treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of
Resolutions A and/or B)
Yes LI (GO TO 2.7)
No LI Don't Know LI (GO TO 2.9)
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2.7 Who was the source of the less favourable treatment? If it came from more than
one source tick the relevant boxes accordingly.
Your incumbent LI
Your diocesan bishop LI
Members of your team ministry LI
Members of your group ministry LI
The patron of the benefice LI
Parochial church council members LI
Others(please specify status)...........................................................................................
2.8 If you ticked any of the boxes, please give details of the incident(s).........................
2.8.a Is it a continuing problem or an isolated incident7................................................
2.8.b Did you speak to anyone about the incident?	 Yes LI No LI
Who7................................................................................................................................
If yes, was any action taken? Yes LI No LI Don't Know LI
Ifyes, what action was taken7..........................................................................................
Has this action prevented the treatment you complained of recurring?
Yes LI No LI Don't Know LI
2.9 Financial position regarding present post.
If you are a NON-STIPENDIARY minister GO TO 2.10.
If you are a STIPENDIARY minister GO TO section three
2.10 Is your non-stipendiary ministry; Full Time LI Part Time LI
Are you in a non-stipendiary post through;
a)Choice E(GOTO2.11)
b) Factors beyond your control LI (GO TO 2.12)
2.11 Is it because;
(Please tick ALL answers which are relevant to you.)
i) You have another job LI
ii) You have another source of income (either savings or a partner's income or a
pension) LI
iii) Other reasons of choice (please specify)
Now GO TO section three
2.12 Is it because;
(Please tick ALL answers which are relevant to you.)
i) Your applications for stipendiary posts were rejected LI
ii) There were no sti endiary posts which you were qualified for in the area you
wanted to apply to
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iii) Your spouse is a priest and diocesan policy states that only one spouse may hold a
stipendiary post LI
iv) Other factors beyond your control (please specify)
Now GO TO section three
SECTION THREE: FIRST CURACY - To be completed by ALL CLERGY
replying to the questionnaire
3.1 Describe how you obtained your first curacy. Was it suggested to you by the
diocesan	 bishop	 or	 a	 college	 principal?	 Please	 give	 details
3.2 At ANY stage in your SEARCH for a first curacy did you receive less favourable
treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of Resolutions A and/or B)
Yes LI (GO TO 3.2.a)
No LI Don't Know LI (GO TO 3.3)
3.2.a Did this happen in regard to;
One post 0	 Three or more posts El
Two posts 0
3.2.b Please tick ALL the ways in which you feel you received less favourable
treatment on grounds of your sex. If this happened to you several times please tick
ALL the instances which you believe a ply to you;
a) Not being selected for interview
b) Not being selected for the post LI
c) Treatment	 at	 interview,	 for example	 interview	 questions.(please
specify).............................................................................................................................
d) Informal comments (please specify) ...........................................................................
e) Other reasons (please specify) .....................................................................................
3.2.c If ou ticked (a) were reasons for non-selection for interview given?
Yes	 No LI Can't Remember [1 In some cases yes in others no LI
I
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If YES what were they? If this happened to you several times please cite as many
examplesas possible .......................................................................................................
3.2.d If ou ticked (b) were reasons for non-selection for the job given?
Yes	 No El Can't Remember El In some cases yes in others no El
If YES what were they? If this happened to you several times please cite as many
examplesas possible........................................................................................................
3.2.e Who was the source(s) of the less favourable treatment?
(Please tick ALL boxes which are relevant to you)
The incumbent El
The diocesan bishop El
Others(please specify their status)...................................................................................
3.3 TREATMENT WHILST AT WORK in first curacy. DO NOT answer this
question if you are still in your first curacy, instead go to section four)
Whilst WORKING in your first curacy, do you think that you have ever received less
favourable treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of Resolutions A
andlor B)
Yes El (GO TO 3.4)
No El Don't Know El (GO TO section 4)
3.4 If you answered YES, who was the source of the less favourable treatment? If it
came from more than one source tick the relevant boxes accordingly.
Your incumbent El	 Members of your group ministry El
Your diocesan bishop 0	 The patron of the benefice El
Members of your team ministry El	 Parochial church council members 0
Others(please specify status)...........................................................................................
3.5 If you ticked any of the boxes, please give details of the incident(s)
3.5.a Was it a continuing problem or an isolated incident'.............................................
3.5.b Did you speak to anyone about the incident? 	 Yes El No El
Who"................................................................................................................................
If yes, was any action taken?	 Yes El No El Don't Know El
Ifyes, what action was taken"..........................................................................................
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Did this action prevent the treatment you complained of recurrin ? 	 Yes LI
No	 Don't Know LI
Now go to section four
SECTION FOUR: SECOND CURACY - to be completed by ALL CLERGY who
have applied for a second curacy
4.1 Have you sought a second curacy? 	 Yes LI No LI
If you answered NO go to section five
If you answered YES, were you successful?
Yes LI (GO TO 4.3)
No LI (GO TO 4.2)
4.2 Are there reasons OTHER THAN YOUR SEX, why you might have been
unsuccessful? E.g. your experience or style of churchmanship. Please give details
......................................................................................... (GO TO 4.3)
4.3 To ALL CLERGY who have applied for a second curacy, whether
SUCCESSFUL OR NOT, have you at ANY stage in your search for a second curacy
received less favourable treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of
Resolutions A and/or B)
Yes LI (GO TO 4.3.a)
No [I Don't Know LI (GO TO 4.4)
4.3.a Did this happen in regard to;
One post LI	 Three or more posts LI
Two posts LI
4.3.b Please tick ALL the ways in which you feel you received less favourable
treatment on grounds of your sex. If this happened to you several times please tick
ALL the instances which you believe a ply to you;
a) Not being selected for interview
b) Not being selected for the post LI
c) Treatment at interview, for example interview questions. (please specify)
d) Informal comments (please specify) ...........................................................................
e) Other reasons (please specify) .....................................................................................
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4.3.c If ou ticked (a) were reasons for non-selection for interview given?
Yes	 No El Can't Remember El In some cases yes in others no El
If YES what were they? If this happened to you several times please cite as many
examplesas possible .......................................................................................................
4.3.d If ou ticked (b) were reasons for non-selection for the job given?
Yes	 No LIII Can't Remember LI] In some cases yes in others no El
If YES what were they? If this happened to you several times please cite as many
examplesas possible .......................................................................................................
4.3.e Who was the source(s) of the less favourable treatment?
(Please tick ALL boxes which are relevant to you)
The incumbent El	 The diocesan bishop El
Others(please specify their status)...................................................................................
Those who were UNSUCCESSFUL in obtaining a second curacy GO TO section
five.
Those who did obtain a second curacy GO TO 4.4
4.4 TREATMENT WHILST AT WORK in second curacy. DO NOT answer this
question if this is your second curacy, instead go to section five.
Whilst WORKING in your second curacy, do you think that you have ever received
less favourable treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of Resolutions
A and/or B)
Yes El (GO TO 4.5)
No El Don't Know El (GO TO section 5)
4.5 Who was the source of the less favourable treatment? If it came from more than
one source tick the relevant boxes accordingly.
Your incumbent El	 Members of your group ministry El
Your diocesan bishop El	 The patron of the benefice El
Members of your team ministry El	 Parochial church council members El
Others(please specify status)...........................................................................................
4.6 If you ticked any of the boxes, please give details of the incident(s)
4.6.a Was it a continuing problem or an isolated incident9.............................................
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4.6.b Did you speak to anyone about the incident?	 Yes El No El
Who7.............................................................................................................................
If yes, was any action taken? 	 Yes El No El Don't Know El
Ifyes, what action was taken7..........................................................................................
Did this action prevent the treatment you complained of recurrin ?	 Yes LI
No	 Don't Know El
Now go to section five
SECTION FIVE: SENIOR POSTS. To be completed by all clergy who have
applied for senior posts; vicar/rector, team vicar, team rector, priest-in-charge
5.1 Have you sought any of the above posts? Yes El No El
If you answered NO go to end of questionnaire
If you answered YES were you successful?
Yes El (GO TO 5.3)
No LJ(GOTO5.2)
5.2 Are there reasons OTHER THAN YOUR SEX, why you might have been
unsuccessful? E.g. your experience or style of churchmanship. Please give
details................................................................................................................................
(GO TO 5.3.)
5.3 To ALL CLERGY who have applied for a senior post, WHETHER
SUCCESSFUL OR NOT, have you at ANY stage in your search for a senior post
received less favourable treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of
Resolutions A and/or B)
Yes El (GO TO 5.3.a)
No El Don't Know El (GO TO 5.4)
5.3.a Did thOne post is happen in regard to;	
Two posts El
Three or more posts El
5.3.b Please tick ALL the ways in which you feel you received less favourable
treatment on grounds of your sex. If this happened to you several times please tick
ALL the instances which you believe a ply to you;
a) Not being selected for interview
b) Not being selected for the post El
c) Treatment at interview, for example interview questions. (please specify)
d) Informal comments (please specify) ...........................................................................
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e) Other reasons (please specify) .....................................................................................
5.3.c If ou ticked (a) were reasons for non-selection for interview given?
Yes	 No El Can't Remember El In some cases yes in others no El
If YES what were they? If this happened to you several times please cite as many
examplesas possible .......................................................................................................
5.3.d If ou ticked (b) were reasons for non-selection for the job given?
Yes	 No El Can't Remember El In some cases yes in others no El
If YES what were they? If this happened to you several times please cite as many
examplesas possible .......................................................................................................
5.3.e Who was the source(s) of the less favourable treatment?
(Please tick ALL boxes which are relevant to you)
The diocesan bishop El
Patron (if different than the bishop) El
Parochial church council representatives El
Members of the group ministry El
Members of the team ministry El
Others(please specify their status)...................................................................................
Those who were UNSUCCESSFUL in obtaining a senior post GO TO end of
questionnaire.
Those who did obtain a senior post GO TO 5.4
5.4 TREATMENT WHILST AT WORK in senior post. ONLY answer this
question regarding senior posts held OTHER than your PRESENT POST, otherwise
go to end of questionnaire.
Whilst WORKING in your senior post, do you think that you have ever received less
favourable treatment on grounds of your sex? (Excluding the use of Resolutions A
anchor B)
Yes El (GO TO 5.5)
No El Don't Know El (go to end of questionnaire)
5.5 Who was the source of the less favourable treatment? If it came from more than
one source tick the relevant boxes accordingly.
Your incumbent El	 Members of your group ministry El
Your diocesan bishop LI	 The patron of the benefice El
Members of your team ministry El	 Parochial church council members El
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Others(please specify status)...........................................................................................
5.6 If you ticked any of the boxes, please give details of the incident(s)
5.6.a Was it a continuing problem or an isolated incident ? ............................................
5.6.b Did you speak to anyone about the incident? 	 Yes E No E
Who7................................................................................................................................
If yes, was any action taken?	 Yes	 No	 Don't Know
Ifyes, what action was taken?..........................................................................................
Did this action prevent the treatment you complained of recurrin ?	 Yes fl
No	 Don't Know
End of questionnaire: TO ALL RESPONDENTS
Thank you for your time spent in answering this questionnaire. Could I ask you to
check that no answers relevant to you have been left out. Please return the
questionnaire in the prepaid envelope. If research time permits I would like to conduct
a sample set of interviews. Please indicate whether you would be willing to participate
in a short interview with me.
Yes D No LI
Space is provided below for additional comments on sex discrimination in
employment within the Church of England. Please feel free to comment on the
questionnaire design too. (E.g. questions which I could have asked, badly worded or
ill designed questions, layout of questionnaire.)
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Final Questionnaire Data Analysis
Table C-i Sample size
MALES	 FEMALES	 TOTAL PRIESTS
Blackburn	 26	 10	 36
Chichester	 36	 21	 57
Gloucester	 19	 25	 44
Guildford	 23	 29	 52
London	 57	 57	 114
Newcastle	 14	 19	 33
Truro	 13	 12	 25
Worcester	 12	 27	 39
TOTAL SURVEY	 200	 200	 400
Table C-2 Response rate
MALES	 FEMALES	 TOTAL PRIESTS
Blackburn
Response rate	 17/26 = 65%	 7/10 = 70%	 24/36 = 67%
Uncompleted returns	 3/26 = 12%	 2/10 = 20%	 5/36 = 14%
Non returns	 6/26 = 23%	 1/10 = 10%	 7/36 19%
Chichester
Responserate	 18/36=50%	 17/21=81%	 35/57=61%
Uncompleted returns 	 3/36 = 8%	 1/21 = 5%	 4/57 = 7%
Non returns	 15/36 = 42%	 3/21 = 14%	 18/57 = 32%
Gloucester
Response rate
	 15/19 = 79%
	 14/25 = 56%
	 29/44 = 66%
Uncompleted returns
	 1/19 = 5%	 5/25 = 20%	 6/44 = 14%
Non returns	 3/19 = 16%	 6/25 = 24%	 9/44 = 20%
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MALES	 FEMALES	 TOTAL PRIESTS
Guildford
Response rate	 18/23 = 78%	 22/29 = 76%	 40/52 = 77%
Uncompletedreturns	 1/23=4%	 5/29= 17%	 6/52= 11.5%
Non returns	 4/23= 18%	 2/29=7%	 6/52= 11.5%
London
Response rate	 40/57 = 70%	 44/57 = 77%	 84/114 = 74%
Uncompleted returns	 3/57 = 5%	 1/57 = 2%	 4/114 = 3%
Non returns	 14/57 = 25%	 12/57 = 21%	 26/114 = 23%
Newcastle
Response rate	 13/14 = 93%	 14/19 = 74%	 27/33 = 82%
Uncompleted returns	 0/14	 4/19 = 21%	 4/33 12%
Non returns	 1/14=7%	 1/19=5%	 2/33=6%
Truro
Response rate	 9/13 = 69%	 11/12 = 92%	 20/25 = 80%
Uncompleted returns	 1/13 = 8%	 0/12	 1/25 = 4%
Nonreturns	 3/13=23%	 1/12=8%	 4/25=16%
Worcester
Response rate	 8/12 = 67%	 20/27 = 74%	 28/39 = 72%
Uncompleted returns	 1/12 = 8%	 0/27	 1/39 = 2%
Non returns	 3/12 = 25%	 7/27 = 26%	 10/39 = 26%
TOTAL SURVEY
Response rate	 138/200 = 69%	 149/200 = 74.5%	 287/400 = 72%
Uncompleted returns	 13/200 = 6.5%	 18/200 = 9%	 3 1/400 = 8%
Non returns	 49/200 = 24.5%	 33/200 = 16.5%	 82/400 = 20%
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Table C-3 Pastoral experience of initial and achieved sample: present status
INITIAL SAMPLE	 ACHIEVED SAMPLE
Deacons
Males	 24/200 = 12%	 14/136 = 10%
Females	 23/200= 11.5%	 17/147= 12%
Priests
Males	 176/200 = 88%	 122/136 = 90%
Females	 177/200 = 88.5%	 130/147 = 88%
Table C-4 Pastoral experience of initial and achieved sample: ordination dates
INITIAL SAMPLE	 ACHIEVED SAMPLE
Males
Priested in 1988	 21/200= 10.5%	 12/134 =9%
Priestedin 1989	 23/200= 11.5%	 19/134=14%
Priested in 1990	 25/200 = 12.5%	 16/134 = 12%
Priested in 1991	 20/200 = 10%	 11/134 = 8%
Priestedin 1992	 23/200= 11.5%	 16/134=12%
Priested in 1993	 24/200 = 12%	 13/134 = 10%
Priested in 1994	 27/200 = 13.5%	 20/134 = 15%
Priested in 1995	 13/200 = 6.5%	 13/134 = 10%
Deaconin 1994	 6/200=3%	 1/134=0%
Deaconin 1995	 18/200=9%	 13/134=10%
Females
Priested in 1994	 159/200 = 79.5%	 104/148 = 70%
Priested in 1995	 18/200 = 9%	 26/148 = 18%
Priested in 1996	 0	 1/148 = 1%
Deacon in 1994	 9/200 = 4.5%	 2/148 = 1%
Deaconin 1995	 14/200=7%	 15/148=10%
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Table C-5 Perceptions of sex discrimination whilst working in and searching for a post
YES	 NO	 DON'T KNOW
Working in present
post
Males	 1/138=1%	 133/138=96%	 4/138=3%
Females	 45/148 = 30%	 97/148 = 66%	 6/148 =4%
Search for a first
curacy
Males	 3/128 = 2%	 123/128 = 96%	 2/128 = 2%
Females	 24/128=19%	 89/128=68%	 15/128=12%
Working in first
curacy
Males	 2/82 = 2.5%	 78/82 = 95%	 2/82 = 2.5%
Females	 36/75 = 48%	 39/75 = 52%	 0/75
Search for a second
curacy
Males	 0/35	 33/35 = 94%	 2/35 = 6%
Females	 7/43 = 16%	 34/43 = 79%	 2/43 = 5%
Working in second
curacy
Males	 0/15	 14/15=93%	 1/15=7%
Females	 7/16 = 44%	 8/16 = 50%	 1/16 = 6%
Search for a senior
post
Males	 2/62 = 3%	 58/62 = 94%	 2/62 = 3%
Females	 15/39 = 39%	 20/39 = 51%	 4/39 = 10%
Working in senior
post
Males	 0/4	 4/4 = 100%	 0/4
Females	 1/2=50%	 1/2=50%	 0/2
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Table C-6 Present sex discrimination cross tabulated with diocese
MALES	 FEMALES
Blackburn	 -	 3/7 =43%
Chichester	 -	 11/21 = 52%
Gloucester	 -	 2/14 = 14%
Guildford	 -	 6/22 = 27%
London	 1/40=2.5%	 10/44=23%
Newcastle	 -	 3/14 = 21%
Truro	 -	 5/11=45%
Worcester	 -	 4/20 = 20%
Table C-7 Characteristics of the sample group
MALE PRIESTS	 FEMALE PRIESTS
Parochial offices
Deacon	 14/136=10%	 17/147=12%
Curate (priested) 	 6 1/136 = 45%	 93/147 = 63%
Priest-in-charge	 7/136 = 5%	 13/147 = 9%
Vicar/rector	 37/136=27%	 7/147=5%
Team vicar	 13/136 = 10%	 7/147 = 5%
Team rector	 -	 1/147 = 1%
Other	 4/136=3%	 8/147=5%
Stipendiary status
NSM curate	 28/136=21%	 57/147=39%
NSM priest-in-charge	 3/136 = 2%	 3/147 = 2%
Stipendiary clergy	 105/136 = 77%	 87/147 = 59%
Experience as a deaconess
Experience as a deaconess	 -	 4 1/149 = 28%
No experience as a deaconess 	 -	 108/149 =72%
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MALE PRIESTS	 FEMALE PRIESTS
Age
	Band2O-29	 2/138=1%	 3/147=2%
	
Band3O-39	 73/138=53%	 17/147=12%
	
Band4O-49	 32/138=23%	 47/147=32%
	
Band5O-59	 20/138=15%	 55/147=37%
	Band6O-69	 11/138=8%	 25/147=17%
Disability
	Disability	 4/138 = 3%	 6/147 = 4%
	
No disability	 134/138 = 97%	 14 1/147 = 96%
Ethnic group
White	 137/138=99%	 144/146=99%
Afro-Caribbean	 0/138	 1/146 = 0.5%
Asian	 0/138	 1/146=0.5%
Other	 1/138 = 1%	 0/146
Churchmanship
Strong catholic	 14/135 = 10%	 3/145 = 2%
Moderate catholic 	 45/135 = 33%	 55/145 = 38%
Central churchmanship	 25/135 = 19%	 42/145 = 29%
	
Evangelical	 45/1 35 = 33%	 34/145 = 23%
Catholic/evangelical	 5/135 = 4%	 7/145 = 5%
Other	 1/135 = 1%	 4/145 = 3%
Marital status
Single	 28/137 = 20%	 54/147 = 37%
Married	 107/137=78%	 75/147=51%
Separated or divorced	 2/137 = 2%	 10/147 = 7%
	
Widowed	 0/137	 8/147=5%
Spouse a cleric	 3/107 = 3%	 15/75 = 20%
Spouse not a cleric	 104/107 = 97%	 60/75 = 80%
Other family relationships
Clergy relatives	 24/1 37 = 18%	 17/140 = 12%
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MALE PRIESTS	 FEMALE PRIESTS
Relatives not clerics	 113/137 = 82%
	 123/140 = 88%
Dependants	 88/136=65%	 56/141=40%
No dependants	 48/136 = 35%
	 85/141 = 60%
Education
Full-time theological training	 102/138 =74%	 59/147 = 40%
Part-time theological training 	 36/138 = 26%
	 88/147 = 60%
Degree	 96/138=70%	 72/147=49%
Nodegree	 42/138=30%	 75/147=51%
Postgraduate degree	 25/1 38 = 18%	 24/147 = 16%
No postgraduate degree
	 113/138 = 82%
	 123/147 = 84%
Parish
Innercity	 15/138=11%	 14/148=9%
Suburban area	 47/138 = 34%	 47/148 = 32%
Rural area	 25/138 = 18%	 32/148 = 22%
Mixture of inner city and
	 23/138 = 17%	 20/148 = 14%
suburbs
Mixture of suburbs and rural	 14/138 = 10%
	 19/148 = 13%
Town	 9/138=6%	 11/148=7%
Other	 5/138=4%	 5/148=3%
Team minister	 29/135 = 21%	 38/144 = 26%
Not a team minister	 106/135 = 79%	 106/144 = 74%
Group minister	 8/135=6%	 18/144= 12.5%
Not a group minister	 127/135 94%
	 126/144 = 87.5%
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Table C-8 Characteristics of the sample group cross tabulated with present sex
discrimination
ANSWERED YES TO
	 ANSWERED YES TO
PRESENT SEX
	 PRESENT SEX
DISCRIMINATION -
	 DISCRIMINATION -
MALE PRIESTS	 FEMALE PRIESTS
Parochial offices
Deacon	 -	 5/17=29%
Curate (priested)	 -	 29/93 = 31%
Priest-in-charge	 -	 3/13 = 23%
Vicar/rector	 1/37 = 3%	 3/7 = 43%
Team vicar	 -	 3/7 = 43%
Team rector	 -	 -
Other	 -	 1/8 = 12.5%
NSM curate	 -	 19/57 = 33%
NSM priest-in-charge	 -	 1/3 = 33%
First curates	 -	 23/7 1 = 32%
Second curates	 -	 11/35 = 31%
Ordination dates to the
priesthood*
1988	 1/12=8%	 -
1994	 -	 30/104=29%
1995	 -	 10/26=38%
Ordination dates to the
diaconate
1987	 1/12=8%	 12/51=23%
1988	 -	 1/7=14%
1989	 -	 3/7=43%
1990	 -	 3/8=37.5%
1991	 -	 7/13=54%
• See Table C-4 for the spread of ordination dates in the sample.
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ANSWERED YES TO
	 ANSWERED YES TO
PRESENT SEX
	 PRESENT SEX
DISCRIMINATION -
	 DISCRIMINATION -
MALE PRIESTS	 FEMALE PRIESTS
	1992	 -	 3/16=19%
	
1993	 -	 4/8=50%
	
1994	 -	 8/23=35%
	
1995	 -	 4/15=27%
Experience as a deaconess 	 -	 10/41 = 24%
Age
Band 20-29	 -	 1/3 = 33%
Band 30-39	 -	 4/17=24%
Band 40-49	 -	 16/47 = 34%
Band 50-59	 1/20=5%	 15/55=27%
Band 60-69	 -	 9/25=36%
Disability
Has a disability	 -	 2/6 33%
Ethnic group
	White	 1/137=1%	 44/144=31%
Afro-Caribbean	 -	 -
	
Asian	 -	 -
	
Other	 -	 -
Churchmanship
Strong catholic	 -	 1/3 33%
Moderate catholic
	 -	 2 1/55 = 38%
Central churchmanship 	 1/25 = 4%	 11/42 = 26%
Evangelical	 -	 8/34 = 24%
Catholic/evangelical	 -	 2/7 = 29%
	
Other	 -	 1/4=25%
Marital status
	Single	 -	 16/54=30%
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ANSWERED YES TO	 ANSWERED YES TO
PRESENT SEX	 PRESENT SEX
DISCRIMINATION - 	 DISCRIMINATION -
MALE PRIESTS	 FEMALE PRIESTS
Married	 1/107=1%	 24/75=32%
Separated or divorced	 -	 2/10 = 20%
Widowed	 -	 3/8 = 37.5%
Spouse a cleric	 -	 4/15 = 27%
Spouse not a cleric 	 1/104 = 1%	 20/60 = 33%
Other family relationships
Clergy relatives	 -	 7/17 = 41%
Relatives not clerics	 1/113 = 1%	 36/123 = 29%
Dependants	 1/88 = 1%	 17/56 = 30%
No dependants	 -	 26/85 = 31%
Education
Full-time theological training	 1/102 = 1%	 13/59 = 22%
Part-time theological training 	 -	 32/8 8 = 36%
Degree	 -	 22/72 = 31 %
No degree	 1/42 = 2.5%	 23/75 = 31%
Postgraduate degree	 -	 8/24 = 33%
No postgraduate degree 	 1/113 = 1%	 37/123 = 30%
Parish
Inner city	 -	 5/14 = 36%
Suburban area	 -	 13/47=28%
Rural area	 -	 10/32=31%
Mixture of inner city and	 -	 6/20 = 30%
suburbs
Mixture of suburbs and rural	 1/14 =7%	 4/19 = 21%
Town	 -	 6/11=55%
Other	 -	 1/5 = 20%
Team minister	 -	 13/38 = 34%
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ANSWERED YES TO	 ANSWERED YES TO
PRESENT SEX	 PRESENT SEX
DISCRIMINATION - 	 DISCRIMINATION -
MALE PRIESTS	 FEMALE PRIESTS
Not a team minister	 1/106 = 1%	 3 1/106 = 29%
Group minister	 -	 6/1833%
Not a group minister 	 1/127 = 1%	 38/126 = 30%
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